TERRENCE W. BOYLE, District Judge.
This matter is before the Court on plaintiffs motion for attorney's fees and costs pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d), the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA). [DE 30]. For the reasons discussed below, plaintiffs motion is GRANTED.
Ms. Gibson sought appellate review of the Commissioner's decision before this Court on April 5, 2013. On August 28, 2014, a hearing was held in Raleigh, North Carolina, after which this Court remanded the matter back to the Commissioner for further proceedings pursuant to one of three arguments presented by plaintiff. Plaintiff now seeks an award of attorney's fees under the EAJA in the amount of $8,654.94 for 46.3 hours of attorney time spent on the appeal and $350.00 in filing fees.
Under the EAJA, parties who prevail in litigation against the United States are entitled to payment for reasonable attorney's fees unless the position of the United States throughout the litigation was "substantially justified." 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). In order to establish eligibility for an award under the EAJA, the claimant must show that (i) she is the prevailing party; (ii) the government's position was not substantially justified; (iii) no special circumstances make an award unjust; and (iv) the fee application was submitted to the court within thirty days of final judgment and was supported by an itemized statement. See Crawford v. Sullivan, 935 F.2d 655, 656 (4th Cir. 1991). As defendant does not dispute that plaintiff meets these threshold conditions for an award of fees and costs under the EAJA, the Court finds that plaintiff has met them.
"Once the district court determines that plaintiffs have met the threshold conditions for an award of fees and costs under the EAJA, the district court must undertake the `task of determining what fee is reasonable.'" Hyatt v. Barnhart, 315 F.3d 239, 253 (4th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). As the prevailing party here, "plaintiff `bears the burden of establishing that the number of hours for which she seeks reimbursement is reasonable and does not include any claim for hours which are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.'" Dixon v. Astrue, No. 5:06-CV-77-JG, 2008 WL 360989, *3 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 8, 2008) (citation omitted). In determining the amount of a fee, a court may consider the extent of plaintiffs success, the novelty and complexity of the issues presented, the experience and skill of the attorney, and the typical range of compensated hours in a particular field. Id. at *3-*4. A court has great discretion to determine the fee award so long as the fee is reasonable. Hyatt, 315 F.3d at 254.
The bulk of the hours billed were devoted to reviewing transcripts and summarizing the lengthy medical evidence, a fact which defendant does not dispute. Given that the record in this case was over 1000 pages long, the number of hours spent is not excessive. In fact, plaintiffs invoice for 46.3 hours is not much greater than the typical range of compensated hours in social security disability litigation despite the incredibly lengthy record. See, e.g., DiGennaro v. Bowen, 666 F.Supp. 426, 433 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (finding that "compensated hours generally range from twenty to forty hours."); see also Hutchison v. Chater, No. 95-44084-SAC, 1996 WL 699695, *3 (D.Kan Oct. 31, 1996) (holding that the "typical EAJA fee application in social security cases claims between thirty and forty hours").
For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiffs motion for EAJA fees is GRANTED and plaintiffs counsel is awarded fees in the amount of $8,654.94 and expenses in the amount of $350.00.
SO ORDERED.