NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

OPINION

KRAMER, Judge.

A.J. Menges appeals an order of the Owen Circuit Court overruling his motion to convert various outstanding costs and fees associated with his current conviction and sentence into an additional, concurrent term of imprisonment. We affirm.

In October, 2009, Menges entered a guilty plea in Owen Circuit Court with respect to three counts of sodomy in the third degree and one count of rape in the third degree. Subsequently, the circuit court entered a final judgment on December 17, 2009, in conformity with a plea arrangement Menges had negotiated with the Commonwealth. The particulars of his sentence were (1) two years' imprisonment (credited with 182 days already served); (2) five years of conditional discharge; and (3) a criminal fine of $1,000.1 At the time of sentencing, the circuit court further adjudicated Menges liable for statutory court costs of $130 and a partial public advocacy fee of $600.

Following Menges' conditional release on June 14, 2011, the circuit court directed him to pay his costs, fees, and fines (totaling $1,730) in $50 monthly installments beginning August 31, 2011. When Menges failed to make any payments, a warrant was issued for his arrest and he was taken into custody on August 27, 2012. On September 11, 2012, the circuit court held a hearing regarding Menges' failure to make the requisite payments; Menges was granted additional time to begin making the requisite payments (i.e., starting November 30, 2011); and Menges was released.

However, a second warrant for Menges' arrest was issued on December 21, 2012, because Menges continued to make no installment payments. This warrant was eventually executed on June 9, 2014. Thereafter, Menges was remanded to the Kentucky State Reformatory to serve out his five-year conditional discharge time. He was also notified on June 9, 2014, that a detainer had been lodged against him as a result of his failure to pay the aforementioned costs, fees, and fines.

On January 30, 2015, citing Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 534.060,2 Menges filed a motion asking the circuit court to convert the outstanding $1,730 in costs and fines to a term of imprisonment to run concurrently with the remainder of his sentence. He argued that the imposition of the fines and court costs affected his institutional classification, his custody level, transfer status and ability to participate in institutional programs.

His motion was opposed by the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth pointed out that Menges had previously made no effort at paying any part of the assessed costs and fines, and it argued that converting Menges' fines and costs to a definite term of imprisonment to run concurrently with the sentence he was already serving—which would essentially allow Menges to escape paying any amount and serve no time in addition to what had already been mandated—would unduly depreciate the seriousness of his crime.

Upon consideration, the circuit court denied Menges' motion. This appeal followed.

At the onset, the Commonwealth argues the circuit court could not have committed error in denying Menges' motion because it lacked jurisdiction to grant it. This, it reasons, is because trial courts typically lose jurisdiction to alter, amend, or vacate a final judgment ten days after the judgment is entered (see, e.g., Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 52.02 and 59.05), and Menges filed his motion well beyond ten days after December 17, 2009, the date of the final judgment and Menges' sentencing. However, this particular argument has already been rejected in prior caselaw. In Owens v. Williams, 955 S.W.2d 196, 197 (Ky. App. 1997), it was explained that a trial court does not lose jurisdiction to convert fines into a jail term after ten days has elapsed from the imposition of the fines because "[KRS 534.060] is triggered by nonpayment of a fine."

The Commonwealth further argues, however, that the circuit court's decision to deny Menges' motion was not an abuse of discretion. We agree.

As an initial matter, the plain language of KRS 534.060 does not contemplate allowing an inmate to file a motion to convert a fine into a term of imprisonment. See KRS 534.060(1) (providing "When an individual sentenced to pay a fine defaults in the payment of the fine or any installment, the court upon motion of the prosecuting attorney or upon its own motion may require him to show cause why he should not be imprisoned for nonpayment." (Emphasis added); see also Williams, 955 S.W.2d at 197, Johnson concurring (calling into doubt that KRS 534.060 authorizes an inmate to file a motion to convert an outstanding fine into a term of imprisonment). Even if it did, however, the plain language of KRS 534.060, particularly its repeated use of the word "may," clearly indicates any decision a court makes regarding such a matter would be subject to review under an abuse of discretion standard. See, e.g., Kitchens v. Milliken, 329 S.W.2d 68, 69 (Ky. 1959).

"The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge's decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles." Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999). Here, the circuit court stated on the record that its decision to overrule Menges' motion to convert his outstanding costs, fees, and fines into a concurrent sentence was based upon the fact that these were part of the consideration of a negotiated plea agreement. Granting Menges' motion would have deprived the Commonwealth of the benefit of its bargain with Menges and, as the Commonwealth argued before the circuit court, would have depreciated the seriousness of his crime. Specifically, if the circuit court had converted Menges' costs, fees, and fines into a concurrent sentence, it would have effectively allowed Menges to reduce his outstanding balance at a rate of at least $50 per day. KRS 534.070(1)(a). At the time of his motion, Menges had well over a year remaining on his sentence for sodomy and rape. Thus, at the conclusion of the sentence Menges was already required to serve, Menges would have owed nothing and likewise would not have been required to serve any additional time.

In light of the above, it was not an abuse to deny Menges the relief he requested. We therefore AFFIRM.

ALL CONCUR.