DEBORAH K. CHASANOW, District Judge.
On April 16, 2014, self-represented Plaintiff Glay L. Kimble, then housed at the Wicomico County Detention Center ("WCDC"),
The crux of the Complaint is Plaintiff's allegation that while detained at WCDC he was denied the appropriate medication for mental illness. Once a party's competency has been brought to the court's attention, it is required to consider and decide the issue. See Seibels, Bruce & Co. v. Nicke, 168 F.R.D. 542, 543 (M.D.N.C. 1996). While Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c)(2) allows the court to appoint a guardian ad litem, it does not compel it to do so, but rather grants it considerable discretion to issue an "appropriate order" to protect the interests of an unrepresented incompetent litigant.
Plaintiff is no stranger to Maryland's criminal courts; his history of arrests and convictions dates back to the late 1990s.
Defendant has moved to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. "`The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion [to dismiss] is to test the sufficiency of a complaint.'"
Ordinarily, a court cannot consider matters outside the pleadings or resolve factual disputes when ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See Bosiger v. U.S. Airways, 510 F.3d 442, 450 (4th Cir. 2007). If the court does consider matters outside the pleadings, "the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56," and "[a]ll parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d); see also Finley Lines Joint Protective Bd. Unit 200 v. Norfolk S. Corp., 109 F.3d 993, 997 (4th Cir. 1997) ("[A] Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss supported by extraneous materials cannot be regarded as one for summary judgment until the district court acts to convert the motion by indicating that it will not exclude from its consideration of the motion the supporting extraneous materials."). This court deems it appropriate to consider the extraneous materials, as they are likely to facilitate disposition of this case. Accordingly, Defendant Autrey's motion shall be treated as a motion for summary judgment.
Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the "court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The Supreme Court has clarified that this does not mean that any factual dispute will defeat the motion. "By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986) (emphasis in original).
"A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment `may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [his] pleadings,' but rather must `set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 522 (4th Cir. 2003) (alteration in original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). The court must "view the evidence in the light most favorable to . . . the nonmovant, and draw all reasonable inferences in her favor without weighing the evidence or assessing the witnesses' credibility." Dennis v. Columbia Colleton Med. Ctr., Inc., 290 F.3d 639, 645 (4th Cir. 2002). At the same time, the court also must abide by the "affirmative obligation of the trial judge to prevent factually unsupported claims and defenses from proceeding to trial." Bouchat, 346 F.3d at 526 (quoting Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 778-79 (4th Cir. 1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986)). This case shall be analyzed in light of this standard of review.
Plaintiff indicates he spent five months at WCDC pending trial. ECF No. 15, p. 1. He states that Dr. Polite
Plaintiff provides no specific allegation against Defendant Autrey; it appears he named her in his lawsuit based on her role as the Health Services Administrator ("HSA") for Conmed at WCDC. In her affidavit, Defendant Autry avers that her responsibility as HSA includes the maintenance of medical records. She also indicates that it is within the scope of Conmed's business to seek records related to prior care in order to verify diagnoses and medications as well as previous care provided to WCDC prisoners. ECF No. 13-3, pp. 1-2.
The records provided indicate that on February 25, 2014, Conmed personnel obtained Plaintiff's authorization to release his mental health records from his previous place of confinement, Coastal State Prison.
Under § 1983, liability is imposed on "any person who shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any person . . . to the deprivation of any rights...." 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute requires a showing of personal fault, whether based upon the defendant's own conduct or another's conduct in executing the defendant's policies or customs. See Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978); West v. Atkins, 815 F.2d 993, 996 (4th Cir.1987), rev'd on other grounds, 487 U.S. 42 (1988) (no allegation of personal involvement relevant to the claimed deprivation); Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir.1977) (in order for an individual defendant to be held liable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, it must be "affirmatively shown that the official charged acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiff's rights ...") (quoting Bennett v. Gravelle, 323 F.Supp. 203, 214 (D.Md.1971), aff'd, 451 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir.1971)). Moreover, an individual cannot be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 under a theory of respondeat superior. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 690; Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 782 (4th Cir.2004) (no respondeat superior liability under § 1983). Plaintiff does not indicate what role, if any, Defendant played in his medical care. Based on her affidavit, it appears that Defendant's duties are focused not on providing medical services, but rather concern the maintenance of medical records as well as requesting "outside" medical records that may assist health care providers in determining appropriate treatment. Defendant is not alleged to have interfered with such care, and she is entitled to summary judgment.
This determination, however, does not end the court's inquiry. During the five months he was confined at WCDC, Plaintiff was entitled to receive reasonable treatment for his serious medical needs. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). Failure to provide such treatment could indicate a "deliberate indifference to serious medical needs" resulting in "the `unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,'...proscribed by the Eighth Amendment." Id. at 104. To show deliberate indifference, Plaintiff must establish that Defendant had actual knowledge or awareness of an obvious risk to Plaintiff's serious medical need and failed to take steps to abate that risk. See generally, Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994); Brice v. Virginia Beach Correctional Center, 58 F.3d 101 (4th Cir. 1995).
As a confined individual, Plaintiff also had an Eighth Amendment right to be free from deliberate indifference to serious psychiatric needs. See Comstock v. McCray, 273 F.3d 693, 702 (6th Cir. 2001). Indeed, there is no underlying distinction between the right to medical care for physical ills and its psychological and psychiatric counterpart. See Bowring v. Goodwin, 551 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1977). Plaintiff was entitled to such treatment if a "[p]hysician or other health care provider, exercising ordinary skill and care at the time of the observation, concludes with reasonable certainty (1) that the prisoner's symptoms evidence a serious disease or injury; (2) that such disease or injury is curable or may be substantially alleviated; and (3) that the potential for harm to the prisoner by reason of delay or the denial of care would be substantial." Id. The right to treatment, however, is "limited to that which may be provided upon a reasonable cost and time basis and the essential test is one of medical necessity and not simply that which may be considered merely desirable." Id., 551 F.2d at 47-48. As previously noted, even if Plaintiff shows that he was denied psychological or psychiatric treatment, he must also demonstrate that the failure or refusal to provide treatment constituted deliberate indifference on behalf of Conmed personnel.
The medical record demonstrates that Plaintiff did receive psychiatric treatment while at WCDC. Among the medication prescribed was Cogentin — the same medication given, in conjunction with other medications, by Coastal State Prison medical personnel during a two-year period ending in September of 2013. Plaintiff did not follow up with mental health aftercare following his release from incarceration in Georgia (ECF No. 13-4, p. 1), and several months later was arrested in Maryland and held at WCDC, where Conmed personnel contacted Georgia prison authorities to obtain information on Plaintiff's previous treatment plan. The medication Plaintiff sought was not among the medications prescribed to him at Coastal State Prison.
Plaintiff was not entitled to unqualified access to health care, see Davis v. Williamson, 208 F.Supp.2d 631, 633 (N.D.W.V. 2002), quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992)), and mere disagreement with the course of treatment does not state an Eighth Amendment claim. See Taylor v. Barnett, 105 F.Supp.2d 438, 487 (E.D. Va. 2000), citing Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 849 (4th Cir. 1985)).
Nothing more is constitutionally required. Accordingly, Defendant's dispositive Motion shall be granted, by separate Order to follow.
