MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

PAULA XINIS, District Judge.

Pending before the Court is a Petition to Compel Arbitration filed by Pineview Extended Care Center, Inc., d/b/a FutureCare Pineview ("Pineview"), along with a separate Motion to Stay Companion Litigation. ECF Nos. 1 and 8. Respondent Esau Ade, through his personal representative Julius Ade ("Ade"), has moved to dismiss the Petition. ECF No. 6. For the reasons below, the Court DENIES the Motion to Dismiss, GRANTS the Petition to Compel Arbitration, and DENIES the Motion to Stay.

I. Background

Julius Ade, as representative of Esau Ade, initiated a medical malpractice action in Maryland's Health Care Alternative Dispute Resolution Office ("HCADRO") against Pineview,1 alleging that Pineview was negligent in its care of Esau Ade. See ECF No. 1-2 at 2-5. Pineview moved this Court to compel arbitration pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), 9 U.S.C. § 4, based on the written agreement executed between Pineview and Julius Ade on behalf of Esau Ade. See ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 3, 20; ECF No. 1-4. In relevant part, the parties agreed that "any and all disputes that may arise from the care that [Esau Ade] receive[s] from [Pineview]" will be "submitted to binding arbitration for resolution." ECF No. 1-4 at 2.

II. Discussion

A. Motion to Dismiss

The Court first addresses Ade's Motion to Dismiss because it centers on this Court's jurisdiction to review the Petition. Ade contends that Pineview has failed to "prove" sufficiently that Ade is a citizen of the District of Columbia. Notably, Ade does not demonstrate, or even argue, that he is not a citizen of the District of Columbia. Rather, Ade asserts that the Petition must be dismissed because Pineview has generated no proof that Ade is domiciled in the District of Columbia. ECF No. 6 ¶ 7. Ade is incorrect.

At the pleading stage, the Court accepts the facts pleaded with regard to citizenship as true, and need not look behind the pleading unless the party challenging citizenship marshals evidence in support of his position. See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 96-97 (2010) ("When challenged on allegations of jurisdictional facts, the parties must support their allegations by competent proof."); Sligh v. Doe, 596 F.2d 1169, 1171 (4th Cir. 1979) (if defendant had offered testimony to rebut finding of Virginia citizenship, there may have been a basis to question diversity jurisdiction, but no such testimony was offered); cf. Axel Johnson, Inc. v. Carroll Carolina Oil Co., Inc., 145 F.3d 660, 663 (4th Cir. 1998) (allegations of mere residence, rather than allegations of citizenship or domicile, insufficient to give rise to diversity jurisdiction). Pineview has alleged adequately that Ade is a citizen of the District of Columbia. See ECF No. 1 ¶ 6. Ade's bare averment regarding Pineview's lack of proof does not warrant dismissal. ECF No. 6 is DENIED.

B. Petition to Compel

The Court next considers Pineview's Petition to Compel Arbitration pursuant to the FAA. The FAA provides:

9 U.S.C. § 4. As addressed above, the parties are citizens of different states, and Pineview properly alleges that the amount in controversy is in excess of $75,000.2 Accordingly, diversity jurisdiction is satisfied. It is also undisputed that the agreement between Pineview and Ade includes an agreement to arbitrate "any disputes that may arise from the care" Pineview provided to Ade.3 "Any dispute" certainly includes the claims currently pending before the HCADRO. This Court, therefore, properly may compel arbitration under the FAA. ECF No. 1 is GRANTED.

C. Motion to Stay

Pineview also requests that this Court stay the HCADRO action pursuant to the stay provision of the Maryland Uniform Arbitration Act ("MUAA"), Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc., § 3-209. The Court denies this request.

As an initial matter, it bears noting that Pineview provides no authority explaining how this Court retains the power to order a state tribunal to stay proceedings in this context. Pineview's reliance on the MUAA is not helpful in this regard; even the cases cited by Pineview involve Maryland courts staying their own actions pending arbitration. See Frederick Contractors, Inc. v. Bel Pre Med. Ctr., Inc., 274 Md. 307, 309, 314-16 (1975) (initial action was filed in Montgomery County Circuit Court; demand for arbitration filed in that court should have had the effect of staying the proceeding until return of arbitration award); Redemptorists v. Coulthard Servs., Inc., 145 Md.App. 116, 128-30, 134 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002) (petition to compel arbitration was brought in same court in which the underlying action was filed; that court also granted a stay pending arbitration); cf. Diesselhorst v. Munsey Bldg., LLLP, No. Civ. AMD 04-3302, 2005 WL 327532, at *2 (D. Md. Feb. 9, 2005) (stay sought under MUAA of proceedings pending in that court); Barnes v. Ontario Drive & Gear Ltd., Civil Action No. WMN-09-CV-3020, 2010 WL 311648, at *1-*3 (D. Md. Jan. 20, 2010) (Court dismissed proceeding that was before it under the MUAA).

Consequently, while the MUAA allows a court to stay its own proceeding pending arbitration—similar to section 3 of the FAA, which permits federal courts to stay cases brought before them pending arbitration—nothing in either the FAA or the MUAA permits that which Pineview seeks from this Court. Indeed, Pineview's request appears to violate basic principles of federalism and comity. See 28 U.S.C. § 2283. To the extent that the parties require a formal stay of the HCADRO action, Pineview must seek the stay from the HCADRO in the first instance. That said, this Court will permit Pineview to move for reconsideration if Pineview can provide specific precedent that would permit this Court to stay a case pending before a state tribunal pursuant to the MUAA where this Court's jurisdiction is limited solely to deciding a petition to compel arbitration under the FAA. Any such motion shall be filed in compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e).

III. Conclusion and Order

For the reasons above, it is this 21st day of May, 2018, by the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, hereby ORDERED that: