FREDERICKA HOMBERG WICKER, Judge.
The defendants appeal the trial court's grant of the plaintiffs' writ of quo warranto. For the reasons that follow, the judgment is amended to reflect that A.J. Vicari validly holds only the offices of corporate director and president. As amended, the judgment is affirmed.
The St. Rose Deer Club, Inc. (Club) was founded in the late 1930's though not incorporated until September 3, 1993. A.J. Vicari, Russell Viola, Michael Croll, and Ed Boldt were the first board of directors (Board) and initial officers of the corporation — president, vice-president, secretary, and treasurer, respectively. Sometime in 2001, Boldt tendered his resignation and three of the Club's officers — Vicari, Croll, and William H. Lee — elected Ronnie Ranatza, Sr. to the board. At the time of Ranatza's election, only two original board
The Club's custom since its inception was that its officers, i.e. president, vice-president, etc, were elected by direct vote from the general membership. Vicari had been elected president annually at the January meeting from the date of incorporation through 2010.
Shortly after that meeting, on January 21, 2011, the Club's directors — Vicari, Viola, and Ranatza — directed letters to 16 Club members, namely those who voted against Vicari for president, indicating that the board was holding a meeting on February 2, 2011, from 5:30 P.M. to 6:30 P.M., to discuss their removal. The letter specifically stated that the members were subject to removal, in pertinent part, for the following:
A separate letter, however, was sent out that same date indicating that the annual meeting would be held at 7:00 P.M., after the removal hearing. Vicari signed this letter in his capacity as president, notwithstanding the fact that he had been removed from office two weeks earlier.
On January 31, 2011, the directors sent a follow-up letter which indicated that the removal meeting originally scheduled for February 2nd had been rescheduled, due to logistical reasons, to February 15, 2011, and would be held at the Law Office of Robert Garrity, Jr., located at 1905 Hickory Avenue in Harahan, Louisiana. The follow-up letter was signed only by Vicari and Ranatza.
The regular annual meeting, however, was, in fact, held on February 2, 2011, at the Club's clubhouse. Neither Vicari nor Ranatza attended. However, nineteen members attended, and the meeting was convened by the newly elected president, Williams. Presumably in response to the removal notices, Williams polled the members to inquire whether anyone knew of the use of by-laws to govern the Club — seventeen members answered negatively while two members expressed their desire to remain neutral. A member then asked
On February 15, 2011, a purported annual meeting and removal proceeding occurred at Garrity's law office. Seven members, including Vicari, were present. None of the members subject to removal appeared. Fourteen of the sixteen members subject to removal were unanimously voted to be removed from the Club. Once the removal proceedings concluded, the seven members proceeded with the meeting in which they purported to elect new directors and officers of the Club.
On February 23, 2011, 18 Club members directed a letter to "President" in which they requested an annual meeting be held pursuant to Article XI of the articles of incorporation. Vicari responded to that letter on March 9, 2011, stating that the removed members had no standing to demand an annual meeting. He further stated that the annual meeting was held on February 15, 2011, wherein the members elected a new board and wherein the board elected new officers, including himself as president.
The plaintiffs/appellees, Canedo, Demuth, and Williams, responded by filing a Petition for Writ of Quo Warranto in the 24th Judicial District Court on April 26, 2011, against the defendants/appellants, Vicari, Ranatza, Fonseca and the Club. The petition challenged the defendants' positions as officers/directors of the Club. The matter proceeded to trial on June 30, 2011. The trial court took the matter under advisement and issued a judgment on September 2, 2011, which stated:
The defendants appealed and assign the following errors:
The proper procedure to contest title to an office in a private corporation is a writ of quo warranto. Yee v. Wond, 08-814 (La.App. 5 Cir.3/24/09), 10 So.3d 791, 793, writ denied, 09-0893 (La.6/5/09), 9 So.3d 873. A writ of quo warranto directs an individual to show by what authority he claims or holds public office, or office in a corporation, or directing a corporation to show by what authority it exercises certain powers. La. C.C.P. art. 3901. "If the court finds that a person is holding an office without authority, the judgment shall forbid him to do so and may declare who is entitled to the office or may direct an election when necessary." La. C.C.P. art. 3902; Morris v. Thomason, 28,238, p. 3 (La.App. 2 Cir.4/8/96), 672 So.2d 433, 434. If, however, it is determined that a person holds office by virtue of a valid election, the inquiry ceases, and the writ should be dismissed. Id. The respondent in a quo warranto proceeding has the burden of showing by what authority he or she claims or holds office in the corporation. In re Interdiction of Vicknair, 01-0902, p. 4 (La.App. 1 Cir.6/21/02), 822 So.2d 46, 50 citing Roser v. Webb, 542 So.2d 122, 124 (La.App. 1 Cir.1989).
Turning to the present case, the Club's articles of incorporation provide, in pertinent part:
The by-laws additionally provide:
The Club's by-laws dictate that officers are elected each year at the January meeting, while Article X provides that the officers shall be elected by the board. The articles further provide that the board shall be elected at the annual meeting, which is to be held on the first Wednesday of February, unless such day is a legal holiday. And in such a case, the annual meeting is to be held on the first Wednesday of the following month. Here, the annual meeting was duly convened on February 2, 2011. Yet, a board of directors was not elected at that time. Instead, a new board was purportedly elected on February 15th — at a meeting guised as the annual meeting.
In Morris, supra, the defendants appealed the trial court's grant of a writ of quo warranto. In that case, the articles specified that the directors were to be elected at the annual meeting held on the third Monday in January. Id. at 434. Despite that provision, a special shareholders' meeting was convened in April wherein the shareholders purported to elect a new board of directors. In that case, the Second Circuit stated:
Morris, supra, at 435.
Likewise, in this case, the articles specifically state that the board shall be elected at the annual meeting convened on the first Wednesday in February. The only provision in the articles that allows for an annual meeting to be held at a different time other than that specified is when the first Wednesday of February falls on a legal holiday or when 50 percent of the members demand so in writing. Because neither scenario applies here, the February 15th meeting and subsequent elections were improper. Due to the invalidity of the February 15th meeting, Fonseca concedes that he has no authority to claim the office of either secretary or corporate director. We agree.
Ranatza does not rely on the February 15th elections to claim his authority to hold the positions of director and vice-president. Rather, he relies on his 2001 election to the board. Thus, he bears the burden of proving the validity of that election.
Vicari, Croll, Viola, and Boldt were the initial directors and officers of the corporation. When Boldt tendered his resignation in 2001, however, Vicari, Croll, and Lee elected Ranatza to the board. Since the articles or bylaws do not provide a method for filling board vacancies, La. R.S. 12:224(E)(3) applies.
Vicari appears to be the only member who validly holds his office as director and Club president.
The articles that were filed in 1993 provide that the initial directors shall serve until the next board is duly elected. It is undisputed in this case that the members have never elected a board of directors. And because Vicari is the only remaining initial director, he still validly claims the office as corporate director. For the same reason, Vicari validly claims the office as president because he has never been replaced in a valid election. Since 1993, the Club's officers have been continuously elected by direct vote of the membership, notwithstanding the articles that provides that the board shall elect officers. Though such procedure has been the Club's custom for over 20 years, "customary practices ... may not substitute for written articles or bylaws." Bethlehem Missionary Baptist Church, supra, at 1341; see also, Bethel Apartments, supra, ("... the non-profit corporation laws of this state are controlling (see LSA-R.S. 12:217(C)) not the traditional practice of that corporation.").
In sum, we find that the February 15th meeting was improperly convened and all of the purported elections of directors and officers which occurred at that meeting are invalid. Moreover, Ranatza failed to prove that he was validly appointed to the board pursuant to La. R.S. 12:224(E)(3). Thus, he has no authority to claim the office of corporate director. But because the Club has never elected a board of
In the second assignment of error, the defendants contend that the trial court erred as a matter of law in granting relief to the plaintiff/appellees in the form of a special meeting to elect directors and officers. The defendants contend that that portion of the trial court's judgment is beyond the scope of a quo warranto proceeding. We disagree.
La. C.C.P. art. 3902 provides, in pertinent part, "when the court finds that a person is holding or claiming office without authority, the judgment shall forbid him to do so. It may declare who is entitled to the office and may direct an election when necessary." See Morris v. Thomason, 28,238, p. 3 (La.App. 2 Cir.4/8/96), 672 So.2d 433, 434. Thus, the trial court acted within its authority to order a special meeting for the election of directors and officers.
As a final matter, we must address the other events that occurred during the February 15, 2011 meeting. Though we have found that the meeting was improperly convened as an annual meeting, we have not specifically addressed the validity of the removal proceedings and Garrity's election into the membership. In this case, the trial court's judgment restored the membership of those members who had been removed on February 15th. We do not find that ruling to be manifestly erroneous.
Paragraph 10 of the bylaws provide, in pertinent part, "a member can only be voted out of the club with a
We, likewise, find that Garrity's admission into the Club was invalid. Paragraph 14 of the by-laws provide: "[a]ll new full time club members
For the reasons stated above, all the proceedings that occurred at the February 15th meeting, including the election of officers, directors, and new members, as well as the purported removal proceedings, are invalid. We amend the trial court judgment, however, to reflect that Vicari is the only person who validly claims the position as director and president, though not the office of treasurer. As amended, the judgment is affirmed.