ACREE, Judge.
Appellants Barren River Waterfront Development, Inc., Stacy Bartlett, and Mike Bartlett appeal from the June 24, 2014, order of the Barren Circuit Court granting summary judgment in favor of Appellee, The Narrows Marina, LLC. We affirm.
In 2006, Barren River obtained a loan secured by a promissory note from Narrows Marina's co-appellee, South Central Bank. The note contained a default provision which accelerated all amounts owed upon any event of default.
To ensure repayment of the loan, the Bank obtained a security interest in "all inventory, accounts, equipment, general intangibles, and fixtures" related to Barren River's marina business,
Barren River defaulted on the note.
To avoid a judicial sale, Stacy and Mike extensively negotiated with Wayne Shelton and William Funk for the sale of the marina. Shelton and Funk ultimately formed Narrows Marina. Appellants tentatively agreed to sell the marina to Narrows Marina for $650,000.00. The circuit court approved the sale by Agreed Judgment entered December 17, 2012. It also ordered that, if the sale of the marina was not consummated before December 31, 2012, the marina, along with all inventory, accounts, equipment, general intangibles and fixtures pertaining thereto, were to be immediately relinquished to the Bank for disposition.
The sale did not occur by the deadline. Appellants failed or refused to surrender the collateral. On January 7, 2013, in response to a motion by the Bank, the circuit court entered summary judgment and an order of possession and sale in favor of the Bank. The court ordered Appellants to turn over all collateral to the Bank and authorized the Bank to dispose of the property at a public or private sale in a commercially reasonable manner.
On January 15, 2013, the Bank filed a motion seeking an order approving the sale of the collateral, excluding the house boat, to Narrows Marina for $360,000.00. Affixed to the motion was the affidavit of Joe Houchens, a licensed auctioneer and real estate broker. Houchens declared that he had made numerous personal inspections of the marina and, during an inspection on January 15, 2013, it was discovered that the condition of the marina was in a more deteriorated state than previously disclosed.
A hearing was held on January 18, 2013, at which Houchens testified consistent with his affidavit. The circuit court issued an order that day authorizing the "sale of the [m]arina," excepting the house boat, at the commercially reasonable price of $360,000.00 and upon the terms set forth in an "Offer of Purchase" dated January 14, 2013, from Narrows Marina to the Bank. The Offer of Purchase identified the collateral subject to the sale, including items allegedly removed from the premises by Mike:
(R. at 187-88). The Offer of Purchase also contained a self-designated "Insurance: Risk of Loss" clause:
(R. at 191).
The proceeds of the sale were to be applied: (i) first to the costs of this action, including attorney's fees; (ii) second to the amount previously adjudged for the Bank; with (iii) any remaining proceeds to be held by the Bank for disposition under further orders of the court.
Closing of the sale occurred on March 8, 2013. The Bank executed a Bill of Sale,
(R. at 276).
Narrows Marina filed an intervening complaint to protect its interest in the insurance proceeds. Appellants answered and counterclaimed that Narrows Marina had unlawfully converted some of their personal property located at the marina that was not security for the loan from the Bank.
On June 6, 2014, Narrows Marina moved for summary judgment, with two affidavits, claiming entitlement to the Travelers' insurance proceeds. Appellants responded in opposition with counter-affidavits. On June 24, 2014, the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Narrows Marina, awarding it the proceeds of the Travelers insurance policy. Appellants filed a CR
On October 29, 2014, while awaiting the circuit court's decision, Narrows Marina served requests for admissions to the Bank; the Bank filed a sworn response that stated in pertinent part:
(R. at 397-98).
The circuit court overruled Appellants' post-judgment motion. This appeal followed.
"The standard of review on appeal of summary judgment is whether the trial court correctly found there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Carter v. Smith, 366 S.W.3d 414, 419 (Ky. 2012). Summary judgment involves only legal questions and the existence, or non-existence, of material facts are considered. Stathers v. Garrard County Bd. of Educ., 405 S.W.3d 473, 478 (Ky. App. 2012). Our review is de novo. Mitchell v. University of Kentucky, 366 S.W.3d 895, 898 (Ky. 2012).
Appellants claim they, not Narrows Marina, are entitled to the Travelers' insurance proceeds and that genuine issues of material fact exist precluding summary judgment. Specifically, they assert there is no definitive evidence in the record as to when the storm damage occurred creating a significant factual dispute, as ownership of the collateral did not vest in Narrows Marina until closing on March 8, 2013. Their argument is flawed.
We will assume for purposes of this appeal, and as supported by the record, that two storms caused damage to the marina: the first storm prior to January 18, 2013 and the second storm on January 30, 2013. These factual assumptions do not afford Appellants the relief they seek.
First, the insurance check from Travelers specifically states it is for loss that occurred on January 30, 2013. Even if a prior storm damaged the marina, these insurance proceeds do not pertain to or cover that loss. Appellants attempt to create a genuine issue of fact where none exists.
Second, the Travelers' policy covered all property in which the Bank held a security interest. The policy only pertained to the Bank's insurable interest, and was in place solely to protect the interests of the Bank. The policy did not cover Appellants' insurable interest. The premiums were not charged to Barren River or to Stacy and Mike. These facts are uncontroverted. The Appellants' affidavits attached to their response to Narrows Marina's summary judgment motion do not challenge or alter these facts. We fail to see how Appellants are entitled to proceeds from an insurance policy the premiums for which were paid solely by the Bank, which insured only the Bank's interest, and which identified only the Bank as the beneficiary of the policy. The Bank is the only entity legally entitled to the proceeds. However, under the terms of the Offer to Purchase, the Bank agreed to pay any insurance proceeds to Narrows Marina.
Third, we reject as irrelevant Appellants' argument that the first storm — the one allegedly occurring prior to January 18, 2013 — and any resulting damage from that storm was used to justify lowering the price of the marina from $650,000.00 to $360,000.00. This has no bearing on whether Appellants are entitled to this particular insurance check for a loss occurring on January 30, 2013. If misdeeds were involved in crafting the Offer of Purchase and the $360,000.00 sales price, such evidence should have been fully produced at the January 18, 2013 hearing.
Appellants also claim entitlement to the insurance proceeds because, in their view, the damage occurred while they still owned the marina. They are mistaken. The circuit court gave possession of the marina to the Bank on January 7, 2013, dispossessing Appellants of all possession, ownership, and control. We emphasize that this case involves only personal, not real, property: that is, a floating marina secured with cables, boat slips, floating walkways, a floating dock, and related equipment, assets, and fixtures. Once again, the storm damage which resulted in the insurance proceeds from Travelers occurred on January 30, 2013. Appellants were divested of ownership prior to this date.
In sum, we agree with the circuit court that no genuine issue of material fact exists in this record and that, as a matter of law, Narrows Marina was entitled to the insurance proceeds.
Finally, Appellants argue that the circuit court improperly dismissed their conversion counterclaim against Narrows Marina. The essence of Appellants' conversion counterclaim is that certain personal property that was not security for the Bank's loan was sold to Narrows Marina. Not only is there no indication that a notice of appeal or cross-appeal has been filed relative to such a ruling, we see nothing in the record to indicate that such a ruling was ever rendered.
This Court is one of review. Fischer v. Fischer, 348 S.W.3d 582, 589 (Ky. 2011). For that reason, a trial court must "first be given the opportunity to rule on questions before they are available for appellate review." Elwell v. Stone, 799 S.W.2d 46, 48 (Ky. App. 1990) (quoting Massie v. Persson, 726 S.W.2d 448, 452 (Ky. App. 1987)). Absent a decision from the circuit court as to this conversion counterclaim, there is nothing for this Court to review. Florman v. MEBCO Ltd. Partnership, 207 S.W.3d 593 (Ky. App. 2006) (quoting Lawrence v. Risen, 598 S.W.2d 474, 476 (Ky. App. 1980)).
Technically, the counterclaim is still alive and subject to disposition. The circuit court's failure to address the conversion counterclaim appears to be a simple oversight.
We affirm the Barren Circuit Court's June 24, 2014, order granting summary judgment for Narrows Marina related to insurance proceeds from Travelers Insurance Company.
ALL CONCUR.