TERRI F. LOVE, Judge.
This appeal arises from a dispute regarding the ramifications of the Return of Lands Act, which applied to tracts of land
We find that the trial court did not err in finding that the plaintiffs' claims were not prescribed. We also find that the trial court did not err in awarding statutory and legal interest. However, we find that the trial court erred by awarding interest as a civil fruit and reverse. As for the reservation of the Plaintiffs' wrongful takings claims, we find that the trial court did not err and affirm.
"In 1924, the Louisiana Legislature enacted Act 99, which authorized the Board of Levee Commissioners of the Orleans Levee District ... to acquire by purchase, donation, or expropriation the lands or other property necessary for the construction of the Bohemia Spillway in Plaquemines Parish." Bd. of Comm`rs of Orleans Levee Dist. v. Gomez, 621 So.2d 826, 827 (La.App. 1st Cir.1992). The Bohemia Spillway "would protect the city of New Orleans from high water in the Mississippi River." Vogt v. Bd. of Levee Comm'rs of Orleans Levee Dist., 95-1187, p. 5 (La.App. 4 Cir. 9/4/96), 680 So.2d 149, 152. "In 1984, the Louisiana Legislature determined that the Bohemia Spillway was no longer needed and, in Act 233 of 1984, mandated that the Levee Board return to the original owners property acquired by expropriation or by purchase under threat of expropriation in order to create the spillway." Gomez, 621 So.2d at 827.
Pursuant to Act 233 of 1984, the successions of Carter Eusan
The Plaintiffs then filed a petition against the OLD seeking revenues from Tract 78 of the Bohemia Spillway pursuant to the Return of Lands Act.
In betwixt the filing of the petition and the present appeal, the trial court ruled in favor of the Plaintiffs on a motion for partial summary judgment. However, this Court remanded the matter on appeal. During that time, the Plaintiffs also filed a wrongful takings action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the OLD in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. The claims were dismissed as premature without prejudice pending a final determination of just compensation to the Plaintiffs.
Following dismissal from federal court, the Plaintiffs filed a motion to amend their petition and withdraw the wrongful takings claims against the OLD without prejudice and to add the Division of Administration of the State of Louisiana ("DOA") as a defendant because the Plaintiffs claimed that, as of January 1, 2007, the DOA managed the assets of the OLD. The OLD and DOA then filed answers, and exceptions to the Plaintiffs' amended petition. Namely, the OLD asserted that the Plaintiffs' claims were prescribed. The OLD and DOA
DOA was dismissed without prejudice on the morning of the trial. After a bench trial, the trial court, found for the Plaintiffs. The trial court awarded $996,596.40 in past revenues. The trial court also awarded $366,957.12 in statutory interest pursuant to Act 1364 of 1997. The trial court awarded interest on the revenues, as a civil fruit, in the amount of $365,777.34. In regards to the Plaintiffs' wrongful taking claims, the trial court ruled that the claims were "reserved." The trial court also overruled OLD's exception of prescription. All other claims regarding any other party were dismissed with prejudice. OLD's timely motion for appeal followed.
OLD asserts that the trial court erred because the Plaintiffs' claims are prescribed, the Plaintiffs are not entitled to the awarded amounts of interest, and that the trial court erred by reserving the wrongful takings claims.
Appellate courts review findings of fact with the manifest error or clearly wrong standard of review. Riley v. Reliance Ins. Co., 97-0445, pp. 4-5 (La.App. 4 Cir. 11/19/97), 703 So.2d 158, 162. "We must be cautious not to reweigh the evidence or substitute our own findings, and where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the fact finder's choice cannot be manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong." Proctor's Landing Prop. Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Leopold, 11-0668, p. 15 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/30/12), 83 So.3d 1199, 1208.
"[T]he standard of review of an appellate court in reviewing a question of law is simply whether the lower court's interpretive decision is correct." Olavarrieta v. St. Pierre, 04-1566, p. 3 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/11/05), 902 So.2d 566, 568. Thus, this requires de novo review. Broussard v. Hilcorp Energy Co., 09-0449; 09-0469, p. 3 (La.10/20/09), 24 So.3d 813, 816.
"Finally, a mixed question of fact and law should be accorded great deference by appellate courts under the manifest error standard of review." Moore v. Dep't of Police, 06-1217, p. 3 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/17/07), 950 So.2d 96, 98.
The OLD contends that the trial court erred in denying its exception of prescription because the Plaintiffs claims for revenues and/or any interest are prescribed utilizing either a one-year, three-year, or ten-year prescriptive period. The OLD avers that "[b]y waiting over twenty years before pursuing any claim, the Eusans unfairly avoided paying property taxes and otherwise maintaining Tract 78 for over twenty years."
The Plaintiffs counter that their claims were not prescribed because the Return of Lands Act permitted claimants until June 30, 2007, to file a claim for certification with the DNR.
The denial of an exception of prescription is an interlocutory judgment that is generally not subject to appeal. Spencer v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 454 So.2d 340, 341 (La.App. 4th Cir.1984). However, this rule is inapplicable if irreparable harm will occur. In re Succession of Linder, 05-640, p. 4 (La.App. 5 Cir. 2/14/06), 924 So.2d 293, 294. Ordinarily, this Court could convert the OLD's appeal of the prescription issue into an application for supervisory review. Stelluto v. Stelluto, 05-0074, pp. 7-8 (La.6/29/05), 914 So.2d 34, 39. However, there is no adequate remedy on appeal in this case because a trial court ruled on the OLD's exception of prescription along with the trial on the merits. Therefore, irreparable harm would occur if we did not consider the OLD's assertions of prescription in the matter sub judice.
The Louisiana legislature passed Act 233 of 1984 (effective June 29, 1984), which provided:
Haspel & Davis Mill. & Planting Co. Ltd. v. Bd. of Levee Comm'rs of Orleans Levee Dist., 95-0233, pp. 4-5 (La.App. 4 Cir. 9/4/96), 680 So.2d 159, 162-63. See also Historical and Statutory Notes to La. R.S. 30:21.2. Further, Act 1364 of the 1997 Louisiana legislature, amended and reenacted
Frank v. Bd. of Levee Comm'rs of Orleans Levee Dist., 04-0358, p. 7 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/6/05), 900 So.2d 1063, 1067. See also Historical and Statutory Notes to La. R.S. 30:21.2. Section 2(d) of Act 130 of 2005 provided that "[n]o property or mineral rights provided for in this Act shall be required to be returned to any person who has not filed a claim with the department for certification as an owner by June 30, 2007" and the provision became effective on June 22, 2005, when signed by the governor. See Historical and Statutory Notes to La. R.S. 30:21.2.
"Liberative prescription is a mode of barring of actions as a result of inaction for a period of time." La. C.C. art. 3447. The Louisiana Supreme Court stated that "[t]he fundamental purpose of prescription statutes is to afford a defendant economic and psychological security if no claim is made timely and to protect the defendant from stale claims and from the loss or non-preservation of relevant proof." Cichirillo v. Avondale Indus., Inc., 04-2894, p. 9 (La.11/29/05), 917 So.2d 424, 430. "`[T]he legislature may create, shorten, lengthen or abolish prescriptive periods at its discretion.'" Fishbein v. State ex rel. Louisiana State Univ. Health Sciences Ctr., 04-2482, p. 15 (La.4/12/05), 898 So.2d 1260, 1270, quoting Picone v. Lyons, 601 So.2d 1375, 1377 (La.1992).
This Court held that the intent of the Return of Lands Act was to "insure that the Levee Board did not retain the expropriated property and its mineral royalties after the effective date of the act." Haspel, 95-0233, p. 16, 680 So.2d at 168. This Court further expounded that "nothing in Act 233 evidenced an intent that the Levee Board retain the property and the revenues generated during the application process." Vogt, 95-1187, p. 15, 680 So.2d at 157. While the Louisiana Supreme Court stated that "[t]he fundamental purpose of prescription statutes is to afford a defendant economic and psychological security if no claim is made timely and to protect the defendant from stale claims and from the loss or non-preservation of relevant proof," the OLD was aware of the time in which claimants to the Bohemia Spillway property could file a claim with the DNR. Cichirillo v. Avondale Indus., Inc., 04-2894, p. 9 (La.11/29/05), 917 So.2d 424, 430.
The Plaintiffs and the OLD stipulated that they filed their claim with the DNR on December 15, 2004, received final certification on June 3, 2005, and filed their initial petition on February 9, 2006. Although the OLD asserts that the Plaintiffs' claims were subject to at least a one-year prescriptive period applicable to delictual actions,
The OLD repeatedly attempts to fault the Plaintiffs for waiting until 2004 to apply for certification with the DNR. The Plaintiffs cannot be penalized for complying with a legislatively mandated timeline.
The OLD contends that the Plaintiffs were not entitled to the three types of interest awarded to the Plaintiffs by the trial court.
The OLD asserts that the trial court erred in awarding the Plaintiffs $365,777.34 as the interest on revenues from 1984 to 1991, which the trial court referred to as civil fruits. To support this contention, the OLD relies upon Frank and Vogt v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Orleans Levee Dist., 98-2379 (La.App. 4 Cir. 6/9/99), 738 So.2d 1142.
The Plaintiffs contend that the award of interest, as prayed for, as a civil fruit is legally sound.
"In the absence of rights of other persons, the owner of a thing acquires the ownership of its natural and civil fruits." La. C.C. art. 483. "Civil fruits are revenues derived from a thing by operation of law or by reason of a juridical act, such as rentals,
The trial court relied upon the provisions of the Louisiana Civil Code regarding civil fruits and stated that Vogt and Frank did "not assist the court in its analysis." Although La. C.C.P. art. 1921 provides that the "court shall award interest" prayed for, this Court held that a plaintiff was not entitled to the civil fruits of their property formerly contained in the Bohemia Spillway. Frank, 04-0358, p. 7, 900 So.2d at 1068. This Court stated that the trial court in Frank did not err in denying the civil fruit interest award, because of the "lack of any authorization in Act 233 of
The OLD maintains that the Plaintiffs are not entitled to statutory interest from 1991 to 2005 for two reasons: 1) the Return of Lands Act was amended to repeal the interest provision prior to the Plaintiffs filing suit and 2) the Plaintiffs did not provide interest rates as calculated by the legislative auditor.
The Plaintiffs contend that they are entitled to statutory interest pursuant to Act 1364 of 1997, which included the following provision to Section 1(b)(ii) of Act 233 of 1984, prior to the previously discussed deletion:
First, the OLD avers that the Louisiana Legislature repealed the portion of the Return of Lands Act that provided for the award of statutory interest with section 1 of Act 130 of 2005, which was enacted seven months before the Plaintiffs filed suit. Therefore, the OLD asserts that the Plaintiffs had no vested right to statutory interest.
The OLD claims that the trial court erred in awarding statutory interest because the Plaintiffs did not file suit until after the interest provision was repealed by the Louisiana Legislature. However, the trial court found that the Plaintiffs were entitled to statutory interest as of June 3, 2005, when the DNR certified them as owners of Tract 78. Therefore, the Plaintiffs "had a vested and accrued cause of action for this statutory interest prior to the enactment of Act 130 of 2005, which removed this interest provision." The trial court relied upon Austin v. Abney Mills, Inc., 01-1598 (La.9/4/02), 824 So.2d 1137 and Walls v. Am. Optical Corp., 98-0455 (La.9/8/99), 740 So.2d 1262 for the holding. Both Louisiana Supreme Court cases relied upon by the trial court state that:
Walls, 98-0455, 740 So.2d at 1268-69. "Once a cause of action accrues, a party has a vested right in the cause of action that a new substantive law cannot take away." Anderson v. Avondale Indus., Inc., 00-2799, p. 6 (La.10/16/01), 798 So.2d 93, 99. Thus, in order to receive statutory interest, the Plaintiffs must have acquired a vested right prior to the repealing of the interest provision. Walls, 98-0455, 740 So.2d at 1269.
In Walls, the Court reasoned that the vested right for a wrongful death action did not exist until Mr. Walls' death. Walls, 98-0455, 740 So.2d at 1270. Likewise, the Plaintiffs' vested right to seek statutory interest did not exist until the DNR certified them as owners of Tract 78 on June 3, 2005, which then permitted the Plaintiffs to seek redress pursuant to the Return of Lands Act. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs' right accrued prior to Act 130 of 2005, effective on June 22, 2005, which repealed the provision regarding the entitlement to statutory interest.
OLD relies upon Intracoastal Pipe Serv. Co., Inc. v. Assumption Parish Sales & Use Tax Dep't., 563 So.2d 863, 864 (La. 1990) and Buckbee v. Aweco, Inc., 626 So.2d 1191, 1193 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1993). However, Intracoastal and Buckbee dealt with legal interest as opposed to statutory interest. Therefore, we find the trial court correctly interpreted the jurisprudence and hold that the OLD's argument against the award of statutory interest regarding statutory amendment lacks merit.
Second, the OLD's argument regarding the interest rates is misplaced. In lieu of live testimony or documentary evidence at trial, all parties submitted two joint stipulations. The parties stipulated to the average interest rates earned from 1991 to 2006 by the OLD. The parties also stipulated that if the trial court determined that the Plaintiffs were entitled to statutory interest based on the revenues of $996,596.40, then the Plaintiffs were entitled to $366,957.12 in statutory interest. "[T]he Louisiana Supreme Court has acknowledged that `[i]t is well established that a stipulation has the effect of a judicial admission or confession, which binds all parties and the court.'" Peters v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 10-0969, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/17/10), 52 So.3d 229, 232, quoting Becht v. Morgan Bldg. & Spas, Inc., 02-2047, p. 5 (La.4/23/03), 843 So.2d 1109, 1112. See also La. C.C. art. 1853. Therefore, we find that the OLD's assertion that the interest rates were not calculated by the legislative auditor lacks merit, due to the joint stipulation, and affirm.
The OLD contends that the Plaintiffs are not entitled to legal interest from the date of judicial demand because the award is not legislatively authorized. Additionally, the OLD claims that legal interest may be awarded if the one-year prescriptive period applies to their claims pursuant to La. R.S. 13:4203. "Legal interest shall attach from date of judicial demand, on all judgments, sounding in damages, `ex delicto', which may be rendered by any of the courts." La. R.S. 13:4203.
Conversely, the Plaintiffs assert that legal interest may be awarded when prayed for and that La. R.S. 13:4203 mandates
The OLD asserts that the trial court erred by reserving the Plaintiffs' "takings" claims under Louisiana or federal law and then dismissing its reconventional demand regarding the "takings" claims with prejudice.
The Plaintiffs counter that their takings claims are premature for adjudication because the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana previously held that the claims regarding wrongful takings were premature until a determination of just compensation was made and the Levee District failed to pay that compensation. We agree.
The trial court then reserved the Plaintiffs' "takings" claims pursuant to La. R.S. 13:4232, which arise under the Constitution of the United States and the Louisiana Constitution. The trial court's judgment reserved claims
Trial courts are granted discretion when deciding whether to grant declaratory judgment relief because the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure provides that the court "may declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed." La. C.C.P. art. 1871. There are also exceptions to the application of res judicata, as noted by the trial court. La. R.S. 13:4232 provides, in pertinent part, that:
OLD relies upon Frank and Vogt for the assertion that this Court has twice found that the taking of land for the Bohemia Spillway did not constitute an unlawful taking under state or federal law. However, neither Frank nor Vogt examined the legal accuracy of the trial courts' holdings regarding the "takings" claims. Instead, this Court addressed the trial courts' award or refusal to award attorneys' fees based upon a wrongful takings claim. Frank, 04-0358, pp. 4-6, 900 So.2d at 1066-67; Vogt, 98-2379, 738 So.2d at 1149. Therefore, we find the OLD's argument is misplaced.
As the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana
For the above-mentioned reasons, we find that the trial court did not err in finding that the plaintiffs' claims were not prescribed. We also find that the trial court did not err in awarding statutory and legal interest. However, we find that the trial court's award of interest as a civil fruit conflicts with this Court's interpretation of the Return of Lands Act and reverse. As for the reservation of the Plaintiffs' wrongful takings claims, we find that the trial court did not err and affirm.
