MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
ERIN WILDER-DOOMES, Magistrate Judge.
Before the Court is the Motion to Remand to State Court (the "Motion"), filed by Plaintiffs Suha Shehadeh ("Suha"), Abdallah Shehadeh, individually and on behalf of their minor children, Hakeem Shehadeh ("Hakeem"), Ameelia Shehadeh ("Ameelia"), Tamer Shehadeh, Suhaib Shehadeh, and Mohammad Shehadeh (collectively, "Plaintiffs").1 The Motion is opposed.2 For the reasons set forth below, it is recommended3 that the Motion4 be denied and this matter referred for a scheduling conference.5
I. Facts and Procedural Background
On April 20, 2018, Plaintiffs filed a Petition for Damages ("Petition") against Noah P. Bergeron ("Bergeron"), Yokogawa Corporation of America ("Yokogawa"), and Sompo America Insurance Company ("Sompo") (collectively, "Defendants") in the Nineteenth Judicial District Court for the Parish of East Baton Rouge, State of Louisiana.6 Plaintiffs allegations are as follows: On or about May 23, 2017, Suha was driving on Louisiana Highway 42 in East Baton Rouge Parish when her vehicle collided with the vehicle driven by Bergeron and owned by his employer, Yokogawa (the "Accident").7 Bergeron was negligent in causing the Accident and his employer, Yokogawa, is vicariously liable for Bergeron's negligent driving, which occurred during the course and scope of his employment.8 Sompo is liable as the insurance carrier for the vehicle driven by Bergeron.9 Suha and the minors, Hakeem and Ameelia, sustained personal injuries, and seek damages, including but not limited to, "severe physical injury, severe emotional injury, pain and suffering, past and future medical expenses, loss of enjoyment of life," and other unspecified damages, as well as property damage to the vehicle.10 The remaining Plaintiffs seek damages for loss of consortium, services, and society with/by Suha.11
On April 18, 2019, after the case had been pending in state court for nearly a year,12 Sompo and Yokogawa13 removed the matter to this Court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).14 In the Notice of Removal, Defendant cited Plaintiffs' claims for generalized damages and acknowledge that such pleading is in conformance with Louisiana law, which prohibits Plaintiffs from quantifying their damages in their petitions.15 Defendants then note their burden to "prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000."16 Defendants claim that they first became aware that grounds for removal existed on April 16, 2019.17 On that date, Defendants allege they received medical and billing records for Suha, which indicate that the amount in controversy likely exceeds the jurisdictional minimum, as follows:
On or about April 16, 2019, undersigned counsel received medical and billing records from Dr. Isaza/Spine Specialists of Louisiana. Those records reflect that Plaintiff Suah (sic) Shehadeh has received injections, reportedly still remains symptomatic, with a new focus of injury to include work-up and treatment of her right hip, to include a recommended arthroscopic surgery and another orthopedic referral. Suha Shehadeh's past medical specials allegedly related to the incident in question are around $36,000 to date.
While defendants deny liability or that plaintiffs suffered any injury, and deny that Plaintiffs are entitled to any damages, it is submitted that because of plaintiff Suha Shehadeh's change in circumstance regarding injections, new focus of injury with recommended arthroscopic surgery, as well as ongoing complaints and the nature of treatment to date, coupled with the amount of past medical specials, the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.00. As a result, the requisite amount in controversy exists.18
Although Plaintiffs agree that the amount in controversy likely exceeds $75,000 exclusive of interest and costs,19 Plaintiffs assert that remand is appropriate because the removal was untimely.20
II. Law and Analysis
A. Legal Standards
The time limits for filing a notice of removal, provided in the removal procedure rules of 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b), are as follows:
(1) The notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed within 30 days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon which such action or proceeding is based, or within 30 days after the service of summons upon the defendant if such initial pleading has then been filed in court and is not required to be served on the defendant, whichever period is shorter.
...
(3) Except as provided in subsection (c), if the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a notice of removal may be filed within 30 days after receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable.
With regard to triggering the 30-day time period from the defendant's receipt of the initial pleading, as provided in § 1446(b)(1), the Fifth Circuit has provided a bright line rule that "the thirty-day removal period under the first paragraph is triggered only where the initial pleading `affirmatively reveals on its face that the plaintiff is seeking damages in excess of the minimum jurisdictional amount of the federal court.'"21 If a plaintiff wants the 30-day period to run from the defendant's receipt of the initial pleading, a plaintiff should place in that pleading "a specific allegation that damages are in excess of the federal jurisdictional amount."22 The initial pleading in this action does not contain a specific allegation that damages are in excess of the federal jurisdictional amount.23 Accordingly, the 30-day period for removing the action was not triggered by service of the initial pleading, which is not disputed by any party.
With regard to triggering the 30-day time period from the defendant's receipt "of an amended pleading, motion, order, or other paper," as provided in § 1446(b)(3), the Fifth Circuit has provided that the 30-day removal period is triggered only where jurisdiction is "unequivocally clear and certain" from the document.24 Courts have found that the standard for triggering removal based upon a subsequent "amended pleading, motion, order, or other paper" as provided in § 1446(b)(3), such as discovery responses,25 is at least as strict as the standard for triggering the 30-day period for removal based on an initial pleading, as provided in § 1446(b)(1).26
B. The Notice of Removal is Timely
Plaintiffs argue that Defendants were put on notice that Plaintiffs' claims were in excess of the requisite jurisdictional amount on several earlier occasions, beginning with Plaintiffs' June 27, 2018 discovery responses and the over four hundred pages of documents/medical records produced.27 In particular, Plaintiffs assert that the records initially produced showed that Suha had a disc herniation, disc bulges, and had received injections, such that, even in the absence of a surgical recommendation, the amount in controversy was satisfied because Suha's "medical bills showed consistent treatment with larger medical charges."28 Alternatively, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants were on notice that the case was removable based on Plaintiffs' September 14, 2018, December 21, 2018, and January 23, 2019 productions of additional medical records that showed consistent medical treatment, and ultimately, $31,933 in medical expenses,29 and Defendants' February 9, 2019 receipt30 of the transcript of Suha's deposition testimony, wherein Suha testified that her prior physician, Dr. Ferachi, recommended surgery.31
In contrast, Defendants argue that (1) Suha's testimony regarding an alleged surgery recommendation from Dr. Ferachi was not supported by the medical records, which do not contain such a recommendation;32 and, (2) they were not able to ascertain that the action was removable until they received updated medical records from orthopedic surgeon Dr. Isaza, related to additional "work up" for Suha's more recently realized injuries to her right hip33 and a surgery recommendation.34 Defendants assert that Plaintiffs' Petition only alleged generalized damages, which did not provide sufficient information for Defendants to determine if the matter was removable, and that "general damages awards for lumbar complaints/disc injuries, with injections and complaints of residual pain are varying," citing competing Louisiana cases featuring awards to similarly-injured plaintiffs for less than $75,000.35 Defendants disagree that Suha's continued medical treatment, by itself, was enough to justify removal. Defendants contend that they timely removed within thirty days of Defendants' receipt of updated medical records that contain "medical evidence of an official notation of a possible arthroscopy."36
This is not a case where a plaintiff "affirmatively stated in an amended pleading or other paper that [her] damages exceeded the jurisdictional requirement, thus triggering the 30-day period for removal pursuant to § 1446(b)(3)." Plaintiffs' discovery responses, successive productions of medical records, and deposition testimony do not satisfy the "unequivocally clear and certain" standard.37 Regarding production of Suha's medical records, "if a defendant has to analyze and dissect medical treatment records to divine whether the nature and cause of a plaintiff's injuries satisfy the amount in controversy requirement, then those papers do not suffice to trigger the 30 day time period."38 Plaintiffs' responses to Defendants' discovery requests do not provide sufficient information "from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable."39 Plaintiffs have not directed the Court to any portion of the discovery responses that make it "unequivocally clear and certain" that the amount in controversy requirement is satisfied or that Plaintiffs were otherwise seeking an amount exceeding the jurisdictional requisite. "Relatedly, if a defendant has to conduct independent research by consulting `quantum books,' then the discovery responses are not sufficiently unequivocally clear and certain to trigger the 30-day removal period."40
Plaintiffs' reliance on language from Shelton, 2018 WL 1998341, Thibodeaux, 2016 WL 4055660, and Thomas Louis Dreyfus Commodities, 2016 WL 1317937 at R. Doc. 3-1, p. 4 is misplaced, as those holdings relate to the issue of whether a defendant has met its burden of showing, by a preponderance, that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold. That inquiry, however, is a separate question from whether an "other paper" (received after a defendant's receipt of the initial pleading) was "unequivocally clear and certain" as to trigger the 30-day deadline to remove provided in § 1446(b)(3).41
In Manieri v. CR England,42 when confronted with similar arguments, that court determined that neither the discovery responses, nor medical records evidencing a surgical recommendation without an estimate for the cost of the surgery, were sufficient to meet the unequivocally clear and certain standard:
In the first set of discovery responses, received on September 19, 2018, the plaintiff disclosed that: (1) her injury was unresolved, and she planned to continue further treatment; (2) she had already incurred $14,641.20 on treatment and lost $4,014.18 in past wages; (3) her physician recommended cervical epidural steroid injections, although she wanted "time to think about injections," and (4) she had been referred to another doctor to consult regarding whether she would be a candidate for surgery. Although the defendant might have been able to infer from these admissions that the amount in controversy requirement was satisfied, because it "was not unequivocally clear and certain, the thirty-day clock did not begin running when [C.R. England] received these discovery responses." See Green v. Geico Gen. Ins., Co., No. 15-3968, 2015 WL 5971760, at *5, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139887, at *13 (E.D. La. Oct. 14, 2015).
Among the updated medical records C.R. England received on February 21, 2019 include the opinion of Dr. Eric Oberlander that Manieri's cervical disc bulges require a C4-7 ACDF surgery to correct, and Dr. Domangue's report that Manieri intends to proceed with the cervical epidural steroid injections he had previously recommended. While the updated medical records indicate that Ms. Manieri is considering cervical disc surgery and will undergo epidural steroid injections, neither these documents (nor any of the defendant's other submissions) refer to the cost of such treatment. See Smith v. Wal-Mart Louisiana, LLC, No. 13-2368, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127080, at *10, 2013 WL 4781778 (W.D. La. Sept. 5, 2013) (finding that recommendation for cervical disc surgery, in the absence of a specific damages estimate, did not trigger second 30-day removal period); see also Johnson, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44968, at *11, 2019 WL 1271053 ("[I]f a defendant has to conduct independent research by consulting `quantum books,' then the discovery responses are not sufficiently unequivocally clear and certain to trigger the 30-day removal period."). Because Manieri's updated medical records do not constitute "unequivocally clear and certain" evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, the 30-day time limit to remove under § 1446(b)(3) was not triggered on February 21, 2019 when C.R. England received the records.43
The same reasoning applies here. Suha's discovery responses indicating that her injury was unresolved and that she intended to continue treatment, her medical records ultimately showing medical expenses of $31,933 and her deposition testimony indicating a surgical recommendation from Dr. Ferachi, but with no information regarding the cost of the surgery, are not sufficient to meet the unequivocally clear and certain standard to trigger the 30-day removal clock. Courts, including this one, have consistently held that the 30-day removal deadline of §1446(b)(3) is not triggered where a defendant must parse medical records and rely on case law to support its position that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.00.44
Even the medical records upon which Defendants rely,45 would not be sufficient to trigger the removal clock, notwithstanding the recommendation of an arthroscopic surgery, because there is no evidence regarding the cost of the surgery. At most, however, this makes the removal premature, which does not warrant remand. Where, as here, a removing defendant can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy likely exceeds the jurisdictional threshold, the case may be removed even though the 30-day deadline set out in § 1446(b)(3) is not yet triggered.46
III. Recommendation
Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that the Motion to Remand,47 filed by Plaintiffs Suha and Abdallah Shehadeh, individually, and on behalf of their minor children, be DENIED as the Notice of Removal was timely filed in this case. In the event this Recommendation is adopted, IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the matter be referred for a scheduling conference.
