BRIAN A. JACKSON, Chief District Judge.
Before the Court are a
This action arises out of the alleged injuries Wright sustained while unloading floor-loaded
On March 12, 2014, Wright filed this action in the 18th Judicial District Court in West Baton Rouge Parish, Louisiana. (Doc. 1-2 at p. 1). On November 7, 2014, TransForce filed a Declinatory Exception of Lack of Personal Jurisdiction
On February 4, 2016, TransForce and Dynamex filed the subject motions. (Docs. 17, 18). Thereafter, the Court granted Wright leave to amend his Complaint to address some of the deficiencies raised in the subject motions. (Doc. 41). On June 20, 2016, the Court ordered Wright to show cause as to why this matter should remain in the Middle District of Louisiana as the alleged injury occurred in Picayune, Mississippi. (Doc. 44). Wright timely filed a response to the order to show cause on June 24, 2016. (Doc. 47). All relevant memoranda are filed and the Court shall now rule on all matters sub judice.
Title 28 U.S.C. § 1391 determines the proper venue for a federal civil action. When all defendants do not reside in a single state, as is the case here, a civil action may be brought in a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2).
Wright's Amended Complaint alleges that venue is appropriate in this district because a substantial part of the events giving rise to this action occurred here. (Doc. 42 at p. 1). It further alleges that Wright sustained injury while "unloading floor loaded freight that were improperly loaded . . . within the City of Port Allen." (Id. at p. 2). The Joint Pretrial Order clarifies that the freight was loaded in Port Allen and unloaded in Picayune, Mississippi, where Wright sustained injury. (See Doc. 39 at p. 15).
Due to the lack of clarity in the Amended Complaint, and the fact that the accident occurred outside of this judicial district, the Court sua sponte raised the issue of venue. (Doc. 44). See Mills v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 886 F.2d 758, 761 (5th Cir. 1989) (clarifying that a district court may transfer of venue sua sponte). Thus, the issue before the Court is whether venue is proper in the location of the accident or where the alleged negligent acts occurred. Compare Harrison v. McDonald's Mgmt. Co., No. 1:10CV587 LG-RHW, 2011 WL 2036443, at *1 (S.D. Miss. May 24, 2011) ("[T]he situs of the accident is the location of proper venue. . . .") with Cabot Oil & Gas Corp. v. Water Cleaning Servs., LLC, No. CIV.A. H-12-0665, 2012 WL 2133589, at *2 (S.D. Tex. June 12, 2012) ("[C]ourts are to focus on relevant activities of the defendant, not of the plaintiff." (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Court is mindful that "there can be more than one district in which a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred." Owen v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys. LLC, No. CIV. A. 07-1565, 2008 WL 5539486, at *2 (W.D. La. July 11, 2008) (quoting Globe Glass & Mirror Co. v. Brown, 888 F.Supp. 768, 770 (E.D. La. 1995)).
Here, it is clear that significant occurrences happened in the Middle District of Louisiana and the Southern District of Mississippi, and that venue would be proper in both districts. Thus, the Court shall consider both the private interests and public interests in maintaining venue. The private interest factors include: "(1) the relative ease of access to sources of proof; (2) the availability of compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses; (3) the cost of attendance for willing witnesses; and (4) all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive." In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 545 F.3d 304, 315 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting In re Volkswagen AG, 371 F.3d 201, 203 (5th Cir. 2004)). The public interest factors include: "(1) the administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion; (2) the local interest in having localized interests decided at home; (3) the familiarity of the forum with the law that will govern the case; and (4) the avoidance of unnecessary problems of conflict of laws [or in] the application of foreign law." Id.
Based on the private and public interests factors, the Court finds that there is a basis for maintaining venue in the Middle District of Louisiana. Of significance is the fact that a majority of the witnesses reside in Louisiana, and only one witness resides in Mississippi. (See Doc. 39 at pp. 27-38). Transferring this case to the Southern District of Mississippi would result in increased litigation costs and an unreasonable inconvenience to the parties and witnesses. Lastly, the Middle District of Louisiana has a localized interest in this matter as Wright is a Louisiana resident and the loading facility is located in this judicial district.
TransForce, a Canadian corporation, seeks to dismiss Wright's claims against it for lack of personal jurisdiction.
In a diversity action, a federal district court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant to the extent permitted by the applicable state law. Panda Brandywine v. Potomac, 253 F.3d 865, 868 (5th Cir. 2001). Pursuant to Louisiana Revised Statute § 13:3201, Louisiana's long-arm statute, courts are permitted to exercise personal jurisdiction over non-residents consistent with the Louisiana State Constitution and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. A & L Energy, Inc. v. Pegasus Group, 791 So.2d 1266, 1270 (La. 2001). A court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant comports with the due process clause when (1) the defendant has purposefully availed itself of the benefits and protections of the forum state by establishing minimum contacts with that state and (2) the court's exercise of jurisdiction over that defendant does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
Wright contends that the Court has personal jurisdiction over TransForce pursuant to the single business enterprise theory. (Doc. 21 at p. 5). When two entities are a single business enterprise, or when one entity is an alter ego of another, the Fifth Circuit has instructed that "the jurisdictional contacts of one are the jurisdictional contacts of the other for the purposes of the . . . due process analysis." Jackson v. Tanfoglio Giuseppe, S.R.L., 615 F.3d 579, 586 (5th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Patin v. Thoroughbred Power Boats, Inc., 294 F.3d 640, 653 (5th Cir. 2002)). Some of the factors considered when determining whether two entities are a single business enterprise include: "common ownership, directors and officers, employees, and offices; unified control; inadequate capitalization; noncompliance with corporate formalities; centralized accounting; unclear allocation of profits and losses between corporations; one corporation paying the salaries, expenses, or losses of another corporation; and undocumented transfers of funds between entities." Id. at 587 (citation omitted).
To determine the existence of a single business enterprise, the Court will rely on the factual allegations in the Amended Complaint and the evidence
Construing the factual allegations and the evidence in Wright's favor, the Court finds that a single business enterprise did not exist. First, the Amended Complaint and Wright's evidence reveal the process of a formal merger between Dynamex and Velocity Express, and not a single business enterprise between the three defendants. For example, only Dynamex and Velocity Express shared certain officers and warehouse space, (Doc. 21-8 at 131:3-13; Doc. 21-4 at 176:10-177:10), and only Dynamex controlled and funded Velocity Express' daily operations. (Doc. 21-4 at 182:3-15).
Second, TransForce did not exert a level of control over Dynamex and Velocity Express that was "more than that appropriate for a sole shareholder of a corporation." Hargrave v. Fibreboard Corp., 710 F.2d 1154, 1161 (5th Cir. 1983). TransForce subjected Velocity Express to its subsidiary-wide policies, participated in the promotion of Velocity Express employees, and purchased new scanners on behalf of Velocity Express. This is not enough, however, to conclude that TransForce did not maintain a separate and distinct corporate form or that it controlled the internal business operations and affairs of Dynamex and Velocity Express. See Hargrave v. Fibreboard Corp., 710 F.2d 1154, 1160 (5th Cir. 1983) (concluding that a parent and a subsidiary were separate entities despite the parent having "complete authority over [the subsidiary's] general policy decisions . . ., including such matters as selection of product lines, hiring and firing [the subsidiary's] officers, and approval of sizable capital investments").
TransForce's relationship with Dynamex and Velocity Express is indicative of a parent-subsidiary relationship, which is not enough to confer personal jurisdiction. See Hargrave v. Fibreboard Corp., 710 F.2d 1154, 1159 (5th Cir. 1983) ("[T]he mere existence of a parent-subsidiary relationship is not sufficient to warrant the assertion of jurisdiction over the foreign parent."). There is no evidence that corporate formalities were not scrupulously observed. Hargrave, 710 F.2d at 1160 ("The corporate formalities were scrupulously observed. T & N and K & M maintained separate bank accounts, accounting and payroll systems, insurance contracts, budgets, and financial records; they also filed separate tax returns. No assets of the corporations were commingled."); see also Dalton v. R & W Marine, Inc., 897 F.2d 1359, 1363 (5th Cir. 1990) (concluding that a parent-subsidiary relationship did not satisfy the alter ego analysis because all factors were outweighed by the parent company's compliance with corporate formalities). Therefore, Wright has failed to establish personal jurisdiction under the single business enterprise theory and TransForce's motion to dismiss is
Dynamex filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and in the alternative, a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment. Dynamex's Rule 12(b)(6) motion shall be recast as a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings because the pleadings are closed.
Summary judgment, however, is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A party asserting that a fact cannot be genuinely disputed must support the assertion by citing materials in the record or asserting that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the presence of a genuine dispute. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In determining whether the movant is entitled to summary judgment, the Court "view[s] facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant and draw[s] all reasonable inferences in her favor." Coleman v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 113 F.3d 528, 533 (5th Cir. 1997).
Here, Dynamex solely argues that Wright failed to allege any conduct attributable to Dynamex.
Based on the foregoing,
