CRONE, Judge.
Luke Keys Carson entered a woman's trailer without permission and left. Later
On appeal, Carson argues that the trial court erred in rejecting his insanity defense because the evidence is without conflict and leads only to the conclusion that he was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct at the time of the crimes. In the alternative, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his burglary conviction.
We conclude that the evidence of Carson's demeanor during and after the crime supports the trial court's determination that he was able to appreciate the wrongfulness of actions at the time of the crimes and therefore was guilty but mentally ill. We also find that the evidence is sufficient to support his burglary conviction. We therefore affirm his convictions.
In the spring of 2009, Carson lived in a Westfield trailer park. Angelina Zuniga lived in the same trailer park, but the two were not acquainted. On the morning of April 16, 2009, Zuniga was in her trailer home eating breakfast when she heard someone opening her unlocked door. She turned and saw an unknown man, later determined to be Carson, standing a couple feet inside her trailer. He was holding a black Bible and some paper and spoke to her in English, which she did not understand. After a couple minutes, Carson said "never mind" and left. Tr. at 64. Zuniga locked the door.
Thirty to forty-five minutes later, Carson returned to Zuniga's trailer and tried to open the door. Zuniga was in her trailer with a friend. When Zuniga saw Carson at the door, she went to the door, opened it, and asked what he wanted. As she stood in the doorway, Carson again spoke to her in English, and she asked him in her "broken English if he had any problems." Id. at 70. Carson came toward Zuniga and cut her right hand with a knife.
At about 10:00 a.m., Westfield Police Officer Joshua Harrell was dispatched to the trailer park. As Officer Harrell pulled into the trailer park, he saw Carson and Hernandez fighting and then voluntarily separate. Officer Harrell got out of his car and saw Hernandez pointing at Carson. "[A]t that point [Carson] started to run and [Officer Harrell] gave chase." Id. at 10. During the chase, Officer Harrell commanded Carson to drop the knife. Initially, Carson did not "acknowledge [Officer Harrell] in any way." Id. Officer Harrell took out his firearm and yelled that he would shoot Carson if Carson did not drop the knife. Carson dropped the knife near a tree but continued to run until he tripped in some gravel. Officer Harrell put his firearm away and grabbed his taser. He commanded Carson to show his hands, which were underneath his body. Carson "kinda turned towards" Officer Harrell, but Officer Harrell "still couldn't see his hands so he deployed his taser." Id. at 11.
Westfield Police Officer Greg Marlow arrived to assist. Officer Marlow saw Carson lying on the ground. Another police officer asked Carson for his identification, and Carson did not comply. Officer Marlow spoke briefly to Carson, who asked for an attorney.
Carson was taken to the police department, where he submitted to a recorded interview. During the interview, Carson repeatedly stated that Isaac, from the movie Children of the Corn, would kill kids and drag them to the cornfield, and that he, Carson, tried to kill a baby and drag it to a cornfield like Isaac in Children of the Corn. State's Ex. 33-A.
On April 17, 2009, the State charged Carson with two counts of class A felony attempted murder, two counts of class C felony battery by means of a deadly weapon, one count of class B felony burglary, and one count of class D felony resisting law enforcement. On April 24, 2009, Carson filed a notice of insanity defense and a notice of incompetency. On April 27, 2009, the trial court entered an order appointing two psychiatrists, Drs. Martin Groff and Ned Masbaum, to examine Carson to assess his competency to stand trial and determine whether he was insane at the time of the crimes; that is, whether he had a "severely abnormal mental condition that grossly and demonstrably impair[ed his] perception" and rendered him "unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct at the time of the [alleged] offenses." Ind. Code § 35-41-3-6.
Dr. Groff and Dr. Masbaum independently examined Carson on May 2 and 6, 2009, respectively. On May 7, 2009, the doctors performed a joint examination of Carson, lasting seventy-five minutes. Both doctors reviewed the probable cause affidavit. Dr. Groff also reviewed Carson's jail records. Dr. Groff's report indicated that on April 21, 2009, Dr. Brett Presley described Carson's thinking as "delusional and grossly disorganized" and prescribed Thorazine.
In his report, Dr. Masbaum diagnosed Carson with a psychotic disorder and concluded that Carson was mentally ill as defined by Indiana Code Section 35-36-1-1
On May 29, 2009, the trial court held a hearing on Carson's competency to stand trial and found that he was not competent.
On October 25, 2010, Logansport filed a comprehension to stand trial report informing the trial court that Carson was competent to stand trial. The parties submitted an agreed entry requesting the trial court to order Drs. Groff and Masbaum to reexamine Carson to determine whether he had a severely abnormal mental condition that grossly and demonstrably impaired his perception and rendered him unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct at the time of the alleged offenses. Dr. Groff examined Carson on January 27, 2011, and Dr. Masbaum examined him on February 11, 2011.
On February 28, 2011, a bench trial was held. The doctors' reports were admitted into evidence. Both doctors determined that Carson had a severely abnormal mental condition that rendered him unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct at the time of the alleged offenses. Def.'s Exs. C and E. Officers Harrell and Marlow
Tr. at 127. The trial court sentenced Carson to an aggregate term of ten years. Carson appeals his convictions.
To sustain a conviction, the State must prove each element of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Ind. Code § 35-41-4-1(a). Even if the State meets its burden, when a defendant raises the insanity defense, the trier of fact has the additional option of finding the defendant "not responsible by reason of insanity at the time of the crime" ("NRI") or "guilty but mentally ill at the time of the crime" ("GBMI"). Ind.Code § 35-36-2-3. Carson argues that the trial court erred in finding him GBMI rather than NRI. The insanity defense is governed by Indiana Code Section 35-41-3-6, which provides,
The insanity defense is an affirmative defense for which the defendant carries the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. Ind.Code § 35-41-4-1. The defendant must establish both that (1) he or she suffers from a mental disease or defect and (2) the mental disease or defect rendered him or her unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his or her conduct at the time of the offense. Galloway v. State, 938 N.E.2d 699, 708 (Ind.2010). "A defendant who is mentally ill but fails to establish that he or she was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his or her conduct may be found [GBMI]." Id. Our supreme court has set forth our standard of review:
Id. at 709-10 (footnote, citations, and quotation marks omitted).
Here, Drs. Groff and Masbaum both agreed that Carson was mentally ill and, as a result, was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct at the time of the offenses. There was no lay opinion testimony as to Carson's ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct. Accordingly, we will consider whether there is demeanor evidence from which a conflicting inference of sanity may reasonably be drawn, and if there is, then we must affirm the trial court. See id. at 712 ("Even where there is no conflict among the experts and the lay witnesses, a finding that a defendant was sane at the time of the crime still may be sustained by probative demeanor evidence from which a conflicting inference of sanity may be drawn.")
Our supreme court has explained that demeanor evidence has its strengths and weaknesses. "Demeanor is useful because a defendant's behavior before, during, and after a crime may be more indicative of actual mental health at the time of the crime than mental exams conducted weeks or months later." Id. (citation, quotation marks, and brackets omitted). When there is some indication that the defendant is feigning mental illness, demeanor evidence is more "useful." Id. at 713. Demeanor evidence is less valuable when the defendant has a history of mental illness with psychosis. Id. "Finally, demeanor evidence before and after a crime is of more limited value than the defendant's demeanor during the crime." Id. at 714. Our supreme court has emphasized that "demeanor evidence must be considered as a whole, in relation to all the other evidence. To allow otherwise would give carte blanche to the trier of fact and make appellate review virtually impossible." Id.
Here, the trial court found that Carson appreciated the wrongfulness of his conduct at the time he committed his crimes based on the following demeanor evidence: (1) Carson stopped fighting and ran when he saw Officer Harrell: (2) Carson dropped his knife when Officer Harrell told him to drop the knife or he would shoot him; (3) during his police interview, Carson described his actions as "stupid;" and (4) Carson apologized.
In a number of Indiana cases, defendants have appealed their GBMI convictions, claiming that he or she should have been found NRI on the basis of nonconflicting expert testimony that the defendant was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his or her conduct at the time of the offense(s). In all these cases, except for Galloway, the appellate court upheld the GBMI conviction(s) because the evidence regarding the defendant's ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of his or her conduct was conflicting. For purposes of comparison, we review a few of these cases and then discuss Galloway.
In Barany v. State, 658 N.E.2d 60 (Ind. 1995), the defendant murdered his girlfriend. He was sitting naked on a pier, and his girlfriend came out of their house and covered him with a blanket. He bit off his girlfriend's finger and swallowed it. She ran into the house. Barany went into the water and then went into the house. He saw his girlfriend talking on the telephone, got a handgun, and shot her eight times in the head. Our supreme court held,
Id. at 64.
In Moler v. State, 782 N.E.2d 454 (Ind. Ct.App.2003), trans. denied, the defendant lived with Neil Wright; Neil's mother, Nina Wright; and Nina's mother, Ethel Cummins. Moler helped care for the elderly Cummins. Neil and Nina knew that Moler had schizophrenia. One morning, Jean Sarver took Moler to Lifespring Mental Health Services for an injection of antipsychotic medication. Later, Moler, Neil, and Cummins spent the afternoon watching television. Moler appeared fine and behaved normally. Neil and Nina left Moler with Cummins while they went to run an errand. When they returned, Cummins was lying next to the couch with blood everywhere. Moler told police that Cummins turned into a witch so he had to kill her. The Moler court concluded,
Id. at 457-58 (citations omitted). The Moler court held that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict that Moler was GBMI. Id. at 458.
In Thompson v. State, 804 N.E.2d 1146 (Ind.2004), the defendant, who had a history of mental illness, was convicted of residential entry. Thompson went to Alisha Beeler's home to use her bath. Beeler observed Thompson talking strangely to the children. When Thompson went to her car to retrieve some bath items, Beeler locked the door. When Thompson came back, Beeler told her to leave. Thompson became irate and broke the window. She climbed in through the window, collected her things, and departed through the front door. The expert opinions were unanimous that Thompson was insane at the time of the offense. The Court of Appeals found this evidence uncontradicted and reversed Thompson's conviction. However, our supreme court affirmed Thompson's conviction, explaining,
Id. at 1149-50 (citations and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).
As noted above, Galloway is the only case in which a defendant's GBMI conviction was reversed. In Galloway, the defendant murdered his grandmother, with whom he lived. The defendant had a long history of mental illness. He had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder by up to twenty different physicians, often with accompanying psychotic and manic symptoms, and had been voluntarily or involuntarily detained or committed for short-term treatment more than fifteen times.
At trial, the experts unanimously agreed that the defendant was insane at the time of the murder. In addition, the opinions of five lay witnesses supported the experts' opinion. Nevertheless, the trial court found the defendant GBMI based on demeanor evidence. On appeal, a majority of our supreme court disagreed, concluding that "there was not sufficient demeanor evidence of probative value from which an inference of sanity could be drawn." 938 N.E.2d at 715.
Id. Further, the Galloway court found that the trial court improperly relied on several facts as being indicative of sanity: the absence of plan or motive and the defendant acting without warning; the defendant's deterioration during trial to the point of incompetency to stand trial; the defendant's failure to take medication; and that the defendant was alert and oriented at trial nearly a year after the murder. Id. Finally, the Galloway court found that it was inappropriate for the trial court to consider the conditions of Indiana's mental health system in rejecting the defendant's insanity defense. Id. at 716.
What these cases illustrate is that determining whether demeanor evidence supports an inference of sanity sufficient to create a conflict with nonconflicting expert testimony that the defendant was insane is fact-sensitive and not amenable to a clear-cut standard. In the case at bar, the evidence does not provide any indication that Carson was feigning or malingering, which reduces the value of demeanor evidence. In addition, demeanor evidence is less valuable because Carson was diagnosed as paranoid schizophrenic, a mental illness with delusions and hallucinations.
Let us first consider the evidence relied on by the trial court of Carson's demeanor at the time of the crimes and immediately thereafter. The fact that Carson ran when he saw the police officer supports a reasonable inference that Carson knew that fighting with Hernandez was wrong. The fact that Carson dropped the knife when the police officer threatened to shoot him does not seem quite as probative. Although it indicates that Carson was thinking clearly enough to protect himself, it is not necessarily indicative of an awareness of right and wrong. Nevertheless, we cannot say that drawing an inference of sanity from it is unreasonable.
The rest of the demeanor evidence relied on by the trial court concerns events that occurred after the crime. Such evidence may be less valuable than evidence of demeanor during the crime, but it is not meaningless. The record shows that Carson asked Officer Marlow for an attorney. In his recorded interview, Carson stated that he fought Hernandez because Carson thought that Hernandez was calling the police. Carson also described what he had done as "stupid" and "crazy." State's Ex. 33-A. More probative of Carson's state of mind at the time of the crimes are Carson's statements that he tried to do "crazy
Carson claims that the trial court did not consider the demeanor evidence presented by lay witnesses Zuniga and Hernandez. He directs us to Zuniga's testimony that he came into her trailer with a Bible and a piece of paper. He notes that Hernandez thought that his behavior was strange enough to cause Hernandez to come out to investigate, and that Hernandez testified that Carson kept asking Hernandez if he were "Richard." Tr. at 29. We find nothing in the record that would cause us to think that the trial court did not consider all the demeanor evidence. The evidence that Carson highlights indeed supports a finding that he was suffering from a mental illness at the time of the crimes. It does not necessarily indicate that he could not appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions. Therefore, it does not undercut the demeanor evidence that does support a reasonable inference that he was able to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct.
Carson ran when he saw a policeman, asked for an attorney, stated that he fought with Hernandez because he thought that Hernandez was calling the police, and stated that he was unable to go through with the stupid, crazy things that he intended to do. We think that considering the demeanor evidence as a whole, in relation to all other evidence, there is probative evidence such that a reasonable inference of Carson's ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct at the time of the crimes can be drawn. We emphasize that the question before us is whether the inferences supporting the judgment are reasonable, not whether there are other more reasonable inferences that could have been drawn. See Thompson, 804 N.E.2d at 1149-50. Here, a reasonable inference that Carson appreciated the wrongfulness of his conduct is supported by the evidence, and therefore the evidence is not without conflict and does not lead only to the conclusion that Carson could not appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions. That being the case, we will not invade the fact-finder's province. See Barany, 658 N.E.2d at 64. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment that Carson is GBMI.
Carson also contends that there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction for class B felony burglary. Our standard of review is well settled.
Gray v. State, 797 N.E.2d 333, 334-35 (Ind.Ct.App.2003) (citations omitted).
Indiana Code Section 35-43-2-1 provides that a person who breaks and enters a dwelling of another person, with intent to commit a felony in it, commits class B felony burglary. "To establish the intent to commit a felony element of a burglary charge, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant's intent to commit a felony specified in the charger." Freshwater v. State, 853 N.E.2d 941, 942 (Ind.2006) (emphasis added).
Carson had two encounters with Zuniga, but our focus will be on the first because Carson opened Zuniga's door and entered her home without permission. The second time, in contrast, Zuniga opened the door herself. Therefore, only the first encounter satisfies the breaking and entering element of burglary, and Carson concedes as much. See Thompson v. State, 692 N.E.2d 474, 477 (Ind.Ct.App. 1998) ("Breaking is proved by showing that even slight force was used to gain unauthorized entry including opening an unlocked door."); see also Henley v. State, 522 N.E.2d 376, 379 (Ind.1988) (evidence sufficient to show breaking and entering where defendant entered victim's home by opening unlocked door).
Although Carson concedes that entering Zuniga's trailer without permission is breaking and entering, he initially contends that there is no evidence that he "committed or attempted to commit any type of felony." Appellant's Br. at 11. No such evidence was required because the burglary statute does not require the actual commission of or an attempt to commit a felony. See Blackmon v. State, 455 N.E.2d 586, 590 (Ind.1983) (noting that State was not required to prove defendant completed theft to sustain burglary conviction). The burglary statute only requires the State to prove that the defendant intended to commit a felony. See Ind.Code § 35-43-2-1. The evidence shows that Carson intended to commit a murder in Zuniga's trailer; that is, he told the police that he went to the trailer to kill a baby. Carson contends this evidence is insufficient under the circumstances because he was delusional and the existence of a baby in Zuniga's trailer was part of his delusion. According to Carson, his delusion negates the "intent to commit a felony" element of the burglary statute. The State counters that the "fact that there was no child in [Zuniga's] home or that [Carson] might be delusional does not negate [his] possession of the intent to commit the underlying felony of murder." Appellee's Br. at 14 n. 6 (citing Anez v. State, 408 N.E.2d 1315, 1317 (Ind.Ct.App.1980)).
Anez dealt with the application of the mistake of fact defense governed by Indiana Code Section 35-41-3-7, which provides, "It is a defense that the person who engaged in the prohibited conduct was reasonably mistaken about a matter of fact, if the mistake negates the culpability required for commission of the offense."
Indeed, Carson does not rely on the mistake of fact defense. Rather, he argues that "an insane delusion is much more than a mistake of fact." Appellant's Reply Br. at 1 (citing Barr v. Sumner, 183 Ind. 402, 107 N.E. 675 (1915)).
Carson does not cite any case law in which an appellate court was asked to examine whether a defendant, suffering from delusions caused by mental illness or disease, was found unable to form the requisite criminal intent due to those delusions. Our own review of Indiana case law does not reveal any such cases.
Here, the evidence shows that Carson entered Zuniga's trailer with the intent to kill a baby. Regardless of whether he was deluded as to the actual existence of a baby, he entered her trailer with the subjective intent to commit murder, a felony, as alleged in the charging information. Moreover, in his videotaped interview, Carson repeatedly stated that he was going to "cut" or "slice" a baby but could not do it. State's Ex. 33-A. Those statements show that he was able to appreciate the wrongfulness of the intent to commit murder. Thus, we conclude that Carson's delusions did not preclude the formation of a "guilty mind." Although there may be circumstances under which insane delusions negate the culpability of a defendant's crime,
Concluding that there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's judgment that Carson was able to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct at the time he committed his crimes and that there was sufficient evidence to support his conviction for burglary, we affirm Carson's GBMI convictions.
Affirmed.
MAY, J., and BROWN, J., concur.
PUBMED HEALTH, U.S. NATIONAL LIBRARY OF MEDICINE, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/ pubmedhealth/PMH0000553/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2012).
