NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

WHIPPLE, C.J.

Defendant, Warren Gonzales, was charged by amended bill of information with two counts of possession of a schedule II controlled dangerous substance (methamphetamine and morphine), violations of LSA-R.S. 40:967(C) (counts 1 and 2); one count of possession of a schedule IV controlled dangerous substance (diazepam), a violation of LSA-R.S. 40:969(C) (count 3); two counts of possession of a schedule III controlled dangerous substance (hydrocodone and buprenorphine), violations of LSA-R.S. 40:968(C) (prior to amendment by 2015 La. Acts No. 189, § 2) (counts 4 and 5); and one count of possession of a schedule I controlled dangerous substance (heroin), a violation of LSA-R.S. 40:966(C) (count 6).1 The defendant pled not guilty. Following a jury trial, the jury found the defendant guilty as charged on all counts. Defendant subsequently filed motions for new trial and postverdict judgment of acquittal, both of which the trial court denied. On counts 1-5, defendant was sentenced to four years imprisonment at hard labor; on count 6, defendant was sentenced to seven years imprisonment at hard labor. The trial court ordered all sentences to run concurrently. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court also held defendant in contempt of court and ordered him to serve six months, consecutive to the above sentences, for this contempt finding.

Thereafter, the state filed a habitual offender bill of information, alleging defendant to be a fourth-felony habitual offender as to all counts.2 Defendant initially denied the allegations in the habitual offender bill, but later withdrew this denial and stipulated to the contents of the bill. The trial court accepted defendant's stipulation and resentenced him as a fourth-felony habitual offender. As to counts 1-3, the trial court vacated the previous sentences and resentenced defendant to twenty years at hard labor, without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. As to count 6, the trial court vacated the previous sentence and resentenced defendant to life imprisonment, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. The trial court ordered these sentences to run concurrently. The trial court did not mention counts 4 and 5 when resentencing defendant. Defendant now appeals, alleging four assignments of error.

For the following reasons, we affirm defendant's convictions for the offenses charged in the amended bill of information, the original sentences on counts 4 and 5, the habitual offender adjudications as to counts 1-3 and 6, and the habitual offender sentences on counts 1-3 and 6. However, we reverse the trial court's order finding defendant to be in contempt and vacate the sentence associated with that determination. Finally, we remand to the trial court for corrections to be made to the minutes and commitment order.

FACTS

On January 20, 2015, Washington Parish Sheriff's Office Lieutenant Brent Goings was patrolling the Bogalusa area in response to ongoing complaints of narcotics activity. During his patrol, Lieutenant Goings observed a maroon Oldsmobile pulling a trailer with no tail lights. On this basis, Lieutenant Goings effected a traffic stop of the vehicle on westbound La. Hwy. 10. Lieutenant Goings contacted dispatch and was advised that the license plate on the Oldsmobile belonged to a different vehicle.

Detective Jason Garbo backed up Lieutenant Goings and assisted in investigating the traffic stop. Lieutenant Goings made contact with the driver of the vehicle, Teresa Rouse, while Detective Garbo made contact with the passenger, defendant. Lieutenant Goings asked Rouse about the switched tag. Rouse produced a bill of sale indicating that she had just bought the vehicle a day or two earlier, but she did not explain the switched tag. Defendant stepped out of the vehicle pursuant to a request from Detective Garbo. Detective Garbo saw, and retrieved, a knife from defendant's right, front pocket. Detective Garbo then placed defendant in handcuffs and patted him down for officer safety.

While Detective Garbo continued to interact with defendant, Lieutenant Goings asked Rouse for permission to search the vehicle. Rouse granted consent without hesitation. In the ensuing search, Lieutenant Goings found a magnetized black box stuck under the dashboard, near the emergency brake. Lieutenant Goings opened the box to find several different types of suspected narcotics. Both Rouse and defendant denied ownership of the box and its contents at the time of the stop. As a result, both individuals were placed under arrest. Chemical analysis later confirmed that the box contained varying quantities of methamphetamine, morphine, diazepam, hydrocodone, buprenorphine, and heroin.

Defendant and Rouse were arraigned on April 6, 2015. Defendant, represented by David Craig, waived the reading of the bill of information and pled not guilty. Rouse was also represented by David Craig at her arraignment, and she, too, waived the reading of the bill of information and pled not guilty. Following Rouse's arraignment, defendant stated to the court, "Your Honor, all that drugs was mine. I am going to let y'all know. I just want to let y'all know she is on the charge with me." Defendant later filed a motion to suppress this statement, but the trial court denied that motion and allowed the transcript to be read to the jury at the outset of defendant's trial.

Rouse testified at trial that she knew defendant used the black box to store his drugs, that the drugs were not hers, and that she granted permission for the search of the vehicle because she did not think there were any drugs in the vehicle. Defendant did not testify at trial.

SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE

When issues are raised on appeal as to both sufficiency of evidence and other trial errors, the appellate court should first review the sufficiency of the evidence. State v. Hearold, 603 So.2d 731, 734 (La. 1992). In his second assignment of error (addressed here first), defendant argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his six convictions for possession of various controlled dangerous substances. He contends that the state's evidence failed to demonstrate his actual or constructive possession beyond a reasonable doubt.

A conviction based on insufficient evidence cannot stand, as it violates due process. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV; La. Const. art. I, § 2. In reviewing claims challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, this court must consider whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560, 573 (1979). See also LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 821(B); State v. Ordodi, 2006-0207 (La. 11/29/06), 946 So.2d 654, 660; State v. Mussall, 523 So.2d 1305, 1308-09 (La. 1988). The Jackson standard of review, incorporated in Article 821(B), is an objective standard for testing the overall evidence, both direct and circumstantial, for reasonable doubt. When analyzing circumstantial evidence, LSA-R.S. 15:438 provides that the factfinder must be satisfied the overall evidence excludes every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. State v. Patorno, 2001-2585 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/21/02), 822 So.2d 141, 144.

When a conviction is based on both direct and circumstantial evidence, the reviewing court must resolve any conflict in the direct evidence by viewing that evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. When the direct evidence is thus viewed, the facts established by the direct evidence and the facts reasonably inferred from the circumstantial evidence must be sufficient for a rational juror to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of every essential element of the crime. State v. Wright, 98-0601 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/19/99), 730 So.2d 485, 487, writs denied, 99-0802 (La. 10/29/99), 748 So.2d 1157 and 2000-0895 (La. 11/17/00), 773 So.2d 732.

Defendant's only contention under his sufficiency claim is that the state failed to prove his actual or constructive possession of the drugs beyond a reasonable doubt. Constructive possession is sufficient to support a conviction. State v. Toups, 2001-1875 (La. 10/15/02), 833 So.2d 910, 913. A person is considered to be in constructive possession of a controlled dangerous substance if it is subject to his dominion and control, and the drug need not be in his actual physical possession. Also, a person may be in joint possession of a drug if he willfully and knowingly shares with another the right to control the drug. See State v. Trahan, 425 So.2d 1222, 1226 (La. 1983). But, the mere presence in the area where narcotics are discovered or the mere association with the person who controls the drug or the area where it is located does not constitute constructive possession. Toups, 833 So. 2d at 913.

A determination of whether there is "possession" sufficient to convict depends on the peculiar facts of each case. Id. Factors to be considered in determining whether a defendant exercised dominion and control sufficient to constitute constructive possession include his knowledge that drugs were in the area, his relationship with the person found to be in actual possession, his access to the area where the drugs were found, evidence of recent drug use, and his physical proximity to the drugs. Id.

Defendant argues that he was not in close physical proximity to the recovered drugs, that there was no evidence indicating recent drug use on his part, that Rouse admitted at trial to using methamphetamine (one of the drugs found in the box), and that he had no knowledge of the drugs in the vehicle. Therefore, defendant contends that the state did not adequately prove his constructive possession of the drugs.

The state's primary witness regarding defendant's possession of the drugs was Rouse. She testified that she did not own the drugs, nor did she know they were in the vehicle. Rouse stated that she had asked defendant when they were driving whether they were "good," meaning that the vehicle contained nothing illegal, and he indicated that they were. Rouse testified that she only granted consent because she believed the vehicle was clean. She also recognized the black box as belonging to defendant and as the container in which he kept his drugs.

Perhaps the most compelling evidence regarding defendant's possession of the drugs was his open-court admission, at Rouse's arraignment, that all the drugs belonged to him. This statement was read to the jury at the beginning of defendant's trial and served as direct evidence regarding defendant's possession of the drugs.

After a thorough review of the record, we are convinced that viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, and to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, that defendant was guilty of the six counts of possession of a controlled dangerous substance. The jury apparently rejected defense counsel's theory that defendant had no knowledge of the drugs' presence in the vehicle. When a case involves circumstantial evidence and the jury reasonably rejects the hypothesis of innocence presented by the defense, that hypothesis falls, and the defendant is guilty unless there is another hypothesis that raises a reasonable doubt. State v. Moten, 510 So.2d 55, 61 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 514 So.2d 126 (La. 1987). No such hypothesis exists in the instant case. An appellate court errs by substituting its appreciation of the evidence and credibility of witnesses for that of the fact finder and thereby overturning a verdict on the basis of an exculpatory hypothesis of innocence presented to, and rationally rejected by, the trier of fact. See State v. Calloway, 2007-2306 (La. 1/21/09), 1 So.3d 417, 418 (per curiam). We cannot say that the jury's determination was irrational under the facts and circumstances presented to it. Ordodi, 946 So. 2d at 660.

This assignment of error is without merit.

MOTION TO SUPPRESS

In his first assignment of error, defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress his statement concerning the ownership of the drugs, made after his codefendant's arraignment. He contends that he was counseled to make this statement by the public defender, who represented both Rouse and himself, in an attempt to get Rouse's bail amount reduced. As an ancillary matter, defendant argues that the public defender's joint representation of himself and Rouse violated his constitutional right to counsel.

Before a confession can be introduced in evidence, the state has the burden of affirmatively proving that it was free and voluntary and not made under the influence of fear, duress, intimidation, menaces, threats, inducements, or promises. LSA-R.S. 15:451. Confessions obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight, or by the exertion of any improper influence, are involuntary and inadmissible as a matter of constitutional law. State v. Brown, 481 So.2d 679, 684 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1985), writ denied, 486 So.2d 747 (La. 1986). Spontaneous and voluntary statements, not given as a result of police interrogation or compelling influence, are admissible in evidence without Miranda3 warnings even where a defendant is in custody. State v. Jones, 386 So.2d 1363, 1366 (La. 1980); State v. Houston, 98-2658 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/24/99), 754 So.2d 256, 258.

Although the burden of proof is generally on the defendant to prove the grounds recited in a motion to suppress evidence, such is not the case with the motion to suppress a confession. In the latter situation, the burden of proof is with the state to prove the confession's admissibility. See LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 703(D). Because the evaluation of witness credibility often plays such a large role in the context of a motion to suppress, the district court's denial of a motion to suppress should not be reversed on appeal absent a clear abuse of the district court's discretion, i.e., unless the court's ruling is not adequately supported by reliable evidence. See State v. Green, 94-0887 (La. 5/22/95), 655 So.2d 272, 281.

Defendant was the only witness to testify at the suppression hearing. On direct examination, defendant stated that he spoke with Mr. Craig, who advised him that admitting to owning the drugs would help Rouse, who was attempting to secure a bond reduction. On cross-examination, defendant testified that Mr. Craig also told the defendant it would be in his own best interest to help Rouse. However, he admitted that Mr. Craig never told him to stand up and make a declaration that the drugs belonged to him. When pressed further about the timing of Mr. Craig's statements to him, defendant said that Mr. Craig made the comments about the potential effects of defendant's admission only after it had been made.

In denying the motion to suppress, the trial court found that defendant made his statement freely and without coercion. The trial court also noted that defendant's inculpatory statement was not responsive to anything on the record.

We find no error or abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress. While defendant's testimony from the suppression hearing is a bit confusing, a fair reading of it indicates that Mr. Craig never counseled defendant to make a statement concerning his ownership of the drugs. Further, Mr. Craig apparently only told defendant that his admission might benefit Rouse after he actually made the statement in open court. Considering the totality of the circumstances, defendant's inculpatory statement appears to have been spontaneously made, without inducement or improper influence. Therefore, it was properly admitted at trial.

As an ancillary matter, defendant argues that Mr. Craig's joint representation of Rouse and himself at the arraignment violated his constitutional right to counsel. James Knight, defendant's counsel at the suppression hearing and at trial, briefly raised this issue prior to defendant's testimony at the suppression hearing. In denying defendant's motion to suppress, the trial court did not make any express finding or ruling related to this argument.

We note first that Mr. Craig's joint representation of Rouse and defendant ended following the April 6, 2015 arraignment. For all proceedings thereafter, James Knight represented defendant. Thus, defendant was not subjected to a situation where he was forced to proceed to trial with counsel who represented a client with interests adverse to his own.

Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 517 provides:

Article 517 is a procedural vehicle to lessen the possibility that a jointly represented defendant will assert after conviction that his counsel was not conflict-free and thus was ineffective. Joint representation is not per se illegal and does not violate the right to assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution or Article I, Section 13 of the Louisiana Constitution unless it gives rise to an actual conflict of interest. State v. Kahey, 436 So.2d 475, 484 (La. 1983) (citing State v. Ross, 410 So.2d 1388, 1390 (La. 1982)). Accordingly, the failure of the trial court to inquire into the joint representation on the record does not rise to the level of a denial of a constitutional right and is subject to a harmless error review. See State v. Miller, 2000-0218 (La. App. 4th Cir. 7/25/01), 792 So.2d 104, 115, writ denied, 2001-2420 (La. 6/21/02), 818 So.2d 791; see State v. Castaneda, 94-1118 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/23/95), 658 So.2d 297, 301.

The right to counsel secured under the Sixth Amendment includes the right to conflict-free representation. See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 482, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 1177, 55 L. Ed. 2d 426 (1978). Holloway creates an automatic reversal rule only where defense counsel is forced to represent codefendants over his timely objection, unless the trial court has determined that there is no conflict. Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 168, 122 S.Ct. 1237, 1241-42, 152 L. Ed. 2d 291 (2002).

In determining whether or not a conflict exists, courts often look to the Rules of Professional Conduct. Furthermore, the Louisiana Supreme Court has determined that the ethical rules which regulate attorneys' law practices have been recognized as having the force and effect of substantive law. The burden of proving disqualification of an attorney or other officer of the court rests on the party making the challenge. State v. Letell, 2012-0180 (La. App. 1st Cir. 10/25/12), 103 So.3d 1129, 1140, writ denied, 2012-2533 (La. 4/26/13), 112 So.3d 838.

Louisiana State Bar Articles of Incorporation, Article XVI, Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.7, provides:

At the arraignment, Mr. Craig did not bring to the trial court's attention any potential for conflict as a result of his joint representation of Rouse and defendant.4 The transcript of this proceeding indicates that the court likely handled other matters unrelated to defendant and Rouse in between their respective arraignments, making these codefendants' connection less apparent. Further, defendant's own testimony from the suppression hearing indicates that Mr. Craig did not counsel him to make the inculpatory statement at Rouse's arraignment, but simply informed him of its potential effect thereafter. In short, the record is devoid of any evidence that the trial court knew or should have known of the potential for conflict raised by Mr. Craig's joint representation at the time defendant made his unsolicited statement. On these facts, any error by the trial court in failing to inquire regarding joint representation of Rouse and defendant at the time of the arraignment was not error, or was harmless, and this argument is not a basis for suppressing defendant's statement. To the extent that Mr. Craig might have been aware of the joint representation at the time of the arraignment, we cannot say that this joint representation at such a routine proceeding (an arraignment) violated the Rules of Professional Conduct. There is no evidence that this joint representation rose to the level that Mr. Craig's representation of either Rouse or defendant would have been directly adverse to the other party, or that the joint representation posed a significant risk that the representation of one of these clients would be materially limited by his responsibilities to the other.

This assignment of error is without merit.

CONTEMPT OF COURT

At the close of the sentencing hearing on defendant's billed offenses, the trial court stated, "I guess you can get six more months. That will be six more months for contempt of court, consecutive." The record does not contain any contempt-worthy statement made by defendant, nor did the trial court identify or provide a basis or further explanation for its contempt finding. In his third assignment of error, defendant argues that this contempt finding and sentence should be vacated because of a lack of support on the record. The state agrees that the Jackson standard for contempt has not been met, citing In re Fournet, 98-1510 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/24/99), 757 So.2d 689, 690-91.

Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's contempt order and vacate the six-month sentence.

HABITUAL OFFENDER ADJUDICATION

In his final assignment of error, defendant argues that the trial court erred in accepting his stipulation to the habitual offender bill because the trial court failed to inform him of his rights under the Habitual Offender Law.

At the August 11, 2015 sentencing hearing, defendant was sentenced and then arraigned on the habitual offender bill of information. The following colloquy took place between the court and defendant:

On August 17, 2015, the parties returned to court for defendant's multiple offender hearing. At that time, defense counsel informed the court that he had spoken with defendant, who was willing to stipulate to the facts in the habitual offender bill of information. The trial court ordered defendant sworn, and the following colloquy took place:

At the arraignment on the habitual offender bill, defendant was clearly informed by the trial court of his right to remain silent as to the allegations in the bill. At this time, defendant, who was represented by counsel, elected to deny the allegations of the bill and opt for a hearing, which the trial court set for several days later. On the day of the hearing, after consulting with his attorney, defendant elected to stipulate to the contents of the bill. There is no express requirement in the law that the court must inform the defendant of his rights at each phase of the habitual offender proceeding. The law requires only that the record demonstrate the proceedings as a whole were fundamentally fair and accorded the defendant due process of law. See State v. Gonsoulin, 2003-2473 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/25/04), 886 So.2d 499, 500-02 (en banc), writ denied, 2004-1917 (La. 12/10/04), 888 So.2d 835.

At the time he stipulated to the contents of the habitual offender bill, defendant had been informed of his right to remain silent. Further, the stipulation occurred at the proceeding that was to be the hearing wherein the state sought to prove these allegations. Notably, the state had a fingerprint witness present and ready to testify at the hearing in the event defendant had not stipulated. Finally, defendant was represented by counsel at all of the habitual offender proceedings. On these facts, it is clear that the proceedings as a whole were fundamentally fair and accorded defendant due process of law.

This assignment of error is without merit.

PATENT ERROR

For errors not assigned, we are limited in our review under LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 920(2) to errors discoverable by a mere inspection of the pleadings and proceedings without inspection of the evidence. See State v. Price, 2005-2514 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/28/06), 952 So.2d 112, 123 (en banc), writ denied, 2007-0130 (La. 2/22/08), 976 So.2d 1277. After careful review, we have found errors in both the minutes and commitment order concerning defendant's sentences on counts four and five.

At the habitual offender hearing, the trial court only made express determinations regarding defendant's habitual offender status regarding the underlying offenses on counts 1-3 and count 6. The transcript does not reflect habitual offender sentences for the convictions on counts 4 and 5. However, the court minutes state that the trial court ruled on counts 1-5. Since there is a discrepancy between the minutes and transcript, the transcript must prevail. State v. Lynch, 441 So.2d 732, 734 (La. 1993). In this case, the minutes and commitment order must be amended to reflect that the sentences on counts 4 and 5 are the underlying sentences of four years at hard labor, imposed at defendant's original sentencing hearing. Additionally, the minutes and commitment order indicate that the remaining non-life sentences on counts 1-3 are to be served without parole. This restriction of parole also conflicts with the transcript and requires correction.

Accordingly, we remand the matter to the trial court with instructions that the minutes and commitment order be amended to delete the parole restriction on counts 1-3, and also to reflect that the sentences on counts 4 and 5 are those from the original sentencing hearing.

CONVICTIONS ON OFFENSES LISTED IN AMENDED BILL OF INFORMATION AFFIRMED; ORIGINAL SENTENCES ON COUNTS 4 AND 5 AFFIRMED; HABITUAL OFFENDER ADJUDICATIONS AND SENTENCES ON COUNTS 1-3 AND 6 AFFIRMED; FINDING OF CONTEMPT REVERSED AND SIX-MONTH SENTENCE VACATED; REMANDED FOR CORRECTION OF MINUTES AND COMMITMENT ORDER.