HOLDRIDGE, J.
Plaintiff-Appellant, Thelma Layton, appeals a State Civil Service Commission (Commission) decision upholding her dismissal from a permanent status position as a Corrections Sergeant at Louisiana State Penitentiary (LSP). For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
During the early morning hours of October 7, 2014, Layton was working in LSP's West Yard Kitchen and Dining Hall, which has two serving lines designated as Line 3 and Line 4. Layton was assigned to Line 3 and Sgt. Danielle Daigle was assigned to Line 4. Another officer, Sgt. Jennifer Winters, was providing assistance to both lines.
At some point, Layton left Line 3. Layton claims that she went to smoke a cigarette, not realizing that the inmates had begun to enter the serving lines. Therefore, she immediately put her cigarette out. Layton then walked by Line 4 and gave the unfinished cigarette to an inmate in Line 4 before returning to her position in Line 3.
Daigle and Winters witnessed Layton pass an object to the inmate in Line 4. It appeared to them to be a cigarette. Corrections officers are prohibited from giving anything of value to inmates. Officers who witness such incidents are required to immediately report them to their superior officer. Therefore, Daigle asked Winters to monitor Line 4 for her and went to report the matter to Lt. Bradley Arvie. As a result, Arvie performed a "shake down" of the inmate and found the unfinished cigarette in his pocket. The inmate told Arvie that Layton had given it to him. Arvie then questioned Layton, who stated that she had merely asked the inmate to hold it for her.
Shortly thereafter, Layton went to Arvie's office. Arvie was not there, but Winters and Sgt. Bernice Cavalier were. Upon entering the office, Layton began making negative comments about Daigle for reporting the incident. According to Winters, Layton referred to Daigle as a "whore."
A few minutes later, Daigle entered Arvie's office. When she did, Layton immediately began directing loud accusations at Daigle and pointing her finger in Daigle's face, telling Daigle to mind her own business. Daigle pointed back, denying Layton's claims. According to Daigle and Winters, Layton then pushed Daigle.
Daigle received a verbal reprimand for her role in the altercation with Layton in Arvie's office. However, by letter dated October 23, 2014, Layton was dismissed from her position effective October 30, 2014. The dismissal letter noted that Layton's actions of: giving a cigarette to an offender; calling Daigle a "whore" in front of fellow employees, Winters and Cavalier; pointing her finger in Daigle's face; accusing Daigle of telling Arvie that she was "dealing" with an offender; and pushing Daigle on her shoulder constituted aggravated malfeasance and unauthorized activities with offenders in violation of LSP Rules 13(a), 13(b), and 14(b).
On October 27, 2014, Layton appealed her dismissal. In her appeal, she denied the allegations of the dismissal letter and alleged that she was the victim of racial discrimination and disparate treatment.
A Commission referee conducted a hearing on January 21, 2015. Following the hearing, the referee issued a decision finding that LSP had proven all of its charges and that Layton had failed to prove her allegation of racial discrimination. The referee further found that LSP's discipline of Layton was for legal cause and that the penalty imposed — dismissal — was commensurate with her offenses.
Layton filed an application for review of the referee's decision, which the Commission denied, making the referee's decision the final decision of the Commission.
Employees with permanent status may be disciplined only for cause expressed in writing. La. Const. art. X, § 8(A). "Cause" for dismissal of such a person includes conduct prejudicial to the public service involved or detrimental to its efficient operation.
Appellate courts reviewing civil service disciplinary cases are presented with a multifaceted review function. Initially, deference should be given to the factual conclusions of the referee and the Commission. Thus, a reviewing court should apply the clearly wrong or manifest error rule prescribed generally for appellate review.
On appeal, Layton primarily contests the credibility determinations made by the referee. It is well settled that credibility determinations, including the evaluation and resolution of conflicts in testimony, are factual issues to be resolved by the trier of fact and should not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of manifest error.
The manifest error standard demands great deference to the trier of fact's findings; for only the factfinder can be aware of the variations in demeanor and tone of voice that bear so heavily on the listener's understanding and belief in what is said. Where documents or objective evidence so contradict the witness's story, or the story itself is so internally inconsistent or implausible on its face, that a reasonable fact finder would not credit the witness's story, the court of appeal may well find manifest error or clear wrongness even in a finding purportedly based upon a credibility determination. But where such factors are not present, and a factfinder's finding is based on its decision to credit the testimony of one of two or more witnesses, that finding can virtually never be manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong.
After conducting a thorough review, we find that the referee's credibility determinations and consequential findings of fact are reasonable in light of the record reviewed in its entirety. The evidence supports a finding that, at least by and large, inmates at LSP smoke homemade, unfiltered cigarettes called "bugles." Commercially-produced, filtered cigarettes, called "free world" cigarettes, are items of value in prison. Layton readily admitted that she gave a partial, "free world" cigarette to an inmate.
The evidence also indicates that upon witnessing Layton pass the cigarette to the inmate, Daigle was duty-bound to report the incident to her superior officer. Nevertheless, Layton was angry that she had done so. Shortly thereafter, while in Arvie's office with Winters and Cavalier, Layton spoke negatively about Daigle for reporting the incident and, according to Winters, referred to Daigle as a "whore."
Likewise, with regard to the charge that Layton committed a battery upon Daigle by pushing her, we note that the referee was again presented with conflicting testimony. According to Daigle and Winters, Layton pushed Daigle. Conversely, Layton insisted that she had been pushed by Daigle; however, Layton's claim was contradicted by Daigle, Winters, and Cavalier. In his decision, the referee specifically found Layton to be lacking in credibility and expressly accepted the testimony of other witnesses. In making factual determinations, the trier of fact is free to accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of any witness.
With respect to these violations, we must now determine whether the disciplinary action of dismissal was based on legal cause (i.e., conduct that impaired the efficient operation of LSP) and, if so, whether it was commensurate with Layton's infractions.
On appeal, Layton only briefly asserts that her act of giving a partial cigarette to an inmate did not affect the efficient operation of LSP and thus, was insufficient to support her dismissal. Significantly, Layton does not argue that her aggressive and offensive language or her battery on Daigle did not impair the efficient operation of LSP. Rather, she merely disputes the referee's conclusion that she committed these violations. However, we have already determined that the relevant factual findings made by the referee were not clearly wrong.
Moreover, based on our review of the record, we are unable to discern any error in the referee's determination that Layton's dismissal by LSP was both based on legal cause and was commensurate with her infractions.
A penal institution is a quasi-military installation which necessarily operates under an exacting set of rules and regulations.
Correctional officers have a difficult and dangerous responsibility. They must keep incarcerated felons from harming themselves, each other, and the officers charged with their supervision. Therefore, correctional officers must necessarily rely on each other for the accomplishment of their mission and for their own safety, as well as the safety of the public.
In the instant matter, we find that Layton's misconduct impaired the public service by placing the safety of prison personnel and inmates at an increased risk of an incident occurring on the premises. Moreover, Layton's inappropriate actions, which resulted in the violation of at least three rules, particularly when taken together, indicate a serious breach of necessary prison security measures.
Layton also contests the referee's determination that she failed to satisfy her burden of proof on her claim of racially disparate treatment. Louisiana Constitution article X, § 8(B) provides, in pertinent part:
In her appeal, Layton, who is black, alleged that her dismissal was the result of racial discrimination; specifically she claimed that she was the victim of disparate treatment because severe disciplinary action was not also meted out to Daigle, who is white.
Lastly, Layton argues that she was denied a fair hearing. As an initial matter, we note Layton made no objection during the proceedings with respect to any purported deficiencies. Furthermore, our review of the record does not reflect that. Layton was denied the right to present evidence or subpoena witnesses. Clearly, Layton had the opportunity to question each testifying witness at the hearing and did so. Indeed, the crux of Layton's argument appears to be that the
For the reasons set forth herein, the decision of the Civil Service Commission is affirmed. All costs of this appeal are assessed to Thelma Layton.
