SUSAN K. GAUVEY, Magistrate Judge.

Dear Counsel,

Plaintiff, Christine Jones, by her attorneys, Richard P. Neuworth and Michael Scott Melick, filed this action seeking judicial review, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), of the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration ("the Commissioner"), who denied plaintiff's claim for Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") and Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") under Title II of the Social Security Act ("the Act"). 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). This case has been referred to the undersigned magistrate judge by consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Local Rule 301. (ECF No. 5; ECF No. 7).

Currently pending before the Court are cross motions for summary judgment. (ECF No. 16; ECF No. 17). No hearing is necessary. Local Rule 105.6. For the reasons that follow, the Court hereby DENIES plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 13), and GRANTS defendant's motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 21).

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff filed an application for DIB and SSI on April 24, 2008 (R. 77-80) alleging a period of disability beginning March 8, 2008 due to diabetes, retinopathy, anemia, gall bladder disease, hepatitis E, and high cholesterol. (R. 155). Plaintiff's application was denied initially on June 25, 2008 (R. 81) and on reconsideration on October 30, 2008. (R. 86). The plaintiff attended an administrative hearing on March 1, 2010. (R. 25-53). At the administrative hearing, Ms. Jones amended her alleged onset date to September 17, 2009. (R. 45, 149). She remained insured through June 30, 2012. (R. 12). The ALJ issued a decision on May 13, 2010, finding that plaintiff was not disabled. (R. 12-20). The Appeals Council denied plaintiff's request for review on September 27, 2011. (R. 1-3). The ALJ's opinion is therefore the final decision of the agency. Plaintiff filed this action seeking review of that final decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g) on March 18, 2011. (ECF No. 1).

II. Factual Background

The Court has reviewed the Commissioner's Statement of Facts and, finding that it accurately represents the record, hereby adopts it. (ECF No. 17-1, 2-8).

III. ALJ's FINDINGS

In evaluating plaintiff's claim for DIB and SSI, the ALJ was required to consider all of the evidence in the record and to follow the sequential five-step evaluation process for determining disability, set forth in 20 C.F.R § 416.920(a).1 If the agency can make a disability determination at any point in the sequential analysis, it does not review the claims further. 20 C.F.R. § 1520(a). After proceeding through all five steps, the ALJ in this case concluded that plaintiff was not disabled as defined by the Act.

The first step requires plaintiff to prove that she is not engaged in "substantial gainful activity."2 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(I). If the ALJ finds that plaintiff is engaged in substantial gainful activity, plaintiff will not be considered disabled. Id. The ALJ in the present case found that plaintiff did not engage in substantial gainful activity since her alleged onset date of September 17, 2009. (R. 14).

At the second step, the ALJ must determine whether plaintiff has a severe, medically determinable impairment or a combination of impairments that limit plaintiff's ability to perform basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1521, 416.921. There is also a durational requirement that plaintiff's impairment last or be expected to last for at least 12 months. 20 C.F.R. § 416.909. Here, the ALJ found that through the date last insured, plaintiff had the following severe impairments: diabetes mellitus, anemia and alcoholism. (R. 14).

At step three, the ALJ considers whether plaintiff's impairments, either individually or in combination, meet or equal an impairment enumerated in the "Listing of Impairments" ("LOI") in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iii). Here, the ALJ found that plaintiff did not have an impairment that meets or medically equals one of the listed impairments. (R. 15).

Before an ALJ advances to the fourth step, he must assess plaintiff's "residual functional capacity" ("RFC"), which is then used at the fourth and fifth steps. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(e). RFC is an assessment of an individual's ability to do sustained work-related physical and mental activities in a work setting on a regular and continuing basis. SSR 96-8p. The ALJ must consider even those impairments that are not "severe." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(2).

In determining a plaintiff's RFC, an ALJ must evaluate the plaintiff's subjective symptoms (e.g., allegations of pain) using a two-part test. Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 594 (4th Cir. 1996); 20 C.F.R. § 404.152. First, the ALJ must determine whether objective evidence shows the existence of a medical impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the actual alleged symptoms. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(b). If the claimant makes that threshold showing, the ALJ must evaluate the extent to which the symptoms limit the claimant's capacity to work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(1). At this second stage, the ALJ must consider all the available evidence, including medical history, objective medical evidence, and statements by the claimant. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c). The ALJ must assess the credibility of the claimant's statements, as symptoms can sometimes manifest at a greater level of severity of impairment than is shown by solely objective medical evidence. SSR 96-7p, 1996 SSR LEXIS 4. To assess credibility, the ALJ should consider factors such as the claimant's daily activities, treatments he has received for his symptoms, medications, and any other factors contributing to functional limitations. Id.

Here, the ALJ found that plaintiff had the residual functional capacity to perform a range of light work activity as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(b) and 404.1567(b) except that claimant requires a stand/sit option, may never climb ladders, ropes, or stairs, may only occasionally balance, kneel, crouch, crawl, bend or climb ramps or stairs, and may not be exposed to unprotected heights or hazardous machinery. (R. 15).

At the fourth step, the ALJ must consider whether plaintiff retains the RFC necessary to perform past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). Here, the ALJ found that claimant had the capacity to perform her past relevant work as a community service officer. (R. 18). Specifically, the ALJ found that claimant's position as a community service officer, which lasted for four years and was within the past 15 years, was substantial gainful activity and met durational and recency requirements. (Id.). The ALJ further noted that the vocational expert testified that claimant's past relevant work as a community service officer was of light exertion and semi-skilled, and therefore was not precluded by her RFC. (Id.).

Although the ALJ determined that plaintiff was capable of past previous work, he also concluded that there were additional jobs in the national economy that plaintiff could perform. (Id.). This determination requires consideration of whether, in light of vocational factors, such as age, education, work experience and RFC, plaintiff is capable of other work in the national economy. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f). At this step, the burden of proof shifts to the agency to establish that plaintiff retains the RFC to engage in an alternative job which exists in the national economy. McLain v. Schweiker, 715 F.2d 866, 868-69 (4th Cir. 1983); Wilson v. Califano, 617 F.2d 1050, 1053 (4th Cir. 1980). The agency must prove both plaintiff's capacity to perform the job and that the job is available. Grant v. Schweiker, 699 F.2d 189, 191 (4th Cir. 1983). Before the agency may conclude that plaintiff can perform alternative skilled or semi-skilled work, it must show that plaintiff possesses skills that are transferable to those alternative positions or that no such transferable skills are necessary. McLain, 715 F.2d at 869. Here the ALJ found that plaintiff was capable of making a successful adjustment to work currently existing in the national economy. (R. 18-19). Specifically, the ALJ found that plaintiff could successfully work as a general office clerk, gate guard, or ticket taker. (R. 19).

The ALJ therefore found that the plaintiff was not under a disability at any time since September 17, 2009, the date the application was filed and the date of her alleged onset. (Id.).

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The function of this Court on review is to leave the findings of fact to the agency and to determine upon the whole record whether the agency's decision is supported by substantial evidence—not to try plaintiff's claim de novo. King v. Califano, 599 F.2d 597, 598 (4th Cir. 1979). This Court must uphold the Commissioner's decision if it is supported by substantial evidence and if the ALJ employed the proper legal standards. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3) (2001); Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996); Coffman v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir. 1987). Substantial evidence "consists of more than a scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less than a preponderance." Laws v. Celebrezze, 368 F.2d 640, 642 (4th Cir. 1966). It is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (internal quotations omitted).

In reviewing the decision, this Court will not re-weigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Craig, 76 F.3d at 589; Hayes v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990). The Commissioner, as fact finder, is responsible for resolving conflicts in the evidence. Snyder v. Ribicoff, 307 F.2d 518, 520 (4th Cir. 1962). If the Commissioner's findings are supported by substantial evidence, this Court is bound to accept them. Underwood v. Ribicoff, 298 F.2d 850 (4th Cir. 1962).

Despite deference to the Commissioner's findings of fact, "a factual finding by the ALJ is not binding if it was reached by means of an improper standard or misapplication of the law." Bowen, 829 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir. 1987). The Court has authority under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to affirm, modify, or reverse the decision of the agency "with or without remanding the case for a rehearing." Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89, 98 (1991).

V. Discussion

The plaintiff made two arguments on appeal, which the Court shall consider in turn.

A. The ALJ Correctly Gave Little Weight to The Opinion of Dr. Sivaraman.

The plaintiff made two arguments on appeal, which the Court shall consider in turn. Plaintiff argues first that the ALJ erred by failing to give either controlling or great weight to the opinion of plaintiff's physician, Dr. Sivaraman. (ECF No. 16, 9). Plaintiff contends that while the ALJ found Dr. Sivarman's assessed limitations to be out of step with the medical findings on record, the ALJ erred in not citing to the specific medical findings considered. (Id. at 10). As such, plaintiff argues that the ALJ's analysis of Dr. Sivaraman's opinion regarding plaintiff's work-related capabilities was "too vague to be legally sufficient." (Id.).

Defendant replies that the ALJ properly cited to several inconsistencies between the evidence on record and Dr. Sivarman's conclusions. (ECF No. 17-1, 11). Defendant emphasizes the ALJ's conclusion that Dr. Sivaraman's opinion was inconsistent with the testimony of plaintiff, the medical record, and Dr. Sivarman's own treatment notes. (Id. at 13-14). Defendant further argues that by citing to both specific medical records and the testimony of plaintiff, the ALJ properly explained his basis for assigning little weight to Dr. Sivaraman's opinion. (Id. at 14). Finally, defendant contends that the ALJ properly concluded that the medical evidence on record did not support Dr. Sivaraman's conclusions. (Id.).

The opinions of treating physicians are generally given a measure of deference by courts due to their "unique perspective to the medical evidence that cannot be obtained from the objective medical findings alone." 20 CFR 404.1527(a)(2). If a treating source is "well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in your case record," it is given controlling weight. Id. However, "by negative implication, if a physician's opinion is not supported by clinical evidence or if it is inconsistent with other substantial evidence, it should be accorded significantly less weight." Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 590 (4th Cir. 1996).

If a treating source opinion does not merit "controlling weight," it should be weighed according to the factors promulgated by the Commissioner in the regulations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2); SSR 96-2p, 1996 SSR LEXIS 9, 1996 WL 374188 (Jul. 2, 1996). The factors are:

20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2).

While a non-controlling treating source opinion is entitled to deference, an ALJ may still find, after an analysis of the above factors, that the opinion is only entitled to slight weight. See, e.g. Thompson v. Astrue, 442 Fed. Appx. 804, 808 (4th Cir. 2011)(affirming decision to afford less weight to a treating physician). If, for example, a treating physician's final opinion "was not supported by treatment notes or by other information on file," an ALJ may discount the opinion. Russell v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 440 Fed. Appx. 163, 164 (4th Cir. 2011); see also Anderson v. Comm'r, 127 Fed. Appx. 96, 97 (4th Cir. 2005).

In his February 1, 2010 assessment, Dr. Sivaraman stated that he had treated plaintiff since 2007 for chronic diarrhea, Diabetes Mellitus, and Gastroesophageal Reflux Disease. As such, he was plaintiff's treating physician. He opined that plaintiff can lift or carry five pounds occasionally and two pounds frequently. (R. 496). He stated that due to pain and frequent diarrhea, plaintiff could stand and/or walk for only forty minutes in an eight hour day, and sit for only two hours. (R. 497). He stated that plaintiff could never climb, balance, stoop, crouch, kneel, or crawl. (Id.). He noted that plaintiff must avoid all exposure to extreme cold or heat, wetness, humidity, noise, vibration, fumes, odors, dust, gases, or poor ventilation. (R. 498). He concluded that plaintiff "is too weak to be gainfully employed." (R. 499).

The ALJ rejected Dr. Sivaraman's assessment, finding it to be "grossly disproportionate to the medical findings supporting the opined limitations." (R. 17). He noted that claimant testified that she could frequently lift five pounds (R. 33), more than the two pounds Dr. Sivaraman assessed. (R. 17). Similarly, Dr. Sivaraman's assessment of claimant's limitation as to sitting was more severe than claimant's. (R. 17). As to Dr. Sivaraman's conclusion that plaintiff had severe environmental limitations, including heat, wetness and fumes, the ALJ noted that record demonstrates that plaintiff "does not have any impairments, such as a respiratory impairment, that would typically indicate such stringent restriction to pulmonary irritants." (Id.). The ALJ similarly did not credit Dr. Sivaraman's remarks regarding plaintiff's pain because there was no evidence in the record that he had prescribed any pain medication to plaintiff. (R. 17). Finally, the ALJ concluded that "Dr. Sivaraman's treatment notes do not reflect objective medical findings to support these extreme limitations of function." (Id.).

The Court finds that this conclusion was properly reached and is supported by substantial evidence. While Dr. Sivaraman is plaintiff's treating physician and is therefore entitled to some deference, there is little evidence in the record to support his conclusions. Contrary to plaintiff's assertions, the ALJ gave specific justifications for his finding. He noted that plaintiff's testimony regarding her lifting and sitting abilities differed from Dr. Sivaraman's findings. (R. 17). He commented that plaintiff was on no medications that caused fatigue, and that Dr. Sivaraman had not prescribed any narcotic pain medication — indeed any pain medication. (Id.) He correctly noted that there is no objective evidence to suggest that plaintiff was experiencing either the significant pain or pulmonary limitation implied by Dr. Sivaraman's restrictive conclusions. (R. 17 — pain — and R. 14 — pulmonary/respiratory).

Plaintiff effectively acknowledges that she does not experience severe pain, but argues that the limitations suggested were primarily—if not exclusively—due to her diarrhea. (ECF No. 16, 10). She points to records from St. Agnes Hospital from October 2009 to demonstrate that Dr. Sivaraman's limitations are consistent with the record. (Id.). The hospital record states that plaintiff was having heavy diarrhea five to six times a day, and that her symptoms did not improve. (R. 391).

This single record does not provide a foundation for Dr. Sivaraman's conclusions. While it suggests that plaintiff has experienced severe diarrhea, it does not support Dr. Sivaraman's conclusion that the malady was chronically debilitating. Indeed, as defendant notes, the medical records suggest the opposite. A colonoscopy showed the possibility of "mild colitis," (R. 392), but was "otherwise normal." (R. 404). A pathology report confirmed mild acute colitis in the ascending colon, moderate acute colitis in the descending colon, and mild acute colitis in the superficial epithelium. (R. 413). The report notes that "these biopsies suggest an acute self-limited process, although the possibility of acute presentation of inflammatory bowel disease cannot be entirely excluded." (R. 413).

In this context, "self-limited" means "a disease that runs a definite limited course. Dorland's Illustrated Medical Dictionary at 1689 (32d ed. 2012). "Acute" is defined as "having a short and relatively severe course." Id. at 24. These records suggest a severe but isolated illness. They provide little support for Dr. Sivaraman's conclusion that plaintiff was severely and profoundly limited in her ability to work.

There is little other objective evidence in the medical record relating to plaintiff's gastrointestinal issues after her onset date. Plaintiff submitted discharge instructions—but no treatment notes—from hospital visits in February and April 2010. The April records note a discharge diagnosis of "C. dificil colitis and Ulcerative Colitis." (R. 519). The discharge records are brief and without detail, however, and do not contain sufficient information to substantially support Dr. Sivaraman's restrictive findings.3

Additionally, the ALJ could and did credit the state agency medical consultants' opinions "that claimant's reported ADLs and limitations are not fully supported by the medical records in evidence." (R. 16). Of course, "if a physician's opinion is not supported by the clinical evidence or it is inconsistent with other substantial evidence, it should be accorded significantly less weight."4 Accordingly, the ALJ did not err in according Dr. Sivaraman's opinion little weight.

B. The ALJ Did Not Err In Finding the Plaintiff Lacked Credibility

Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ erred in affording her testimony weight only to the extent it was consistent with the ALJ's RFC. (ECF No. 16-11). Noting that the ALJ took into account an inconsistency in her testimony regarding alcohol use, plaintiff contends that "the ALJ largely relies on this small discrepancy to completely reject" her testimony. (Id.). Plaintiff argues that this "conclusory rejection" is in violation of SSR 96-7p. Defendant responds that plaintiff misstates the record, arguing that in fact the ALJ advanced several rationales for his conclusion regarding plaintiff's testimony. (ECF No. 17-1, 18-19).

An ALJ's credibility analysis is a two-step process. First, the adjudicator must consider whether there are underlying medically determinable physical or mental impairments that could reasonably be expected to produce the individual's pain or other symptoms. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(b). Second, if the underlying physical or mental impairments are shown, the adjudicator must evaluate the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of the individual's ability to do basic work activities. Id., SSR 96-7p, 1996 SSR LEXIS 4, *2.

The final credibility determination "cannot be based on an intangible or intuitive notion about an individual's credibility," but must "contain specific reasons for a finding on credibility." SSR 96-7p. A "single conclusory statement" that plaintiff's allegations are not credible is insufficient. Id. ALJs are directed to consider a non-exclusive range of factors in making their determination.5 Id. In addition, an ALJ may consider the opinions of state-agency examiners as to whether the objective evidence on record supports the claimant's alleged limitations. SSR 96-7p. Non-compliance with treatment may be "particularly appropriate" to the assessment of a claimant's credibility. Culotta v. Astrue, No. SAG-10-cv-3137, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120747 *19 (D. Md. 2011).

The ALJ here considered several factors in his assessment of plaintiff's credibility. First, he stated that he accepted the opinions of state agency medical consultants that claimant's alleged limitations "are not fully supported by the medical records in evidence." (R. 16). Second, the ALJ found plaintiff's claim that she no longer drank alcohol to be less than fully credible. (Id.). He noted that while plaintiff stated that she stopped drinking in September 2009, a February 2010 medical assessment indicated that plaintiff had not consumed alcohol for three months, suggesting that her cessation date was in fact October 2009. (Id.). Third, the ALJ noted that medical records from a February 2010 hospital visit were "suspiciously incomplete." (Id.). Finally, the ALJ found that claimant's "general noncompliance" with treatment had likely exacerbated her condition. (R. 17). Ultimately, the ALJ concluded that claimant's statements were not credible to the extent they were inconsistent with the ALJ's RFC formulation. (R. 16).

This conclusion was properly reached. The Court agrees with plaintiff that the one-month discrepancy in her statements regarding alcohol cessation is insufficient, alone, to cast any significant doubt on her credibility. The ALJ's discussion was not as limited, however, as plaintiff suggests. The ALJ, as per SSR 96-7p, also properly considered the findings of the state agency medical consultants. In addition, the Court agrees with the ALJ that plaintiff's submission of only discharge instructions related to her February 2011 hospital visit, and not treatment notes, raises some doubt, particularly because the post-onset medical record in this case is otherwise relatively slight.6 Finally, the ALJ emphasized that plaintiff's noncompliance cast doubt on the severity of her symptoms. Indeed, the record suggests that plaintiff was at times "extremely non-compliant." (R. 258).

The Court finds that the evidence of non-compliance, the opinions of state agency consultants, and plaintiff's failure to provide a full treatment record, together form a sufficient basis for the ALJ's finding that plaintiff lacked credibility as to the extent and severity of the pain, other symptoms and limitations that she claimed.

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that the ALJ committed no errors in his opinion. Accordingly, the Court DENIES plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and GRANTS defendant's motion for summary judgment.

Despite the informal nature of this letter, it shall constitute an Order of the Court, and the Clerk is directed to docket it accordingly.