THOMAS M. DIGIROLAMO, Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff Terrance Pierce seeks judicial review under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Defendant" or the "Commissioner") denying his applications for disability insurance benefits ("DIB") and Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. Before the Court are Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 13) and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 14).
Plaintiff was born in 1961, has an eighth-grade education, and previously worked as an automotive mechanic, furniture mover, wrecking mechanic, construction worker, and laborer. R. at 25, 37-43. Plaintiff applied for DIB and SSI on March 30, 2012 (with a protective filing date of March 2, 2012), alleging disability beginning on April 1, 2009, due to bad knees, carpal tunnel syndrome, and severe arthritis in his ankles and feet. R. at 168-83, 215, 227. The Commissioner denied Plaintiff's applications initially and again on reconsideration, so Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). R. at 90-134, 138-47. On July 16, 2014, ALJ Robert W. Young held a hearing in Baltimore, Maryland, at which Plaintiff and a vocational expert ("VE") testified. R. at 33-59. At the hearing, Plaintiff amended his alleged onset date of disability to the date of his 50th birthday. R. at 36. On September 24, 2014, the ALJ issued a decision finding Plaintiff not disabled "from April 1, 2009, through the date of [the] decision." R. at 26. Plaintiff sought review of this decision by the Appeals Council, which denied Plaintiff's request for review on January 23, 2015. R. at 1-5, 10, 288-93. The ALJ's decision thus became the final decision of the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.981, 416.1481; see also Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 106-07, 120 S.Ct. 2080, 2083 (2000).
On March 27, 2015, Plaintiff filed a complaint in this Court seeking review of the Commissioner's decision. Upon the parties' consent, this case was transferred to a United States Magistrate Judge for final disposition and entry of judgment. The case subsequently was reassigned to the undersigned. The parties have briefed the issues, and the matter is now fully submitted.
Dr. Michael Sullivan treated Plaintiff every three months at Mission of Mercy for about three years beginning in December 2010. R. at 24, 49-50, 298-337, 372-91. On July 4, 2011, Dr. Sullivan opined on a "Medical Report Form 402B" (R. at 332-35) that, because of his joint pain and right knee pain, Plaintiff could stand for one hour and walk for one hour in an eight-hour workday. R. at 332-33. He could sit and reach without restrictions, but he could never climb, bend, squat, or crawl. R. at 333. According to Dr. Sullivan, Plaintiff could lift less than ten pounds, and he could use his hands for simple grasping, pushing, and fine manipulation. R. at 333. Dr. Sullivan also opined that Plaintiff had marked restriction in activities of daily living; marked difficulties in maintaining social functioning; no difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace; and repeated (three or more) episodes of decompensation. R. at 334. Dr. Sullivan further opined that Plaintiff's medical condition limited his ability to work from June 27, 2011, to June 27, 2012. R. at 335.
On April 4, 2012, Dr. Sullivan opined on a "Medical Report Form 500" (R. at 336-37) that, because of Plaintiff's right knee pain and instability, he could stand for one hour, walk for one hour, and reach for two hours in an eight-hour workday. R. at 336. Although he could sit without restrictions, Plaintiff could never climb, bend, squat, or crawl. R. at 336. Dr. Sullivan opined that Plaintiff could lift at most ten pounds. R. at 336. According to Dr. Sullivan, Plaintiff had an impairment or combination of impairments that interfered with his ability to function independently, appropriately, and effectively on a continuous basis. R. at 337. Plaintiff had moderate restriction in daily living activities, mild difficulty in maintaining social functioning, and moderate restriction in maintaining concentration that limited his ability to work from April 4, 2012, to April 4, 2013. R. at 337.
On July 6, 2012, a state agency medical consultant, S.K. Najar, M.D., assessed Plaintiff's physical residual functional capacity ("RFC"). R. at 95-97, 105-07. Dr. Najar opined that Plaintiff could (1) lift and/or carry twenty pounds occasionally and ten pounds frequently; (2) stand and/or walk for a total of about six hours in an eight-hour workday; (3) sit for about six hours in an eight-hour workday; and (4) perform unlimited pushing and/or pulling. R. at 95-96, 105-06. Plaintiff frequently could balance and occasionally could stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl, and climb ramps and stairs (but never ladders, ropes, or scaffolds). R. at 96, 106. Plaintiff had no manipulative, visual, or communicative limitations, but he was to avoid all exposure to hazards, such as machinery and heights. R. at 96-97, 106-07. On January 16, 2013, another state agency consultant, Nisha Singh, M.D., expressed the same opinion about Plaintiff's physical RFC. R. at 116-18, 126-28.
The ALJ reviewed Plaintiff's testimony in his decision:
R. at 21-22; see R. at 36-53.
The VE testified that a hypothetical individual with Plaintiff's same age, education, and work experience with the RFC outlined below in Part III could not perform Plaintiff's past relevant work but could perform the unskilled, light
On September 24, 2014, the ALJ found that Plaintiff (1) had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the amended onset date of disability of April 24, 2011;
In so finding, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the RFC "to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except he can occasionally climb ramps and stairs, stoop, balance, kneel, crouch and crawl, never climb ladders, ropes and scaffolds and he must avoid all exposure to hazards." R. at 20-21. The ALJ also considered Plaintiff's credibility and found that his "medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms; however, [his] statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely credible for the reasons explained in this decision." R. at 22. The ALJ found that Plaintiff's "activities of daily living are functional in that he is independent in his personal care, cooks, makes his bed, can climb stairs and goes shopping." R. at 22.
In considering the opinion evidence, the ALJ afforded "great weight" to the opinions of Drs. Najar and Singh, the state agency medical consultants. R. at 23. The ALJ gave "little weight" to Dr. Sullivan's July 2011 and April 2012 opinions because "Dr. Sullivan relied too heavily upon [Plaintiff's] subjective complaints and his opinion is not consistent with the record as a whole." R. at 24. The ALJ further found that "Dr. Sullivan failed to cite to any specific treatment or examination notes to support his assessment, which overstates [Plaintiff's] limitations." R. at 24.
The Social Security Act defines a disability as the inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment that can be expected to result in death or that has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505, 416.905. A claimant has a disability when the claimant is "not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists . . . in significant numbers either in the region where such individual lives or in several regions of the country." 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(B).
To determine whether a claimant has a disability within the meaning of the Social Security Act, the Commissioner follows a five-step sequential evaluation process outlined in the regulations. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; see Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 24-25, 124 S.Ct. 376, 379-380 (2003). "If at any step a finding of disability or nondisability can be made, the [Commissioner] will not review the claim further." Thomas, 540 U.S. at 24, 124 S. Ct. at 379; see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). The claimant has the burden of production and proof at steps one through four. See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5, 107 S.Ct. 2287, 2294 n.5 (1987); Radford v. Colvin, 734 F.3d 288, 291 (4th Cir. 2013).
First, the Commissioner will consider a claimant's work activity. If the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity, then the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i).
Second, if the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, the Commissioner looks to see whether the claimant has a "severe" impairment, i.e., an impairment or combination of impairments that significantly limits the claimant's physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. Pass v. Chater, 65 F.3d 1200, 1203 (4th Cir. 1995); see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 404.1521(a), 416.920(c), 416.921(a).
Third, if the claimant has a severe impairment, then the Commissioner will consider the medical severity of the impairment. If the impairment meets or equals one of the presumptively disabling impairments listed in the regulations, then the claimant is considered disabled, regardless of age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 404.1520(d), 416.920(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(d); see Radford, 734 F.3d at 293.
Fourth, if the claimant's impairment is severe, but it does not meet or equal one of the presumptively disabling impairments, then the Commissioner will assess the claimant's RFC to determine the claimant's "ability to meet the physical, mental, sensory, and other requirements" of the claimant's past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 404.1545(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4)(iv), 416.945(a)(4). RFC is a measurement of the most a claimant can do despite his or her limitations. Hines v. Barnhart, 453 F.3d 559, 562 (4th Cir. 2006); see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(1), 416.945(a)(1). The claimant is responsible for providing evidence the Commissioner will use to make a finding as to the claimant's RFC, but the Commissioner is responsible for developing the claimant's "complete medical history, including arranging for a consultative examination(s) if necessary, and making every reasonable effort to help [the claimant] get medical reports from [the claimant's] own medical sources." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(3), 416.945(a)(3). The Commissioner also will consider certain non-medical evidence and other evidence listed in the regulations. See id. If a claimant retains the RFC to perform past relevant work, then the claimant is not disabled. Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv).
Fifth, if the claimant's RFC as determined in step four will not allow the claimant to perform past relevant work, then the burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove that there is other work that the claimant can do, given the claimant's RFC as determined at step four, age, education, and work experience. See Hancock v. Astrue, 667 F.3d 470, 472-73 (4th Cir. 2012). The Commissioner must prove not only that the claimant's RFC will allow the claimant to make an adjustment to other work, but also that the other work exists in significant numbers in the national economy. See Walls, 296 F.3d at 290; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v). If the claimant can make an adjustment to other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy, then the Commissioner will find that the claimant is not disabled. If the claimant cannot make an adjustment to other work, then the Commissioner will find that the claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v).
The Court reviews an ALJ's decision to determine whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standards and whether the factual findings are supported by substantial evidence. See Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996). In other words, the issue before the Court "is not whether [Plaintiff] is disabled, but whether the ALJ's finding that [Plaintiff] is not disabled is supported by substantial evidence and was reached based upon a correct application of the relevant law." Id. The Court's review is deferential, as "[t]he findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Under this standard, substantial evidence is less than a preponderance but is enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to support the Commissioner's conclusion. See Hancock, 667 F.3d at 472; see also Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 1427 (1971).
In evaluating the evidence in an appeal of a denial of benefits, the court does "not conduct a de novo review of the evidence," Smith v. Schweiker, 795 F.2d 343, 345 (4th Cir. 1986), or undertake to reweigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Hancock, 667 F.3d at 472. Rather, "[t]he duty to resolve conflicts in the evidence rests with the ALJ, not with a reviewing court." Smith v. Chater, 99 F.3d 635, 638 (4th Cir. 1996). When conflicting evidence allows reasonable minds to differ as to whether a claimant is disabled, the responsibility for that decision falls on the ALJ. Johnson v. Barnhart, 434 F.3d 650, 653 (4th Cir. 2005) (per curiam).
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erroneously assessed his RFC contrary to Social Security Ruling
SSR 96-8p explains how adjudicators should assess RFC and instructs that the RFC
Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632, 636 (4th Cir. 2015) (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted). The Fourth Circuit has held, however, that a per se rule requiring remand when the ALJ does not perform an explicit function-by-function analysis "is inappropriate given that remand would prove futile in cases where the ALJ does not discuss functions that are `irrelevant or uncontested.'" Id. (quoting Cichocki v. Astrue, 729 F.3d 172, 177 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam)). Rather, remand may be appropriate "where an ALJ fails to assess a claimant's capacity to perform relevant functions, despite contradictory evidence in the record, or where other inadequacies in the ALJ's analysis frustrate meaningful review." Id. (quoting Cichocki, 729 F.3d at 177). The court in Mascio concluded that remand was appropriate because it was "left to guess about how the ALJ arrived at his conclusions on [the claimant's] ability to perform relevant functions" because the ALJ had "said nothing about [the claimant's] ability to perform them for a full workday," despite conflicting evidence as to the claimant's RFC that the ALJ did not address. Id. at 637.
Plaintiff contends that, although the ALJ found at step two that his impairments of osteoarthritis/degenerative joint disease of the knees, feet, and hands, bilaterally, were severe because they limited his ability to do basic work activities (R. at 17-18), the ALJ failed to include in the RFC assessment any limitation related to Plaintiff's abilities to stand or walk, to handle or finger objects, or to use his hands in any manner. Pl.'s Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 6-7, ECF No. 13-1. As noted in Part IV above, the Commissioner determines at step two of the five-step sequential evaluation process whether the claimant has a medically severe impairment or combination of impairments. "Step two of the sequential evaluation is a threshold question with a de minimis severity requirement." Felton-Miller v. Astrue, 459 F. App'x 226, 230 (4th Cir. 2011) (per curiam). In other words, "the step-two inquiry is a de minimis screening device to dispose of groundless claims." Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1290 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 153-54, 107 S. Ct. at 2297-98). Thus, "[t]he findings that the [Commissioner] must make at steps two and four . . . are quite different." Taylor v. Astrue, Civil Action No. BPG-11-0032, 2012 WL 294532, at *8 (D. Md. Jan. 31, 2012). "At step four, on the other hand, the [Commissioner] must look to all the evidence on record and determine more precisely how, if at all, the claimant's impairments limit her ability to work." Id. "It is possible, therefore, for [the Commissioner] to find at step two that a claimant's condition is severe— because the medical evidence does not conclusively prove otherwise—and yet at step four find no substantial evidence that the condition actually limits the claimant's ability to work." Id. Thus, "an ALJ is not required to include a corresponding limitation for each severe impairment." Copes v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., Civil No. SAG-11-3487, 2013 WL 1809231, at *1 (D. Md. Apr. 26, 2013).
In any event, although the ALJ noted Plaintiff's history of suffering from degenerative joint disease/osteoarthritis of the knees, feet, and hands bilaterally, the ALJ found that the medical evidence did not support the severity of his allegations. R. at 22. Failing to identify any evidence of greater limitations resulting from his impairments that the ALJ should have included in the RFC assessment, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that his impairments limited him to a greater extent than the ALJ found. See Def.'s Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 10-11, ECF No. 14-1. Further, Plaintiff has not contested the ALJ's consideration of his credibility and weight given to the various opinions in assessing his RFC. See id. at 11-12. Because Plaintiff "has failed to point to any specific piece of evidence not considered by the Commissioner that might have changed the outcome of his disability claim," his argument in this regard thus is unavailing. Reid v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 769 F.3d 861, 865 (4th Cir. 2014).
In sum, substantial evidence supports the decision of the ALJ, who applied the correct legal standards here. Thus, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 14) is
