RECOMMENDED DECISION ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT

JOHN C. NIVISON, Magistrate Judge.

In this action, Plaintiff Brandon Drewry, currently an inmate at the Maine State Prison, alleges Defendants acted with deliberate indifference toward his medical needs in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 162) and Plaintiff's Motion to Supplement. (ECF No. 167.) Through his summary judgment motion, Plaintiff requests judgment against Defendants Elisabeth Lamson and Dana Webster. Through his motion to supplement, evidently in support of the motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff seeks to introduce certain facts regarding his need for a vaporizer to treat a medical condition.

Following a review of the pleadings, summary judgment filings, and the parties' arguments, I grant Plaintiff's motion to supplement. In addition, I recommend the Court deny Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.

I. Plaintiff's Motion to Supplement

Shortly after filing his motion for summary judgment, and before Defendants filed their opposition to the motion, Plaintiff moved to supplement the record with certain facts regarding Defendants' decision to deny Plaintiff the use of a vaporizer. A vaporizer was apparently part of the treatment an outside provider recommended for one of Plaintiff's medical conditions. (Motion to Supplement, ECF No. 167; April 5, 2011, Letter of Robert Dixon, M.D., to Maine State Prison, ECF No. 169.) As part of the motion to supplement, Plaintiff filed eight exhibits. (Additional Attachments, ECF No. 169.) Because Plaintiff filed the motion to supplement before Defendants responded to the motion for summary judgment, Defendants were aware of the additional alleged facts when they filed their response to the motion. I cannot, therefore, discern any prejudice to Defendants if the motion is granted. Accordingly, I grant the motion to supplement.1

II. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment

A. Summary Judgment Standard

"The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "After the moving party has presented evidence in support of its motion for summary judgment, `the burden shifts to the nonmoving party, with respect to each issue on which he has the burden of proof, to demonstrate that a trier of fact reasonably could find in his favor.'" Woodward v. Emulex Corp., 714 F.3d 632, 637 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Hodgens v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 144 F.3d 151, 158 (1st Cir. 1998)).

A court reviews the factual record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, resolving evidentiary conflicts and drawing reasonable inferences in the non-movant's favor. Perry v. Roy, 782 F.3d 73, 77 (1st Cir. 2015). If the court's review of the record reveals evidence sufficient to support findings in favor of the non-moving party ..., a trial worthy controversy exists and summary judgment must be denied .... Id. ("The district court's role is limited to assessing whether there exists evidence such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." (internal quotation marks omitted)).2

B. Standard of Proof for Deliberate Indifference

Plaintiff contends Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to his medical needs. Defendants' obligation to Plaintiff regarding medical care is governed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, the Due Process Clause imposes on the states the "substantive obligation" not to treat prisoners in their care in a manner that reflects "deliberate indifference" toward "a substantial risk of serious harm to health," Coscia v. Town of Pembroke, 659 F.3d 37, 39 (1st Cir. 2011), or "serious medical needs," Feeney v. Corr. Med. Servs., 464 F.3d 158, 161 (1st Cir. 2006) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-106 (1976)). To be actionable, a deliberate indifference claim must satisfy both an objective and a subjective standard. Leavitt v. Corr. Med. Servs., 645 F.3d 484, 497 (1st Cir. 2011).

The objective standard evaluates the seriousness of the risk of harm to one's health. For a medical condition to be objectively "serious," there must be "a sufficiently substantial `risk of serious damage to [the inmate's] future health.'" Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 843 (1994) (quoting Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993)). A medical need is serious if it has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment, or is so obvious that even a lay person would recognize a need for medical intervention. Leavitt, 645 F.3d at 497; Gaudreault v. Mun. of Salem, 923 F.2d 203, 208 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 956 (1991)).

The subjective standard concerns the culpability of the defendant. There must be evidence that a particular defendant possessed a culpable state of mind amounting to "deliberate indifference to an inmate's health or safety." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (internal quotation marks omitted). Deliberate indifference is akin to criminal recklessness, "requiring actual knowledge of impending harm, easily preventable." Feeney, 464 F.3d at 162 (quoting Watson v. Caton, 984 F.2d 537, 540 (1st Cir. 1993)). The focus of the deliberate indifference analysis "is on what the jailers knew and what they did in response." Burrell v. Hampshire Cnty., 307 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2002).

Deliberate indifference must be distinguished from negligence. As the First Circuit explained:

Torraco v. Maloney, 923 F.2d 231, 234 (1st Cir. 1991).

C. Summary Judgment Record

On September 28, 2015, in granting in part Defendants' motion to dismiss, the Court determined Plaintiff had asserted an actionable claim for deliberate indifference as to Defendants' treatment of Plaintiff's hereditary hemorrhagic telangiectasia (HHT) and Staphylococcus aureus infections. (Order Affirming the Recommended Decision of the Magistrate Judge, ECF No. 95; Recommended Decision, ECF No. 90.)

At summary judgment, Plaintiff maintains that employees of Defendant Correct Care Solutions (CCS), specifically Health Services Administrator Elisabeth Lamson and Dana Webster, M.D., acted with deliberate indifference in their treatment of Plaintiff's medical conditions. (Motion for Summary Judgment at 1.) In essence, Plaintiff argues Defendants failed to address properly his medical condition even though Defendants were aware of his conditions and, through his grievance activity, were aware of his dissatisfaction with his treatment. (Id. at 2.)

In support of his motion, Plaintiff relies on an affidavit of inmate Jeffrey Williams, who asserts Plaintiff "has a medical condition that causes his nose to bleed constantly," and that Plaintiff "leaves drops of blood, which causes him to be confronted by other prisoners" (ECF No. 162-2); an affidavit of inmate Randall Hofland, who states Plaintiff experiences incidents in which blood gushes from his nose, frequently complains of inadequate care for this condition, and has "multiple skin ailments ... that the Prison's medical staff have routinely failed to treat" (ECF No. 162-3); an affidavit of inmate Dwight Norwood, who asserts Plaintiff has experienced "several nose bleeds for no apparent reason," on an "almost daily" basis, with some lasting "for almost an hour" (ECF No. 162-4); and an affidavit of inmate Michael Toby, who observed Plaintiff "leaning over the sink with blood streaming out of his nose" (ECF No. 162-5).

Plaintiff also filed certain grievance-related documents, which demonstrate Plaintiff has filed grievances regarding Defendants' care of his nosebleeds. In addition, Plaintiff cites the letter from an outside medical consultant, Dr. Robert Dixon, to prove that Defendants acted with deliberate indifference when they failed to provide Plaintiff with a vaporizer.

In response to Plaintiff's motion, Defendants rely on record evidence, including affidavit testimony from medical providers involved in Plaintiff's care, to contest Plaintiff's deliberate indifference contention.3 For instance, Defendant Clinton, the Regional Medical Director for Defendant CCS, who has been directly involved in Plaintiff's care, reports that on the occasions Plaintiff has been diagnosed as having a Staph infection, he has received appropriate antibiotics. (Defendants' Additional Statement ¶ 74.)

As to Plaintiff's nosebleeds, Plaintiff has been seen by an outside consultant (Dr. Julius Damion, an ear-nose-throat specialist) on six occasions in three years and has received YAG photocoagulation surgeries from Dr. Damion (Id. ¶¶ 59-60); he has been scheduled for another YAG procedure in the near future (Id. ¶ 62); he is provided ointments to prevent dryness in his nasal cavity to reduce the frequency of nosebleeds (Id. ¶ 64); he receives a saline nasal mist and iron supplements to prevent anemia due to blood loss (Id.); and he has been provided with a humidifier (Id. ¶ 67).4

D. Summary Judgment Analysis

As explained above, to establish deliberate indifference, Plaintiff must satisfy both an objective standard and a subjective standard. To prove facts that satisfy the objective standard, unless the need for a specific treatment is obvious even to a lay person, a plaintiff must establish that a physician has made a diagnosis that mandates treatment. Leavitt, 645 F.3d at 497. Additionally, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant in question demonstrated deliberate indifference to the plaintiff's serious medical need by disregarding "impending harm, easily preventable," Feeney, 464 F.3d at 162, or "a refusal to provide essential care," Torraco, 923 F.2d at 234, not simply a dispute about a particular course of treatment, Sires, 834 F.2d at 13.

A review of the summary judgment record reveals Plaintiff has failed to establish as a matter of law that Defendants acted with deliberate indifference toward Plaintiff's medical needs. In particular, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate conclusively that a physician has made a diagnosis that mandates certain treatment, or that a specific treatment is obvious to a lay person. Plaintiff thus is not entitled to summary judgment on his deliberate indifference claim.5

III. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing analysis, I grant Plaintiff's Motion to Supplement. (ECF No. 167.) In addition, I recommend the Court deny Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 162.)

NOTICE