PETTIGREW, J.
Plaintiff appeals from a judgment of the trial court, denying her request for a preliminary injunction and dismissing her claims for damages against all named defendants. For the reasons that follow, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
Plaintiff, Stacey Adler, was an employee of the Town of White Castle for 24 years; for 17 years, she held the appointed position of Town Clerk. According to the record, Ms. Adler became involved in a payroll fraud investigation in 2014 conducted by the Town's CPA firm against the Assistant Town Clerk, Monica Hamilton. Also in 2014, White Castle Mayor Gerald Jermarr Williams ran for re-election, under the mistaken belief that Ms. Adler was not supporting his candidacy. Mayor Williams won re-election, and, on December 31, 2014, both Ms. Adler and her mother (another employee of the Town of White Castle) received notice, signed by Mayor Williams, that their employment was terminated, effective January 2, 2015.
Ms. Adler testified that on January 2, 2015, she reported to Town Hall and returned her keys, her mother's keys, and her uniforms. She also destroyed her Town of White Castle credit card in front of two other Town of White Castle employees. Ms. Adler then collected her personal belongings and left Town Hall. Ms. Adler received a second letter dated January 5, 2015, changing her effective termination date as follows: "There was an error in your termination letter of December 31, 2014. This is your notice that your services are no longer required at the expiration of your term, at 6:00 pm on January the 20, 2015, the first regular meeting of the board of aldermen succeeding a regular election."
Ms. Adler filed suit against Mayor Williams, individually and in his official
The preliminary injunction was heard over a period of three days, March 4, 17, and 18, 2015, at which time the trial court heard from numerous witnesses and considered various documents that were introduced into evidence. During the testimony of Mayor Williams, there was an objection by defense counsel to a line of questioning concerning whether Ms. Adler was fired due to retaliation because she was a whistleblower. After discussion with the parties, whereby counsel for Ms. Adler agreed to save any evidence concerning Louisiana's Whistleblower Statute for the merits of the case, the trial court sustained the objection.
At the close of Ms. Adler's case, defense counsel moved for a dismissal under La. R.S. 23:844, arguing that because Ms. Adler failed to meet all six factors necessary for an injunction to issue in a case involving a labor dispute, an injunction was not warranted. The trial court initially took the matter under advisement, ordering the parties to submit briefs on the issue and the applicable law. However, just two days later, the trial court issued a ruling dated March 20, 2015, denying defendants' motion for involuntary dismissal, concluding as follows:
Thereafter, the parties appeared before the trial court on May 5, 2015, at which time the trial court addressed a request made by defense counsel that written reasons be provided for the trial court's denial of defendants' motion for dismissal. After some discussion about whether this request was timely, the trial court reiterated its belief that Ms. Adler had presented her case and that dismissal would be improper. Defense counsel again urged the trial court to consider the six factors set forth in La. R.S. 23:844, arguing that Ms. Adler had not proven all of the required factors for the issuance of an injunction. The trial court subsequently vacated the March 20, 2015 ruling denying defendants' motion for dismissal and heard arguments from both sides on the issue. At the close of the hearing, the trial court instructed the parties to submit briefs on the issue and
On July 16, 2015, the trial court issued the following "Ruling," dismissing Ms. Adler's claims:
On August 3, 2015, Ms. Adler filed a motion for suspensive appeal from the trial court's July 16, 2015 ruling.
Ms. Adler has appealed, assigning error to the trial court's judgment as follows:
On appeal, Ms. Adler argues that the trial court erred in its reliance on La. R.S. 23:844 in this case. She notes that all of the cases cited by defendants in their memoranda in support of the application of La. R.S. 23:844 to the injunctive relief requested in this matter concerned unionized labor disputes of collective bargaining agreements and that no such labor dispute is at issue in this case. Thus, Ms. Adler maintains, La. R.S. 23:844 cannot legally or logically be applicable herein. Defendants counter that based on the definition of "labor dispute" found in Title 23, the relief that Ms. Adler is seeking from her former employers qualifies as a labor dispute and, thus, falls under the purview of La. R.S. 23:844. Defendants further argue that Ms. Adler's position on this issue is contrary to her petition for damages in that she cites to Title 23 in support of her claim for whistleblower status. We have reviewed the applicable law and jurisprudence and agree with Ms. Adler that La. R.S. 23:844 is not applicable herein.
The instant case involves the proper application and interpretation of La. R.S. 23:844, which is a question of law.
Statutory interpretation is the province of the judiciary. We have long held that the paramount consideration in interpreting a statute is ascertaining the legislature's intent and the reasons that prompted the legislature to enact the law. Legislative intent is the fundamental question in all cases of statutory interpretation; rules of statutory construction are designed to ascertain and enforce the intent of the statute.
The starting point in the interpretation of any statute is the language of the statute itself.
A reading of Act. No. 203 of 1934, by which the legislature enacted La. R.S. 23:821-849 (commonly referred to as "Little Norris-LaGuardia Acts"), provides insight into the overall spirit behind the
When all of the provisions of Act. No. 203 are considered together, it is evident the intent of the Louisiana Legislature in enacting the Little Norris-LaGuardia Act was to address the potential for abuse of injunctive relief in cases involving striking laborers. Our conclusion concerning the legislative intent behind Louisiana's Little Norris-LaGuardia Act is further supported by the title of Act No. 203, which states: "To prevent the improvident issuance of injunctions and temporary restraining orders; to define and limit the jurisdiction of the courts issuing the same, and to declare the public policy of the State of Louisiana regarding labor controversies, yellow dog contracts and the use of collective bargaining."
Moreover, while defendants correctly point out on appeal that Title 23 is entitled "Labor and Workers' Compensation" and addresses legal issues that fall within the parameter of employment law, each of the fifteen chapters within Title 23 covers a different area of employment law. We note that La. R.S. 23:844 appears in Chapter 8, Part II of Title 23 under the headings, Labor and Workers' Compensation,
Based on our review of the statutes and the legislative history, it is clear that La. R.S. 23:844 was never intended for application to a case such as the one before us now. As pointed out by Ms. Adler on appeal, La. R.S. 23:821-849 lend themselves to direct application to cases concerning unionized labor disputes of collective bargaining agreements, not to the injunctive relief she seeks. Thus, the trial court erred in applying La. R.S. 23:844 to the facts of this case. However, our inquiry does not end here as Ms. Adler argues that her motion for preliminary injunction in this matter was governed by La. Code of Civ. P. art. 3601 et seq.
An injunction shall be issued in cases where irreparable injury, loss, or damage may otherwise result to the applicant, or in other cases specifically provided by law. La. Code Civ. P. art. 3601(A). Generally, a party seeking the issuance of a preliminary injunction must show that he will suffer irreparable injury, loss, or damage
The writ of injunction, a harsh, drastic, and extraordinary remedy, should only issue in those instances where the moving party is threatened with irreparable loss or injury, and is without an adequate remedy at law.
Applying the foregoing legal precepts to the facts of this case, we find that the denial of a preliminary injunction was clearly warranted in this case. Ms. Adler's suit is a suit for damages based on her alleged wrongful termination. While there was testimony at the hearing below regarding the facts surrounding Ms. Adler's alleged wrongful termination and the actions of Mayor Williams and the Board of Aldermen at the January 20, 2015 meeting, Ms. Adler made no showing of irreparable injury, loss, or damage whereby she would be entitled to injunctive relief in the form of a preliminary injunction. Thus, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of Ms. Adler's request for a preliminary injunction.
However, we find that the trial court did err in dismissing Ms. Adler's claims for violations of the Open Meetings Law, Louisiana's Whistleblower Statute, and the Lawrason Act. In addition to seeking a preliminary injunction, Ms. Adler also requested a permanent injunction. A preliminary injunction is essentially an interlocutory order issued in summary proceedings incidental to the main demand for permanent injunctive relief.
While in some cases the merits of an action may be decided during an interlocutory proceeding, this is only "where the parties have expressly agreed to submit the case for final decision at the hearing on the rule for a preliminary injunction."
In the instant case, there is no indication that the parties agreed to dispose of the entirety of the case during the preliminary injunction proceedings. In fact, before the beginning of testimony on March 4, 2015, the trial court emphatically stated, "This is a preliminary injunction, it is not a full blown trial on the merits. It will be limited." Furthermore, the transcript of the preliminary injunction hearing is riddled with references by the trial court and counsel for Ms. Adler and defendants evidencing their intent that the hearing was solely for the purpose of considering Ms. Adler's request for a preliminary injunction. And, at the May 5, 2015 hearing, the trial court again emphasized, "we need to be mindful that [what] we have here is a preliminary injunction."
We acknowledge that after defense counsel moved for involuntary dismissal on March 18, 2015, there was some discussion on the record about whether the trial court could ultimately make a final ruling in the case. The trial court then asked the parties to submit briefs in support of their respective positions on the motion for involuntary dismissal and instructed them to include a discussion about whether any decision rendered could be converted into a final decision. However, the record is void of any agreement concerning same and neither of the parties' briefs appears in the record. Thus, based on the facts and circumstances we have before us now, the trial court unquestionably erred in disposing of the merits of Ms. Adler's case.
For the above and foregoing reasons, we affirm, on different grounds, the trial court's denial of Ms. Adler's request for a preliminary injunction. We reverse the trial court's denial of Ms. Adler's causes of action for violations of the Lawrason Act, Open Meetings Law, and Louisiana's Whistleblower Statute. We remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. All costs associated with this appeal are divided equally between the parties.
No court shall issue a temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of a labor dispute, as herein defined, except after hearing the testimony of witnesses in open court, with opportunity for cross-examination, in support of the allegations of a complaint made under oath, and testimony in opposition thereto, if offered, and except after findings of fact by the court to the effect:
(1) That unlawful acts have been threatened or committed and will be executed or continued unless restrained;
(2) That substantial and irreparable injury to complainant's property will follow unless the relief requested is granted;
(3) That as to each item of relief granted greater injury will be inflicted upon complainant by the denial thereof than will be inflicted upon the defendants by the granting thereof;
(4) That no item of relief granted is relief that a court has no authority to restrain or enjoin under R.S. 23:841;
(5) That complainant has no adequate remedy by ordinary legal procedure; and
(6) That the public officers charged with the duty to protect complainant's property have failed or are unable to furnish adequate protection.
The term "labor dispute" is defined in La. R.S. 23:821(3) as follows:
And Section 843 discusses the public policy behind the strict prerequisites of injunctive relief. "Legal procedure that permits a complaining party to obtain sweeping injunctive relief ... [without compliance with due process requirements] ... is peculiarly subject to abuse in labor litigation...." La. R.S. 23:843.
