DANIEL L. DYSART, Judge.

This is an appeal of a summary judgment granted in favor of defendants-appellants, Leonce "Lee" Hampton, Amistad Research Center and Lance Query. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On July 10, 2009, plaintiff, Brenda B. Square, filed a Petition for Damages against her supervisor, Leonce Hampton, and Amistad Research Center ("ARC"), a non-profit business entity which employed plaintiff since 1994.1 Plaintiff became the Director of Archives and Library at ARC in 1998.

According to the Petition, plaintiff was the designated Project Director of an IMLS grant which gave her "immediate responsibility for all program activities and the proper and legal expenditures of those funds." Plaintiff alleges that Mr. Hampton refused to allow her to oversee and manage the program, although she received periodic financial reports from an independent accountant. Plaintiff raised issues concerning the "questionable use" of the IMLS funds to ARC's Board of Directors by letter date January 8, 2008.2 ARC's executive committee met in April, 2008, and by letter dated June 6, 2008 from ARC's President and Chairman of the Board, ARC informed plaintiff that it found "no evidence to substantiate the charges" she raised concerning Mr. Hampton's management of the IMLS funds. It further advised that plaintiff should have initially addressed her concerns with Mr. Hampton as provided by ARC's "Personnel Policies."

On October 3, 2008, plaintiff filed a formal grievance with Mr. Hampton, who replied on October 10, 2009, indicating that he would not review the grievance due to its "untimeliness."3 She then appealed to ARC's Personnel Committee, but received no response.

Plaintiff maintains that, after she raised her concerns, she was subjected to retaliation, citing the following examples: (1) her removal from the position of Director of Library (she was provided with the new job description of Director of Archives); (2) her removal from the position of manager of the Tom Dent Processing Project; (3) the denial of staff assistance (relying solely on volunteers) to address a "backlog of collections acquired in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina" and at which time ARC's staff was reduced from 12 to 3 employees; (4) increased harassment and disrespect from Mr. Hampton and other colleagues4(5) her being given "minimal input in the United Church Board for Homeland Ministries Grant project, which she initiated;" and (6) ARC's denial of a formal role for her in ARC's "recently funded civil rights preservation projects."

The Petition alleges violations of ARC's policies in addition to federal and state laws designed to protect an employee who exposes her employer's "improper and unlawful acts" from retaliation. The Petition seeks damages under Louisiana's "whistleblower" statute and damages in the form of mental anguish and emotional distress.

In response to the Petition, ARC and Mr. Hampton filed a Motion to Dismiss based on several grounds, including the Petition's failure to state a cause of action, the court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction and the Petition's untimeliness.

On November 5, 2009, plaintiff filed a First Supplemental and Amending Petition for Damages ("First Amended Petition"), which removed all claims under the federal or state whistleblower laws, and added claims under tort law (specifically, La.C.C. art. 2315) and constitutional claims concerning the alleged violation of plaintiff's "due process and property rights." With respect to the latter claim, plaintiff added the following allegations-that defendants subjected her to a hostile working environment which caused severe mental anguish and distress; that after she questioned Mr. Hampton's misuse of grant funds, he "routinely humiliated and embarrassed" her before her peers and "outside professionals;" that Mr. Hampton denied her the opportunity to manage various projects; that Mr. Hampton intentionally delayed a "major grant funded in January 2008," causing plaintiff to be untimely in submitting reports (which reflected negatively on her in her capacity as the Project Director); that ARC's Executive Director changed her parking permit from a "faculty" permit to a "staff" permit; that Mr. Hampton "conspired with colleagues" to change procedures without discussing same with her and failing to timely provide notice to her of those changes; that in the "Spring and Summer semesters of 2009," she was removed as supervisor of interns from Southern University at New Orleans and Xavier University; and that she was not allowed to complete the "grant-funded Ninth Ward Oral History project."

ARC and Mr. Hampton then filed another Motion to Dismiss based on the failure of the Petition, as amended, to state a cause of action.

By way of a Second Amending and Supplemental Petition ("Second Amended Petition") filed on March 3, 2011, plaintiff added claims that occurred since the filing of her amended Petition. She alleges that, after she had a subpoena duces tecum served on Mr. Hampton for financial records pertaining to ARC's grants, she experienced increased hostility and negative treatment from Mr. Hampton and occasionally from her co-workers, including his having issued a written "admonition" to her for her alleged failure to help with "moving activities" related to the move of ARC's art collection from the New Orleans Museum of Art. Additionally, she was suspended on October 12, 2011.5

The Second Amended Petition also alleges other incidents — a November 9, 2010 copy of minutes from a staff planning meeting that included "incorrect statements and distortions of plaintiff's position on a number of issues;" a November 17, 2010 report submitted to Mr. Hampton for ARC's board meeting which he revised "thereby distorting and minimizing [p]laintiff's contributions;" in early December, 2010, plaintiff was given tasks to be completed by January 3, 2011, with no consideration for holiday leave and pre-approved personal leave.6

The Second Amended Petition then states that, on January 3, 2011, plaintiff was informed at 4:25 p.m. that certain reports given to her in December were due by 4:00 p.m., although she had never previously been made aware of that deadline (plaintiff maintains she submitted the reports prior to leaving work that day). The following day, January 4, 2011, plaintiff was given a letter of termination (the day before her deposition was scheduled to take place in connection with this litigation).7

Plaintiff asserts that her termination was "retaliatory, arbitrary, and capricious" and a violation of her substantive due process. She likewise maintains that her termination was "procedurally flawed." The Second Amended Petition sought an injunction denying her termination pending a trial on her claim for damages, in addition to back pay and all benefits.

A hearing was held on the injunction on March 14, 2011, and the trial court denied plaintiff's request for injunctive relief. Plaintiff filed a Motion to Appeal the denial of injunctive relief on April 6, 2011.

On January 4, 2012, plaintiff again amended her Petition to name the Administrators of the Tulane Educational Fund ("Tulane University") and Lance Query as additional defendants.8 Tulane University was added as Mr. Query's employer and as the "second employer" of Mr. Hampton. Plaintiff claims that Tulane University allowed Mr. Query and Mr. Hampton to terminate plaintiff's employment after she complained about the alleged misuse of grant funds through her "whistleblower lawsuit." Plaintiff maintains that Tulane University "clearly" has control over ARC, giving ARC's listing as a Tulane University library on its website as an example. Plaintiff also maintains that Mr. Query, in his various roles with ARC, functioned as Mr. Hampton's supervisor.9

According to plaintiff, Mr. Query was involved in a June 3, 2010 evaluation of her and her ultimate termination (in that he stood with Tulane University's security officers as plaintiff was ordered to leave her job by Mr. Hampton). Plaintiff also added the allegations that she has sought medical assistance for her "severe emotional distress and mental anguish" and that she has suffered "increased blood pressure, headaches, [and] sleeplessness."10

Defendants, ARC and Mr. Hampton, filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on October 21, 2011, which was reiterated (and supplemented) in a second Motion for Summary Judgment filed on June 21, 2012.11 A hearing was held on the Motions on September 28, 2012, and by judgment dated October 2, 2012, the trial court denied summary judgment on plaintiff's claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress but granted summary judgment and dismissed with prejudice (as to all defendants)12 all of plaintiff's remaining claims.

Plaintiff appealed the October 2, 2012 judgment on October 26, 2012. In addition, the ARC defendants filed an application for a supervisory writ in this Court regarding the trial court's failure to grant summary judgment as to plaintiff's claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress. This Court denied the writ application. See Square v. Hampton, et al., 12-1545, unpub., (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/21/12). The ARC defendants then sought review with the Supreme Court which, on March 8, 2013, granted the writ application, reversing the trial court's judgment and granting summary judgment on the basis that "[p]laintiff has failed to produce factual support for her claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress." See White v. Monsanto Co., 585 So.2d 1205 (La.1991)." Square v. Hampton, 13-0167 (La.3/8/13), 109 So.3d 351.

Because plaintiff did not timely pay the costs for the appeal of the October 2, 2012 appeal (nor the costs for the March 21, 2011 appeal), the ARC defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss both appeals on May 17, 2013. Plaintiff then filed "Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss Appeal, Without Prejudice, and Motion for An Expedited Hearing" on July 31, 2012. The basis of plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss is that "[n]either the March 21, 2011 nor the October 2, 2012 Judgments in question dismissed all of [her] claims against the Amistad Defendants, and are not appealable absent a designation as a final judgment by the District Court." Plaintiff sought a dismissal of her appeal, with the intent to file a new motion for appeal once a final judgment was entered. Plaintiff also maintained that she was not untimely with respect to the appeal costs insofar as the delay for paying those costs begins to run only "upon the signing of a `final judgment.'"

Both motions to dismiss plaintiff's appeals were heard by the trial court on August 7, 2013. By judgment dated August 7, 2013, the trial court rendered judgment based on the parties' stipulation that plaintiff's appeals should be dismissed as abandoned "for non-payment of the estimated costs of appeal," thereby granting the ARC defendants' Motion to Dismiss Appeals. The trial court then granted a final judgment on the ARC defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, dismissing with prejudice:

Plaintiff timely filed the current appeal.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff raises several assignments of error. At the outset, however, we address two preliminary matters. First, plaintiff assigns as error the trial court's denial of her request for injunctive relief. That issue is not properly before the Court given plaintiff's failure to timely perfect an appeal of that issue.

Under La. C.C.P. art. 3612 B, "[a]n appeal may be taken as a matter of right from an order or judgment relating to a preliminary or final injunction." As this Court recognized, "[a]lthough a preliminary injunction is a procedural device, interlocutory in nature, La. C.C.P. art. 3612 does not restrict the right of appeal to only judgments that grant injunctive relief [and] a party aggrieved by a judgment either granting or denying a preliminary injunction is entitled to an appeal." Sessions, Fishman & Nathan, L.L.P. v. Salas, 04-1790, p. 6 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/25/05), 905 So.2d 373, 377-8, citing Fabacher v. Hammond Dairy Co., Inc., 389 So.2d 87, 89 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1980).

An appeal of "an order or judgment relating to a preliminary injunction must be taken," however, "within fifteen days from the date of the order or judgment." La. C.C.P. art. 3612 C (emphasis added). See also Yokum v. Nicholas S. Karno, Inc., 10-0357, p. 1 (La.App. 4 Cir. 8/26/10), 47 So.3d 1014, 1015 ("La. C.C.P. art. 3612 grants only a fifteen-day period to appeal an order granting or denying a preliminary writ of injunction.") Here, the judgment denying plaintiff injunctive relief was rendered on March 21, 2011. Plaintiff's Motion for Devolutive Appeal, filed on April 6, 2011, thus was untimely. The last day on which a timely Motion for Appeal could have been filed was April 5, 2011. According to La. C.C.P. art. 5059, legal holidays are included in "the computation of a period of time allowed or prescribed... except when ... (3) the period is less than seven days." Here, plaintiff's Motion for Appeal was filed sixteen days after the judgment denying injunctive relief and therefore, was not timely.13

As a second preliminary matter, plaintiff purportedly assigns no error to the trial court's October 2, 2012 ruling which denied the ARC defendants' motion for summary judgment as to her claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. However, she nevertheless proceeds to argue that "[t]he evidence in this case is sufficient to reach the Louisiana Supreme Court's high threshold for intentional infliction of emotional distress," citing a number of supporting cases. She then outlines the facts set forth in her affidavit that she believes give rise to her claim that "the `unsatisfactory job performance' argument is a mere pretext for the retaliatory conduct directed toward [plaintiff] over a 3-year period, intended to and in fact, inflicted extreme emotional distress."

Plaintiff's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress has been eliminated in its entirety by the Supreme Court's grant of the ARC defendant's writ application. Square, supra.14 That decision is the law of the case and, accordingly, we do not address those claims again in this opinion. See, e.g., Duncan v. Bartholomew, 11-0855, p. 17 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/14/12), 88 So.3d 698, 711 ("[u]nder the law-of-the case doctrine ... prior rulings on [plaintiff's] interlocutory writ ha[ve] conclusive effects on subsequent proceedings.")

We now turn to plaintiff's remaining assignments of error, all of which arise out of the grant of the ARC defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. We review the grant of a summary judgment de novo using the identical criteria that govern the trial court's consideration of whether summary judgment is appropriate. Smitko v. Gulf South Shrimp, Inc., 11-2566, p. 7 (La.7/2/12), 94 So.3d 750, 755. See also Smith v. Treadaway, 13-0131, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/27/13), 129 So.3d 825, 828. "A court must grant a motion for summary judgment if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact, and that mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, pursuant to LSA-C.C.P. art. 966(B)." Jackson v. City of New Orleans, 2012-2742, p. 3 (La.1/28/14), ___ So.3d ___, 2014 WL 341020.

Plaintiff's arguments focus largely on her contention that ARC's personnel policies afforded her "constitutionally protected" due process rights, which ARC violated.15 Plaintiff relies on ARC's Personnel Policies, a copy of which was attached to her opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment, in support of her position that "where the employer has officially provided a `due process' right [in the form of an employment policy manual], a court can find a contractual right or implied contractual right."16 More particularly, plaintiff claims that the provisions set forth in paragraph XII, entitled "Termination," and subpart B "provided guidelines and safeguards for the termination of its employees." The provision on which she relies states as follows:

We note that subpart B, a provision plaintiff does not address, also provides that:

Consistent with subpart B(2), Louisiana law has routinely recognized that, absent a contract of employment, or when employment is for an indefinite period of time, an employee is considered to have "at will" employment. See Jeansonne v. Schmolke, 09-1467, p. 11 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/19/10), 40 So.3d 347, 358 ("[a]n `at will' employee is one that was not hired for a fixed time period"); Bell v. Touro Infirmary, Inc., 00-0824, p. 4 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/21/01), 785 So.2d 926, 929 ("a person employed for an indefinite period is an employee `at will'"), citing Brannan v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 526 So.2d 1101, 1103-04 (La.1988).

Our jurisprudence is well-settled that an "at will" employee "is subject to dismissal by his employer at any time, for any reason, without the employer incurring liability for wrongful discharge." Jeansonne, 09-1467, p. 11, 40 So.3d at 358, citing Saacks v. Mohawk Carpet Corp., 03-0386 (La.App. 4 Cir. 8/20/03), 855 So.2d 359. See also Wusthoff v. Bally's Casino Lakeshore Resort, Inc., 97-1386 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2/25/98), 709 So.2d 913, 914 ("[a]n employer may dismiss an at will employee at any time for any reason"). Similarly, an "at will" employee may terminate her employment at any time and without exposing herself to liability to her employer. Bell v. Touro Infirmary, Inc., 00-0824, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/21/01), 785 So.2d 926, 928. See also Bains v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n of Greater New Orleans, 06-1423, p. 9 (La.App. 4 Cir. 10/3/07), 969 So.2d 646, 652 ("in the at-will employment context, either the employer or employee may terminate at any time")(internal citation omitted).

We recognize that there are exceptions to the general rule that an "at will" employee may be terminated for any reason and at any time. For example, an employee may have a cause of action where his or her termination violated a "statutory or constitutional provision." Bell, 00-0824, p. 4, 785 So.2d at 928. In that regard, for example, under both federal and Louisiana law, employers are prohibited from taking adverse employment actions based upon certain "protected" characteristics, such as race, gender, age, national origin, or religion. Hare v. Paleo Data, Inc., 11-1034, p. 6 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/4/12), 89 So.3d 380, 385. As the Louisiana Supreme Court noted in Quebedeaux v. Dow Chemical Co., 01-2297, p. 5 (La.6/21/02), 820 So.2d 542, 545-46:

In this matter, while plaintiff has generally alleged that her "constitutionally protected" "due process" or "property rights" were violated, she cites no constitutional or statutory provision under which she asserts these claims. Nor does she claim to be a member of a "protected class" against whom ARC took an adverse employment action."18 We note that classified public employees and civil servants have certain recognized property rights in continued employment and may not be deprived of those rights without due process of law.19 However, plaintiff is neither a public employee nor a civil servant. We know of no statute or case law (and plaintiff cites neither) which acknowledge the constitutional protection of employment in general.20

The record clearly demonstrates that plaintiff had no contract of with ARC, as she admitted in her deposition:

Accordingly, absent an employment contract, there can be no dispute that plaintiff was an "at will" employee of ARC, as is consistent with ARC's Personnel Policies, which specifically state that "all employees of [ARC] are considered `at will' employees." As we recognized in Bell, "[the employer] only needed to prove that [plaintiff] was an `at will' employee" for purposes of establishing that summary judgment was appropriate. Bell, 00-0824, p. 5, 785 So.2d at 929. In fact, the Bell court noted that, for an "at will" employee, "the reasons for termination need not be accurate, fair or reasonable;" likewise, "there need be no reason at all for termination." Id., 00-0824, p. 4, 785 So.2d at 928.21 We find, therefore, that the trial court correctly granted summary judgment as we find no genuine issue of material fact that plaintiff was an "at will" employee who could be terminated by ARC for any reason and at any time.

We likewise find no merit to plaintiff's contention that ARC's Personnel Policies "officially provided a `due process' right" or that the court "can find a contractual right or implied contractual right." This Court noted in Stanton, 00-0403, p. 13, 777 So.2d at 1250, "[t]he contention that a handbook creates a contract between an otherwise `at will' employee and his employer is neither novel nor, in this jurisdiction, meritorious." The Stanton Court then cited Mix v. The University of New Orleans, 609 So.2d 958, 964 (La.App. 4 Cir.1992), which affirmed the dismissal, by summary judgment, of a wrongful termination case, and noted:

Id., 00-0403, p. 14, 777 So.2d at 1250.

In line with Stanton and Mix, we conclude that ARC's Personnel Policies do not alter plaintiff's status as an "at will" employee or otherwise reflect a contract of employment between plaintiff and ARC. Nor does plaintiff's longevity as an ARC employee create an implied contractual right to continued employment.

We further reject plaintiff's argument that ARC violated La. R.S. 23:631 "by failing to pay [plaintiff] `any amount then due under the terms of employment, whether the employment is by the hour, day, week, or month....'"22 Plaintiff maintains that "[a]bsent a 30-day notice, she was entitled to compensation for thirty (30) days."23 It is unclear on what basis she maintains that she is entitled to pay for thirty days, although it appears that she relies on ARC's Personnel Policies' provision that "[f]or exempt staff, separation will take effect after one month's notice or immediately upon payment of equivalent salary in lieu of notice."24

As we have already held, ARC's Personnel Policies do not create contractual rights between the parties and our jurisprudence clearly indicates that an employer is not liable to an employee for failing to follow its own internal policies (absent an employment contract). The Mix Court surveyed cases involving similar issues, one of which was the Second Circuit case of Williams v. Delta Haven, Inc., 416 So.2d 637 (La.App. 2 Cir.1982), in which the court held that "[p]laintiff's allegation that the defendant failed to comply with its own personnel policy requiring three warnings to an employee prior to discharge does not amount to an allegation that defendant was contractually obligated to her as part of an employment to give the warnings prior to discharge." Mix, 609 So.2d at 962, quoting Williams, 416 So.2d at 638. The Williams court reasoned that, "there is no wrongful discharge when an employee hired without a fixed term or other contractual prerequisite to termination is fired." Id.

Indeed, we noted in Mix that "employment at will may be altered by contract, but not by internal policies, procedures, and manuals." Mix, 609 So.2d at 963 (emphasis supplied). Accordingly, we find that even had ARC failed to comply with its own internal policy to pay exempt employees "one month's ... equivalent salary," this failure would not create an actionable claim.

We do agree that under La. R.S. 23:631 A(1)(a), at the time of plaintiff's termination, ARC was obliged "to pay the amount then due under the terms of employment." However, plaintiff admitted in her deposition that she "was paid for every day" she worked. ARC, therefore, complied with its statutory requirement to pay plaintiff her accrued salary.

Next, plaintiff contends that she is entitled to "penalty wages" under La. R.S. 23:632, which provides for penalties to be assessed against "[an] employer who fails or refuses to comply with the provisions of R.S. 23:631." Because ARC complied with La. R.S. 23:631, plaintiff is not entitled to penalties under La. R.S. 23:632. See, e.g., Becht v. Morgan Bldg. & Spas, Inc., 02-2047, p. 4 (La.4/23/03), 843 So.2d 1109, 1112 ("[i]n order to recover penalty wages and attorney's fees under La. R.S. 23:632, the claimant must show that (1) wages were due and owing; (2) demand for payment was made where the employee was customarily paid; and (3) the employer did not pay upon demand")(emphasis added; citations omitted). Plaintiff has admitted that no wages were "due and owing" and therefore, the first factor for a claim for penalties cannot be met.

Lastly, we turn to plaintiff's argument that she is entitled to damages under La. C.C. art. 2315, and more specifically, that she suffered bodily injury as a result of defendants' actions. To support this claim, plaintiff relies on the affidavit of her physician that she suffered headaches and high blood pressure problems which he attributes to her "job-related stress." Plaintiff also relies on the affidavit of her husband, who attested to witnessing her "excruciating headaches" and "physical ill[ness]" resulting for her "stress workload" and that of a counselor, who attested to seeing plaintiff "emotionally upset and sometimes fearful."

The ARC defendants' argument that they are not liable for Article 2315 damages is two-fold. First, the ARC defendants maintain that the only liability an employer has for injury to an employee that is not compensable under Louisiana's Workers' Compensation Act is for an injury arising out of the employer's intentional act. Second, citing the Louisiana Supreme Court case of White v. Monsanto,25 the ARC defendants contends that any claim plaintiff has for physical harm is wholly linked to, and indistinct from, her claim for emotional distress (which, as noted herein, has been dismissed from this action).

We need not reach the merits of the ARC defendants' contentions, as we have already found that the ARC defendants are not liable under any theory for plaintiff's termination. Plaintiff suggests liability arising from La. C.C. art. 2315, Louisiana's general tort law,26 which provides in subpart A that "[e]very act whatever of man that causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it." Implicit in Article 2315 is an initial finding of wrongful conduct which causes injury. See, e.g., Hornsby v. Bayou Jack Logging, 04-1297, p. 8 (La.5/6/05), 902 So.2d 361, 367 ("[u]nder Louisiana Civil Code article 2315, a person may recover damages for injuries caused by a wrongful act of another")(emphasis added).

In this matter, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate legally cognizable wrongful conduct on the part of the ARC defendants. Accordingly, the ARC defendants are not liable under Article 2315.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, the trial court's judgment dismissing Leonce Hampton, Amistad Research Center and Lance Query is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.