RICHARD L. VOORHEES, District Judge.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), United States Magistrate Judge David C. Keesler was designated to consider and recommend disposition of the aforesaid motions. Accordingly, in a Memorandum and Recommendation ("M & R") filed on December 27, 2013, the Magistrate Judge recommended that the Court
At the time of her original application for social security Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB"), Plaintiff Robin Y. Upright ("Upright") was forty-six years old. (R. 44). Upright has a ninth grade education and has previously worked as a machine operator and a house cleaner. (R. 44-45). The alleged date of disability is October 28, 2008. (R. 44). Plaintiff represents that she has been unable to work since 2008 when she had two herniated discs and two collapsed discs in her neck. (R. 45). Upright underwent surgery on her neck in December 2008. (R. 46). Four discs were replaced and a metal plate put in to resolve these issues. (R. 46).
In support of her application for DIB, Upright contends that she experiences debilitating pain in her neck, back, hip, numbness in her arms, elbows, and fingers, as well as swelling, muscle spasms, muscle weakness, and fatigue as a result of degenerative disc disease of the cervical and lumbar spine. (R. 44). Upright also complained of hypertension, side effects from medications, and panic attacks. (R. 30).
During the evidentiary hearing before the ALJ, Upright described her pain as feeling "[l]ike somebody stabbing me." (R. 47). Upright testified that her average daily pain ranged from a level 6 to 8 on a scale of 1 to 10. (R. 48). Upright testified that her pain worsened if she walked or lifted anything and that the swelling of her hands, neck, feet, and legs required her to elevate her legs above her heart for a "[c]ouple hours." (R. 48). Upright stated that she could sit for no longer than thirty minutes and stand for no more than twenty minutes without experiencing pain. (R. 52-53). According to Upright, she averaged only four to five hours of sleep a night due to the need to position herself a certain way. (R. 49). Upright explained that she took hour-long naps three times a week. (R. 49). During the evidentiary hearing, Plaintiff's counsel represented that the occupational base available for Plaintiff would be further eroded by Upright's need "to take frequent unscheduled breaks" and "inability to maintain punctual attendance." (R. 44).
A summary of the ALJ's sequential evaluation process and decision follows. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v). At step one, the ALJ noted that Upright has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date, October 28, 2008. (R. 26).
At step two, the ALJ found that Upright suffers from the following medically severe impairments: degenerative disc disease of the cervical region of the spine, obesity, and mood disorder.
At step three, the ALJ did not find that Upright's severe impairments, or combination thereof, satisfied the criteria for any listed impairment. (R. 28). In evaluating the criteria for a mental impairment listing under Listing 12.04, the ALJ found Upright experienced only "mild" or "moderate" restrictions (as opposed to a "marked" restriction). (R. 28). Specifically, the ALJ determined that Upright experienced "mild" difficulties in the areas of daily living and social functioning and "moderate" difficulties with regard to concentration and persistence or pace. (R. 28-29). There is no claim or evidence that Upright's mood disorder caused her to experience episodes of decompensation. (R. 29). The record revealed that Upright had not experienced an anxiety attack in more than a year and had not received any inpatient or outpatient mental health treatment to address her alleged symptoms of anxiety since the alleged onset date of disability. (R. 29/Exh. 18F).
As for Upright's residual functional capacity ("RFC") and step four of the evaluation process, the ALJ determined that Upright retained the capacity to perform "light" and "unskilled" work subject to limitations including (i) a sit/stand option, and (ii) an inability to have concentrated exposure to hazards such as moving machinery and unprotected heights.
During the evidentiary hearing, the ALJ asked a Vocational Expert ("VE") to opine on the availability of jobs in the national economy for a person capable of: "the full range of light work"; "[a] sit/stand option on an occasional basis required"; [r]eaching is limited overhead to frequent bilaterally; "can only occasionally climb, balance, stoop, crouch, kneel or crawl"; there is "no concentrated exposure to hazards such as moving machinery or unprotected heights"; and "limited to unskilled work." (R. 55). The VE testified that such hypothetical individual would maintain the residual functional capacity to perform work as a cashier, bench assembler (sitting at a bench to assemble) and carding machine operator (a carder). (R. 56). According to the VE, if Upright required approximately one-hour naps three or more times a week while on the job, competitive employment options would be eliminated. (R. 57). Similarly, the VE testified that if Upright's impairments caused intermittent, unpredictable absences (whether for several hours, days, or weeks) at least three to five times a month, this would also likely rule out competitive employment. (R. 57).
Based on the record as a whole, including the VE's professional opinion, the ALJ determined at step five that jobs exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Upright can perform. (R. 34). The ALJ ultimately found that Upright was not disabled and not entitled to disability benefits.
In reviewing a denial of benefits under the Social Security Act, the Court may not conduct a de novo review of the decision of the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") but rather must examine the record to determine whether the Commissioner's findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence and whether the decision is in accordance with the law. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir.1990); Smith v. Schweiker, 795 F.2d 343, 345 (4th Cir. 1986); Hancock v. Astrue, 667 F.3d 470, 472 (4th Cir. 2012). The district court reviews de novo only those portions of the Memorandum and Recommendation to which specific objections have been raised. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). De novo review is not required when an objecting party raises only general or conclusory objections, or when an objection is essentially identical to an argument raised in a motion for summary judgment without further reference to the Memorandum and Recommendation. Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982); Eaker v. Apfell, 152 F.Supp.2d 863, 864 (W.D.N.C. 1998). Accordingly, the Court conducts a careful review of the entire Memorandum and Recommendation, as well as a de novo review of those issues specifically raised in objection to the Memorandum and Recommendation.
Plaintiff specifically objects to the M & R on the basis that the Magistrate Judge improperly recommends this Court affirm the ALJ's and the Commissioner's ultimate determination given the following alleged errors.
Plaintiff Upright contends that the ALJ did not adequately explain the weight attributed to the findings and opinion of her nurse practitioner, Judy Keighron, FNP ("Keighron"), Greenbriar Primary Care, PA, and faults the Magistrate Judge for excusing the ALJ from explaining consideration of the relevant factors within 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c) via SSR 06-03p.
In addition to presenting medical evidence from licensed medical doctors, under 20 C.F.R. § . (d), a plaintiff is permitted to submit evidence from "other sources."
The ALJ adequately explained why little weight was attributed to the nurse practitioner's views concerning claimant's physical capacity to work. In short, the ALJ determined that Keighron's medical opinion was inconsistent with other substantial evidence of record.
On January 18, 2011, Upright visited Keighron for purposes of supporting her application for DIB. Upright asked Keighron to complete a "Lumbar Spine Functional Residual Functional Capacity Questionnaire" ("LS RFC"), consisting of five pages of questions concerning the existence and severity of functional limitations related to Upright's alleged disability. (R. 427/Exh. 19F).
According to Keighron, Upright's prognosis was described as "poor due to chronic C-spine pain."
Keighron's LS RFC responses represent Plaintiff as falling within the most extreme categories of functional limitation. The functional limitations identified by Keighron included: constant interference with attention and concentration; thirty minute limits on both sitting and standing at one time; an inability to either sit or stand/walk more than two hours during an 8-hour work day; ten minute walks every thirty minutes; and unscheduled breaks every ten to thirty minutes with breaks lasting an average of thirty minutes to an hour. (R. 422-23/Exh. F, ¶¶ 10, 13b-13d, 13g). Keighron indicated that Upright was likely to be absent from work "more than four days a month" as a result of her impairment. (R. 423/Exh. 19F, ¶ 13m). Attached to the LS RFC is a one-page document entitled, "General Medical Opinion Re: Physical Capacity To Do Work," also dated January 18, 2011. (R. 425/Exh. 19F). Keighron checked the box marked "NO" in response to the direct question, "Is your patient capable of performing sustained work activities in an ordinary work setting on a regular and continuing basis (eight hours a day, five days a week)?" (R. 425).
Here, the ALJ considered the Keighron materials in rendering a decision as to eligibility for benefits, but nevertheless determined the Keighron findings should be given "little weight." (R. 32). The ALJ expressly found that the Keighron opinion was "not well supported by the medical evidence of record, including her own treatment notes (Exhibits 19F and 20F)."
Finally, Keighron's view concerning "disability" is not considered a medical opinion. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(3), 416.927(d)(3); see Pascoe v. Astrue, No. 11-226, 2012 WL 3528054, at *3 (W.D.N.C. July 23, 2012) (rec. dec. aff'd Aug. 14, 2012) (quoting SSR 96-5p, 1996 WL 374183). Disability determinations are within the province of the Commissioner.
In short, the Court finds that substantial evidence exists in the record to support the ALJ's (and the Commissioner's) decision to award "little weight" to the findings and opinion of Keighron.
Upright challenges the ALJ's credibility determination by asserting the ALJ "failed to consider the extensive medical evidence of record . . . and only plucked out those that supported the conclusion he wanted to reach." (Doc. 17, 4). According to Upright, the ALJ's analysis concerning credibility is contrary to Hines v. Barnhart. 453 F.3d 559 (4th Cir. 2006). In Hines, the Fourth Circuit emphasized its teaching in Walker v. Bowen, which explained that:
Hines, 453 F.3d at 564 (quoting Walker v. Bowen, 889 F.2d 47, 49 (4th Cir. 1989) (emphasis in original)). The Hines claimant suffered from sickle cell disease, a medical condition capable of causing the type of chronic pain described by Hines and a disease with a reputation for its absence of objective medical evidence to corroborate subjective complaints of pain. Hines, 453 F.3d at 565. The Fourth Circuit held in Hines that the ALJ erred by selectively citing evidence out of context concerning tasks claimant testified he was capable of performing and ignoring unrebutted testimony that claimant suffered from such pain and fatigue due to sickle cell disease that he was forced to lie down "half a day," was unable to do much around the house, and experienced "a lot of pains in his leg." Hines, 453 F.3d at . Between Hines' complaints of pain and the opinion of his long-term treating physician, there was undisputed record evidence that Hines' pain caused him to lie down several hours a day and also experienced acute attacks of pain that typically took Hines up to a month to recover from. Hines, 453 F.3d at 566-67. The appellate panel found that by insisting that objective medical evidence support the claimant's subjective complaints of debilitating pain none of which were inconsistent with the objective medical evidence that did exist the ALJ applied an incorrect legal standard. Hines, 453 F. 3d at 563-66.
Unlike the Hines case, the ALJ did not require objective evidence in considering Upright's complaints of pain.
Substantial evidence supports the ALJ's RFC findings.
Finally, in her last specific objection to the M & R, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to address whether her obesity caused any physical or mental limitations. In addition, Upright criticizes the Commissioner's attempt to provide post-hoc rationalization for (and the Magistrate Judge's acceptance of) the ALJ's treatment of, or omission of, discussion concerning, Upright's obesity.
By all accounts, Plaintiff Upright weighs over two hundred pounds at 5'4" tall. (R. 76). The ALJ specifically noted that the claimant "weighed pounds on October 4, 2007, had a body mass index (BMI) of 32.40 on May 15, 2009, and had a BMI of 36.67 on August 19, 2010.. . ." (R. 27). The ALJ expressly recognized the need to consider the impact of Upright's obesity pursuant to SSR 02-01p, and found that "the claimant's obesity could exacerbate symptoms from her physical impairments, such as pain."
Here, both the Commissioner and Magistrate Judge highlight that Upright did not complain about her weight to any of her medical providers or consultative examiners. (M & R, 10; Def.'s Mem. In Supp., at 20, 22). Moreover, Plaintiff did not discuss her obesity in connection with any particular functional limitation. The Magistrate Judge found that Upright failed to carry her burden on this issue and was unable to show that obesity gave rise to any functional limitation not already considered by the ALJ and included in the RFC. (M & R, 10). That is not to say that Upright's obesity was not considered by the ALJ in fashioning her RFC, or that obesity has not contributed to or exacerbated Upright's already identifiable functional limitations. Indeed, the ALJ identified support in the record for each functional limitation, including the three limitations the ALJ recognized as associated with or potentially impacted by obesity. (R. 32-33). The Alj explained that additional physical limitations described in the RFC assessment (beyond what is supported by objective medical tests), such as a prescribed sit/stand option on an occasional basis, were to account for Upright's obesity and her credible reports of pain. (R. 32).
The undersigned agrees that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision.
Plaintiff's Objections to the Memorandum and Recommendations will be
Additionally, SSR 06-03p reads:
20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(d)(1) (emphases added).
Roberson v. Astrue, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148897, * 8 (D.S.C. November 3, 2011) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(2)(2004); Mastro v. Apfel, 270 F.3d 171, 178 (4th Cir. 2001)).
