DENISE J. CASPER, District Judge.
Plaintiff Martin McCauley ("McCauley") has filed this lawsuit pro se, alleging violations of his Eighth Amendment rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, his rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") and the Rehabilitation Act and a medical malpractice claim. D. 36. Over the course of this litigation, the Court has dismissed certain claims and defendants, D. 37; D. 83, and referred McCauley's medical malpractice claim to a medical malpractice tribunal in accordance with Mass. Gen. L. c. 231, § 60B. D. 102. McCauley's surviving claims include ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims against Defendants Turco and Medeiros (the "Commonwealth Defendants"), as well as ADA, Rehabilitation Act and § 1983 claims against Defendants Angeles, Atkins, Byron, Groblewski, Lubelczyk and Massachusetts Partnership Correctional Health (the "Medical Defendants") (collectively, the "Defendants"). Pending before the Court are Defendants' motions for summary judgment, D. 127; D. 132, as well as Defendants' motion to strike, D. 144, Defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to comply with a court order, D. 153, and Defendants' motion to continue the trial date, D. 153. Also pending are McCauley's motion for extension of time to file an opposition, D. 145, a motion to compel discovery, D. 146, and McCauley's opposition and cross-motion for summary judgment, D. 155. For the reasons set forth below, the Court ALLOWS Defendants' motions for summary judgment, DENIES McCauley's cross-motion for summary judgment and DENIES as moot the remaining motions that are pending.
The Court grants summary judgment where there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the undisputed facts demonstrate that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "A fact is material if it carries with it the potential to affect the outcome of the suit under the applicable law."
McCauley instituted this action on June 25, 2014. D. 1. McCauley filed an amended complaint on August 9, 2016. D. 36. Subsequently, the Court dismissed claims against UMass Correctional Health System pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(2). D. 37. On March 17, 2017, the remaining Defendants moved to dismiss. D. 71; D. 73; D. 75. The Court dismissed all claims against Governor Charles Baker for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), and dismissed all claims against Cynthia Sumner and Lynn Lizotte as a result of McCauley's failure to serve these Defendants properly under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5). D. 83. The Court also dismissed the § 1983 claim against the Commonwealth Defendants.
McCauley failed to file a timely opposition to Defendants' motions for summary judgment. D. 115. On July 23, 2018, two days before the hearing on Defendants' motions for summary judgment, D. 127; D. 132, and McCauley's pending motion for discovery, D. 124, McCauley filed a motion requesting additional time to file an opposition to the summary judgment motions, D. 137. The Court denied McCauley's request, D. 139, in light of the age of this litigation, the fact that McCauley has already received extensions on multiple occasions,
On July 25, 2018, the Court heard the parties on the pending motions for summary judgment. During oral argument, McCauley provided the Court with a statement he had prepared for the hearing, D. 142, and which the Court agreed to consider along with the motions for summary judgment. D. 141. The Court also heard the parties on McCauley's pending motion for discovery, D. 124, which the Court denied. D. 141. In addition, the Court granted McCauley's request for leave to file an opposition to Defendants' motions after the hearing.
On August 8, 2018, McCauley filed a copy of the Medical Defendants' statement of material facts that includes handwritten notes purportedly responding to the facts proffered by the Medical Defendants. D. 143. On August 15, 2018, the Medical Defendants filed a motion to strike McCauley's response to its statement of material facts for failure to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 and Local Rule 56.1. D. 144. McCauley filed a motion for extension of time to August 16, 2018 to file an opposition to Defendants' motions for summary judgment, D. 145, a renewed motion for discovery, D. 146, and McCauley's third motion for appointment of counsel, D. 148. Defendants have opposed these motions, D. 149; 150; 151, and filed joint motions to continue the trial date, D. 154, or, in the alternative, to dismiss in light of McCauley's failure to comply with the Court's deadline to file an opposition to summary judgment, D. 153.
McCauley's opposition to Defendants' motions for summary judgment, cross-motion for summary judgment and a statement of material facts were filed on August 22, 2018.
The following facts are drawn primarily from the parties' statements of material facts, D. 129; D. 134; D. 156, and supporting materials. The facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted. McCauley is an inmate currently incarcerated at Massachusetts Correctional Institution-Norfolk ("MCI-Norfolk"), which is part of the Massachusetts Department of Correction ("DOC"). D. 134 ¶ 1. With the exception of thirteen months during which McCauley resided at MCI-Shirley between 2014 and 2015, McCauley has primarily served his sentence at MCI-Norfolk. D. 134 ¶ 2.
McCauley suffers from several health issues, including issues with his back, shoulder, thumb and discomfort caused by his dentures. D. 156 ¶¶ 5, 69. Since July 1, 2013, Defendant Massachusetts Partnership for Correctional Healthcare, LLC ("MPCH"), a privately-owned company under contract with DOC, has overseen McCauley's medical treatment. D. 134 ¶ 6. Prior to July 1, 2013, UMass Correctional Healthcare provided medical services at DOC facilities. D. 134 ¶ 4.
McCauley has severe scoliosis, degenerative joint disease of the spine, spinal stenosis, Hepatitis C and chronic back pain. D. 129 ¶ 4; D. 134 ¶ 3. McCauley's back problems were first documented by UMass Correctional Healthcare in 1983. D. 156 ¶ 8; D. 160-2 at 1. In 2003, a MRI of McCauley's back revealed "[s]evere degenerative disc disease at the L4-5 level with vacuum disc phenomena being identified, without evidence of a focally herniated or lateralizing disc." D. 156 ¶ 8; D. 160-6 at 2. In a follow-up letter, a physician explained that although McCauley's MRI showed significant degenerative disease nothing "seems to suggest that surgical treatment" was necessary at the time. D. 160-2 at 6. The letter further states that "consideration could be given to epidural steroid injections, but . . . continued supportive treatment would be the best for [McCauley]."
On July 30, 2012, Dr. Riesenburger discussed the benefits of back surgery with McCauley, and McCauley asked for more time to think about it. D. 160-6 at 36. On November 16, 2012, McCauley requested that any surgery on his back be delayed until he could secure a "single cell." D. 134 ¶ 42; D. 135-1 at 16. Shortly thereafter, Defendant Lubelczyk took over McCauley's care at MCI-Norfolk and referred him to another neurosurgeon. On March 28, 2013, Lubelczyk told McCauley that his new neurosurgeon, Dr. Massengale, had recommended back surgery. D. 134 ¶ 45; D. 135-1 at 22. That day, McCauley told Lubelczyk that he wanted to defer the procedure, and he reiterated this request on April 12, 2013.
After surgery, McCauley was sent to the Souza Baranowski Correctional Center infirmary for recovery and physical therapy. D. 134 ¶ 52. McCauley returned to MCI-Norfolk on September 27, 2013. D. 134 ¶ 54. Between October 2013 and January 2014, McCauley met with Lubelczyk regarding his back on at least nine occasions.
In January 2014, McCauley underwent a second surgery on his back. D. 134 ¶ 75; D. 135-1 at 47. After his surgery, McCauley was sent to the Lemuel Shattuck Hospital until May 14, 2014 and then to MCI-Shirley for rehabilitation and physical therapy until May 2015. D. 134 ¶ 76. Defendant Angeles also ordered additional scans of McCauley's back at least as late as April 2015. D. 36-3 at 16-19. In January 2017, Dr. Massengale recommended McCauley for a posterior cervical laminectomy to help decompress his spinal cord. D. 134 ¶ 77; D. 135-1 at 92-95. The surgery occurred in February 2017. D. 134 ¶ 77.
In late October 2013, McCauley informed Lubelczyk of his continued back pain from surgery and Lubelczyk observed that McCauley had trouble standing up without the assistance of his hands. D. 134 ¶ 55; D. 135-1 at 30. Subsequently, on October 21, 2013, Lubelczyk discontinued McCauley's prescription for pain medications Percocet and Neurontin because McCauley had tested positive for an illicit substance that he was not prescribed. D. 134 ¶ 57; D. 135-1 at 31. To alleviate McCauley's pain, Lubelczyk issued McCauley prescriptions for other pain medications. D. 135-1 at 31. McCauley did not agree with Lubelczyk's decision to discontinue his Neurontin prescription. D. 156 ¶ 21; D. 160-2 at 32 (indicating that, on November 25, 2013, Prisoners' Legal Services sent a letter to the Medical Director of MCI-Norfolk on McCauley's behalf explaining that he was experiencing severe pain after his prescriptions for pain medications were discontinued). As a result, he filed a grievance requesting the reinstatement of his Neurontin prescription. D. 134 ¶ 114; D. 133-3 at 19. On December 3, 2013, Defendant Atkins denied McCauley's grievance because "it was submitted greater than 10 days after the incident date," and requested that McCauley submit a "sick slip or attend access hour with any further questions or concerns." D. 134 ¶ 114; D. 133-3 at 18. McCauley's appeal, D. 133-3 at 21, was also denied after discussion with his medical team,
On November 11, 2014, McCauley submitted a sick call request form in which he explained that he was hospitalized from an allergic reaction to Zanaflex, a medicine that Defendant Angeles had recently prescribed McCauley despite the fact that it should not be taken with one of McCauley's other medications. D. 134 ¶ 118; D. 135-1 at 54-55; D. 133-3 at 39. McCauley's grievance regarding the incident was denied as "non-grievable medical" and Zanaflex was added to his allergy chart. D. 134 ¶ 118; D. 133-3 at 39. McCauley did not appeal the decision. D. 134 ¶ 119.
McCauley has experienced issues with his shoulder, thumb and teeth. D. 134 ¶¶ 94-112. With respect to his shoulder, McCauley first received a cortisone shot to his right shoulder in November 17, 2011. D. 134 ¶ 96; D. 135-1 at 2. McCauley received an MRI on his shoulder on April 2, 2012, which showed an "AP tear of labrum and some muscle tear." D. 134 ¶ 97; D. 135-1 at 11. On May 24, 2012, McCauley informed Defendant Atkins that he wanted to try physical therapy as opposed to surgery to alleviate his shoulder pain. D. 134 ¶ 98; D. 135-1 at 11. McCauley similarly rejected recommendations for surgery on June 4, 2012 and July 31, 2012, stating that he wanted to wait until he had a single cell.
On March 10, 2011, McCauley received an x-ray for his thumb, which showed mild degenerative changes. D. 134 ¶ 102; D. 135-1 at 15. In April 2011, McCauley received a cortisone shot for his thumb pain. D. 134 ¶ 103; D. 135-1 at 5. In January and August 2012, he complained about his thumb, but did not file a formal grievance alleging inadequate treatment as to this condition. D. 134 ¶¶ 101, 103, 104; D. 133-3.
McCauley also struggles with pain due to the ill-fitting dentures. D. 156 ¶ 69. McCauley first received dentures in June 2015. D. 134 ¶ 107; D. 135-1 at 67-68. He received new dentures and/or had his dentures adjusted at least four times between June 2015 and February 2016. D. 134 ¶¶ 108-9, 111-12; D. 135-1 at 81, 89, 91. McCauley has filed two grievances regarding his dentures. D. 134 ¶¶ 121-22; D. 133-3 at 52-65. Both grievances were denied by Defendant Byron on the grounds that McCauley's dentures were already realigned for the best possible fit.
By November 13, 2013, Defendant Lubelczyk observed that McCauley, who was wearing a plastic corset from his surgery and reported "sharp" abdominal pain, appeared to be "in less distress and less pain" than Lubelczyk had previously observed. D. 134 ¶ 64; D. 135-1 at 56. Less than two weeks later, McCauley filed a request for reasonable accommodation of special needs with the DOC. D. 129 ¶ 16; D. 129-1 at 34. Specifically, McCauley requested a stand-up locker in his cell to replace the standard foot locker issued to individuals incarcerated in DOC facilities.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), provides that "[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a);
Pursuant to the MPCH's Clinical Grievance Mechanism, an incarcerated person must complete the following steps before administrative remedies will be deemed exhausted: (1) bring an informal grievance to the attention of the relevant Health Services Administrator ("HSA"); (2) file a formal grievance using the Inmate Grievance and Appeal Form within ten working days of the incident, becoming aware of the incident or the date upon which the HSA responds to the informal grievance, if the HSA did not provide a satisfactory response to the informal grievance; and (3) appeal a decision on the formal grievance to the MPCH Grievance and Appeal Coordinator within ten working days from receipt of the decision by the HSA. D. 133-3. An incarcerated person's administrative remedies are deemed exhausted only after the Grievance and Appeal Coordinator issues a response to the appeal.
Courts have held that failure to complete the formal grievance and appeal processes outlined in the MPCH policy at issue here is fatal to claims under § 1983 and other federal laws at the summary judgment stage.
Even assuming McCauley could cure his failure to exhaust the aforementioned administrative remedies, his claims still fail on the merits. Moreover, to the extent McCauley properly exhausted administrative remedies with respect to the discomfort caused by his dentures, judgment as a matter of law is nevertheless warranted for the reasons discussed below as to the merits of these claims.
McCauley's remaining Eighth Amendment claims under § 1983 include claims seeking injunctive relief against the Medical Defendants in their official capacities and damages against Defendants Angeles, Atkins, Byron, Groblewski and Lubelczyk in their individual capacities. D. 83. McCauley alleges that the medical care he received from the Medical Defendants was "so inadequate as to shock the conscience" in violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
The Court first turns to the subjective prong of the analysis. McCauley alleged in the amended complaint that the Medical Defendants engaged in a pattern of deliberate failure to treat his medical issues, which resulted in his conditions worsening over time.
McCauley argues that Lubelczyk, the only Medical Defendant who was directly responsible for McCauley's medical care and treatment, deliberately failed to attend to his medical issues, including by denying recommendations that McCauley undergo back surgery, delaying orders for tests and appointments and discontinuing McCauley's pain medication. D. 155 at 28-30. To the contrary, the undisputed material facts indicate that Lubelczyk conducted regular evaluations of McCauley's conditions, repeatedly referred McCauley for MRIs and other diagnostic tests, ensured that McCauley received consultations with specialists in connection with his back pain, facilitated the scheduling of McCauley's first back surgery, advised against McCauley's requests to delay the procedure and recommended medical restrictions, pain medication and ADL residency following McCauley's surgery.
To the extent McCauley asserts that Lubelczyk exacerbated his back injury by allegedly ignoring a neurosurgeon's recommendation for surgery in 2011, this assertion is unsupported by the record. D. 160-6 at 27-28 (indicating that Dr. Riesenburger, McCauley's neurosurgeon in 2011, did not recommend surgery and, instead, referred McCauley to physical therapy). In addition, even assuming Lubelczyk's inability to secure an MRI within three months of McCauley's back surgery,
With respect to the remaining Medical Defendants, the record is devoid of any evidence that they acted with deliberate indifference to McCauley's medical treatment. First, McCauley opines that Angeles failed to exercise proper care when prescribing a new drug, Zanaflex, to which McCauley had a negative reaction. D. 155 at 30. However, there is no indication that Angeles purposely prescribed medication that would harm McCauley and after the incident occurred MPCH personnel ensured that Zanaflex was added to McCauley's allergy list, D. 134 ¶ 118; D. 133-3 at 39. Without more, Angeles' conduct does not rise to the level of "deliberate indifference" required for an Eighth Amendment violation.
Second, McCauley argues that Atkins was deliberately indifferent to his medical needs because she denied McCauley's grievance concerning Lubelczyk's decision to discontinue McCauley's prescription for Neurontin and failed to address the delay in McCauley's MRI allegedly caused by Lubelczyk. D. 155 at 31-32. McCauley does not recall any other instance in which Atkins was involved in or made specific decisions with respect to his care. D. 133-2 at 9-11 (explaining during his deposition that he did not recall "all the decisions [Atkins] made" and that he "recall[ed] dealing with her in the past" but could not "recall what it was for"). Courts have repeatedly held that it is reasonable for "prison administrators and staff . . . [to] rely `on the opinions of the treating doctors,'"
Third, McCauley contends that Byron denied grievances concerning discomfort caused by McCauley's dentures. The record indicates that both grievances were denied in accordance with the medical team's recommendation and on the grounds that McCauley's dentures were already realigned for the best possible fit. D. 134 ¶¶ 121-22; D. 133-3. Where, as here, the "dispute concerns not the absence of help, but the choice of a certain course of treatment, or evidences mere disagreement with considered medical judgment," the Court finds that McCauley has not established an Eighth Amendment violation.
Finally, the facts before this Court do not suggest that Groblewski was involved in McCauley's medical care nor do they support a theory of supervisory liability with respect to Groblewski or MPCH. In the context of § 1983 claims, the First Circuit has explained that "only those individuals who participated in the conduct that deprived the plaintiff of his rights can be held liable."
The Medical and Commonwealth Defendants urge this Court to deny McCauley's claims pursuant to Title II of the ADA
Under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, the undisputed material facts must show that the plaintiff: (1) "is a qualified individual with a disability;" (2) "was either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of some public entity's services, programs or activities or was otherwise discriminated against;" and (3) "that such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of the plaintiff's disability."
After considering the record, the Court concludes that Defendants' conduct was not discriminatory on its face and that McCauley's treatment was not "so unreasonable—in the sense of being arbitrary and capricious—as to imply that it was pretext for some discriminatory motive, such as animus, fear, or apathetic attitudes."
For the foregoing reasons, the Commonwealth and Medical Defendants' summary judgment motions are ALLOWED, D. 127; D. 132, and McCauley's cross-motion for summary judgment is DENIED, D. 155. The Court also DENIES the parties' remaining motions as moot. D. 144-46; D. 153; D. 154; D. 157-59; D. 161-64.
