WILLIAM T. LAWRENCE, District Judge.
This cause is before the Court on the motion to dismiss filed by the Defendant, General Revenue Corporation d/b/a Sallie Mae ("Sallie Mae"). Dkt. No. 43. The motion is fully briefed, and the Court, being duly advised,
Sallie Mae moves to dismiss Plaintiff Kimerly Reynolds' complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2), 37(d), and 41(b).
Under Rules 37(b)(2) and 37(d), if a plaintiff fails to serve answers to interrogatories or respond to a request for inspection, or if the plaintiff fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery, the court may dismiss the plaintiff's case. "[T]o dismiss a case as a sanction for discovery abuse the court must only find that the party's actions displayed willfulness, bad faith, or fault." Collins v. Illinois, 554 F.3d 693, 696 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing In re Thomas Consol. Indus., Inc., 456 F.3d 719, 724 (7th Cir. 2006); Maynard v. Nygren, 332 F.3d 462, 468 (7th Cir. 2003)).
Additionally, Rule 41(b) provides as follows:
or failure to join a party under Rule 19—operates as an adjudication on the merits. Dismissal is appropriate under Rule 41(b) in cases where "there is a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct, or when other less drastic sanctions have proven unavailable." Rice v. City of Chicago, 333 F.3d 780, 785-86 (7th Cir. 2003) (citations and quotations omitted). "[T]he power to sanction through dismissal is essential to the district courts' ability to manage efficiently their heavy caseloads and thus protect the interests of all litigants." Roland v. Salem Contract Carriers, Inc., 811 F.2d 1175, 1178 (7th Cir. 1987).
On October 26, 2012, the parties submitted a joint case management plan ("CMP") to the Court. The CMP was approved by the Court on November 2, 2012. According to the CMP, the parties were to exchange initial disclosures on or before November 16, 2012. The CMP also ordered Reynolds and Sallie Mae to file preliminary witness and exhibit lists on or before February 15, 2012 and March 15, 2013, respectively.
On November 5, 2012, Sallie Mae served interrogatories and requests for production on Reynolds. Reynolds, however, did not respond to the discovery requests, nor did she move for (or informally request) an enlargement of time to respond to the requests. Reynolds also failed to serve her initial disclosures on November 16, 2012, and to file her preliminary witness and exhibit lists on February 15, 2012.
On March 4, 2013, still without Reynolds' discovery responses, initial disclosures, and preliminary witness and exhibit lists, Sallie Mae filed a motion to compel. The Magistrate Judge assigned to this case granted the motion on March 27, 2013, and ordered Reynolds to (1) serve, without objections, her responses to Sallie Mae's discovery requests, (2) serve her initial disclosures, and (3) file her preliminary witness and exhibit lists, all within fourteen days of the order (i.e., April 10, 2013). Dkt. No. 41. The Magistrate Judge further warned Reynolds that her failure to abide by the order would subject her case to "summary dismissal for failure to prosecute under Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." Id. Despite this warning, Reynolds failed to comply with the Magistrate Judge's order.
On April 16, 2013, Sallie Mae filed the instant motion to dismiss pursuant to Rules 37(b)(2), 37(d) and 41(b). Sallie Mae argues that dismissal is appropriate because Reynolds "has repeatedly and intentionally refused to comply with discovery obligations, ignored numerous Court orders, and violated the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." Sallie Mae's Br. at 1, Dkt. No. 44.
Reynolds failed to timely serve her initial disclosures, failed to respond to Sallie Mae's discovery requests, failed to file her preliminary witness and exhibit lists, and failed to comply with the Magistrate Judge's order compelling discovery, despite the Magistrate Judge's clear warning that her claims would be subject to dismissal if she did not comply with the order. Reynolds' counsel argues that he (as opposed to Reynolds) failed to comply with the case management and discovery deadlines and the order compelling discovery because he was busy with another case,
The Court acknowledges that the delays in this case were counsel's doing. Reynolds, however, must accept responsibility for her attorney's actions. As discussed in Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626 (1962):
Id. at 633-34.
Accordingly, dismissal of Reynolds' claims is appropriate under Rules 37(b)(2), 37(d) and 41(b). See Williams v. Bd. of Educ., 155 F.3d 853, 858 (7th Cir. 1998) (dismissal for failure to prosecute appropriate where plaintiff's counsel frequently disregarded discovery rules, protocol, and the court's deadlines and schedule); In re Thomas Consol. Indus., Inc., 456 F.3d at 725 (no abuse of discretion where district court dismissed case after plaintiff failed to comply with court order compelling discovery).
For the reasons set forth above, the Defendant's motion to dismiss is
SO ORDERED.