SEAN F. COX, District Judge.
Petitioner Christian Bell, through counsel, seeks habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner is a state prisoner in the custody of the Michigan Department of Corrections pursuant to convictions for second-degree murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. He raises two claims for habeas relief. Respondent argues that the claims are meritless. The Court denies the petition.
Petitioner's convictions arise from the shooting death of Nathaniel Webb. The Michigan Court of Appeals provided this overview of the trial testimony:
People v. Bell, No. 315196, 2014 WL 3887196, *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 7, 2014).
Petitioner was convicted by a jury in Wayne County Circuit Court of second-degree murder, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.317, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.227b. On January 16, 2013, he was sentenced to 18 to forty years for the second-degree murder conviction, and 2 years for the felony-firearm conviction.
Petitioner filed an appeal of right in the Michigan Court of Appeals arguing that the prosecutor improperly exercised two peremptory challenges to exclude two African-American members from the jury pool, the police search of Petitioner's phone violated the Fourth Amendment, the trial court improperly denied request for manslaughter jury instruction, and offense variables 3, 6, and 19 were improperly scored. The Michigan Court of Appeals denied Petitioner's claims with the exception of the Batson claim. Bell, No. 315196, 2014 WL 3887196, at *12-*13. The court of appeals held that the trial court failed to properly evaluate Petitioner's objection to the prosecutor's peremptory challenges during jury selection and remanded to the trial court to conduct a hearing pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). Id. at *8-*9, *12-*13. The State appealed the Michigan Court of Appeals' decision remanding the case, but the Michigan Supreme Court denied the State's application for leave to appeal. People v. Bell, 497 Mich. 856 (Mich. Sept. 5, 2014).
On remand and after holding a hearing and taking testimony from the prosecutor, the trial court held that the peremptory challenges had not been motivated by purposeful racial discrimination. See 12/12/2014 Tr. at 68-74. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of the Batson claim, People v. Bell, No. 315196, 2015 WL 1314122 (Mich. Ct. App. March 24, 2015), and denied Petitioner's motion for reconsideration. People v. Bell, No. 315196 (Mich. Ct. App. May 6, 2015). The Michigan Supreme Court denied Petitioner's application for leave to appeal. People v. Bell, 498 Mich. 907 (Mich. Oct. 28, 2015).
Petitioner then filed this habeas corpus petition. He raises these claims:
Review of this case is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"). Under the AEDPA, a state prisoner is entitled to a writ of habeas corpus only if he can show that the state court's adjudication of his claims —
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
A decision of a state court is "contrary to" clearly established federal law if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than the Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000). An "unreasonable application" occurs when "a state court decision unreasonably applies the law of [the Supreme Court] to the facts of a prisoner's case." Id. at 408. "[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly." Id. at 411.
The Supreme Court has explained that "[a] federal court's collateral review of a state-court decision must be consistent with the respect due state courts in our federal system." Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). The "AEDPA thus imposes a `highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings,' and `demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.'" Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010) (quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333 n. 7 (1997); Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam)). "[A] state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as `fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011). The Supreme Court has emphasized "that even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable." Id. at 102. Furthermore, pursuant to § 2254(d), "a habeas court must determine what arguments or theories supported or ... could have supported, the state court's decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of th[e Supreme] Court." Id.
Although 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended by the AEDPA, does not completely bar federal courts from relitigating claims that have previously been rejected in the state courts, it preserves the authority for a federal court to grant habeas relief only "in cases where there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court's decision conflicts with" Supreme Court precedent. Id. Indeed, "Section 2254(d) reflects the view that habeas corpus is a `guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems,' not a substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal." Id. (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332 n. 5 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring)). Therefore, in order to obtain habeas relief in federal court, a state prisoner is required to show that the state court's rejection of his claim "was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Id. at 103, 131 S. Ct. at 786-87.
Additionally, a state court's factual determinations are entitled to a presumption of correctness on federal habeas review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). A petitioner may rebut this presumption with clear and convincing evidence. See Warren v. Smith, 161 F.3d 358, 360-61 (6th Cir. 1998). Moreover, habeas review is "limited to the record that was before the state court." Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011).
Petitioner argues that the prosecution violated his right to equal protection during jury selection by using peremptory challenges to excuse two African-American members of the jury pool.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that "no State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. This Clause prohibits a prosecutor from using a peremptory challenge to exclude members of the jury venire because of their race. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986). In Batson, the Supreme Court articulated a three-step process for evaluating claims when a prosecutor has used peremptory challenges in a manner violating the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 96-98. First, the court must determine whether the defendant made a prima facie showing that the prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge on the basis of race. Id. at 96-97. Second, if the showing is made, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to present a race-neutral explanation for striking the juror. Id. at 97-98. "Although the prosecutor must present a comprehensible reason, `[t]he second step of this process does not demand an explanation that is persuasive, or even plausible'; so long as the reason is not inherently discriminatory, it suffices." Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 338 (2006), quoting Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767-68 (1995). Third, if a race-neutral explanation is offered, the court must then determine whether the defendant carried the burden to prove purposeful discrimination. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98.
The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of the Batson challenge, stating:
Bell, 2015 WL 1314122, at *2-*3.
"[A] trial court finding regarding the credibility of an attorney's explanation of the ground for a peremptory challenge is entitled to great deference." Davis v. Ayala, 135 S.Ct. 2187, 2199 (2015) (citations omitted). On direct appeal, a credibility determination may be reversed "only if the trial judge is shown to have committed clear error." Id. (citing Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 338 (2006)). The standard is even stricter under AEDPA. A state court's determination of the absence of discriminatory intent is "`a pure issue of fact' accorded significant deference." Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 339 (2003) (quoting Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 367 (1991)). On habeas review, findings of fact made by the state court are presumptively correct and must be rebutted by the petitioner by clear and convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Petitioner has not rebutted the finding by the trial court finding the prosecutor's race-neutral explanations credible. Therefore, this Court must defer to the state court's ruling on the issue of purposeful discrimination, and to the state appellate court's conclusion that no Batson error occurred. Habeas relief is not warranted on this claim.
Petitioner's second claim for relief concerns the trial court's denial of a requested voluntary manslaughter jury instruction. He argues that the trial court's ruling deprived him of his right to a properly instructed jury and his right to present a defense.
The Michigan Court of Appeals held that the evidence did not support a manslaughter jury instruction:
Bell, 2014 WL 3887196 at *10-11.
"`To warrant habeas relief, jury instructions must not only have been erroneous, but also, taken as a whole, so infirm that they rendered the entire trial fundamentally unfair.'" Doan v. Carter, 548 F.3d 449, 455 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Austin v. Bell, 126 F.3d 843, 846-47 (6th Cir. 1997)). Where a claim of error involves failure to give an instruction, the petitioner's burden is "especially heavy" because "[a]n omission, or an incomplete instruction, is less likely to be prejudicial than a misstatement of the law." Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 155 (1977).
The Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause require that a trial court instruct the jury on lesser included offenses in the context of a capital case. See Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637-38 (1980) (holding that a trial court is required to instruct on lesser included offenses where the failure to do so would result in the jury being given an "all or nothing" choice of convicting on the capital charge or acquitting the defendant). But "the Constitution does not requires a lesser-included offense instruction in non-capital cases." Campbell v. Coyle, 260 F.3d 531, 541 (6th Cir. 2001). Even where a lesser offense instruction is requested, the failure of a court to instruct on a lesser included or cognate offense in a non-capital case is generally "not an error of such magnitude to be cognizable in federal habeas corpus review." Bagby v. Sowders, 894 F.2d 792, 797 (6th Cir. 1990) (en banc). Because there is no clearly established Supreme Court law which requires the giving of a requested lesser offense instruction in the non-capital context, as is required for habeas relief under § 2254(d)(1), habeas relief is denied on this claim.
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 22 provides that an appeal may not proceed unless a certificate of appealability (COA) is issued under 28 U.S.C. § 2253. Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Proceedings now requires that the Court "must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant." A COA may be issued "only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). The substantial showing threshold is satisfied when a petitioner demonstrates "that reasonable jurists would find the district court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong." Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
In this case, the Court concludes that reasonable jurists would not debate the Court's conclusion that neither of the claims in the habeas petition warrant relief. Therefore, the Court denies a certificate of appealability.
Accordingly, it is
