DEBORAH K. CHASANOW, District Judge.
This case was referred to Magistrate Judge Thomas DiGirolamo for pretrial management and a Report and Recommendation for disposition, which Judge DiGirolamo issued on June 8, 2016. (ECF No. 22). Plaintiff Jonathan Jay Hill ("Plaintiff") filed an objection to the Report and Recommendation. (ECF No. 25). For the following reasons, Plaintiff's objection will be overruled, and the Report and Recommendation will be adopted.
Additional factual background may be found in the Report and Recommendation. (ECF No. 22, at 2-9). Plaintiff suffered a cerebrovascular accident, or a stroke, on May 19, 2012, which Plaintiff contends prevented him from working. (Id. at 3). Plaintiff protectively filed for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income on May 29, 2013. After his application was denied initially and on reconsideration, Plaintiff requested a hearing before an administrative law judge ("ALJ"). Following the hearing, the ALJ issued a decision finding that Plaintiff was not disabled under the definitions of the Social Security Act. (ECF No. 11-3, at 21-31). Plaintiff's request for review from the appeals council was denied, and the ALJ's decision became the final decision of the Commissioner.
On April 10, 2015, Plaintiff filed a complaint in this court seeking review of the ALJ's decision. (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff moved for summary judgment or, in the alternative, to remand. (ECF No. 17). Defendant Carolyn W. Colvin ("Defendant") filed a motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 18), and Plaintiff responded (ECF No. 21). On June 8, 2016, Judge DiGirolamo issued a Report and Recommendation recommending that this court grant Defendant's motion, deny Plaintiff's motion, and affirm the ALJ's decision. (ECF No. 22). On June 24, Plaintiff filed an objection to the Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 25), and Defendant responded (ECF No. 28). Plaintiff argues that Judge DiGirolamo did "not address at all the ALJ's failure to consider" certain medical entries in the record. (ECF No. 25, at 8).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, a district judge may designate a magistrate judge to conduct hearings and report proposed findings of fact and recommendations for action on a dispositive motion. Thereafter,
Baltimore Line Handling Co. v. Brophy, 771 F.Supp.2d 531, 534-35 (D.Md. 2011). Here, Plaintiff's objection contends:
(ECF No. 25, at 1). In short, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ impermissibly ignored pieces of material evidence regarding his medical condition. Thus, the undersigned will conduct a de novo review of the portions of the Report and Recommendation regarding the ALJ's assessment of evidence. The remaining sections of the Report and Recommendation will be assessed for clear error.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently summarized the standard of review courts use when reviewing an ALJ's decision in a Social Security case:
Dunn v. Colvin, 607 F.App'x 264, 266 (4
Plaintiff contends that the Report and Recommendation does not adequately address the ALJ's alleged failure to consider certain medical entries, which Plaintiff believes establishes he was disabled. (See ECF No. 25, at 8). Specifically, Plaintiff objects to the fact that the ALJ "afford no weight" to an assessment made by Dr. Milan Joshi, who averred that Plaintiff was unable to function at work from January to July 2013. (Id. at 3). In his decision, the ALJ explained:
(ECF No. 11-3, at 28 (citations omitted)). The ALJ then discussed other medical and opinion evidence, determining that Plaintiff "had the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work . . . except [Plaintiff] can occasionally climb ramps, stairs, ropes, ladders, and scaffolds, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl; and he is limited to simple, routine, repetitive tasks with no production rate for pace of work." (Id. at 25-29).
Plaintiff contends that the "ALJ's decision fails to mention or consider in any way" some of Dr. Joshi's notes. (See ECF No. 25, at 4-5). For example, Dr. Joshi noted that Plaintiff was depressed and asserted that he was "not back to his baseline level of functioning" and did not go on a family vacation because "he did not want to deal with people." (Id. at 5). Moreover, according to Plaintiff, the ALJ failed to consider several pieces of evidence regarding Plaintiff's mental and cognitive difficulties, including those that indicate that Plaintiff suffered from at least a "mild cognitive-communication deficit." (Id. at 5-7). Plaintiff argues that such pieces of evidence "are supportive of Dr. Joshi's assessment. They also weigh against the conclusion in the ALJ's decision that `the medical evidence . . . does not substantiate disabling limitations.'" (Id. at 7 (quoting ECF No. 11-3, at 27)).
A review of the record shows that the ALJ's decision was based on "substantial evidence" and should be afforded deference. See Dunn, 607 F.App'x at 271 ("We must defer to the ALJ's assignments of weight unless they are not supported by substantial evidence.").
Reid v. Commissioner of Social Sec., 769 F.3d 861, 865 (4
Plaintiff has not articulated, beyond merely listing the pieces of evidence he believes the ALJ failed to consider, how such evidence would have changed the decision. That is, Plaintiff has not shown that the purported unconsidered evidence so undermines the evidence cited in the decision as to put into question whether the ALJ's decision was supported by substantial evidence. See Dunn, 607 F.App'x at 271 ("Simply stated, there is more than a `scintilla of evidence' in the record supporting the ALJ's conclusion that Dr. Swing's opinion is incongruent with both his own treatment notes and some of the other medical evidence in the record."). Much of the evidence that Plaintiff contends went unconsidered by the ALJ suggests "mild" or "occasional" lapses in Plaintiff's progress. (See ECF No. 25, at 5-7). Such evidence is countered by substantial evidence showing continued progress and increased functionality, as discussed by the ALJ. (ECF No. 11-3, at 27-29). Moreover, as in Reid, the ALJ "stated that the whole record was considered, and absent evidence to the contrary, [the court] take[s] [him] at [his] word." Reid, 769 F.3d at 1211.
Finally, the two cases Plaintiff cites in his brief do not counsel a different outcome. In Fox v. Colvin, 632 F.App'x 750, 751 (4
Id. (quoting SSR 96-2p, 61 Fed.Reg. 34,490, 34,492 (July 2, 1996)). Similarly, in Raeke v. Commissioner, Social Sec., No. GLR-15-1726, 2016 WL 892856, *2 (D.Md. Mar. 9, 2016), Magistrate Judge Stephanie A. Gallagher held that the ALJ's decision lacked the required specificity. In Raeke, the ALJ gave less weight to a physician's opinion because the opinion was contrary to his treatment notes. Judge Gallagher held that the treatment notes actually were unclear and "could be deemed to support either position." Id. Judge Gallagher recommended remanding the case because the ALJ failed to cite specific evidence undermining the physician's opinion beyond the incomplete reference to the treatment notes. Id. Here, on the other hand, the ALJ based his determination not only on Dr. Joshi's treatment notes, but also on several pieces of other evidence that undermine Dr. Joshi's opinion. Unlike in Fox and Raeke, the ALJ has put forth numerous specific reasons for his determination. Accordingly, Plaintiff's objection to the Report and Recommendation is overruled. Because a review of the record indicates that there is no clear error in the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which Plaintiff did not object, the Report and Recommendation will be adopted in its entirety.
For the foregoing reasons, the court will overrule Plaintiff's objection and adopt the Report and Recommendation by separate order.