PAUL W. GRIMM, District Judge.
Plaintiff J & J Sports Productions Inc. ("J & J") filed this action against Defendants
J & J had exclusive broadcast rights to the championship fight between Floyd Mayweather Jr. and Robert Guerrero (the "Program") on May 4, 2013, and Defendants broadcast the Program at their commercial establishment without a license. Compl. ¶¶ 9, 12, ECF No. 1. Plaintiff's private investigator approximates the maximum capacity at Defendants' establishment at one hundred people, Stephens Aff., ECF No. 10-3, and Plaintiff's Rate Card provides that the fee for a license for an establishment of that size to show the Program was $4,200, Rate Card, ECF No. 10-4.
J & J served Daysi Gil on May 26, 2015, and her answer was due on June 16, 2015. See ECF No. 6. J & J served Walter Gil on May 28, 2015, whose answer was due on June 18, 2015. See ECF Nos. 7 & 7-1.
I have reviewed J & J's motion for judgment by default, the exhibits attached thereto, and the record in this case. I find that Defendants Walter Gil and Daysi Gil were properly served yet failed to plead or otherwise defend. Moreover, accepting the well-pleaded factual allegations in J & J's complaint as to liability as true, see Ryan v. Homecomings Fin. Network, 253 F.3d 778, 780 (4th Cir. 2001), I find that Walter Gil and Daysi Gil are liable for violations of 47 U.S.C. §§ 605(e)(3)(B)(iii) & 605(e)(3)(C)(ii) and 47 U.S.C. §§ 553(c)(3)(B) & 553(c)(2)(c) and that they acted willfully in violating the statutes. For these reasons, I will award J & J damages as detailed below.
"Consistent with prior case law in this District, the Court will accept the cost to purchase the Program as the direct loss to J & J Sports Productions . . . ." J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. El Rodeo Restaurant, LLC, No. PJM-15-172, 2015 WL 3441995, at *2-3 (D. Md. May 26, 2015). Plaintiff provided the Rate Card showing $4,200 as the amount Defendant would have paid for a license to show the Program. See Rate Card. Accordingly, I will award Plaintiff a total of $4,200 in statutory damages under 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(B)(iii).
Plaintiff has requested enhanced damages under 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(C)(ii). See Pl.'s Mot. 2. Previously, I have granted limited enhanced damages under a similar fact pattern to the present case where the defendant acted willfully, the private investigator did not pay a cover charge, and there was no evidence that the defendant advertised the event or repeatedly violated the statute for monetary gain. See J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Diaz, Grandados, Inc., No. PWG-14-457, slip op. 2 (D. Md. Sept. 28, 2015). The fact pattern present in this case constitutes "non-egregious willfulness" that is insufficient "to recover the maximum damages authorized by statue and . . . damages under section 553, section 605, and conversion for the same conduct." See J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Rumors, Inc., No. CCB-14-2046, 2014 WL 6675646, at *4 (D. Md. Nov. 21, 2014). "Undaunted, J & J `has repeatedly filed motions seeking excessive damages in nearly identical cases, and the court has consistently addressed the limitations on damages for the same causes of action brought here.'" Id. (quoting J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Sabor Latino Rest., Inc., No. PJM-13-3515, 2014 WL 2964477, at *2 (D. Md. June 27, 2014)). "In light of this recalcitrance, the court declines to award any enhanced damages." Id. "[S]ince Rumors, J & J has made several unsupported requests for the maximum amount of enhanced damages in this district." J & J Sports Prod., Inc. v. Intipuqueno, LLC, No. DKC 15-1325, 2016 WL 1752894, at *4 (D. Md. May 3, 2016) (citations omitted) (denying Plaintiff's request for maximum enhanced damages where facts are almost identical to this case because Plaintiff continues to request such damages and ignores precedent of this Court denying its requests). It would be one thing if Plaintiff had acknowledged the line of cases from this Court denying enhanced damages in similar circumstances and advanced a non-frivolous argument why a different result would be warranted in this case, but it did not. Plaintiff simply ignored clearly dispositive case law that was inconsistent with its position and that it may not do with impunity. Accordingly, I will follow the recent rulings of this Court and decline to award J & J any enhanced damages.
As noted, Plaintiff and its counsel have ignored the clear precedent of this Court in continuing to seek "excessive" enhanced damages as requested in its motion. In its argument seeking these damages, J & J fails to cite to the portions of recent cases rejecting J & J's arguments for damages at the statutory maximum level. J & J has acknowledged that "[g]enerally, Plaintiffs cannot recover under both statutes for the same conduct and courts allow recovery under only § 605 as it provides for greater recovery." See Pl.'s Mem. 5 (citing J & J Sports Productions, Inc. v. Quattrocche, No. WMN-09-3420, 2010 WL 2302353, at *1 (D. Md. June 7, 2010)). However J & J ignores this Court's ruling in the same opinion rejecting its request for damages at the statutory maximum:
Id. at *3. J & J ignores and does not cite to this Court's findings in Sabor:
Sabor, 2014 WL 2964477, at *2 (internal citations omitted). J & J has also failed to cite or otherwise discuss this Court's finding in Rumors:
Rumors, 2014 WL 6675646, at *4.
"The cases Plaintiff cites from other districts granting enhanced damages do not erase the repeated, clear direction that multiple judges in this district have given Plaintiff regarding damages." Intipuqueno, 2016 WL 1752894, at *4.
In Quattroche, counsel for J & J was Richard Kind of the Law Offices of Kind and Dashoff. In Sabino, Rumours, Intipuqeno, and the present case, counsel for J & J were or are Amy Keller, Erica Cook, and Richard Kind of the Law Offices of Kind and Dashoff. Plaintiff's counsel are members of the bar of the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. "This Court applies the Rules of Professional Conduct as they have been adopted by the Maryland Court of Appeals." Loc. R. 704. Rule 3.3 states that a "lawyer shall not knowingly:. . . (3) fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel." From the materials before me, it appears that Plaintiff's counsel violated Maryland Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3 by failing to disclose the precedent in Quattroche, Sabino, Rumours, and Intipuqeno that was directly adverse to J & J's position with respect to enhanced damages. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(3), I will order Plaintiff and its counsel to show cause pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1) why they should not be sanctioned for yet again seeking maximum enhanced damages without discussing contrary controlling precedent from this Court regarding the extent of damages recoverable in this case.
"J & J cannot . . . recover under both section 553 and section 605. To hold otherwise would violate the maxim that `courts can and should preclude double recovery . . . .'" Rumors, 2014 WL 6675646, at *2 (quoting EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 297 (2002)). J & J acknowledges that this Court generally does not permit double recovery but seemingly urges that I follow a Northern California district court in permitting recovery under both sections 605 and 553. See Pl.'s Mem. 5 (citing Spencer Promotions, Inc. v. 5th Quarter Enterprises, Inc., No. C-94-0988 CW, 1996 WL 438789, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 1996)). I will follow the precedent of this Court and deny J & J's request for statutory and enhanced damages under 47 U.S.C. § 553 because I already have awarded J & J damages under 47 U.S.C. § 605.
J & J also seeks damages of $1,500 for the tort of conversion.
Quattrocche, 2010 WL 2302353, at *1 (citations omitted). I will follow the precedent of this Court and deny J & J's request for damages based on the tort of conversion because I already have awarded J & J damages under 47 U.S.C. § 605.
For the reasons explained above, I will GRANT IN PART AND DENY IN PART Plaintiff's motion for judgment by default.
Accordingly, it is, this 1st day of
I will order J & J to serve Zelada by September 1, 2016, or J & J's case against Zelada will be dismissed without further notice.