ELLEN S. CARMODY, Magistrate Judge.
This is an action pursuant to Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), to review a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff's claim for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) under Title II of the Social Security Act. The parties have agreed to proceed in this Court for all further proceedings, including an order of final judgment. (ECF No. 11). Section 405(g) limits the Court to a review of the administrative record and provides that if the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence it shall be conclusive. The Commissioner has found that Plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Act. For the reasons stated below, the Court concludes that the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the Commissioner's decision is
The Court's jurisdiction is confined to a review of the Commissioner's decision and of the record made in the administrative hearing process. See Willbanks v. Sec'y of Health and Human Services, 847 F.2d 301, 303 (6th Cir. 1988). The scope of judicial review in a social security case is limited to determining whether the Commissioner applied the proper legal standards in making her decision and whether there exists in the record substantial evidence supporting that decision. See Brainard v. Sec'y of Health and Human Services, 889 F.2d 679, 681 (6th Cir. 1989). The Court may not conduct a de novo review of the case, resolve evidentiary conflicts, or decide questions of credibility. See Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984). It is the Commissioner who is charged with finding the facts relevant to an application for disability benefits, and her findings are conclusive provided they are supported by substantial evidence. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance. See Cohen v. Sec'y of Dep't of Health and Human Services, 964 F.2d 524, 528 (6th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). It is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Bogle v. Sullivan, 998 F.2d 342, 347 (6th Cir. 1993). In determining the substantiality of the evidence, the Court must consider the evidence on the record as a whole and take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight. See Richardson v. Sec'y of Health and Human Services, 735 F.2d 962, 963 (6th Cir. 1984). As has been widely recognized, the substantial evidence standard presupposes the existence of a zone within which the decision maker can properly rule either way, without judicial interference. See Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted). This standard affords to the administrative decision maker considerable latitude, and indicates that a decision supported by substantial evidence will not be reversed simply because the evidence would have supported a contrary decision. See Bogle, 998 F.2d at 347; Mullen, 800 F.2d at 545.
Plaintiff was 37 years of age on his alleged disability onset date. (PageID.235). He possesses an eleventh grade education and previously worked as an assembler and sales clerk. (PageID.50-51, 96). Plaintiff applied for benefits on May 9, 2012, alleging that he had been disabled since April 9, 2012, due to severe headaches, balance issues, memory lapse, and post-concussion syndrome. (PageID.235-36, 275). Plaintiff's application was denied, after which time he requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). (PageID.129).
Following a March 28, 2013 hearing, ALJ Dawn Groenberg denied Plaintiff's claim for benefits. (PageID.58-91, 129-40). The Appeals Council subsequently remanded the matter for further consideration. (PageID.146-48). On December 10, 2014, Plaintiff appeared before ALJ Manh Nguyen with testimony being offered by Plaintiff and a vocational expert. (PageID.92-112). By the time of this second administrative hearing, Plaintiff had returned to full-time work. (PageID.41). Thus, the question before ALJ Nguyen was simply whether Plaintiff was disabled between the dates of April 9, 2012, through October 1, 2013. (PageID.39). In a written decision dated February 13, 2015, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff did not qualify for benefits. (PageID.38-52). The Appeals Council declined to review the ALJ's determination, rendering it the Commissioner's final decision in the matter. (PageID.28-31). Plaintiff subsequently initiated this appeal pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of the ALJ's decision.
The social security regulations articulate a five-step sequential process for evaluating disability. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a-f), 416.920(a-f).
The burden of establishing the right to benefits rests squarely on Plaintiff's shoulders, and he can satisfy his burden by demonstrating that his impairments are so severe that he is unable to perform his previous work, and cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, perform any other substantial gainful employment existing in significant numbers in the national economy. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A); Cohen, 964 F.2d at 528. While the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner at step five, Plaintiff bears the burden of proof through step four of the procedure, the point at which his residual functioning capacity (RFC) is determined. See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987); Walters v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 528 (6th Cir. 1997) (ALJ determines RFC at step four, at which point claimant bears the burden of proof).
The ALJ determined that during the relevant time period Plaintiff suffered from: (1) degenerative disc disease of the cervical spine; (2) cephalgia; (3) obesity; (4) carpal tunnel syndrome; (5) blurred vision, amnesia, and auditory hallucination secondary to post-concussion syndrome; (6) schizoaffective disorder; (7) anxiety disorder; and (8) attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), severe impairments that whether considered alone or in combination with other impairments, failed to satisfy the requirements of any impairment identified in the Listing of Impairments detailed in 20 C.F.R., Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (PageID.41-44).
With respect to Plaintiff's residual functional capacity, the ALJ determined that between the dates of April 9, 2012, through October 1, 2013, Plaintiff retained the capacity to perform light work subject to the following limitations: (1) he can occasionally lift/carry 20 pounds and can frequently lift/carry 10 pounds; (2) during an 8-hour workday he can sit and stand/walk for 6 hours each; (3) he can occasionally climb ramps and stairs, but cannot climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; (4) he can occasionally balance, stoop, and crouch, but cannot kneel or crawl; (5) he can only work on level even flooring; (6) he can frequently reach, handle, and finger; (7) for every 30 minutes of sitting, standing, or walking, he must be able to change position for 5 minutes before resuming the prior position; (8) he will remain on task 90 percent of the workday; (9) he can tolerate occasional exposure to environmental pollutants such as fumes, dust, or smoke, but cannot tolerate exposure to extreme heat or cold; (10) he cannot work around unprotected heights or uncovered unguarded moving machinery; (11) he is limited to simple instructions; (12) he can tolerate occasional changes in the workplace; (13) he cannot interact with the general public as part of his job duties; and (14) he can occasionally interact with supervisors and co-workers. (PageID.44).
The ALJ found that Plaintiff cannot perform his past relevant work at which point the burden of proof shifted to the Commissioner to establish by substantial evidence that a significant number of jobs exist in the national economy which Plaintiff could perform, his limitations notwithstanding. See Richardson, 735 F.2d at 964. While the ALJ is not required to question a vocational expert on this issue, "a finding supported by substantial evidence that a claimant has the vocational qualifications to perform
The vocational expert testified that there existed approximately 311,000 jobs in the national economy which an individual with Plaintiff's RFC could perform, such limitations notwithstanding. (PageID.107-09). This represents a significant number of jobs. See Born v. Sec'y of Health and Human Services, 923 F.2d 1168, 1174 (6th Cir. 1990); Hall v. Bowen, 837 F.2d 272, 274 (6th Cir. 1988); Martin v. Commissioner of Social Security, 170 Fed. Appx. 369, 374 (6th Cir., Mar. 1, 2006). The ALJ concluded, therefore, that Plaintiff was not entitled to disability benefits.
A claimant's RFC represents the "most [a claimant] can still do despite [the claimant's] limitations." Sullivan v. Commissioner of Social Security, 595 Fed. Appx. 502, 505 (6th Cir., Dec. 12, 2014); see also, Social Security Ruling 96-8P, 1996 WL 374184 at *1 (Social Security Administration, July 2, 1996) (a claimant's RFC represents her ability to perform "work-related physical and mental activities in a work setting on a regular and continuing basis," defined as "8 hours a day, for 5 days a week, or an equivalent work schedule"). Plaintiff asserts that he is entitled to relief on the ground that the ALJ's RFC determination is not supported by substantial evidence. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ's RFC fails to adequately account for his mental impairments. A review of the medical evidence indicates otherwise.
In early 2012, Plaintiff began experiencing headaches, dizziness, and memory difficulties which he believed were related to his involvement in an auto accident 14 years earlier. (PageID.444). On January 11, 2012, Plaintiff participated in an MRI examination of his brain the results of which were "normal." (PageID.390-91).
On March 19, 2012, Plaintiff participated in a speech/language evaluation which measured Plaintiff's abilities in several areas. (PageID.446-47). In the area of "auditory selective attention," Plaintiff's score was "average." (PageID.446). Plaintiff's "word retrieval fluency" was "moderately impaired." (PageID.446). Plaintiff's "reasoning skills" were "average for inductive style reasoning," but "moderately impaired for deductive reasoning." (PageID.446). Plaintiff's visual processing scores "range[d] from average to high average." (PageID.446). Plaintiff's "immediate recall for novel information is moderately impaired [which] indicates that [he] may require repetition of new information in order to retain it." (PageID.446). In light of Plaintiff's performance, the examiner recommended that Plaintiff participate in a "brief amount of speech/language therapy." (PageID.447).
On June 5, 2012, Plaintiff participated in a neuropsychological evaluation. (PageID.492-97). Plaintiff reported that he was experiencing chronic headaches, poor coordination, occasional dizziness, and occasional temporary numbness in his arm and face. (PageID.493). Plaintiff also reported experiencing "times when he blacks out and does not remember what happened." (PageID.493). Plaintiff's performance on a battery of assessments was described as follows:
(PageID.495-96).
On June 19, 2012, Plaintiff was examined by Dr. Kersti Bruining who concluded that Plaintiff's reported symptoms were "not consistent with traumatic brain injury, nor is it suggestive of epilepsy." (PageID.502). The doctor concluded that Plaintiff was experiencing a thought disorder for which psychiatric treatment was appropriate. (PageID.502).
On July 18, 2012, Plaintiff was examined by Dr. Lawrence Probes with Pine Rest Christian Mental Health Services. (PageID.535-39). The results of a mental status examination were as follows:
(PageID.538).
The doctor diagnosed Plaintiff with schizoaffective disorder, anxiety disorder, and ADHD. (PageID.532). Plaintiff's GAF score was rated as 45. (PageID.532). Plaintiff was started on a regimen of psychotropic medication. (PageID. 533). Subsequent treatment notes by Dr. Probes indicate that Plaintiff's condition improved significantly on medication. On November 14, 2012, Dr. Probes reported that Plaintiff's symptoms were improved. (PageID.572-73). Plaintiff's GAF score was rated as 51. (PageID.573). On December 13, 2012, Dr. Probes reported that Plaintiff was experiencing "continued improvement." (PageID.570-71). Plaintiff's GAF score was rated as 58. (PageID.571). On January 17, 2013, Dr. Probes reported that Plaintiff was experiencing "abatement of depression" and "minimal anxiety," as well as "good tolerability" of his medications. (PageID.569). Plaintiff's GAF score was rated as 65. (PageID.569). On March 22, 2013, Dr. Probes reported that Plaintiff was experiencing "some increase in depression again with persistent mild psychotic symptoms." (PageID.614-15).
The medical evidence reveals that while Plaintiff may have temporarily been experiencing significant symptomatology, his condition responded to appropriate medication and treatment. The medical evidence does not suggest that Plaintiff was more limited during the relevant time period than the ALJ recognized. Accordingly, the Court finds that the ALJ's RFC determination is supported by substantial evidence.
On February 15, 2013, Dr. Probes reported that Plaintiff was far more limited than recognized by the ALJ. (PageID.562-65). Specifically, the doctor reported that during an 8-hour workday, Plaintiff's impairments would cause Plaintiff to be off-task "3 hours or more." (PageID.563). The doctor also reported that Plaintiff's impairments would cause Plaintiff to be absent "more than three times a month." (PageID.563). The doctor also assessed Plaintiff's ability to function in 20 categories encompassing (1) understanding and memory, (2) sustained concentration and persistence, (3) social interaction, and (4) adaptation. (PageID.564-65). The ALJ reported that Plaintiff was moderately limited in 14 categories and markedly limited in 6 categories. (PageID.564-65). The ALJ, however, afforded "little weight" to Dr. Probes' opinion. (PageID.49). Plaintiff argues that he is entitled to relief on the ground that the ALJ failed to articulate sufficient reasons for discounting the opinion of his treating physician.
The treating physician doctrine recognizes that medical professionals who have a long history of caring for a claimant and his maladies generally possess significant insight into her medical condition. See Barker v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 789, 794 (6th Cir. 1994). An ALJ must, therefore, give controlling weight to the opinion of a treating source if: (1) the opinion is "wellsupported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques" and (2) the opinion "is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in the case record." Gayheart v. Commissioner of Social Security, 710 F.3d 365, 375-76 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527).
Such deference is appropriate, however, only where the particular opinion "is based upon sufficient medical data." Miller v. Sec'y of Health and Human Services, 1991 WL 229979 at *2 (6th Cir., Nov. 7, 1991) (citing Shavers v. Sec'y of Health and Human Services, 839 F.2d 232, 235 n.1 (6th Cir. 1987)). The ALJ may reject the opinion of a treating physician where such is unsupported by the medical record, merely states a conclusion, or is contradicted by substantial medical evidence. See Cohen, 964 F.2d at 528; Miller v. Sec'y of Health and Human Services, 1991 WL 229979 at *2 (6th Cir., Nov. 7, 1991) (citing Shavers v. Sec'y of Health and Human Services, 839 F.2d 232, 235 n.1 (6th Cir. 1987)); Cutlip v. Sec'y of Health and Human Services, 25 F.3d 284, 286-87 (6th Cir. 1994).
If an ALJ accords less than controlling weight to a treating source's opinion, the ALJ must "give good reasons" for doing so. Gayheart, 710 F.3d at 376. Such reasons must be "supported by the evidence in the case record, and must be sufficiently specific to make clear to any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the treating source's medical opinion and the reasons for that weight." This requirement "ensures that the ALJ applies the treating physician rule and permits meaningful review of the ALJ's application of the rule." Id. (quoting Wilson v. Commissioner of Social Security, 378 F.3d 541, 544 (6th Cir. 2004)). Simply stating that the physician's opinions "are not well-supported by any objective findings and are inconsistent with other credible evidence" is, without more, too "ambiguous" to permit meaningful review of the ALJ's assessment. Gayheart, 710 F.3d at 376-77.
If the ALJ affords less than controlling weight to a treating physician's opinion, the ALJ must still determine the weight to be afforded such. Id. at 376. In doing so, the ALJ must consider the following factors: (1) length of the treatment relationship and frequency of the examination, (2) nature and extent of the treatment relationship, (3) supportability of the opinion, (4) consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole, (5) the specialization of the treating source, and (6) other relevant factors. Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527). While the ALJ is not required to explicitly discuss each of these factors, the record must nevertheless reflect that the ALJ considered those factors relevant to his assessment. See, e.g., Oldham v. Astrue, 509 F.3d 1254, 1258 (10th Cir. 2007); Undheim v. Barnhart, 214 Fed. Appx. 448, 450 (5th Cir., Jan. 19, 2007).
In his decision, the ALJ discussed at length the medical evidence. (PageID.44-49). With respect to Dr. Probes' opinion, the ALJ discounted such on the ground that it was "inconsistent with" certain specified portions of the medical record as described in his opinion. (PageID.49). As discussed above, the medical evidence does not support Dr. Probes' opinion that Plaintiff experienced greater limitations than recognized by the ALJ. Accordingly, the Court finds that the ALJ articulated sufficient reasons for discounting Dr. Probes' opinions.
For the reasons articulated herein, the Court concludes that the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the Commissioner's decision is
