GRAHAM C. MULLEN, District Judge.
This matter is before the Court upon the Commissioner's Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Plaintiff has submitted a response in opposition to the Commissioner's motion and this matter is ripe for disposition.
The Commissioner has submitted the Declaration of Marie Cousins, Office of Disability Adjudication and Review ("Declaration"), which sets forth the procedural history in this matter. On March 28, 2014, Ms. Wallace filed an application for title II benefits, which was denied at both the initial and reconsideration levels of review (Declaration, ¶ 3(a) and (b)). Ms. Wallace filed a request for a hearing on October 21, 2014, but the request was dismissed on January 10, 2017, on the basis of res judicata (Declaration, ¶ 3(c), Exhibit 6 of the Declaration). Per the Order of Dismissal, Ms. Wallace previously filed applications for a period of disability, DIB, and supplemental security income (SSI) payments that were denied in a determination dated September 26, 2013 (Exhibit 6 of the Declaration). This determination, issued after Ms. Wallace's insured status expired,
On January 26, 2017, Ms. Wallace filed a request for review of the dismissal (Declaration, ¶ 3(d)). Ms. Wallace's request was denied on April 26, 2017 (Declaration, ¶ 3(d), Exhibit 8 of the Declaration). On June 23, 2017, Ms. Wallace filed this civil action.
A court "generally may not rule on the merits of a case without first determining that it has jurisdiction over the category of claim in suit (subject-matter jurisdiction)." Sinochem Int'l Co. Ltd. v. Malaysia Int'l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 430-31 (2007) (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 93-102 (1998)). The plaintiff bears the burden of proving that subject matter jurisdiction exists. See Evans v. B.F. Perkins Co., a Div. of Standex Int'l Corp., 166 F.3d 642, 647 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R. Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir. 1991)).
When a defendant challenges subject matter jurisdiction, the court "is to regard the pleadings as mere evidence on the issue, and may consider evidence outside the pleadings without converting the proceeding to one for summary judgment." Id. at 647 (quoting Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R. Co., 945 F.2d at 768); see also Williams v. United States, 50 F.3d 299, 304 (4th Cir. 1995) (in considering exhibits outside pleadings, court "is free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case") (internal quotation omitted)). That is, upon a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, "the court may look beyond the pleadings and `the jurisdictional allegations of the complaint and view whatever evidence has been submitted on the issue to determine whether in fact subject matter jurisdiction exists.'" Khoury v. Meserve, 268 F.Supp.2d 600, 606 (D. Md. 2003) (internal quotation omitted), aff'd, 85 F. App'x 960 (4th Cir. 2004).
Judicial review of the final decisions on claims arising under title II or title XVI of the Act is provided for and limited by sections 205(g) and (h) of the Act.
42 U.S.C. §§405(g) and (h) (emphasis added).
It is clear from these provisions of the Act that the only civil action permitted on any claim arising under titles II or XVI is an action to review the "final decision of the [Commissioner] made after a hearing." Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 108 (1977).
It is undisputed that Plaintiff did not seek review of the September 26, 2013 determination. As such, that determination became the final decision of the Commissioner. In the Order of Dismissal the ALJ determined there were no conditions present to reopen the September 26, 2013 final determination.
The regulations provide that the Commissioner may dismiss a hearing request and decline to issue a "final decision" if:
As the September 26, 2013 determination became final as a result of Ms. Wallace's failure to seek review, the current claim, which involves the same facts, law, issues and parties, was properly precluded from consideration by the Commissioner on the grounds of res judicata. Cleaton v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 815 F.2d 295, 298 (4th Cir. 1987).
The Fourth Circuit, in extending the rationale of Califano v. Sanders, has held that a district court has no jurisdiction to review the Commissioner's res judicata determinations, unless a colorable constitutional violation has been alleged. Brown v. Harris, 669 F.2d 911, 913 (4th Cir. 1981); see also Hall v. Chater, 52 F.3d 518, 520 (4th Cir. 1995). In this case there is no colorable constitutional claim. Accordingly, this Court has no jurisdiction to review the instant action.
Moreover, the Commissioner also properly construed Ms. Wallace's request for review as a request to reopen the final decision on a prior claim. Ellis v. Schweiker, 662 F.2d 419 (5th Cir. 1981). The Commissioner's discretionary denial of Ms. Wallace's request to reopen the prior claim is not subject to judicial review. Sanders, 430 U.S. at 108. The Supreme Court held that neither section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706, nor section 205(g) of the Social Security Act grants district courts jurisdiction to review a decision of the Commissioner not to reopen a previously adjudicated claim for Social Security benefits. The Supreme Court held that 42 U.S.C. §405(g) "clearly limits judicial review to a particular type of agency action, a `final decision of the [Commissioner] made after a hearing.' But a petition to reopen a prior final decision may be denied without a hearing as provided in . . . . § 405(b)." Sanders, 430 U.S. at 108. The Fourth Circuit, in adopting Sanders, has held that a district court has no jurisdiction to review the Commissioner's discretionary denial of a request to reopen a prior final determination, absent a colorable constitutional claim. Hall, 52 F.3d at 520; Cleaton, 815 F.2d at 298; Brown, 669 F.2d at 913. As there is no colorable constitutional claim in the instant case, this Court has no jurisdiction and the action must be dismissed.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Commissioner's Motion to Dismiss is hereby GRANTED.
McGowen v. Harris, 666 F.2d 60, 65 (4th Cir. 1981), citing Shrader v. Harris, 631 F.2d 297 (4th Cir. 1980).