Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

In this appeal, Andrew Chance (Defendant) raises numerous evidentiary challenges to his convictions, following a jury trial, on one count of filing a retaliatory lien against a government employee, 18 U.S.C. § 1521, and three counts of filing a false claim against the government, id. § 287. We affirm.

I.

The statutory section pertaining to the retaliatory lien count provides, in relevant part:

Id. § 1521. The statutory section pertaining to the false claim counts provides, in relevant part:

Id. § 287.

With respect to the single count of filing a retaliatory lien against a government employee, the undisputed evidence at Defendant's trial established the following. On or about July 25, 2007, a federal jury convicted Defendant on one count of filing a false claim against the government based upon Defendant's conduct of knowingly filing a federal income tax return which falsely claimed his entitlement to a refund in the amount of $306,753.00. See id. § 287. Defendant was sentenced to twenty-seven months' imprisonment for such crime.

Approximately two months after his release from federal prison for such crime, on or about August 14, 2009, Defendant filed a UCC Financing Statement with the Maryland Department of Assessments and Taxation (the UCC Financing Statement), in which Defendant listed himself as the secured party and claimed that Steven Dunne (Dunne), the Assistant United States Attorney who had prosecuted him on the 2007 false claim charge, owed him $1,313,000,000.00 in tort damages. Defendant further claimed in the UCC Financing Statement that "Said Tort Claim becomes a perfected claim/lien after 90 days (billing time period), and said lien becomes an `account receivable,' and the account receivable becomes the private property of the Claimant . . . ." (J.A. 832). Defendant paid the appropriate filing fee to file the UCC Financing Statement. The Maryland Department of Assessments and Taxation accepted the UCC Filing Statement as filed and made it a publically available record.

Following Defendant's arrest on the charges in the present case and after being advised of his constitutional right to remain silent, Defendant told the arresting officers that he filed the lien against Dunne because Dunne had "done [him] wrong" by prosecuting him. (J.A. 537).

With respect to the three counts of filing a false claim against the government, the undisputed evidence at Defendant's trial established the following. In April 2010, the United States Internal Revenue Service (the IRS) issued an employer identification number to the Andrew Chance Trust. In September 2010, Defendant filed three federal income tax returns for tax years 2007, 2008, and 2009, which Defendant had signed under penalty of perjury. Each return listed the Andrew Chance Trust as the taxpayer and listed the employment identification number that had been issued by the IRS to the Andrew Chance Trust in April 2010.

For each of the three years at issue, the returns falsely reported trust income of $900,000.00, falsely reported $300,000.00 of such income had been withheld by the government, and falsely reported that a $300,000.00 refund was due to the trust. Defendant admitted under oath at trial that he knew the trust had not generated income of $900,000.00 for any of the three years at issue. He also admitted that he knew the trust did not have $300,000.00 in withholding in any account with the government for the same three years, but explained that the refund figures on the returns corresponded to a total of $900,000.00 that he believes he is owed in reparations because he is a descendant of slaves.

The district court sentenced Defendant to sixty-five months' imprisonment with respect to the retaliatory lien count and to sixty months' imprisonment on each of the three false claim counts to run concurrently with his sentence on the retaliatory lien count. This timely appeal followed in which Defendant challenges his convictions on various evidentiary grounds.

II.

Defendant first challenges all of his convictions on the ground that the district court abused its discretion by granting the government's motion in limine to exclude the testimony of the following mental-health experts he offered to rebut the government's evidence on the specific intent element of the retaliatory lien count and the false claim counts: (1) forensic psychiatrist Dr. Martin Brandes; (2) neuropsychologist Dr. Victoria Starbuck; and (3) neurologist/neuropsychiatrist Dr. Richard Restak.1

Defendant's challenge to his convictions is without merit. The law is well settled that a district court is afforded wide discretion in determining the admissibility of evidence at trial, United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 54 (1984), and "the district court's evidentiary determinations should not be overturned except under the most extraordinary of circumstances," United States v. Aramony, 88 F.3d 1369, 1377 (4th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the government's motion in limine to exclude the expert testimony of Drs. Brandes, Starbuck, and Restak.

Of relevance to this issue, without objection by Defendant, the district court charged the jury as follows regarding the specific intent element of Defendant's retaliatory lien count: "the defendant knew or had reason to know that such lien or encumbrance contained a materially false or fictitious statement or representation." (J.A. 720). Without objection by Defendant, the district court charged the jury as follows regarding the specific intent element of his false claim counts: "that the defendant presented the claim knowing that it was false or fictitious as to a material fact." (J.A. 722). Of relevance to this issue, the district court further instructed the jury without objection:

(J.A. 724).

At trial, Defendant did not dispute that the events in this case occurred more or less as described by the government's evidence. Defendant also did not raise a federal insanity defense under the Insanity Defense Reform Act (the IDRA), 18 U.S.C. § 17, which act requires a defendant to prove by clear and convincing evidence "that, at the time of the commission of the acts constituting the offense, the defendant, as a result of a severe mental disease or defect, was unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his acts," id. § 17(a).2 Rather, the crux of Defendant's defense at trial was that his actions were the result of a confused and irrational mind. In support of this defense, Defendant sought to have Drs. Brandes, Starbuck, and Restak testify that he has a rigid personality style, is mentally inflexible, has certainty in the righteousness of his behavior, and is unwilling to consider alternative explanations. According to Defendant, the doctors' testimony would negate the government's evidence regarding the specific intent element of his charged crimes. Notably, prior to ruling on the government's motion in limine to exclude Drs. Brandes, Starbuck, and Restak from testifying as expert witnesses for the defense, the district court only had the benefit of such doctors' written reports to explain the substance of their proposed testimony.3

In granting the government's motion in limine to exclude the expert testimony of Drs. Brandes, Starbuck, and Restak, the district court wrote a thorough, detailed, and well-reasoned memorandum opinion. The crux of the district court's reasoning in granting the motion was that the conclusions about Defendant offered by his proposed mental-health expert witnesses fall into the category of defenses that Congress intended to preclude under the IDRA, which act "expressly prohibits the use of any `[m]ental disease or defect' as a defense unless it demonstrates that the defendant `was unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his acts,'" United States v. Worrell, 313 F.3d 867, 872 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 17), "leav[ing] no room for a defense that raises `any form of legal excuse based upon one's lack of volitional control' including `a diminished ability or failure to reflect adequately upon the consequences or nature of one's actions,'" id. (quoting United States v. Cameron, 907 F.2d 1051, 1061 (11th Cir. 1990)). We fully agree with the district court's reasoning in granting the government's motion in limine, as set forth in the district court's memorandum. See United States v. Chance, 2011 WL 5826675 (D.Md. November 17, 2011) (memorandum opinion). Accordingly, we rely on such reasoning to hold the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting such motion.

III.

Defendant challenges his retaliatory lien conviction on the basis that the district court abused its discretion by granting the government's motion in limine to exclude the testimony of J. Kimon Yiasaides (Yiasaides), his proposed expert witness on the use of bonds and liens in this case and commercial disputes. Notably, Defendant did not provide the district court with a report from this proposed expert.

The district court granted the government's motion in limine with respect to Yiasaides on the basis that his expertise was irrelevant and unnecessary to the case considering the relatively simple concepts at issue with respect to whether Defendant filed a false lien against a federal prosecutor. Additionally, the district court concluded that such expert testimony would likely only confuse or mislead the jury, and that if it became evident during trial that jurors required specialized knowledge to understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue, it would reconsider its ruling. The district court never deemed it necessary to reconsider its ruling.

Having reviewed the relevant materials on this issue, including the record and the parties' briefs, we hold the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the government's motion in limine to exclude the expert testimony of Yiasaides.

IV.

We have carefully reviewed Defendant's remaining assignments of error, including his argument that the district court improperly restricted his cross-examination of Dunne and his argument that the district court improperly restricted the redirect examination of himself as a witness, and find such assignments of error to be without merit.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED.