DREW, J.

FACTS

In January of 2012, C.S., age 20, and I.S., age 21, pled guilty to one count each of indecent behavior with juveniles, in violation of La. R.S. 14:81. Their admitted offenses occurred over seven years, at which time:

• C.S. was 12 years old and his victim was not yet 6 years of age; and

• I.S., the brother of C.S., was 13 years old and his victim was not yet 8 years of age.

Prosecuted in adult criminal court, C.S. was sentenced to five years at hard labor, suspended, with three years of probation. I.S. was sentenced to three years at hard labor, suspended, with three years of probation. Both were ordered to register as sex offenders for 15 years, in compliance with La. R.S. 15:542.

In a consolidated appeal, we are asked to review only one issue: the legality of the registration requirement under these unique facts.

Defendants argue that:

• they were indisputably juveniles when these criminal events occurred;

• they could not have been ordered to register had they been charged and prosecuted as juveniles while they were juveniles;

• fairness dictates that they should not have to register now just because the prosecution was delayed until after they became adults; and

• La. R.S. 15:542(A) instructs that a juvenile's age at the time of the offense determines whether registration is required.

The state responds that the trial court had a mandatory duty to order the defendants to register. The father of the victims requests registration.

During a sentencing hearing on May 29, 2012, the trial court stated that:

• the defendants had been prosecuted under La. Ch. C. art. 857(C)(2);

• with the exception of these matters, each defendant had a clean record;

• one defendant is a high school graduate and the other received a G.E.D.; and

• both were employed.

INITIAL ANALYSIS

1. The purpose of sex offender registration is to protect the public.1

2. These defendants are sex offenders, as each has committed a sex offense.2

3. Sex offenders must register as such.3

4. Had these offenses been discovered and prosecuted when the defendants were still juveniles, their cases could not have been transferred to adult court, since each was under 14 when the crimes occurred, and also because the crime of indecent behavior with juveniles is not one of the seven crimes allowing a transfer to adult prosecution of juveniles who are 14 or older at the time of their crime.4

5. The district court has proper adult criminal jurisdiction of these defendants, though any period of confinement is limited to that which they could have received had they been prosecuted while still juveniles.5

6. This confinement limitation is repeated in the Code of Criminal Procedure.6

7. Sex offender registration and notification requirements are mandatory.7

8. To protect the public, the legislature has established onerous probationary conditions for sex offenders.8

9. We have no issue of prescription here.9

JURISPRUDENCE

A. There is not much jurisprudence, and nothing directly on point.

B. One sister circuit has interpreted La. Ch. C. art. 857(C)(2) in State v. Odoms, 2011-2092 (La.App. 1st Cir.6/8/12), 94 So.3d 166. In that case, the defendant was 29 when he was charged with a murder committed when he was 14. According to the law at the time of the crime, a 14-year-old convicted of murder could not be sentenced to a period of confinement extending past his 21st birthday. The trial court sentenced Odoms to imprisonment until his 21st birthday, candidly recognizing that the sentence would have no practical effect, since he had already surpassed the maximum age of confinement.

On appeal, the state argued that:

• the trial court should have applied La. Ch. C. art. 857(A) and (B), which allowed minors who commit any one of eight enumerated crimes when they were at least 14 years of age to be sentenced to confinement until age 31;

• since Odoms was 14 years old at the time of the offense, under La. Ch. C. art. 857(B), the maximum sentence to which he could have been subjected was 17 years, as he was 17 years from age 31 when he committed the murder; and

• even though this amended version of La. Ch. C. art. 857 was not in existence at the time Odoms committed the crime, the state asked the First Circuit to retroactively apply the law so that Odoms could be imprisoned for 17 years.

The First Circuit rejected the state's request, ruling that:

• to retroactively apply La. Ch. C. art. 857(B) would violate constitutional prohibitions10 against ex post facto laws;

• because the law in existence at the time of Odoms' crime authorized imprisoning him only until his 21st birthday, to apply art. 857(B) would increase Odoms' original sentencing exposure by 10 years;

• La. Ch. C. art. 857(C)(2) could be retroactively applied, as this particular provision would not "redefine criminal conduct or increase the penalty by which it is punished. It simply allow[ed] the courts to impose the term of incarceration that could have been imposed at the time of the offense, had the defendant not avoided prosecution at that time";

• had Odoms been prosecuted at age 14, he could have been imprisoned for seven years until he turned 21;

• accordingly, the court could presently sentence Odoms to seven years; and

• since the sentence imposed was no greater than what he could have received had he been prosecuted at the time of the murder, the retroactive application of La. Ch. C. art. 857(C)(2) did not constitute an ex post facto violation.

The First Circuit's holding in Odoms, supra, confirms that La. Ch. C. art. 857(C)(2) prohibits offenders from evading punishment for juvenile crimes, even if the offenses are not discovered until adulthood. The court in Odoms did not have before it our specific issue of whether La. Ch. C. art. 857(C)(2) allows the district court to impose any additional sentencing consequences besides imprisonment.

C. The Louisiana Supreme Court has provided some guidance, at least by analogy. In State ex rel. Olivieri v. State, 2000-0172 (La.2/21/01), 779 So.2d 735, the court dealt with a claim that La. R.S. 15:542 constituted an ex post facto law.

In its analysis, the court focused upon whether a new law redefines criminal conduct or increases the penalty by which the crime is punishable.11 According to the court, a careful review of the subjective intent enunciated in La. R.S. 15:540 shows that the Legislature enacted these Megan's Laws with an avowedly nonpunitive intent. The court found that the laws of registration were enacted to protect communities, aid police in their investigation of sex offenders, and enable quick apprehension of sex offenders.

In addition, the court found that this legislation was of paramount governmental interest because: (1) sex offenders pose a high risk of engaging in sex offenses, (2) sex offenders have a high incidence of recidivism, (3) unless there was registration and community notification, sex offenders could remain hidden and thereby increase the risk to public safety, (4) the intent of the Legislature was remedial, not punitive, thus (5) the law at the time of sentencing should be applied to protect the public and assist law enforcement in tracking these criminals.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

Legislation is the solemn expression of legislative will and, therefore, the interpretation of legislation is primarily the search for the legislative intent.12

When a law is clear and unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, it shall be applied as written and no further interpretation may be made in search of legislative intent.13 The remedial intent of the registration and reporting requirements could not be clearer in La. R.S. 15:540. See Footnote 1.

FINAL ANALYSIS

La. Ch. C. Art. 857(C)(2) specifically prohibits the district court from imposing any greater term of confinement than the defendant could have received in juvenile court. La. Ch. C. art. 857 allows a district court to exercise substantive authority depending on the type of offense of prosecution. If the crime is charged as an adult offense, the law still takes into account the youthful age of the offender and affords him some protections from an increased sentence by the trial court.

The defendants are asking us here to extend the ex post facto protections to sentencing consequences that could not have been imposed by the juvenile court had the defendant been prosecuted while still a juvenile. We decline to do so.

The defendants contend that:

• under La. R.S. 15:542, the age of the defendant at the time of the commission of the offense determines whether or not registration is required; and

• they were neither the requisite age when they committed their offenses, nor were they convicted of one of the seven enumerated crimes allowing transfer.

We agree with the state that registration is required. We conclude this by reading together Olivieri, supra,14 La. R.S. 15:542(A)(1)(a), and La. Ch. C. art. 857(C)(2).15 Remedial legislation,16 intended to protect the public, is properly assessed as the law exists at the time that the probationary or parole conditions are fixed.17

CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court's judgment requiring registration for these defendants who were prosecuted as adults for nontransferrable sex offenses committed when each was a child under the age of 14.

AFFIRMED.

CARAWAY, J., dissents with written reasons.

CARAWAY, J., dissenting.

I agree that Louisiana's sex offender registration is not criminal punishment but rather a regulatory scheme that is civil and nonpunitive. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 123 S.Ct. 1140, 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003), and Olivieri, supra. The scope of that regulation is substantively set forth in La. R.S. 15:542(A), identifying the total class of offenders subject to the regulation. In that statute, the Legislature's imposition of the registration requirements upon a juvenile or "child predator" who commits a sex crime is narrowly limited, as follows:

La. R.S. 15:542(A)(2). The only sex offenses listed in the Children's Code in the cited Articles 305 or 857 are aggravated rape and forcible rape.1 Rounding out the class of offenders who must register, the other provisions of La. R.S. 15:542(A) apply to adults and to other juveniles who commit a crime after attaining the age of 14.

Thus, La. R.S. 15:542(A)(2), the key substantive provision of our law for sex offender registration (which the majority does not address), makes it clear that only the "child predator" who is convicted of rape (aggravated or forcible) shall be regulated for a 15-year period by Louisiana's sex offender registration. The juvenile who commits the crime of indecent behavior with a juvenile is excluded from Louisiana's regulation.

In considering La. R.S. 15:542(A)(2), it is clear that the Legislature intended to impose the regulatory scheme upon the child predator rapist (aggravated or forcible) well into the adult years of his life. The obvious corollary of that rule is that the Legislature never intended that a juvenile who commits the crime of indecent behavior with a juvenile have imposed upon him the sex registration requirements extending for 15 years into his adult years. At this point, the competing legislative policy concern of imposing the stigma of such registration upon a non-rapist juvenile for years into adulthood required that no such registration would apply.

These defendants are guilty of the crime of indecent behavior with a juvenile committed by them at ages 12 and 13. As such, they are not included in the class of persons identified by our law who commit a sex crime as a juvenile and fall under the sex offender registration regulation thereafter. La. R.S. 15:542(A). The Legislature expressly chose not to impose Louisiana's regulatory scheme for sex registration upon them into their adulthood. The other statutes discussed at length by the majority are procedural. They never attempt to redefine the class of sex offender registrants. Nor do they address or expand the clear import of La. R.S. 15:542(A)(2). The judgment requiring registration is contrary to the legislative directives and should be reversed.

APPLICATION FOR REHEARING

Before BROWN, CARAWAY, DREW, MOORE and PITMAN, JJ.

Rehearing denied.

CARAWAY and MOORE, JJ., would grant rehearing.