LANCE M. AFRICK, District Judge.
Before the Court is a motion
This case arises out of a motor vehicle accident that injured the plaintiffs on June 25, 2018.
On May 12, 2019, the plaintiffs sent a pre-suit settlement demand to the adjuster for defendant, Acuity Mutual Insurance Company's ("Acuity"), for payment of the policy limit of $500,000.
As stated previously, plaintiffs filed suit on June 17, 2019.
By July 12, 2019, Anna Bales, David Bales, Acuity, Tricor, Inc. ("Tricor"), and Frontier Adjusters, Inc. ("Frontier") (collectively, the "defendants") had all been served with the petition for damages.
On August 2, 2019, Wawzrycki and counsel for the defendants engaged in settlement negotiations via email that were ultimately unsuccessful.
On August 23, 2019, the defendants removed the case to this Court on the basis of federal diversity jurisdiction by filing a Petition for Removal ("the Petition").
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), "any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending," unless Congress provides otherwise. "The removing party bears the burden of establishing that federal jurisdiction exists." De Aguilar v. Boeing Co., 47 F.3d 1404, 1408 (5th Cir. 1995). "Any ambiguities are construed against removal because the removal statute should be strictly construed in favor of remand." Manguno v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Co., 276 F.3d 720, 723 (5th Cir. 2002).
To remove a case from state to federal court, a defendant must file a notice of removal. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a). Section 1446(b)(1) states that "[t]he notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed within 30 days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon which such action or proceeding is based, or within 30 days after the service of summons upon the defendant if such initial pleading has then been filed in court and is not required to be served on the defendant, whichever period is shorter."
"[I]f the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a notice of removal may be filed within 30 days after receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable." 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3). "If the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable solely because the amount in controversy does not exceed the amount specified in section 1332(a), information relating to the amount in controversy in the record of the State proceeding, or in responses to discovery, shall be treated as an `other paper.'" 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(3)(A).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, a district court has original jurisdiction over cases in which the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and the parties are citizens of different states. It is uncontested that the parties are completely diverse, as the plaintiffs are both Louisiana citizens, and none of the defendants are citizens of Louisiana.
The plaintiffs argue that the Petition is untimely because it was filed more than thirty days after July 12, 2019, the day the last defendant was served with the Petition for Damages.
The defendants argue in response that the thirty-day period to remove did not start to run until August 2, 2019, when the plaintiffs definitively rejected their settlement offer of $75,000.
The defendants also argue that Wawrzycki's rather limited medical care and costs, as detailed in the July 9, 2019 settlement offer, did not put them on notice that the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000, because the offer "admits that the physical therapy was helping" and "that [Wawzrycki] ha[d] not received any injections, invasive treatment, or surgical recommendations."
Pre-suit documents are not "other papers" for the purpose of commencing the removal clock because "[t]he plain language of [§ 1446(b)(3)] requires that if an `other paper' is to start the thirty-day time period, a defendant must receive the `other paper' after receiving the initial pleading." Chapman v. Powermatic, Inc., 969 F.2d 160, 164 (5th Cir. 1992). "[Section 1446(b)] applies by its terms only `if the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable[,]'" and thus there must be an initial pleading before the "other paper" is received. Id. (quoting § 1446(b)(3)). Therefore, the plaintiffs' pre-suit settlement demand on May 12, 2019 did not trigger the defendants' thirty days to remove the case to federal court because the plaintiffs' initial pleading was not filed until June 17, 2019.
A post-complaint settlement demand letter, which is not plainly a sham,
Notwithstanding the defendants' arguments that the July 9, 2019 settlement offer did not accurately reflect the amount of damages that the plaintiffs could likely prove, or the amount of damages that a jury would likely award, the defendants do not dispute that the offer exceeded the $75,000 jurisdictional limit.
The plaintiffs also seek costs and attorneys' fees pursuant to § 1447(c).
Accordingly,