NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

OPINION

DIXON, Judge.

Travis Merritt appeals from the October 25, 2013, final judgment and sentence of imprisonment of the Madison Circuit Court. That judgment found Merritt guilty of one count of theft by deception, sentenced him to five years' imprisonment, and ordered him to pay $20,000.00 in restitution. We affirm.

The events which formed that basis of Merritt's conviction took place in September of 2010. On September 13, 2010, Miley Cain was at home when he was approached by a man offering to blacktop Cain's driveway. Mr. Cain, who was 85-years-old, testified that he was originally offered a cost of "seventy-two" and then, after declining, was offered a price of "twenty-seven," which he understood to mean twenty-seven dollars. Mr. Cain called his wife, Barbara Cain, to discuss the offer. Mr. Cain testified that he approved the deal and five or six men, including Merritt, then worked on his driveway for several hours. Mr. Cain also testified that Merritt was not the man with whom he had negotiated the cost. At one point while the men were working, Mr. Cain observed that they had begun working on a second driveway. Mr. Cain came out of the house in order to tell the men to stop working on the second driveway, at which time he fell and hit his head. When Mrs. Cain returned home, the men were still working. After the work was completed, two men came into his home and told the Cains that the final cost was $20,000.00. Mrs. Cain testified that Merritt was one of the men who presented them with the final cost. Testimony further indicated that no official bill or invoice was ever presented to the Cains. After being told the final cost, Mr. Cain called his bank to determine if he could borrow that amount of money. He was told that he could but, due to the late hour, the money could not be retrieved until the next day. The next day, Mrs. Cain was met at the bank by Merritt, who told her to have the check put into his name. Mrs. Cain then gave Merritt a check for $20,000.00, which he then cashed at the bank before leaving.

Detective Glen Wagner, of the Berea Police Department, testified that he received a call from the Cains' bank manager, who was concerned about the transaction. Detective Wagner interviewed the Cains who were unable to supply any of the men's names or descriptions. Detective Wagner performed a recorded interview with Merritt, which was later played during trial. During that interview, Merritt indicated that he was uninvolved with negotiating the price of the job with the Cains. He stated that he was a work hand and was paid $100.00 per job. He further explained that he met Chris Grady, who owned the paving equipment used in the job on the Cains' driveway, through a friend, Scott Boswell, and had been working for Grady, with Scott and his brother, Eric Boswell; Ralph Rowe; and Randall Rowe for a couple of weeks to months. According to Merritt, Grady was always in charge of findings jobs, negotiating the price, supplying equipment, and supervising the jobs. Merritt also stated that Grady had indicated that he could not cash checks in Kentucky because he did not have a Kentucky driver's license and that checks would have to be made out in Merritt's name, if Merritt wanted to get paid. Grady offered Merritt $100.00 for cashing the Cains' check. Merritt said that he did not know the price of the Cain job until Mrs. Cain handed him a check at the bank that morning. He indicated that he thought that the price was high, and that other paving jobs he had done for Grady were quoted between $8,000.00 and $9,000.00. Merritt stated that he took the $20,000.00 from cashing the Cains' check and gave it to Grady. Detective Wagner testified that, despite a substantial investigation, he was unable to locate any of the other parties involved in the Cain job.

Merritt was indicted on one count of theft by deception, over $10,000.00. At trial, Lyle Walker, an experienced construction business owner, testified that a driveway comparable in size to the Cains' would cost between $2,000.00 and $3,000.00 to blacktop. Walker further testified that the work done on the Cains driveway was substandard and that his common business practice was to have payments made out to his business and not to one of his workers. The jury returned a verdict of guilty and recommended a sentence of five years' imprisonment. Merritt received his final sentence on October 25, 2013. Therein, the trial court adopted the jury's recommended sentence of five years and ordered Merritt to pay $20,000.00 in restitution to the Cains. This appeal followed.

Merritt's first argument on appeal is that the trial court erred when it failed to grant a directed verdict on the theft by deception charge. Directed verdicts are governed by Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 50.01. A defendant is only entitled to a directed verdict when it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find guilt based upon the evidence as a whole. Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Ky. 1991). When considering a motion for directed verdict, the trial court "must consider the evidence as a whole, presume the Commonwealth's proof is true, draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the Commonwealth, and leave questions of weight and credibility to the jury." Acosta v. Commonwealth, 391 S.W.3d 809, 816 (Ky. 2013). A directed verdict is appropriate when the Commonwealth "has produced no more than a mere scintilla of evidence." Id.

In particular, Merritt maintains that he was entitled to a directed verdict because there was no evidence that he was involved in the negotiation of the job or the price, and that there was no evidence of misrepresentation or reliance. We disagree. "The directed-verdict question is . . . controlled . . . by the statutes creating the offense." Acosta, 391 S.W.3d at 816. The crime of theft by deception is governed by Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 514.040, which states, in relevant part:

KRS 514.040(1). In the case before us, evidence was presented that Merritt was present at the time that Mr. Cain was given a quote; that he was present during the completion of the work; that he was present at the time that Mr. Cain was given a final amount due; that he had instructed Mrs. Cain to put the check in his name; that he had received the check; that he cashed the check; and that he agreed with law enforcement that the amount charged was an unfair price for the work performed. Based upon this evidence as a whole, it is not clearly unreasonable for a jury to find that Merritt obtained property (cash) from the Cains by reinforcing a false impression of the value of the work performed on the Cains' driveway. As indicated above, these are the statutory elements which compose the offense of theft by deception. KRS 514.040. We therefore hold that the trial court did not err when it denied Merritt's motion for directed verdict.

Merritt's final argument on appeal is that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered restitution. Merritt maintains that it is unreasonable to order him to pay the full amount of restitution given his limited involvement in the Cain job; the involvement of other parties; and an inadequate investigation by the police. At a minimum, Merritt argues, the trial court should have deducted the reasonable value of the Cains' blacktop job from the $20,000.00 sum. Again, we disagree.

Restitution is statutorily defined, in relevant part, as "compensation paid by a convicted person to a victim for . . . property damage and other expenses suffered by a victim because of a criminal act." KRS 532.350(1). Decisions regarding restitution are within the sole discretion of the trial court. Hearn v. Commonwealth, 80 S.W.3d 432, 436 (Ky.2002). Accordingly, we will not disturb an order of restitution absent an abuse of that discretion. The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court's decision was "arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles." Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky.1999) (citations omitted).

It is statutorily authorized that "[w]here there is more than one (1) defendant or more than one (1) victim, restitution may be apportioned." KRS 533.030(3). The Supreme Court of Kentucky has held that this statute allows a trial court to order joint and several liability for a single defendant. R.S. v. Commonwealth, 423 S.W.3d 178, 189 (Ky. 2014). In support of its holding, the Court in R.S. stated:

Id. Given the clear permissive nature of KRS 533.030(3), as defined by the Court in R.S., it is our holding that the trial court herein did not abuse its discretion when it ordered Merritt to pay the Cains the full $20,000.00 in restitution. The restitution ordered adequately reflects the loss suffered by the Cains as a result of Merritt's criminal activity. Moreover, the Cains' loss of $20,000.00 is not diminished by their receipt of a substandard driveway in exchange for the deception.

For the foregoing reasons, the October 25, 2013, final judgment and sentence of imprisonment of the Madison Circuit Court is affirmed.

ALL CONCUR.