NANCY TORRESEN, District Judge.
The Plaintiffs, Pan Am Systems, Inc., Springfield Terminal Railway Company, and David Andrew Fink, bring claims for defamation and false light against Defendants Atlantic Northeast Rails & Ports and Chalmers Hardenbergh. The Plaintiffs also seek punitive damages. Before the Court is the Defendants' motion (ECF No. 65) seeking summary judgment on all the Plaintiffs' claims. For the reasons that follow, the Court
Pan Am Systems, Inc. (
Atlantic Northeast Rails & Ports (
The Plaintiffs claim that four articles written and published by the Defendants defamed them and placed Fink in a false light. Because each article presents a different factual background, the Court will present the facts in the Discussion section of this opinion.
The Plaintiffs initiated this suit in September of 2011 when they filed their original complaint (ECF No. 1). There, the Plaintiffs alleged the Defendants had defamed them in six different articles. Compl. 3-5. The Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim, arguing the Plaintiffs had failed to allege falsity or fault and that five of the six statements in question were not capable of conveying a defamatory meaning as a matter of law. Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss (ECF No. 14). The Court granted the motion and dismissed the Plaintiffs' claims without prejudice. Order of May 14, 2012 (ECF No. 20). In its order, the Court determined that, for First Amendment purposes, the Defendants should be treated as "media defendants" and all the speech at issue implicated "matters of public concern." Order of May 14, 2012 at 7-10. The Court held that the issue of whether the Plaintiffs should be treated as "public figures" was not yet ripe for decision. Id. at 10-11.
The Plaintiffs subsequently filed an expanded Amended Complaint (ECF No. 25) based on the same six articles. A standard scheduling order issued (ECF No. 27), and the Defendants objected (ECF No. 31). Concerned that inquiry into the fault element of defamation would require them to reveal confidential sources and threaten First Amendment interests, the Defendants proposed bifurcating discovery according to a procedure laid out by the First Circuit in Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1980). The Court referred the issue to Magistrate Judge John H. Rich III, who issued an order (ECF No. 42) largely adopting the Defendants' proposal. The Magistrate Judge's order contemplated that the parties would proceed by engaging in discovery on all issues other than fault, followed by summary judgment motion work on those issues, followed by further discovery if necessary.
After the first phase of discovery, the Defendants filed the motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 65) currently before the Court. In their opposition to the Defendants' motion (ECF No. 69), the Plaintiffs represented that they are no longer pressing their claim with respect to two of the six statements identified in their complaints, one from an article published on October 22, 2010 and the other from an article published on November 3, 2010.
The Court may grant a motion for summary judgment brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 where the movant shows that "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact" and that it "is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "`A "genuine" issue is one that could be resolved in favor of either party, and a "material fact" is one that has the potential of affecting the outcome of the case.'" Jakobiec v. Merrill Lynch Life Ins. Co., 711 F.3d 217, 223 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Calero-Cerezo v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 19 (1st Cir. 2004).
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court construes the record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and resolves all reasonable inferences in its favor. See Jakobiec, 711 F.3d at 223. The Court may not weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations and must set aside "conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation." Pina v. Children's Place, 740 F.3d 785, 788 (1st Cir. 2014) (quoting Medina-Rivera v. MVM, Inc., 713 F.3d 132, 134 (1st Cir. 2013)). The motion should be denied if the nonmoving party's evidence is strong enough "to support a verdict in her favor." Sensing v. Outback Steakhouse of Fla., LLC, 575 F.3d 145, 153 (1st Cir. 2009) (quoting Calero-Cerezo, 355 F.3d at 19).
Procedures like summary judgment take on added urgency in suits that have the "potential of . . . chilling constitutionally protected speech." Guilford Transp. Indus., Inc. v. Wilner, 760 A.2d 580, 582, 592 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (citing Washington Post Co. v. Keogh, 385 F.2d 965, 968 (D.C. Cir. 1966). In such cases, "`[t]he threat of being put to the defense of a lawsuit . . . may be as chilling to the exercise of First Amendment freedoms as fear of the outcome of the lawsuit itself.'" Guilford, 760 A.2d at 592 (quoting and affirming oral order entered by lower court).
Under Maine law, the tort of defamation consists of:
Rippett v. Bemis, 672 A.2d 82, 86 (Me. 1996) (quoting Lester v. Powers, 596 A.2d 65, 69 (Me. 1991). Relevant here, the common law rule provides that "one who repeats or otherwise republishes defamatory matter is subject to liability as if he had originally published it." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 578 (1977).
As discussed above, Magistrate Judge Rich issued a bifurcated discovery order in October of 2012, which postponed discovery on the fault element because it might require the Defendants to reveal confidential sources. The Defendants now move for summary judgment on the grounds that the Plaintiffs cannot establish that the statements at issue are defamatory or false and that two of the statements at issue are protected by the fair report privilege.
If the fair report privilege does apply, as the Defendants contend, the Court would still have to determine whether the Defendants abused the privilege, an inquiry that requires examining the issue of fault. See Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 600, 611 (common law fair report privilege is conditional, and can be defeated by showing the defendant knew the matter to be false or acted in reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity); Yohe v. Nugent, 321 F.3d 35, 42-45 (1st Cir. 2003) (Massachusetts's fair report privilege is conditional, not absolute, and can be defeated by showing at least some types of malice). Accordingly, the issues of whether Maine law provides for a fair report privilege and whether any of the Defendants' statements are protected by it are not yet ripe for decision. The Court proceeds to the Defendants' remaining arguments for summary judgment, which implicate the first element of defamation and the publication component of the second element of defamation.
As the Court explained in an earlier order in this case:
Pan Am. Sys., Inc. v. Hardenbergh, 871 F.Supp.2d 6, 11 (D. Me. 2012). Relevant to this motion, the First Amendment limits how state courts may define what is "defamatory," see, e.g., Greenbelt Coop. Publ'g Ass'n, Inc. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 12-13 (1970), and requires a plaintiff bringing a defamation claim against a media defendant (such as ANR&P and Hardenbergh) to prove the falsity of the defendant's statement. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974).
Given defamation's common law roots and constitutional overlay, this Court must adhere to both the holdings of the Law Court applying Maine law and the holdings of the Supreme Court and the First Circuit applying First Amendment law. See Veilleux v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 206 F.3d 92, 107-108 (1st Cir. 2000).
Under Maine's common law, a statement is "defamatory" only if "it tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him." Schoff v. York Cnty., 761 A.2d 869, 871 n.3 (Me. 2000) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 559 (1977)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Whether a statement "is capable of conveying a defamatory message at all is a question of law," to be determined by the Court. Bakal v. Weare, 583 A.2d 1028, 1030 (Me. 1990)). However, "[i]f a court determines that the statement is capable of bearing a defamatory meaning, the matter goes to the factfinder to determine if the statement was understood by the recipient as defamatory." Schoff, 761 A.2d at 871 n.2.
In making these determinations, context matters. Chapman v. Gannett, 132 Me. 389, 398 (1934). As the Law Court has explained:
Id. (quoting Cooley on Torts (4th Ed.) 503, § 146).
Additionally, "Maine's common law of defamation does not allow recovery for statements of opinion alone," though "[a] statement of opinion may be actionable . . . if it implies the existence of undisclosed defamatory facts." Lester, 596 A.2d at 71. "Whether an allegedly defamatory statement is a statement of fact or opinion is a question of law . . . but if the average reader could reasonably understand the statement as either fact or opinion, the question of which it is will be submitted to the fact-finder." Ballard, 877 A.2d at 1087 (internal citations, quotation marks, and bracketing omitted).
Under the First Amendment, a statement may not be held defamatory "unless in a given context it reasonably can be understood as having an easily ascertainable and objectively verifiable meaning." Levinsky's, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 127 F.3d 122, 129 (1st Cir. 1997). Whether a statement has an easily ascertainable and objectively verifiable meaning is question of law, for the court. Gray v. St. Martin's Press, Inc., 221 F.3d 243, 248 (1st Cir. 2000).
Under this rule, only statements that can be proved true or false are actionable. Id. Statements based on "loose, figurative, or hyperbolic language" cannot support a claim. Phantom Touring, Inc. v. Affiliated Publ'ns, 953 F.2d 724, 727-8 (1st Cir. 1992) (statement that production was "fake" and "phony" not actionable). Nor can statements which lack a "precise meaning." McCabe v. Rattiner, 814 F.2d 839, 842-43 (1st Cir. 1987) (statement that timeshare real estate development was a "scam" not actionable).
Making the "easily ascertainable and objectively verifiable" determination requires examining the various potential meanings the statement could have and the context in which the statement was made. Levinsky's, 127 F.3d at 129. In Levinsky's, the First Circuit held that a statement that retail customers were left waiting on the phone for twenty minutes was objectively verifiable, whereas a statement that a store was "trashy" was not. Id. at 130. The court explained that "trashy" could have a number of meanings and that, on the specific facts of the case, its "inherent elusiveness" was "not pinned down by context." Id. In Gray, the First Circuit held that a statement in an article that a public relations firm had "failed" was not defamatory where the writer stated in the same article that the company had sold for $16 million. Id. at 249. In context, the court explained, it was clear that the author was not claiming that the company went bankrupt or lost money, but was rather expressing a subjective, unverifiable viewpoint that the company had not succeeded in spreading its message. Id.
At common law, a defendant pressing the affirmative defense of truth could not be held liable if he proved that his statement was "substantially true," even if not "technically accurate." McCullough v. Visiting Nurse Serv. of S. Me., Inc., 691 A.2d 1201, 1204 (Me. 1997). It was not necessary for the defendant "to establish the literal truth of the precise statement made." Id. (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 581A cmt. f (1977)). "Slight inaccuracies of expression" were "immaterial provided that the defamatory charge" was "true in substance." Id. (statement that nurse was fired due to "several" incidents of misconduct deemed "substantially true" even though in fact nurse was fired due to only two incidents of misconduct). Where, as here, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving falsity, the doctrine of substantial truth remains in force but is flipped on its head; the plaintiff must establish not only that the statement in question was false, but that it was "materially false." Vellieux, 206 F.3d at 105.
In November 2009, several rail cars derailed while traveling along train tracks owned by Springfield Terminal. Pls.' Statement of Additional Material Facts ¶¶ 10, 11 (
Defs.' Statement of Material Facts ¶ 2 (
As it turned out, a faulty rail car owned by a different rail company was the cause of the derailment. PSMF ¶¶ 5-11. The car was severely corroded and had insufficient side bearing clearance, restricting the truck swivel and thereby preventing the railcar from travelling properly along the rail. PSMF ¶¶ 6-10. The accident was not caused by the state of Springfield Terminal's tracks. PSMF ¶¶ 5-11.
The Plaintiffs assert that the Burling statements republished in the above article are false and defamatory because the derailment was not a "perfectly predictable accident," the Plaintiffs' railroad system was not "horrendously dilapidated," and the state of the Plaintiffs' rail line did not "cause" the accident. Am. Compl. ¶ 11; Pls.' Opp'n to Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. 14-16 (ECF No. 69).
With respect to the Plaintiffs' first two contentions, the Defendants argue that Burling's statements that the derailment was "perfectly predictable" and that the railroad system was "horrendously dilapidated" are protected by the First Amendment because they constitute loose, figurative language and are not objectively verifiable. The Court agrees.
Both of these phrases are hyperbole. Neither can be reduced to anything approaching a precise, testable fact. The Court cannot objectively verify whether a risk of derailment has crossed the line from "hard to predict" to "predictable" to "perfectly predictable," nor whether a railroad system has fallen from "ship-shape" to "could use some work" to "horrendously dilapidated." These are the kind of loose, subjective judgments necessary for the vigorous, freewheeling debate that the First Amendment protects.
The statement about a dilapidated railway system causing the accident presents a closer question. Whether a general set of conditions (the state of repair of the "railroad system") caused a particular accident (the Bridge Street derailment) is verifiably testable. If it was shown that something else was the true cause — an earthquake, for instance — then the statement could be proved definitively, materially false.
To this, the Defendants respond that the Burling statement was not materially false. Again, the Court agrees. Nowhere in the quotations ANR&P published did Burling claim that the state of Pan Am's tracks caused the accident. His statement was significantly broader — that the state of the railroad system caused the crash. The phrase "railroad system" fairly encompasses not just train tracks, but also the trains and rail cars that run on them. It is unclear from the record whether Pan Am rightly bears any responsibility for allowing poorly maintained, corroded rail cars to run on its tracks. But under the undisputed facts, the Plaintiffs cannot show that the objectively verifiable portion of Burling's statement — that the state of repair of the railroad system caused the derailment — was materially false. Based on the above, the Defendants are entitled to summary judgment with respect to the December 2, 2009 article about the Bridge Street derailment.
Although the Court has determined that the republication of Burling's statements do not support defamation liability, an additional First Amendment doctrine — the neutral reporting privilege — might well bar application of the common law rule that a statement's republisher is subject to liability as if he had originally made the statement. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 578 (1977). The Defendants colorably point toward that possibility in their motion.
The neutral reporting privilege was first discussed by the Second Circuit in Edwards v. National Audubon Society, Inc., 556 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1977). There, the National Audubon Society published a letter broadly accusing DDT-industry scientists of "being paid to lie." Edwards, 556 F.2d at 117. A New York Times reporter called the letter's author and convinced him to name the scientists. Id. The reporter then wrote a story identifying the individuals, titled "Pesticide Spokesmen Accused of `Lying' on Higher Bird Count." Id. at 118. Under these facts, the Second Circuit held that a privilege imposed by the First Amendment barred libel liability:
Id. at 120 (internal citations omitted). Neutrality is key to the privilege the Second Circuit announced; it has no force where the publisher distorts statements to support a personal attack of its own on a public figure. Id.; see also Cianci v. New Times Pub. Co., 639 F.2d 54, 69 (2d Cir. 1980) (declining to apply the neutral reporting privilege where an article not only described a rape charge, but also concurred in the charge and omitted all statements refuting it). The Eighth Circuit has joined the Second Circuit in holding that the First Amendment provides a neutral reporting privilege, Price v. Viking Penguin, Inc., 881 F.2d 1426, 1434 (8th Cir. 1989), while the Third Circuit has held that it does not. Dickey v. CBS Inc., 583 F.2d 1221, 1226 (3d Cir. 1978).
Although the Court need not decide whether to adopt the neutral reporting privilege, it fits well to the facts presented by this case. ANR&P's December 2, 2009 article leads with a lengthy description of Fink's on-site investigation of the derailment and reports on Fink's preliminary assessment that a problem with a rail car likely caused the accident. Only then does the article recount the critical statements made by Burling,
The Plaintiffs allege that an article the Defendants published on December 21, 2010, defamed them because it incorrectly stated that they had promised to offer certain services to its customers and then falsely characterized the failure to provide those services as a broken promise. The Court first lays out the events leading up to the publication of the December 21, 2010 article and then describes the article itself.
In 1985, New England South Railroad Company, Inc. (
In April of 2007, Pan Am sent New England Southern notice that it intended to terminate the lease and begin operating the Subject Line itself. PSMF ¶¶ 59, 60; Surface Transp. Bd. Dec. 2. Pan Am applied to the Surface Transportation Board, a federal agency with jurisdiction over railroad operation rights, for an "adverse discontinuance." PSMF ¶¶ 57, 59; Surface Transp. Bd. Dec. 2-3. An adverse discontinuance is an administrative determination that removes a dispute between two railroad operators from the Surface Transportation Board's jurisdiction and allows the party seeking the determination to pursue other legal remedies, such as eviction. PSMF ¶¶ 57, 59; Surface Transp. Bd. Dec. 3; 49 U.S.C §§ 701-727. Under federal law, the Surface Transportation Board may grant an adverse discontinuance "only if the Board finds that the present or future public convenience and necessity require or permit the . . . discontinuance." 49 U.S.C. § 10903(d); see also Pan Am Application at 8-9.
With its application, Pan Am submitted a verified statement made under oath on Pan Am's behalf by Richard Miller, the assistant to Pan Am's vice president of transportation. DSMF ¶ 40; Pan Am Application at 87-89. In the statement, Miller explained how Pan Am would service the 1,700 cars per year that interchange between Pan Am's tracks and New England Southern's tracks:
Pan Am Application 87-88; see also DSMF ¶ 40.
The main body of Pan Am's application cited to Miller's statement to bolster its argument that an adverse discontinuance would support the public convenience and necessity, but added language, not found in Miller's statement, which suggested that any increase in service would be contingent on traffic levels:
PSMF ¶ 61; Pan Am Application 9-10 (emphasis added).
In its formal response to Pan Am's application, New England Southern recognized that Pan Am had the legal right to terminate New England Southern's lease and therefore did not oppose the grant of an adverse continuance. New England Southern Resp. at 3. However, New England Southern expressed concerns about whether Pan Am would provide adequate service along the Subject Line and at its connection with the White Mountain Line:
New England Southern Resp. 8-9 (one footnote omitted from original; remaining footnote in original designated by asterisk).
NHDOT filed a response as well, requesting the Surface Transportation Board condition any grant of an adverse discontinuance on a binding requirement that Pan Am interchange with New England Southern at a site known as Concord Yard. See Pan Am Reply 4; PSMF ¶ 67. NHDOT argued Concord Yard was the most convenient location for an interchange. Pan Am Reply 4; PSMF ¶ 67.
In a subsequent reply, Pan Am took issue with both New England Southern's and NHDOT's filings. With respect to the concerns New England Southern raised about how often Pan Am would interchange with the White Mountain Line, Pan Am wrote:
Pan Am Reply 4-5.
With respect to NHDOT's request that the Surface Transportation Board require Pan Am to interchange at the Concord Yard site, Pan Am noted that NHDOT had "never consulted" with Pan Am and asked that Pan Am "be permitted to negotiate in good faith with NES to determine an appropriate interchange point." Pan Am Reply 5; see PSMF ¶¶ 5, 6.
The Surface Transportation Board issued a decision on May 10, 2010 granting Pan Am's adverse discontinuance application and denying NHDOT's request for a condition requiring Pan Am to provide interchange at Concord Yard. Surface Transp. Bd. Dec. at 6; PSMF ¶¶ 65, 68. Responding to New England Southern's concerns, the Board stated:
DSMF ¶ 38; Defs.' Ex. 17 at 2; Defs.' Ex. 18A at 4.
On May 13, 2010, ANR&P published an article reporting on the Board's decision and describing the reaction of New England Southern's owner, Peter Dearness. DSMF ¶¶ 36-37. The Court reproduces the beginning of the article below, except that it omits a part of the ANR&P's direct quotation of the Board's decision.
Defs.' Ex. 17 at 10.
On December 21, 2010, ANR&P published the allegedly defamatory statement in a follow-up article titled
PSMF ¶ 53; Defs.' Ex. 16 at 11.
The Plaintiffs do not claim the December 21, 2010 article was false and defamatory because Pan Am actually did have a team working in Concord or actually was switching customers between the Subject Line and the White Mountain Line more than one day a week. Am Compl. ¶ 27-28; PSMF ¶ 55. Rather, they contend that they never made a promise to provide those services, so the article's premise that they broke a promise was false. Am Compl. ¶ 27-28; PSMF ¶ 55. The Defendants counter that nothing in the article is materially false.
As an initial matter, the Plaintiffs' briefing assumes that the word "promise" always has a specific, legal meaning: to enter into a binding agreement to take a particular action. That may be the technical meaning given to the word promise in certain areas of the law, but the word promise can also take on a softer meaning. The first two entries for the noun "promise" in Webster's Third New International Dictionary are: (1) "a declaration that one will do or refrain from doing something specified"; and (2) "an undertaking however expressed that something will happen or that something will not happen in the future." Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 1980 (1988). As a verb, Webster's Third instructs, the term promise can mean "to engage to do or bring about (as something desired or pleasing)" or to "give assurance . . . of." Id.
Which meaning applies depends on the context in which the statement appeared. See, e.g., Bakal, 583 A.2d at 1030; Levinsky's, 127 F.3d at 129. Here, that context includes ANR&P's May 13, 2010 article, cited for background in the allegedly offending December 21, 2010 article. The May 13, 2010 article refers to Pan Am's stated intention to headquarter a crew in Concord and interchange with the White Mountain Line five days a week as "promises," but also accurately explains that the Board declined to require Pan Am to do either. This background renders the Plaintiffs' legalistic interpretation of the word promise unsupportable. The May 2010 article does not imply that Pan Am agreed to be legally bound to its representations; rather, it makes clear the opposite. Accordingly, ANR&P's use of the term "promise" necessarily takes on the more forgiving meaning discussed above, of an assurance or a statement of intention to take future action. It is in light of this meaning that the Court must consider whether the implication in ANR&P's December 21, 2010 issue that Pan Am failed to live up to a "promise" was materially false.
In Miller's verified statement, he declared, without qualification, that Pan Am "planned to headquarter a crew in Concord" and that "one crew will be required on a five day per week basis." Pan Am Application 87-89 (emphasis added). Miller's statement does not mention the possibility that Pan Am might decide to provide a lower level of service and forego a Concord crew.
Based on Miller's statement, it is fair to say that an authorized Pan Am representative told the Surface Transportation Board under oath and without equivocation that Pan Am planned to locate a crew in Concord and switch customers to the White Mountain Line five times a week and that this constituted a promise. The fact that Pan Am's lawyer later conditioned Miller's assertion does not alter what Miller attested to under oath. It is also fair to say that the board considered Miller's statement when it said that Pan Am is:
DSMF ¶ 38; Defs.' Ex. 17 at 2; Defs.' Ex. 18A at 4.
Because Miller indisputably declared in his verified statement that Pan Am planned to locate a crew in Concord and provide interchange service five days a week, and because the Board relied on that statement as a commitment made by Pan Am, and because the term "promise" in the full context of the ANR&P articles was not used in the sense of a legally binding agreement, the Plaintiffs cannot establish that the December 21, 2010 article was materially false. The Court grants the Defendants' motion with respect to the December 21, 2010 article.
Jones Chemical Incorporated (
In May of 2007, Springfield Terminal raised the prices it charged to deliver chlorine and implemented costly new restrictions on trains carrying the chemical. DSMF ¶ 43. In July of 2007, Jones Chemical's president, Jeff Jones, publicly complained about the changes and announced that Jones Chemical was considering closing its Merrimack facility. DSMF ¶ 44.
On March 10, 2011, ANR&P published an article about the dispute between Jones Chemical and Pan Am. PSMF ¶ 25. Below, the Court reproduces the entire article. The ellipses and bracketing are in the original:
PSMF ¶ 25; Defs.' Ex. 21 at 15-16 (original quotation marks, bracketing and ellipses preserved). The last paragraph, which is the offending portion of the article, is a quotation from an unnamed source.
The Plaintiffs now contend that ANR&P and Hardenbergh defamed them by publishing the March 10, 2011 article. PSMF ¶¶ 27, 31. They claim they do not lose rail cars on a consistent and ongoing basis and have never lost a rail car for more than 60 days. PSMF ¶¶ 27, 31. The Defendants respond that the statement does not have an easily ascertainable and objectively verifiable meaning and therefore cannot support liability.
The Court agrees with the Defendants. Read in context, the sentence in question is irreducibly vague. Though the bulk of the sentence is not in quotation marks, its ellipses and bracketing make it apparent to a reader familiar with ANR&P's house style that Hardenbergh is either quoting or paraphrasing emails he received on March 2, 2011. As to what Hardenbergh or the emails intended to convey, any reasonable reader would be stuck — the sentence allows for many different interpretations, none of which can be "pinned down" by the context provided in the article. See Levinsky's, 127 F.3d at 129.
For instance, the quotation marks around the words "loses" and "lost" could suggest Hardenbergh is quoting his source exactly here, but they could equally suggest that readers should not interpret the words "lose" and "lost" literally. Even if the reader concluded that the sentence was intended to convey something specific, it is unclear exactly what that would be. The sentence is too cryptic and oddly structured to communicate anything concrete enough to be considered easily ascertainable and objectively verifiable. Id. The Court therefore grants the Defendants' motion with respect to the March 10, 2011 article.
Prior to 2006, Fink served as both the president and CEO of Pan Am and the president and CEO of the Pan Am group of railroad entities (the
As time passed, differences of operational philosophy emerged between father and son. PSMF ¶ 38. In early 2011, principal owner Tim Mellon decided that a change needed to be made. PSMF ¶ 39. Mellon directed Fink either to take back total control of Pan Am's railroad operations or relinquish power to his son. PSMF ¶ 39. Fink opted for the latter and retired. PSMF ¶ 41.
On March 7, 2011, Fink wrote the following in a letter to Mellon:
DSMF ¶ 58; Defs.' Ex. 29 at 1.
On March 21, 2011, ANR&P published an article on Fink's departure. PSMF ¶ 34. The Court reproduces a portion of the article below:
PSMF ¶ 34; Defs.' Ex. 28 at 2.
The Amended Complaint alleges that Plaintiffs defamed them by publishing the March 21, 2011 article about Fink's departure from Pan Am. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 39-40; PSMF ¶¶ 34-51. In its Order of May 14, 2012, dismissing the original complaint, which contained most of the above quotation, the Court noted "[o]ne can infer from this quote that Mr. Fink's removal was not his choice" and that "[t]he hyperbolic term `coup de grace' carries with it a sense that Mr. Fink was fired." Pan Am Sys., Inc., 871 F. Supp. 2d at 16 n.4. The Court nonetheless held that the statement was not capable of conveying a defamatory meaning as a matter of law:
Id. at 16.
The Plaintiffs nonetheless reasserted this claim in their Amended Complaint under the apparent theory that the following two sentences, which were not included in their original Complaint, cast it in a different light:
Am. Compl. ¶ 39; see also Compl. ¶ 12.
The Plaintiffs continue to press the claim in the face of the Defendants' motion for summary judgment. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 39-46; PSMF ¶¶ 34-51. They contend that Picard v. Brennan does not apply, because, read in context, the article claims that Fink was removed for specific reasons — because he was a bad manager who misused company resources. Am. Compl. ¶ 40; Pls.' Opp'n to Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. 5-8 (ECF No. 69).
This claim was a pretty mealy apple when the Court first dismissed it, and it has not aged well with further discovery. Only by torturing the full text of the article beyond recognition can it be read to assert that Fink was removed for any particular reason that could give rise to defamation liability. The Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to summary judgment as to this claim as well.
The Plaintiffs allege that the statements discussed above invade Fink's privacy by portraying him in a false light. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 54-57.
Maine common law provides that:
Cole v. Chandler, 752 A.2d 1189, 1197 (Me. 2000) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E (1977). A false light cause of action lies only when "there is such a major misrepresentation of [the plaintiff's] character, history, activities or beliefs that serious offense may reasonably be expected to be taken by a reasonable man in his position." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E cmt. c (1977).
The only statement identified by the Plaintiffs that discusses Fink in a personal capacity is the March 21, 2011 article about his departure from Pan Am. For the same reason that none of the statements in that article are capable of conveying a defamatory meaning, none of them are capable of an interpretation that would be highly offensive to a reasonable person. See Veilleux, 206 F.3d at 134-35.
For the reasons stated above, the Court
SO ORDERED.
