Filed: Mar. 08, 2010
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: 08-1289-pr Persad v. Conway UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT . CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT ’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT , A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER
Summary: 08-1289-pr Persad v. Conway UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT . CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT ’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT , A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER ”..
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08-1289-pr
Persad v. Conway
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT . CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED
ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT ’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A
DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT , A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER ”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST
SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL .
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan
3 United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of
4 New York, on the 8 th day of March, two thousand ten.
5
6 PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS,
7 Chief Judge,
8 JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,
9 DEBRA A. LIVINGSTON,
10 Circuit Judges.
11
12 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X
13 SERUANINE PERSAD,
14 Petitioner-Appellant,
15
16 -v.- 08-1289-pr
17
18 JAMES CONWAY, Warden, Attica
19 Correctional Facility
20 Respondent-Appellee.
21 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X
22
23 APPEARING FOR PETITIONER: RANDA D. MAHER, Law Office of
24 Randa D. Maher, Great Neck, New
25 York.
26
27 APPEARING FOR APPELLEES: PRISCILLA STEWARD, Assistant
28 Attorney General for the State
1
1 of New York, New York, New York
2 (Barabara D. Underwood, Roseann
3 B. MacKechnie, on the brief,
4 Solicitor General’s Office of
5 the State of New York), for
6 Andrew M. Cuomo, Attorney
7 General of the State of New
8 York.
9
10 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District
11 Court for the Eastern District of New York (Amon, J.).
12
13 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED
14 AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court be
15 AFFIRMED.
16
17 Seruanine Persad appeals the judgment of the district
18 court denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. We
19 assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts,
20 the procedural history, and the issues presented for review.
21
22 Persad contends that the jury charge was unbalanced to
23 such an extent, and infected his trial with such unfairness,
24 that his conviction must be vacated. To succeed on his
25 claim, Persad must establish that: (1) the jury charge was
26 unbalanced in violation of New York law; (2) the unbalanced
27 charge violated Persad’s Fourteenth Amendment right to due
28 process; and (3) habeas relief is available pursuant to 28
29 U.S.C. § 2254(d). See Harris v. Alexander,
548 F.3d 200,
30 203 (2d Cir. 2008).
31
32 Although we conclude that the charge was unbalanced in
33 violation of New York law, see People v. Williamson, 40
34 N.Y.2d 1073, 1074 (N.Y. 1976); People v. Bell,
38 N.Y.2d
35 116, 123 (N.Y. 1975), we nonetheless affirm because Persad
36 suffered no deprivation of due process. The decisive
37 inquiry is whether the unbalanced instruction, understood in
38 the context of the charge and the trial as a whole, see
39 Gaines v. Kelly,
202 F.3d 598, 606 (2d Cir. 2000), “by
40 itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting
41 conviction violates due process,” Cupp v. Naughten,
414 U.S.
42 141, 147 (1973); see also Jackson v. Edwards,
404 F.3d 612,
43 624 (2d Cir. 2005) (framing the issue as whether the
44 instruction was “sufficiently harmful to make the conviction
45 unfair.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
46
2
1 Here, the prosecution adduced overwhelming evidence of
2 Persad’s guilt, including the testimony of multiple
3 witnesses, positive identifications (both during the
4 investigation and in-court during trial), Persad’s own
5 statement, and Persad’s flight upon learning that he was
6 under investigation for the shooting. In light of this
7 evidence, the unbalanced charge did not deprive Persad of
8 his due process rights under Cupp.
9
10 Finding no merit in Persad’s remaining arguments, we
11 hereby AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
12
13
14 FOR THE COURT:
15 CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK
16
3