HUGHES, J.
This is an appeal from a district court's summary judgment, dismissing the plaintiffs' suit, which arose out of a high school student's accusation of rape against another student. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
On or about February 12, 2004,
After the dismissal of the charges, Leonard and his parents, Marian and Rudolph Jackson, brought the instant suit, naming as defendants: the East Baton Rouge Parish School Board ("EBRPSB"), through its superintendent, Charlotte Placide; Nanette Greer; the City of Baton Rouge, through its Mayor, Melvin "Kip" Holden; Donald P. Young, Jr.; Charlene Fontenot; Rebekah Fontenot; ABC Insurance Company; and XYZ Insurance Company.
The answers filed by the City of Baton Rouge, Mr. Young, EBRPSB, Ms. Greer, and the Fontenots denied any wrongdoing. The EBRPSB and the Fontenots also alleged that any damages suffered by the plaintiffs were caused by other persons for whom neither the EBRPSB, Ms. Greer, nor the Fontenots were responsible. In the alternative, it was asserted that contributory negligence, comparative negligence, victim fault, and/or assumption of the risk should be applied in the case. The Fontenots, EBRPSB, and Ms. Greer further asserted that the plaintiffs' petition was impermissibly vague and that the stated claims had prescribed. EBRPSB and Ms. Greer also claimed that the plaintiffs had failed to properly serve their petition for damages pursuant to LSA-R.S. 17:51
The exceptions of the defendants were denied by the district court, and thereafter, the defendants each filed motions for summary judgment. The Fontenots, EBRPSB, and Ms. Greer re-urged their exceptions of prescription in their motions for summary judgment.
At the outset, we note that the plaintiffs' motion for devolutive appeal stated that plaintiffs desired to devolutively appeal from the "final" judgment "signed on the 20
A judgment denying a motion for new trial is an interlocutory order, which is appealable only when expressly provided by law pursuant to LSA-C.C.P. art. 2083(C) (as amended by 2005 La. Acts, No. 205, § 1, effective January 1, 2006); an interlocutory order is not a final, appealable judgment.
In this case, the plaintiffs identified the judgment sought to be appealed as the "final" judgment signed "on the 20
The summary judgment procedure is designed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action, except those disallowed by LSA-C.C.P. art. 969; the procedure is favored and shall be construed to accomplish these ends. LSA-C.C.P. art. 966(A)(2). Summary judgment shall be rendered in favor of the mover if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact and that mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. LSA-C.C.P. art. 966(B).
Appellate courts review summary judgments de novo under the same criteria that govern a district court's consideration of whether summary judgment is appropriate.
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the judge's role is not to evaluate the weight of the evidence or to determine the truth of the matter, but instead to determine whether there is a genuine issue of triable fact. All doubts should be resolved in the non-moving party's favor.
A fact is material if it potentially insures or precludes recovery, affects a litigant's ultimate success, or determines the outcome of the legal dispute. A genuine issue is one as to which reasonable persons could disagree; if reasonable persons could reach only one conclusion, there is no need for trial on that issue and summary judgment is appropriate.
On motion for summary judgment, the burden of proof remains with the movant. However, if the moving party will not bear the burden of proof on the issue at trial and points out that there is an absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party's claim, action, or defense, then the non-moving party must produce factual support sufficient to establish that he will be able to satisfy his evidentiary burden of proof at trial. If the opponent of the motion fails to do so, there is no genuine issue of material fact and summary judgment will be granted.
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in LSA-C.C.P. art. 967, an adverse party may not rest on the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in LSA-C.C.P. art. 967, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be rendered against him, LSA-C.C.P. art. 967(B).
Because it is the applicable substantive law that determines materiality, whether a particular fact in dispute is material can be seen only in light of the substantive law applicable to the case.
After a thorough review of the record presented on appeal in this case, we find summary judgment was properly granted, dismissing the defendants. The pleadings, depositions, and the exhibits to the pleadings, contained in the appellate record, reveal the following facts in this case.
On or about February 12, 2004 a student at Baton Rouge Magnet High School reported to the school principal, Nanette Greer, that Leonard Anthony Jackson had written a note to Rebekah Fontenot, which had upset her.
On the same day, Ms. Greer called Leonard to the office to discuss the note, which he denied writing.
After comparing the handwriting in Leonard's notebook to that in the note, Ms. Greer called Howard Davis, who was then the director of security for EBRPSB, pursuant to school board policy, and gave him the note. Mr. Davis contacted the police, and Detective Donald P. Young, Jr., of the Baton Rouge Police Sex Crimes Division, came to the school campus to investigate the matter.
Ms. Greer recommended that Leonard be expelled from school for inappropriate behavior, and he was suspended, pending a hearing on the expulsion.
On February 13, 2004 Detective Young met with Rebekah and her mother, Charlene Fontenot, at the Baton Rouge Police Department. Rebekah accused Leonard of rape, which allegedly occurred nearly two years earlier, between May 3, 2002 and May 13, 2002. Rebekah further identified Leonard as the person who had passed her the note during class, in which comments were made about the alleged rape.
On March 29, 2004 Detective Young petitioned for and obtained an order from a 19th Judicial District Court judge, requiring Leonard to provide twelve handwriting samples for examination by a certified forensic document examiner. On March 30, 2004 Leonard, accompanied by his then-attorney, completed a handwriting specimen form administered by Captain Bill Strickland of the East Baton Rouge Parish Sheriffs office. Leonard's handwriting samples were submitted to forensic document examiner, Robert G. Foley, along with the note allegedly passed by Leonard to Rebekah. After conducting his examination, Foley opined that the person who wrote the March 30, 2004 handwriting samples, Leonard, also wrote the note passed to Rebekah.
On April 22, 2004 Detective Young submitted a verified complaint of forcible rape against Leonard and obtained an order for Leonard's arrest from an East Baton Rouge Parish Juvenile Court judge. Detective Young then met Leonard at school and arrested him. Leonard asserts that he was cuffed and shackled "in the presence of his [classmates]." Young contends that Leonard was not cuffed or shackled until he was placed in an unmarked police car, and that none of Leonard's classmates were present at the time of the arrest. According to the plaintiffs' petition, on March 17, 2005 the forcible rape charges against Leonard were dismissed in an East Baton Rouge Parish Juvenile Court proceeding.
With respect to the plaintiffs' claims against Rebekah and her mother, that Rebekah's allegedly false allegations against Leonard caused him and his parents damage, we conclude that any action plaintiffs had against these defendants prescribed before the petition in this case was filed. Pursuant to LSA-C.C. art. 2315(A), "[e]very act whatever of man that causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it." Nevertheless, "[d]elictual actions"
As to the Baton Rouge Police Department and its officers, actions were taken following the report of a citizen that a crime had taken place. We find no indication in the record before this court that those actions were unreasonable.
Police officers who act pursuant to statutory authority in arresting and incarcerating a citizen are not liable for damages for false arrest or imprisonment.
In the instant case, the police officers interviewed the parties involved, obtained expert handwriting analysis of evidence obtained, and submitted the facts to a district court judge for a probable cause evaluation. The district court judge found probable cause existed for the arrest of Leonard in connection with Rebekah's allegations. The arrest of Leonard by the police was made on the strength of the arrest warrant issued by the district court. Under these circumstances, we find no basis presented in this record of actionable negligence on the part of the police department or Detective Young.
With respect to the EBRPSB and its employees' actions in investigating whether, and reporting to the police that, a possible crime might have taken place, based on the allegations made by Rebekah, we also find summary judgment was appropriate. The plaintiffs alleged in their petition that EBRPSB employees failed to properly supervise Rebekah, implying that school employees could have prevented her from falsely reporting a criminal act, and they contend that EBRPSB should have protected them from "students [who] had a vice or defect that made it unreasonably dangerous for [Leonard] as a student, whose injuries were caused by this defect," when school officials had actual or constructive knowledge of the defect. Further, the plaintiffs assert that school employees had a duty to warn students and their parents "of the danger associated with allowing [Ms. Greer] to [turn] their property over to the police," and they complain that school employees "allowed" police to arrest Leonard.
First, we note that a conditional privilege is extended to citizens, respecting the communication of alleged wrongful acts to the officials authorized to protect the public from such acts, which is founded on a strong public policy consideration: vital to our system of justice is that there be the ability to communicate to police officers the alleged wrongful acts of others without fear of civil action for honest mistakes.
Moreover, "any person who provides training and supervision of a child, including any public or private teacher, teacher's aide, instructional aide, school principal, [or] school staff member" are specifically denominated "mandatory reporters" by LSA-Ch.C. arts. 603(15)
In the instant case, a student at Baton Rouge Magnet High School reported to the school principal that she had been sexually abused at the school nearly two years previously and that, at the time of her reporting the incident, she had, on the day she made the report, been further subjected to sexual harassment by the alleged perpetrator, in the form of a note, which was produced and seemingly supported the accusations. In light of these accusations, school personnel had a duty to investigate the accusations and inform the appropriate law enforcement officials when they found the reports credible. No tort liability can attach under these factual circumstances.
The EBRPSB employees further had the right, during the course of their investigation into these allegations, to examine Leonard's written school work in attempting to resolve the conflicting statements given by Rebekah and Leonard, as to whether he had written the note in question. Although the Fourth Amendment applies to searches conducted by school authorities, public high school students have a lesser expectation of privacy than the general public. Even though school students do not shed their constitutional rights at the schoolhouse door, they have a lesser expectation of privacy than members of the population in general. The reasonableness of seizures must be determined in light of all of the circumstances, with particular attention being paid to whether the seizure was justified at its inception and reasonable in scope. A warrant is not necessarily required before searching a student, and the burden for a reasonable search in a school setting is not probable cause, but the much lesser burden of reasonable suspicion.
Under the particular facts and circumstances presented in this case, we conclude that the EBRPSB employees' actions were unquestionably reasonable. In this regard, we further note the qualified privilege granted to school teachers and officials by LSA-R.S. 17:416.11, decreeing that no personal liability shall lie "for any act or failure to act in the directing of or disciplining of school children under his care and supervision, unless such act or failure to act was malicious and willfully and deliberately intended to cause bodily harm."
Accordingly, we conclude no genuine issue of material fact existed in this case, and the defendants were entitled to summary judgment dismissing them from the suit. Having decided that summary judgment was appropriately granted, we further find no merit in the plaintiffs' contention that their motion for new trial was improperly denied.
For the reasons assigned herein, the judgment of the district court, granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants and dismissing the plaintiffs' suit, is affirmed. All costs of this appeal are to be borne by the plaintiffs, Leonard Anthony Jackson, Marian Ann Gable Jackson, and Rudolph Jackson.
With respect to mandatory reporters:
