BRADFORD, Judge.
Appellant-Defendant Lora L. Karr appeals from the trial court's denial of her pretrial motion to suppress, contending that certain evidence was obtained as the result of an unconstitutional seizure. We affirm.
On February 25, 2011, Mooresville Police Officer Benjamin Goodin received a dispatch regarding a Maroon GMC Sonoma with a license plate numbered 1283 driving erratically Southbound on State Road 67. The civilian who placed the initial 911 call reported a few moments later that the vehicle was driving on the shoulder. Officer Goodin located the Sonoma in question by instructing the 911 caller, who was following it, to activate her hazard lights.
Officer Goodin pulled in behind the Sonoma and followed it for approximately one quarter mile but did not witness any traffic violations or other reasons to pull it over before it turned South on Interurban Lane. Interurban Lane is a gravel drive that leads back to two or three homes, and the Sonoma parked in the driveway of one of them with its license plate facing the garage door. Officer Goodin, who never activated his lights or siren, parked in a large open gravel area to the Northwest of the driveway, "off to the side out of the way essentially" and approximately eight to ten steps away from the Sonoma. Tr. p. 7. When Karr, the driver of the Sonoma, emerged, Officer Goodin approached "and just asked her how things were going just to strike up a conversation." Tr. p. 7. Upon first contact, Officer Goodin could smell the odor of alcoholic beverages on Karr's breath and noticed that her speech was slurred, her eyes were bloodshot, her eyelids were "droopy," and she was swaying while standing still. Tr. p. 9. Officer Goodin continued his investigation of Karr.
On February 28, 2011, the State charged Karr with Class A misdemeanor operating a vehicle while intoxicated endangering a person
We review the denial of a motion to suppress "in a manner similar to other sufficiency matters. We do not reweigh the evidence, and we consider conflicting evidence most favorable to the ruling. Unlike typical sufficiency reviews, however, we will consider not only the evidence favorable to the ruling but also the uncontested evidence favorable to the defendant." Gunn v. State, 956 N.E.2d 136, 138 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." "The overriding function of the Fourth Amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State." Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966). "In Wolf [v. People of State of Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949) (overruled on other grounds by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)] we recognized `(t)he security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police' as being `at the core of the Fourth Amendment' and `basic to a free society.'" Id.
Overstreet v. State, 724 N.E.2d 661, 663 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied.
Karr does not dispute that the interaction between Officer Goodin and herself began as a consensual encounter. Karr, however, citing to another panel of this court's decision in State v. Atkins, 834 N.E.2d 1028 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied, contends that Officer Goodin had no right to initiate even a consensual encounter on her private property without probable cause. The holding in Atkins, however, has no applicability to consensual encounters. At most, Atkins stands for the proposition that police must have probable cause to perform a Terry stop of a person on his or her private property. Id. at 1032. Karr's reliance on Atkins is unavailing. The trial court did not err in rejecting Karr's Fourth Amendment argument.
Myers v. State, 839 N.E.2d 1146, 1153 (Ind. 2005).
The degree of concern that Karr might have been driving impaired was reasonably high. A concerned citizen reported erratic driving and then that Karr's Sonoma was driving on the shoulder a few moments later. Although Officer Goodin did not personally witness any erratic driving by Karr, he only followed her for approximately one quarter mile before she stopped. Moreover, nothing occurred that would have dispelled any concern generated by the citizen's reports of erratic driving.
Officer Goodin's intrusion on Karr's activities was minimal. As previously mentioned, Karr does not dispute that the encounter was initially consensual. Officer Goodin parked in such a way as not to block Karr's vehicle, activated neither his lights nor siren, never pulled his weapon, never touched Karr, and never ordered Karr to stop. There is no indication that Officer Goodin's tone or manner was intimidating. It seems that Officer Goodin simply walked up to Karr and began conversing with her in her driveway, at which point he noticed signs of possible intoxication.
The needs of law enforcement were reasonably high, even though Karr was no longer on the road when Officer Goodin approached her. Indiana has an obvious interest in the prevention and detection of and punishment for impaired driving. This Court has previously recognized that "`the threat to public safety posed by a person driving under the influence of alcohol is as great as the threat posed by a person illegally concealing a gun.'" State v. McCaa, 963 N.E.2d 24, 34 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (quoting State v. Superior Court In & For Cochise Cnty., 149 Ariz. 269, 718 P.2d 171, 176 (1986)), trans. denied. In any event, had Officer Goodin simply left, Karr could have reentered her vehicle and continued to drive, possibly endangering the public. We have little trouble concluding that, in light of the reasonably high degree of suspicion, low degree of intrusion, and reasonably high degree of law enforcement need, Officer Goodin's actions were reasonable pursuant to Article I, Section 11. The trial court did not err in concluding that Officer Goodin's actions did not violate the Indiana Constitution.
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
ROBB, C.J., and BAKER, J., concur.