RICHARD D. BENNETT, District Judge.
Pending is a Motion to Dismiss, or in the alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant Bobby P. Shearin. ECF 37.
The case was instituted upon receipt of a civil rights Complaint filed by Plaintiff Brandon Roberts,
When Plaintiff returned to the segregation unit on or about January 28, 2012, he discovered that no legal library had been established. Rather, a book-mobile style cart was in operation in lieu of a library. Id., p. 3. Plaintiff indicates that the book carts are devoid of any legal research materials, and alleges that Defendant has failed to provide segregation inmates basic research materials such as federal or state digests, legal dictionaries, Sheppard's citations, United States Codes and Statues. Id., p. 4.
Plaintiff indicates that the existing system used to access legal materials is inadequate in that he is forced to request legal research materials by exact citation, it takes weeks to months to obtain the requested materials, and he is only able to obtain five cases at a time, making it difficult to carry out meaningful legal research. Id. Plaintiff further indicates that frequently the wrong research is sent, or no response to the request is received, causing him to miss deadlines in with the court. He states that this puts him in a position where he needs to explain to the court the difficulties in preparing his pleadings. Id., p. 5.
NBCI Correctional Librarian Rebecca Hammons avers that NBCI provides computers in the main library and in housing units 2, 3 and 4 which contain legal dictionaries. ECF 18-2, ¶ 4. Hammons further avers that on October 23, 2012, Black's Law Dictionaries were placed in each housing unit at NBCI and in the Main Library for use by inmates.
From September 22, 2008 through October 12, 2012, Plaintiff checked out and received 17 legal materials, including the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, treatises, and portions of the Maryland Code. ECF 18-2, ¶ 7; ECF 18-3. From October 12, 2012, to the signing of Hammons' affidavit on February 4, 2014, Plaintiff did not request any legal related cases, books, citations or department directives form the NBCI main library. ECF 18-2, ¶ 8. From December 28, 2011 to October 14, 2013, Plaintiff requested and received approximately 140 legal resources through LASI. ECF 18-4.
The purpose of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is to test the sufficiency of the plaintiff's complaint. See Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999). The dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted does not require defendant to establish "beyond doubt" that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 561 (2007). Once a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint. Id. at 563. The court need not, however, accept unsupported legal allegations, see Revene v. Charles County Comm'rs, 882 F.2d 870, 873 (4th Cir. 1989), legal conclusions couched as factual allegations, see Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986), or conclusory factual allegations devoid of any reference to actual events, see United Black Firefighters v. Hirst, 604 F.2d 844, 847 (4th Cir. 1979).
Summary Judgment is governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) which provides that:
The Supreme Court has clarified that this does not mean that any factual dispute will defeat the motion:
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986) (emphasis in original).
"The party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment `may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [his] pleadings,' but rather must `set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 525 (4th Cir. 2003) (alteration in original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). The court should "view the evidence in the light most favorable to . . . the nonmovant, and draw all inferences in her favor without weighing the evidence or assessing the witness' credibility." Dennis v. Columbia Colleton Med. Ctr., Inc., 290 F.3d 639, 644-45 (4th Cir. 2002). The court must, however, also abide by the "affirmative obligation of the trial judge to prevent factually unsupported claims and defenses from proceeding to trial." Bouchat, 346 F.3d at 526 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 778-79 (4th Cir. 1993), and citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986)).
In Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986) the Supreme Court explained that in considering a motion for summary judgment, the "judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." A dispute about a material fact is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. at 248. Thus, "the judge must ask himself not whether he thinks the evidence unmistakably favors one side or the other but whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the [nonmoving party] on the evidence presented." Id. at 252.
The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. No genuine issue of material fact exists if the nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of his or her case as to which he or she would have the burden of proof. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). Therefore, on those issues on which the nonmoving party has the burden of proof, it is his or her responsibility to confront the summary judgment motion with an affidavit or other similar evidence showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.
Prisoners have a constitutionally protected right of access to the courts. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977). However:
Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 355 (1996).
"Ultimately, a prisoner wishing to establish an unconstitutional burden on his right of access to the courts must show `actual injury' to `the capability of bringing contemplated challenges to sentences or conditions of confinement before the courts.'" O'Dell v. Netherland, 112 F.3d 773, 776 (4th Cir. 1997), quoting Lewis, 518 U.S. at 355. "The requirement that an inmate alleging a violation of Bounds must show actual injury derives ultimately from the doctrine of standing, a constitutional principle that prevents courts of law from undertaking tasks assigned to the political branches." Lewis, 518 U.S. at 349. Actual injury occurs when a prisoner demonstrates that a "nonfrivolous" and "arguable" claim was lost because of the denial of access to the courts. Id. at 352-352.
In Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002), the Court characterized access to the courts claims as being in one of two categories. Id at 413. The first, termed "forward looking claims," are cases where official action frustrates a plaintiff's ability to bring a suit at the present time. Jennings v. City of Stillwater, 383 F.3d 1199, 1208-09 (10th Cir. 2004). The second class, termed "backward looking claims," arise when a Plaintiff alleges that a specific claim "cannot be tried (or tried with all the evidence) [because past official action] caused the loss or inadequate settlement of a meritorious case." Id. at 1209. In this way, the official action is said to have "`rendered hollow [the plaintiff's] right to seek redress'" in the courts. Id. (quoting Christopher, 536 U.S. at 415 (brackets in original) (internal citations omitted)).
Whether the claim is forward or backward looking, a prisoner claiming he was denied access to the courts must ultimately prove he suffered an actual injury by showing that the defendant's acts hindered his ability to pursue a nonfrivolous legal claim. Conclusory allegations are not sufficient in this regard. See Wardell v. Duncan, 470 F.3d 954, 959 (10th Cir. 2006) (denying access to court claim based on allegation that petition for a writ of certiorari had, for unspecified reasons, been dismissed and where plaintiff did not even mention the point on appeal). The right of access to the courts is "ancillary to the underlying claim, without which a plaintiff cannot have suffered injury by being shut out of court." Christopher, 536 U.S. at 415.
Plaintiff has established that while housed on segregation at NBCI he did not have access to a satellite legal library. He has, however, failed to allege, much less demonstrate any injury to non-frivolous legal claims caused as a result of the NBCI's system for accessing legal materials. Plaintiff's bald allegations that the system in place at NBCI prohibits his meaningful legal research and resulted in his missing unspecified deadlines are insufficient. The facts before the Court demonstrate that while segregation inmates have more limited access to legal materials than non-segregation inmates and that the main library at NBCI does not possess all of the materials Plaintiff desires, he has nevertheless failed to demonstrate any injury. As such, his claim fails.
For the aforementioned reasons, Defendant Shearin's Motion, construed as a motion for summary judgment, shall be GRANTED. A separate Order follows.
