NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

HIGGINBOTHAM, J.

The defendant, Jarvis McKinley Fleming, was charged by grand jury indictment with second degree murder, a violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1. He pled not guilty and, following a jury trial, was found guilty as charged. Fleming filed motions for new trial and postverdict judgment of acquittal, both of which the trial court denied. The trial court sentenced Fleming to life imprisonment at hard labor, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. On appeal, Fleming alleges two counseled assignments of error related to his sentence, as well as two additional pro se assignments of error concerning claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.

FACTS

In the early morning hours of October 23, 2010, Baton Rouge Police Officer Nicholas Morgan was dispatched to the corner of Osage Street and Plank Road in response to a shooting. Upon arriving at the scene, Officer Morgan observed a Dodge Intrepid with its engine still running, located next to a nearby convenience store. Officer Morgan found the victim, Daniel Smith, inside the vehicle, having already died from several apparent gunshot wounds.

Baton Rouge Police Corporal Christopher Rudy investigated Smith's death, but was unable to identify any direct witnesses to the shooting. However, crime scene investigators were able to recover five shell casings from a nearby carwash on the north side of Osage Street. These shell casings and a DNA swab from them were sent to the Louisiana State Police Crime Laboratory for further analysis.

Coincidentally, several weeks later, on November 7, 2010, Baton Rouge Police Officer Walter Edwards was dispatched to Fleming's residence at 4244 Hollywood Street in response to another shooting. During the course of the investigation of this incident, Officer Edwards determined that Fleming had accidentally shot himself in the leg, apparently while inside of his vehicle. Officer Edwards recovered a spent shell casing from the floorboard of Fleming's vehicle. Pursuant to a subsequent consent search of the residence, Officer Edwards also found a Mack series nine-millimeter pistol hidden under a bed.

A reference sample of Fleming's DNA later matched DNA recovered from the swab of the five spent shell casings from Smith's murder. Statistical analysis determined that the probability of a match from an unrelated, unknown individual other than Fleming approached 1-in-35.3 quadrillion. Additionally, ballistics testing confirmed that the cartridge casings recovered from the scene of Smith's murder and from Fleming's vehicle were all fired from the nine-millimeter handgun recovered from the residence where Fleming accidentally shot himself. Finally, the bullets recovered from Smith's body and vehicle also matched the same handgun. On the basis of this evidence, the jury unanimously convicted Fleming of the second degree murder of Smith.

COUNSELED ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

In his first counseled assignment of error, Fleming argues that his sentence of life imprisonment, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, is unconstitutionally excessive. In his second counseled assignment of error, Fleming contends that his trial counsel's failure to file a motion to reconsider sentence constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel and should not preclude this court from reviewing his sentence for excessiveness.

The record does not contain an oral or written motion to reconsider sentence. Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 881.1(E) provides that the failure to file or make a motion to reconsider sentence precludes a defendant from raising an excessive sentence argument on appeal. Ordinarily, pursuant to the provisions of this article and the decision of State v. Duncan, 94-1563 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/15/95), 667 So.2d 1141, 1143 (en banc per curiam), we would not consider an excessive sentence argument. However, in the interest of judicial economy, we will consider Fleming's argument that his sentence is excessive, even in the absence of a motion to reconsider sentence, in order to address his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See State v. Wilkinson, 99-0803 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/18/00), 754 So.2d 301, 303, writ denied, 2000-2336 (La. 4/20/01), 790 So.2d 631. Failure to file a motion to reconsider sentence in itself does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Nevertheless, if the defendant can show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's error, his sentence would have been different, a basis for an ineffective assistance claim may be found. See State v. Felder, 2000-2887 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/28/01), 809 So.2d 360, 370, writ denied, 2001-3027 (La. 10/25/02), 827 So.2d 1173.

Article I, Section 20 of the Louisiana Constitution prohibits the imposition of excessive punishment. Although a sentence may be within statutory limits, it may violate a defendant's constitutional right against excessive punishment and is subject to appellate review. State v. Sepulvado, 367 So.2d 762, 767 (La. 1979). A sentence is constitutionally excessive if it is grossly disproportionate to the severity of the offense or is nothing more than a purposeless and needless infliction of pain and suffering. See State v. Hurst, 99-2868 (La. App. 1st Cir. 10/3/00), 797 So.2d 75, 83, writ denied, 2000-3053 (La. 10/5/01), 798 So.2d 962. A sentence is grossly disproportionate if, when the crime and punishment are considered in light of the harm done to society, it shocks the sense of justice. State v. Hogan, 480 So.2d 288, 291 (La. 1985). A trial court is given wide discretion in the imposition of sentences within statutory limits, and the sentence imposed by it should not be set aside as excessive in the absence of manifest abuse of discretion. State v. Lobato, 603 So.2d 739, 751 (La. 1992).

Fleming argues that his sentence of life imprisonment at hard labor, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, is excessive. He cites as mitigating factors his youthfulness and minimal criminal history (which he describes as a single previous conviction for simple burglary). We note, however, that the sentence imposed is the mandatory sentence for the offense of second degree murder. See La. R.S. 14:30.1(B). Even though a sentence is the mandatory minimum sentence, it may still be excessive if it makes no "measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment" or amounts to nothing more than the "purposeful imposition of pain and suffering" and is "grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime." State v. Dorthey, 623 So.2d 1276, 1280-81 (La. 1993). In order for a defendant to rebut the presumption that a mandatory minimum sentence is constitutional, he must "clearly and convincingly" show that:

State v. Johnson, 97-1906 (La. 3/4/98), 709 So.2d 672, 676. Departures downward from the minimum sentence should only occur in rare situations. See Johnson, 709 So.2d at 677.

Based on our review of the record, we cannot say that the trial court erred or abused its discretion in imposing Fleming's sentence in accordance with the mandatory penalty provided for in La. R.S. 14:30.1(B). At his sentencing hearing, Fleming did not attempt to make any clear and convincing showing to the trial court that he is exceptional and a victim of the legislature's failure to assign a sentence that was meaningfully tailored to his culpability, to the gravity of the offense, and to the circumstances of the case. We note that Fleming expressly declined the opportunity to give any sort of statement prior to his sentencing. On these facts, the trial court had no reason to deviate downward from the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment at hard labor, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. Fleming has shown no reasonable probability that his sentence would have been different in the event counsel had filed a motion to reconsider sentence. Accordingly, these assignments of error are without merit.

PRO SE ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR #1

In his first pro se assignment of error, Fleming argues that his trial counsel was ineffective. First, Fleming claims that his trial counsel misinformed him that a recorded statement he made to the police would not be presented at trial, causing him to reject a fifteen-year plea deal. Second, Fleming contends that his trial counsel should have filed a motion to quash on the basis that the State failed to commence trial in a timely manner.

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is generally relegated to post-conviction proceedings, unless the record permits definitive resolution on appeal. State v. Miller, 99-0192 (La. 9/6/00), 776 So.2d 396, 411, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1194, 121 S.Ct. 1196, 149 L.Ed.2d 111 (2001). However, where the claim is raised as an assignment of error on direct review and where the record on appeal is adequate to resolve the matter, the claims should be addressed in the interest of judicial economy. State v. Calhoun, 96-0786 (La. 5/20/97), 694 So.2d 909, 914.

A defendant is entitled to effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 13 of the Louisiana State Constitution. In assessing a claim of ineffectiveness, a two-pronged test is employed. The defendant must show that (1) his attorney's performance was deficient, and (2) the deficiency prejudiced him. The error is prejudicial if it was so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, or "a trial whose result is reliable." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). In order to show prejudice, the defendant must demonstrate that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068; Felder, 809 So.2d at 370. Further, it is unnecessary to address the issues of both counsel's performance and prejudice to the defendant if the defendant makes an inadequate showing on one of the components. State v. Serigny, 610 So.2d 857, 860 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1992), writ denied, 614 So.2d 1263 (La. 1993). Decisions relating to investigation, preparation, and strategy require an evidentiary hearing,1 and therefore, cannot possibly be reviewed on appeal. See State v. Allen, 94-1941 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/9/95), 664 So.2d 1264, 1271, writ denied, 95-2946 (La. 3/15/96), 669 So.2d 433.

Statements/Rejection of Plea Agreement

Prior to trial, Fleming filed a motion to suppress statements that he made to Baton Rouge Police Lieutenant Christopher Johnson. Following a pretrial hearing, at which Fleming was present, the trial court granted Fleming's motion to suppress and ordered the suppression of most of Fleming's interview with Lieutenant Johnson, finding that Fleming had invoked his right to remain silent after a few minutes into the interview.

At trial, Lieutenant Johnson testified regarding his unrecorded initial contact with Fleming, wherein Fleming denied any involvement in Smith's death. Lieutenant Johnson also testified about the unsuppressed, recorded portion of Fleming's statement in which Fleming appeared to admit his involvement in the shooting, but claimed the shooting was accidental.

On appeal, Fleming now contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to explain to him that part of his recorded statement with Lieutenant Johnson was not suppressed and would be played at trial. Fleming contends that had he been made aware that part of the statement would be introduced, he would have taken a fifteen-year plea deal allegedly offered by the State.

The record does not contain evidence of any advice Fleming's trial counsel gave to him regarding the admissibility of the statement he made to Lieutenant Johnson. We do note that Fleming was present at the hearing at which the trial court ruled a portion of this statement would be admissible. However, we cannot determine whether Fleming understood this ruling. To the extent that Fleming argues his trial counsel misinformed him concerning the trial court's ruling and that this alleged misinformation affected his ability to assess a plea offer, this issue is a matter of trial preparation and strategy that is not included in, and cannot be assessed on the record before us. Thus, this portion of Fleming's first pro se assignment of error is unreviewable on appeal.

Motion to Quash/Commencement of Trial

In his second allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel, Fleming contends that his trial counsel erred in failing to file a motion to quash based upon the State's failure to commence trial in a timely manner.

Generally, no trial shall be commenced in a non-capital felony case after two years from the date of the institution of prosecution. See La. Code Crim. P. art. 578(A)(2). However, when a defendant files a motion to quash or other preliminary plea, the running of the periods of limitation established by Article 578 shall be suspended until the ruling of the court thereon; but in no case shall the State have less than one year after the ruling to commence the trial. See La. Code Crim. P. art. 580(A). A preliminary plea is any pleading or motion filed by the defense which has the effect of delaying trial, including properly filed motions to quash, motions to suppress, or motions for a continuance, as well as applications for discovery and bills of particulars. State v. Lathers, 2005-0786 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/10/06), 924 So.2d 1038, 1043, writ denied, 2006-1036 (La. 11/3/06), 940 So.2d 659.

In the instant case, the State properly and timely instituted prosecution by grand jury indictment on April 27, 2011. See La. Code Crim. P. arts. 382(A) & 571. On February 22, 2012, Fleming filed a motion to suppress his recorded statement. On August 2, 2013, Fleming filed an amended motion to suppress the same statement. Fleming's motion to suppress was a preliminary plea that suspended the statutory time limitation of Article 578. See Lathers, 924 So.2d at 1043. When the trial court issued its suppression ruling on August 22, 2013, the State had at least one year from that date to commence trial. See La. Code Crim. P. art. 580(A).

On August 18, 2014, defense counsel was granted a continuance over the State's objection. This motion for a continuance was another preliminary plea that suspended the statutory time limitation of Article 578. See Lathers, 924 So.2d at 1043. Therefore, the State had a period of at least one year from this date to commence trial. See La. Code Crim. P. art. 580(A). Trial commenced with the examination of the first prospective juror on December 8, 2014, well within that year.2 See La. Code Crim. P. art. 761.

Based on the above facts, defense counsel did not perform deficiently in failing to file a motion to quash alleging that the state failed to commence trial in a timely manner. At no time did the time limitations for commencement of trial found in Articles 578 and 580(A) expire. Therefore, this portion of Fleming's first assignment of error is without merit.

PRO SE ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR #2

In his second pro se assignment of error, Fleming contends that the State improperly introduced at trial a confession that was withheld from the defense. Fleming's argument is somewhat unclear, but he appears to claim that the State unlawfully withheld the evidence of his interview with Lieutenant Johnson until trial. However, Fleming also argues that both he and defense counsel believed his entire interview would be suppressed and not played at trial.

Fleming's argument that the State withheld any evidence regarding the recorded interview introduced at trial is rebutted by his own assignment of error and claims asserted throughout these proceedings that clearly reflect an awareness of the existence of the recorded interviews, as he filed a motion to suppress and an amended motion to suppress related to the interviews. The trial court largely granted Fleming's motion to suppress and explained to the parties exactly what small portion of Fleming's recorded statement would not be suppressed. Our review of the record reveals that the portion of the recording played at trial was exactly the portion that the trial court ruled to be admissible. Therefore, Fleming was aware of this evidence well in advance of trial, and the State did not unlawfully withhold any evidence related to the recorded statements or interviews. Accordingly, this assignment of error is without merit.

For the assigned reasons, we affirm Jarvis McKinley Fleming's conviction and sentence.

CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED.