OPINION

BRADFORD, Judge.

CASE SUMMARY1

Late in the evening of December 29, 2012, Ryan Jackson's home in Cross Plains, Indiana was broken into, and Jackson was robbed at gunpoint. Early the next morning, Nancy Hershman was shot and killed during a break-in at her home in Milan, Indiana. Based on information provided by Jackson, authorities were soon pointed in the direction of D.H. as a suspect, and he confessed his participation in the robbery and the homicide while also implicating Appellee-Defendant Allison Moore and three others. Moore was arrested in her Ohio residence and transported to the Colerain Township Police Department, where she was placed in an interrogation room. At the time of her arrest, Moore was babysitting four children. Indiana State Police Detectives Tom Baxter and Vince Patton met with Moore and advised her of her Miranda2 rights. Moore soon indicated that she did not want to talk to the police, and the discussion regarding the criminal investigation was suspended.

Soon thereafter, Indiana State Police Sergeant Anthony Scott entered and asked Moore about the four children in her care when she was arrested. After contentiously conversing with Sergeant Moore about the children, Moore requested that Detective Baxter return. Moore spoke with Detective Baxter about the children and then asked what the other suspects were saying about her. Without re-Mirandizing Moore, Detective Baxter verified that Moore now wanted to speak with him. Moore then made statements incriminating herself in the robbery of Jackson and Hershman's death.

Appellant-Plaintiff the State of Indiana ("the State") charged Moore with felony murder, Class B felony burglary, and Class B felony conspiracy to commit burglary. The State later added a charge of intentional murder and requested that Moore receive a sentence of life without parole. Moore filed a motion to suppress her statements to police, and the trial court granted Moore's motion following a hearing. The trial court granted the State's motion for certification of the matter for interlocutory appeal, and this court accepted jurisdiction. The State contends that the trial court erroneously granted Moore's motion to suppress because she waived her right to silence by reinitiating the conversation with police. Moore contends that police continued to question her after she invoked her right to silence and that police interference led to her giving a statement without being re-Mirandized.

We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

At approximately 11:30 p.m. on December 29.2012, D.H. and his friends S.N., B.N., Moore, and K.B. went to Jackson's Cross Plains home. D.H. kicked in the door, and the group stole approximately $700.00 and some marijuana. Early the next morning, the group went to Hershman's Milan home. Once at Hershman's home, D.H. kicked in the door, and he, S.N., and Moore entered the residence. During a confrontation between Moore and Hershman, Hershman was shot in the head and died from her wound.

Jackson indicated to police that he recognized one of his assailants as D.H. because D.H. had done some work on his home, and police spoke to D.H. on January 5, 2013. D.H. admitted his involvement in the robbery at Jackson's home and the homicide at Hershman's and also implicated Moore, S.N., B.N., and K.B.

On January 5, 2013, Ohio authorities arrested Moore at her residence, where she was babysitting four children, and transported her to the Colerain Township Police Department in Ohio. Detectives Patton and Baxter met with Moore, and the following exchange occurred:

Interview Tr. pp. 5-24.

Moore went on to make incriminating statements related to the Jackson robbery and the Hershman homicide. On January 7, 2013, the State charged Moore with felony murder, Class B felony burglary, and Class B felony conspiracy to commit burglary. On October 1, 2013, the State filed a request for a sentence of life without parole. On October 22, 2013, the State added a charge of intentional murder.

On March 26, 2014, Moore filed a motion to suppress her statement to police. On March 31, 2014, following a hearing, the trial court granted Moore's motion to suppress. The trial court certified the matter for interlocutory appeal, and, on June 3, 2014, this court accepted jurisdiction.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

Whether the Trial Court Abused its Discretion in Granting Moore's Motion to Suppress

We review a trial court's decision to grant a motion to suppress as a matter of sufficiency. State v. Moriarity, 832 N.E.2d 555, 557-58 (Ind.Ct.App.2005). When conducting such a review, we will not reweigh evidence or judge witness credibility. Moriarity, 832 N.E.2d at 558. In such cases, the State appeals from a negative judgment and must show that the trial court's ruling on the suppression motion was contrary to law. State v. Estep, 753 N.E.2d 22, 24-25 (Ind.Ct.App.2001). This court will reverse a negative judgment only when the evidence is without conflict and all reasonable inferences lead to a conclusion opposite that of the trial court. Id. at 25.

Mendoza-Vargas v. State, 974 N.E.2d 590, 594-95 (Ind.Ct.App.2012).

The State argues that the trial court erred in granting Moore's motion to suppress because (1) Moore was properly Mirandized and the interview stopped immediately when she invoked her right to silence, (2) additional questions put to Moore by Sergeant Scott were unrelated to the criminal investigation, and (3) Moore reinitiated the interrogation and impliedly waived her previously-invoked right to silence. Moore counters that (1) the State is requesting that we reweigh the evidence and revisit the trial court's findings; (2) the State's questioning of Moore did not, in fact, immediately cease; (3) Sergeant Scott's questioning of Moore led to the reintroduction of Detective Baxter; and (4) the police coerced Moore into making incriminating statements by their harassing questioning involving the children she was babysitting.

A. Whether Questioning Immediately Stopped

The State argues that questioning immediately stopped once Moore invoked her right to silence, while Moore argues that the trial court found that it did not and that the State's argument is therefore an invitation to reweigh the evidence. The relevant portion of the interview is as follows:

Interview Tr. pp. 7-9.

Detective Patton did not immediately stop his questioning of Moore, as he asked her who she was with the previous weekend and what her sister's name was after she unequivocally indicated she did not want to talk. Even though the questioning did not immediately result in incriminating statements, we conclude that the State did not scrupulously honor Moore's right to silence by immediately ceasing the questioning, as required by Mosley. This is particularly so because the questions related to a possible false alibi, which would have been incriminating. To the extent that the State argues that the interrogation immediately ceased upon Moore's invocation of her right to silence, this argument is an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which this court will not do.

B. Sergeant Scott's Questioning

The State contends that Sergeant Scott's questioning about the children Moore was babysitting did not amount to interrogation and was therefore not improper. Moore counters that Sergeant Scott's questioning, although ostensibly about the children in Moore's care at the time of her arrest, was "harassing[,]" causing her to seek out Detective Baxter for relief, which led to resumption of the conversation regarding the criminal investigation.

1. Community-Caretaking Function

First, the State contends that Sergeant Scott's questions regarding the children were proper pursuant to the police's community-caretaking function. Moore argues that there is no indication that the children were in imminent danger, rendering the community-caretaking function inapplicable. Regarding the community-caretaking function, the Indiana Supreme Court has stated,

Fair v. State, 627 N.E.2d 427, 431 (Ind. 1993).

The State notes that Moore had four children in her care, ranging from the ages of two months to six years, and police had no idea who the children's parents were, whether any had special needs, or whether Moore's mother was a viable care option. Moore notes that there is no indication in the record that the children were in imminent danger and that Moore's neighbor had taken over Moore's child care responsibilities until Moore's mother arrived. Moreover, Moore noted at oral argument that although she was arrested while caring for the children in her Ohio residence, both Sergeant Scott and Detective Baxter serve with the Indiana State Police.

There does not appear to be any Indiana authority on point.3 However, given that the State has the burden to show that it scrupulously honored Moore's right to silence, the State has failed to show that the police's community-caretaking function justified continued questioning of Moore. While the State is correct that police had limited information regarding the children in Moore's care, there is also no indication of any imminent peril. Moreover, it is unclear what Indiana police officers would be able to do about children in Ohio. The record in this case supports a conclusion that the State has failed to carry its burden to show that Sergeant Scott's questions were justified pursuant to the community-caretaking function.

2. Whether Sergeant Scott's Questioning Constituted Interrogation

The State also argues that because Sergeant Scott only asked questions related to the children in Moore's care, his questioning did not amount to "interrogation." Moore argues that Sergeant Scott's questioning of her was harassment that ultimately led her to seek out Detective Baxter, to whom she ultimately confessed. "Under Miranda, `interrogation' includes express questioning and words or actions on the part of the police that the police know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect." White v. State, 772 N.E.2d 408, 412 (Ind. 2002) (citing Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980); Loving v. State, 647 N.E.2d 1123, 1126 (Ind.1995)). "[C]ustodial interrogation for purposes of Miranda includes both express questioning and words or actions that, given the officer's knowledge of any special susceptibilities of the suspect, the officer knows or reasonably should know are likely to `have ... the force of a question on the accused,' Harryman v. Estelle, 616 F.2d 870, 874 ([5th Cir.] 1980), and therefore be reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response." Penn. v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 110 S.Ct. 2638, 2650, 110 L.Ed.2d 528 (1990).

Examination of the record reveals that neither Sergeant Scott nor Detective Baxter asked Moore anything about the crimes being investigated until after she expressed some interest in the criminal investigation. The question, then, is whether Sergeant Scott and/or Detective Baxter knew or reasonably should have known that questioning Moore about the children was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. Moore argues that Sergeant Scott's questioning was intentionally antagonistic such that Moore was coerced into asking for Detective Baxter, who had been "nice" to her, whereupon she confessed.

The trial court found that Sergeant Scott's questioning of Moore amounted to continued interrogation, and, because the questioning did not overtly concern the criminal investigation, can only mean that the trial court found that Sergeant Scott's and Detective Baxter's ostensibly unrelated questioning was intended to ultimately elicit an incriminating response. Under the circumstances, we cannot conclude that this finding is clearly erroneous. As can be seen from the transcript of the interview, Sergeant Scott's conversation with Moore became increasingly contentious, until, at last, she called for Detective Baxter's return. Soon after Detective Baxter returned, Moore indicated that he was the only police officer who had been "nice" to her and soon thereafter indicated that she wished to know what others were saying about her. Especially when one considers that neither Sergeant Scott nor Detective Baxter had any apparent authority to actually do anything about the children who had been in Moore's care, it seems likely that their continued questioning of Moore was intended to eventually induce her to make incriminating statements. We conclude that Sergeant Scott's and Detective Baxter's questioning of Moore amounted to interrogation, which was pursued despite Moore's clear invocation of her right to silence. Because the State did not scrupulously honor Moore's right to silence in this case, the trial court did not err in granting her motion to suppress her incriminating statements.4

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

RILEY, J., and ROBB, J., concur.