MEMORANDUM

JAMES K. BREDAR, District Judge.

Pending before the Court is a pro se motion by Travis Lamont Foote ("Petitioner") to vacate his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (ECF No. 69.) Following the Court's Order of October 22, 2015 (ECF No. 74), the Government filed a response in opposition to Petitioner's motion (ECF No. 81). The Court has carefully reviewed Petitioner's motion and the Government's response, and it has determined that no hearing is necessary. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b); Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2014).1 For the reasons explained below, Petitioner's motion will be DENIED.2

I. Procedural Posture

On January 9, 2014, the Grand Jury for the District of Maryland returned an Indictment against Petitioner, charging him with six counts relating to commercial sex trafficking. (ECF No. 1.) On September 30, 2014, pursuant to a plea agreement, Petitioner pleaded guilty to a single count of conspiracy to commit sex trafficking by force, fraud, and coercion in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1594(c). (ECF No. 38.) That same day, at the request of both parties, the Court sentenced Petitioner to a prison term of 144 months. (ECF No. 41.) Petitioner did not file a notice of appeal with the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.

On October 19, 2015, Petitioner filed the pending motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a statute authorizing the sentencing court to vacate, set aside, or correct a sentence that "was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States" or that "is otherwise subject to collateral attack." According to Petitioner, at some point subsequent to his guilty plea, he discovered inconsistencies between the Grand Jury testimony of one of his victims (Jane Doe 1) and Jane Doe 1's prior statements in certain Facebook messages. (ECF No. 69 at 7.) Petitioner contends that his attorney "was ineffective and failed to explore all avenues of [his] case," ostensibly because the attorney failed to investigate these purported inconsistencies. (Id. at 7, 11.) Petitioner avers that, had he "been made aware of the information he is now in possession of[,] he would not have pleaded guilty but would have proceeded to trial." (Id. at 7.)3

Petitioner's theory fails: it is time-barred, and it is meritless.

II. Analysis

A. One-Year Limitations Period

Section 2255(f), Title 28, United States Code, provides that motions to vacate are governed by a one-year limitations period. This period generally runs from "the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final." § 2255(f)(1). The Fourth Circuit has held that, where a defendant does not appeal his conviction, the judgment is treated as having become final as of the date it was entered. See United States v. Sanders, 247 F.3d 139, 142 (4th Cir. 2001). Applying Sanders to the facts of this case, the judgment against Petitioner became final on September 30, 2014, and so he should have filed his motion to vacate on or before September 30, 2015. Instead, he filed it on October 19, 2015—nineteen days out of time.4

Because the limitations provision of section 2255 does not "speak in jurisdictional terms or refer in any way to the jurisdiction of district courts," the Fourth Circuit has held that the one-year period is subject to equitable tolling. United States v. Prescott, 221 F.3d 686, 688 (4th Cir. 2000) (quoting Harris v. Hutchinson, 209 F.3d 325, 329 (4th Cir. 2000)). Equitable tolling, however, is an extraordinary remedy that is sparingly granted: a petitioner is entitled to such relief only if he can show "`(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way' and prevented timely filing." Holland v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 2562 (2010) (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)). Petitioner here has neither proffered an explanation for the tardiness of his motion nor identified extraordinary circumstances that interfered with his ability to comply with section 2255(f)(1). Accordingly, his motion must be denied as untimely.

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Even had Petitioner timely filed his motion to vacate, the Court would still deny the motion because Petitioner's ineffective-assistance claim is meritless. To prevail on such a claim, Petitioner must show both that (1) his counsel's performance "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" and (2) "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984). "[C]ounsel should be `strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.'" Burt v. Titlow, 134 S.Ct. 10, 17 (2013) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). Moreover, because Petitioner's claim relates to a proceeding brought under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Petitioner must specifically show that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, [he] would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Lafler v Cooper, 132 S.Ct. 1376, 1384-85 (2012) (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)).

Petitioner can satisfy neither prong of the Strickland analysis. First, he has not demonstrated that his attorney made an error. Rather, his primary theory5—i.e., that his attorney failed to uncover and investigate the apparent inconsistency between Jane Doe 1's testimony and her Facebook messages—is undercut by an exhibit to the Government's opposition brief showing that defense counsel received this evidence nearly eight months before Petitioner entered his guilty plea.6 Second, even supposing purely arguendo that counsel overlooked or somehow misjudged the significance of the Facebook transcript, Petitioner has not shown—and cannot show—that he was prejudiced thereby. The crux of Petitioner's argument is that Jane Doe 1's Facebook messages show she voluntarily agreed to enter the sex trade; accordingly, Petitioner contends that he could not have been convicted of the offenses charged in the Indictment. But that contention is absurd. Two of the charged offenses7 require no proof of coercion whatsoever, while a third offense8 merely requires proof that the defendant persuaded, induced, enticed, or coerced an individual to travel across state lines for unlawful sexual activity. And while Count Five—the offense to which Petitioner pleaded guilty9—does require proof that the defendant conspired to engage in trafficking by force, fraud, or coercion, Count Five does not even mention Jane Doe 1 as a victim.10 Thus, Petitioner's "discovery" of Jane Doe 1's Facebook messages is wholly irrelevant to the offense of conviction—a conviction well-supported by the statement of facts outlined in the plea agreement and ratified by Petitioner at his Rule 11 hearing. (ECF Nos. 81-1 at 8-10 & 81-3 at 21.) Cf. United States v. Lemaster, 403 F.3d 216, 221 (4th Cir. 2005) ("[A] defendant's solemn declarations in open court affirming [a plea] agreement . . . carry a strong presumption of verity." (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. White, 366 F.3d 291, 295 (4th Cir. 2004))).11 Because Petitioner has not articulated a plausible Strickland claim, he is entitled to no further evidentiary review.

III. Certificate of Appealability

Petitioner may not appeal the Court's denial of his section 2255 motion unless he first secures a certificate of appealability. "A certificate of appealability will not issue absent `a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.'" United States v. Hardy, 227 F. App'x 272, 273 (4th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2)). "A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that any assessment of the constitutional claims by the district court is debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling by the district court is likewise debatable." Id. In this case, no reasonable jurist could find merit in Petitioner's Strickland claim; moreover, the claim is indisputably time-barred. Consequently, no certificate of appealability shall issue from this Court.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, an Order shall enter DENYING Petitioner's motion to vacate (ECF No. 69) and further DENYING AS MOOT his related open motions (ECF Nos. 71-73).