JOHN C. NIVISON, Magistrate Judge.
In this action, Plaintiff Frank Inman alleges that Defendants Wendy Riebe, Dr. Robert Clinton, and Dr. George Stockwell were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs while he was incarcerated at the Maine Correctional Center.
The matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, through which motion Defendants assert that the record cannot support a finding of deliberate indifference. (ECF No. 87.) Plaintiff did not file an opposition to the motion.
Following a review of the pleadings and the summary judgment filings, I recommend the Court grant Defendants' motion.
In his complaint, Plaintiff alleged Defendant Wendy Riebe, Health Services Administrator for Correct Care Services, failed to follow through on an agreement to secure a pair of eyeglasses for Plaintiff from Plaintiff's "regular eye doctor." (Complaint at 3, ECF No. 1.) According to Plaintiff, at the time his glasses were broken. Id. In addition to the claim against Defendant Riebe, Plaintiff alleged that although the physicians who oversee medical care at the Correctional Center, Defendants Clinton and Stockwell, understood that Plaintiff had "medical issues," specifically migraines, pain from a prior back injury, and a positive test result for Huntington's disease, they refused to treat Plaintiff for the issues. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff signed his complaint using the statutory alternative for the oath. (Id. at 3.)
After Plaintiff's complaint was docketed, Plaintiff sent miscellaneous correspondence to the Court in which he described certain post-filing events at the Correctional Center and enclosed articles related to Huntington's disease. None of the subsequent filings was sworn or bore any other indicia of evidentiary quality.
Plaintiff was incarcerated in the Department of Corrections from November 6, 2013 — December 21, 2015. (Defendants' Statement of Material Facts ¶ 1.) In 2009, Plaintiff was diagnosed through genetic testing as having a genetic marker for Huntington's disease. (Id. ¶¶ 2-7.) The Huntington's findings were recorded as "[pre]manifest Huntington's Disease as defined by lack of definitive symptoms in the setting of a positive genetic test. . . ." (Id. ¶ 7.) Defendants Clinton and Stockwell consulted with Plaintiff regarding the diagnosis. (Id. ¶¶ 8-13.)
During his incarceration, Plaintiff was also provided with outside consultations related to his Huntington's diagnosis. (Id. ¶¶ 25-28.) The symptoms that Plaintiff believed were the product of Huntington's disease, i.e., headaches, alleged balance issues, depression, forgetfulness, seizures (undocumented), and weight loss,
As to Plaintiff's alleged Huntington's disease, the record establishes that (1) other than having the genetic marker, Plaintiff has not been diagnosed with Huntington's disease because he does not meet the specific criteria for the diagnosis; (2) no treatment was available that would have reduced the risk that Plaintiff would develop Huntington's disease; and (3) because Plaintiff did not meet the criteria for the diagnosis of Huntington's disease, he did not require treatment during his incarceration. (Id. ¶¶ 95-99.)
Defendants assessed and treated Plaintiff's complaints of migraine headaches. (Id. ¶ 86.) When Plaintiff was observed by CCS staff, he did not show any signs or symptoms of impairing headaches and regularly went to the gym, to work, and to programs. (Id. ¶ 87.) In part on this basis, Plaintiff's headaches were determined not to be medically serious. (Id. ¶ 88.)
Plaintiff's reports of back injury and pain did not impact his ability to function as he participated in work, exercised regularly, and moved without evidence of pain or impairment. (Id. ¶ 90.)
Relevant to Plaintiff's claim regarding his eyeglasses, Plaintiff entered the Correctional Center in November 2013 with his own pair of prescription eyeglasses, which had wire frames. (Id. ¶ 100.) At the Correctional Center, all inmates who need eyeglass frames wear a standard black plastic frame. (Id. ¶ 101.) Defendant Riebe asked the Correctional Center staff to permit Plaintiff to use the wire frames and updated prescription lenses with which he arrived at the Correctional Center. (Id. ¶ 102.) The request was denied for safety and security reasons. (Id. ¶¶ 103, 105, 127, 129.) Defendant Riebe subsequently secured for Plaintiff renewed prescription lenses in the standard-issue frames permitted at the Correctional Center. (Id. ¶ 106.) Plaintiff was issued, but from time to time, refused to wear the new glasses. (Id. ¶ 109.) Plaintiff's concerns regarding his eyesight were addressed regularly. (Id. ¶ 110.) The Correct Care Services optometrist adjusted Plaintiff's prescription on three occasions in 18 months, and while incarcerated, Plaintiff signed receipts for three different pairs of standard issue black eyeglass frames with three new prescriptions. (Id. ¶ 111.)
"The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "After the moving party has presented evidence in support of its motion for summary judgment, `the burden shifts to the nonmoving party, with respect to each issue on which he has the burden of proof, to demonstrate that a trier of fact reasonably could find in his favor.'" Woodward v. Emulex Corp., 714 F.3d 632, 637 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Hodgens v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 144 F.3d 151, 158 (1st Cir. 1998)).
A court reviews the factual record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, resolving evidentiary conflicts and drawing reasonable inferences in the non-movant's favor. Perry v. Roy, 782 F.3d 73, 77 (1st Cir. 2015). If a court's review of the record reveals evidence sufficient to support findings in favor of the non-moving party on one or more of his claims, a trial-worthy controversy exists and summary judgment must be denied as to any supported claim. Id. ("The district court's role is limited to assessing whether there exists evidence such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." (internal quotation marks omitted)). Unsupported claims are properly dismissed. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986) ("One of the principal purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses.").
Through their motion for summary judgment, Defendants maintain the record demonstrates that they were attentive to Plaintiff's medical needs and that the factfinder could not reasonably conclude that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to a serious risk to Plaintiff's health. (Motion for Summary Judgment at 9-10.)
Defendants' obligation to Plaintiff regarding medical services is governed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, the Due Process Clause imposes on the states the "substantive obligation" not to treat prisoners in their care in a manner that reflects "deliberate indifference" toward "a substantial risk of serious harm to health," Coscia v. Town of Pembroke, 659 F.3d 37, 39 (1st Cir. 2011), or "serious medical needs," Feeney v. Corr. Med. Servs., 464 F.3d 158, 161 (1st Cir. 2006) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-106 (1976)). To be actionable, a deliberate indifference claim must satisfy both an objective and a subjective standard. Leavitt v. Corr. Med. Servs., 645 F.3d 484, 497 (1st Cir. 2011).
The objective standard evaluates the seriousness of the risk of harm to one's health. For a medical condition to be objectively "serious," there must be "a sufficiently substantial `risk of serious damage to [the inmate's] future health.'" Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 843 (1994) (quoting Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993)). A medical need is serious if it has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment, or is so obvious that even a lay person would recognize a need for medical intervention. Leavitt, 645 F.3d at 497; Gaudreault v. Mun. of Salem, 923 F.2d 203, 208 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 956 (1991)).
The subjective standard concerns the culpability of the defendant. There must be evidence that a particular defendant possessed a culpable state of mind amounting to "deliberate indifference to an inmate's health or safety." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (internal quotation marks omitted). Deliberate indifference is akin to criminal recklessness, "requiring actual knowledge of impending harm, easily preventable." Feeney, 464 F.3d at 162 (quoting Watson v. Caton, 984 F.2d 537, 540 (1st Cir. 1993)). The focus of the deliberate indifference analysis "is on what the jailers knew and what they did in response." Burrell v. Hampshire Cnty., 307 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2002).
Deliberate indifference must be distinguished from negligence. As the First Circuit explained:
Torraco v. Maloney, 923 F.2d 231, 234 (1st Cir. 1991).
While Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff has not satisfied either the objective or the subjective standard that governs his claim (Motion for Summary Judgment at 9), Defendants principally contend that the record does not contain any evidence that could support the subjective prong of the deliberate indifference standard. (Id. at 9-10.)
Even assuming, arguendo, that the record could support a finding that at least one of Plaintiff's medical conditions was objectively serious, the summary judgment record lacks any evidence upon which a factfinder could reasonably conclude that Defendants were aware of certain medical conditions and failed to address them. The uncontroverted facts establish that Defendants were responsive to Plaintiff's medical needs and acted appropriately in addressing Plaintiff's needs. For instance, Defendant Reibe arranged for Plaintiff to obtain eyeglasses with his updated prescription. Indeed, Plaintiff received three pairs of eyeglasses in approximately one year.
Based on the foregoing analysis, I recommend the Court grant Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 87), and enter judgment in favor of Defendants on Plaintiff's complaint.
The Court, however, "may not automatically grant a motion for summary judgment simply because the opposing party failed to comply with a local rule requiring a response within a certain number of days." NEPSK, Inc. v. Town of Houlton, 283 F.3d 1, 7-8 (1st Cir. 2002). Instead, the Court must assess whether the movant has shown "that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In particular, when the Court has before it a verified complaint, the Court may consider the statements contained therein when assessing whether a genuine issue of fact exists for trial. Clarke v. Blais, 473 F.Supp.2d 124, 128 (D. Me. 2007).
The facts set forth herein are derived principally from Defendants' Statement of Material Facts (ECF No. 88), but also include references to Plaintiff's verified complaint.