CARMAN, Judge.
Plaintiffs Jiaxing Brother Fastener Co., Ltd. (also known as Jiaxing Brother Standard
At issue here is whether Commerce chose the "best available information," as required by 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(1),
The Court affirms the Final Determination to the extent that Commerce rejected the financial statements of Deepak, Mangal, and Visakha and accepted the statements of Lakshmi and Sterling because the Court finds that substantial record evidence supports these decisions and that they are otherwise in accordance with law. However, the Court finds that Commerce based its decision to reject the financial statement of Rajratan on a mistake as to the nature of that company's products, and that the decision was therefore not supported by substantial evidence on the record. Plaintiffs' motion is therefore granted in part and the Final Determination is remanded to Commerce to reconsider the appropriateness of using Rajratan's financial statement by analyzing the comparability of Rajratan's merchandise to the subject merchandise.
Commerce began this investigation after receiving a petition from Vulcan seeking the imposition of antidumping duties on STR from China. (Petition from Law Firm of Vorys Sater to Sec of Commerce (Mar. 5, 2008), PR 2.) Commerce published its preliminary determination of sales at less than fair value ("LTFV") on October 8, 2008 (Certain Steel Threaded Rod from the People's Republic of China, 73 Fed. Reg. 58,931 (Oct. 8, 2008), PR 132), and an amended preliminary determination later that month (Certain Steel Threaded Rod from the People's Republic of China, 73 Fed.Reg. 63,693 (Oct. 27, 2008), PR 146). After conducting verification and accepting submissions of factual information and case briefs from interested parties, Commerce analyzed and made decisions in an Issues and Decision Memorandum regarding all issues raised. (Memo w/attachment(s) from DAS/IA to AS/IA issues and decision memo for Final Det of Sales LTFV (Feb. 20, 2009), PR 186 ("IDM").)
The Court "shall hold unlawful any determination, finding, or conclusion found . . . to be unsupported by substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise not in accordance with law," but otherwise shall uphold Commerce's determination. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(b)(i); Dorbest Ltd. v. United States, 604 F.3d 1363, 1371 (Fed. Cir.2010). Substantial evidence "is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477, 71 S.Ct. 456, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951) (internal quotations omitted). Under this standard, the Court must ensure that Commerce took "into account contradictory evidence or evidence from which conflicting inferences could be drawn." See id. at 487, 71 S.Ct. 456. The reviewing court must also consider "the record as a whole, including evidence that supports as well as evidence that `fairly detracts from the substantiality of the evidence.'" Huaiyin Foreign Trade Corp. (30) v. United States, 322 F.3d 1369, 1374 (Fed.Cir.2003) (quoting Atl. Sugar, Ltd. v. United States, 744 F.2d 1556, 1562 (Fed. Cir.1984)). However, "the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency's finding from being supported by substantial evidence," Consolo v. Fed. Maritime Comm'n., 383 U.S. 607, 620, 86 S.Ct. 1018, 16 L.Ed.2d 131 (1966) (citations omitted), so long as there is a "rational connection between the facts found and the choice made" in the agency's determination. See Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168, 83 S.Ct. 239, 9 L.Ed.2d 207 (1962). Thus, in the specific context of reviewing Commerce's decision regarding which information constitutes the "best available information" under 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(1), "the court's role `is not to evaluate whether the information Commerce used was the best available, but rather whether a reasonable mind could conclude that Commerce chose the best available information.'" Dorbest Ltd. v. United States, 30 CIT 1671, 1676, 462 F.Supp.2d 1262, 1269 (2006), aff'd-in-part, vacated-in-part, and remanded on other grounds, 604 F.3d 1363 (quoting Goldlink Indus. Co. v. United States, 30 CIT 616, 619, 431 F.Supp.2d 1323, 1327 (2006)).
This case centers on whether Commerce violated the mandate, given by 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(1), to choose the "best available information" with its determinations about which proxy financial statements from Indian surrogate companies to accept and reject in valuing the factors of production to calculate the normal value of the subject merchandise. The parties' contentions regarding the appropriateness of the financial data from each potential surrogate company are set forth below, along with the Court's analysis relating to that company.
Commerce rejected the financial statements of Deepak, an Indian producer of merchandise identical to the subject merchandise, because Commerce found that Deepak might have benefitted from countervailable subsidies and had submitted incomplete financial statements.
Plaintiffs object to Commerce's rejection of Deepak's financial statements on three
Second, Plaintiffs allege that Commerce arbitrarily and capriciously departed from its practice of preferring financial statements from companies producing identical merchandise—even in the face of evidence of subsidies—if the alternative requires the use of financial statements from producers of merely comparable products. (Pl's 56.2 Mot. at 11-12 (citing Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final Determination of Carbazole Violet Pigment 23 from the People's Republic of China (Nov. 8, 2004), available at http://ia.ita.doc. gov/frn/summary/prc/E4-3197-1.pdf ("CVB-23 IDM"") (last visited Nov. 15, 2010), incorporated into Final Determination of Carbazole Violet Pigment 23 from the People's Republic of China, 69 Fed. Reg. 67,304 (Nov. 17, 2004) and 19 C.F.R. § 351.408(c)(4)).) According to Plaintiffs, Deepak was the only producer of identical merchandise in the preliminary determination, and Commerce's decision to reject Deepak's financial statement and accept instead that of Sterling (a producer of merely comparable merchandise) was arbitrary and capricious, and "led to a 15 percentage point increase in Brother's dumping margin" in the final determination. (Id. at 12.) Commerce rejects the charge that it acted arbitrarily and capriciously here, contending that, by policy, the Department only accepts financial
Third, the Brother Companies argue that Commerce wrongly determined that Deepak's financial statement was incomplete. (Pl.'s 56.2 Mot. at 12-14.) According to Plaintiffs, Commerce found that "schedules V and XIV" from the "Consolidated Profit and Loss Account for the Year Ending 31-03-07" were missing, although the documents (Annexures V and XIV to the balance sheet section of the financial statements) are found in Document 98 of the Public Record at pages 23 and 25. (Id. at 12-13.) While Plaintiffs admit that the generic name of Deepak's principle product—fasteners—was omitted from the "Balance Sheet Abstract and Company's General Business Profile page" summary form (a "standard form under the Indian Companies Act that merely summarizes on one page the information found elsewhere in the financial statements"), they note that the financial statements nevertheless indicate that "total sales revenue related to sales of `fasteners items'" and that the Director Report indicates "that Deepak operates in the `Fasteners Industry.'" (Id. at 13-14.) Plaintiffs also point out that "extensive product information" in the record showed that "Deepak produced steel threaded rod." (Id. at 14.) From this, Plaintiffs argue that Commerce's final determination, rejecting Deepak's financial statement as incomplete, was not supported by substantial evidence. (Id.) Commerce contends that Plaintiffs are mistaken in believing that the presence of Annexures V and XIV to the Consolidated Balance Sheet on the record solves the incompleteness problem, since the items Commerce found to be missing were Annexures V and XIV to a different document (the Consolidated Profit and Loss Account for the Year Ending 31-03-07), and remain unaddressed by Plaintiffs. (Def.'s 56.2 Opp. at 13.) Commerce also contends that its "well-founded concerns ... about the reliability and integrity of Deepak's financial statement" are not addressed "just because the omitted information could potentially be gleaned from another source." Vulcan did not comment on the completeness of Deepak's financial statement.
The antidumping statute requires that, when establishing the normal value of merchandise in a nonmarket economy ("NME"), Commerce "shall determine the normal value of the subject merchandise on the basis of the values of the factors of production utilized in producing the merchandise and to which shall be added an amount for general expenses and profit plus the cost of containers, coverings, and other expenses." 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(1). The statute restricts the manner in which the factors may be valued by stating that "the valuation ... shall be based on the best available information regarding the value of such factors in a market economy country or countries considered to be appropriate" by Commerce (in this instance, India). Id. The factors of production include, "but are not limited to—(A) hours of labor required, (B) quantities of raw materials employed, (C) amounts of energy and other utilities consumed, and (D) representative capital cost, including depreciation." § 1677b(c)(3).
Commerce has promulgated 19 C.F.R. § 351.408, a regulation further elaborating
Commerce has also articulated the policy by which it applies the statute and regulation in particular investigations. The Department's policy is guided by the conference report issued by the Congressional committee charged with reconciling the House and Senate versions of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, which stated, in regard to calculating normal value by the factors of production method, that "Commerce shall avoid using any prices which it has reason to believe or suspect may be ... subsidized prices.... [We] do not intend for Commerce to conduct a formal investigation to ensure that such prices are not ... subsidized, but rather intend that Commerce base its decision on information generally available to it at that time." Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, H.R.REP. NO. 100-576, at 59, (1988) (Conf.Rep.), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1547, 1623-24.
Plaintiffs argue that § 1677b(c)(1) means that Commerce, in selecting the "best available information," must prioritize data regarding identical merchandise over data pertaining to merely comparable merchandise. Plaintiffs' interpretation is supported solely by citation to the CVB-23 IDM. A reading of the CVB-23 IDM, however, reveals that Plaintiffs misinterpret that evidence of agency practice. Contrary to Plaintiffs' interpretation, the CVB-23 IDM expressed the Department's preference for data regarding either identical or comparable merchandise versus Reserve Bank of India data aggregating financial ratios of many hundreds of producers of all manner of merchandise. See CVB-23 IDM at 3-8. While isolated quotes from the CVB-23 IDM appear to express a preference solely for data regarding identical merchandise,
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ("CAFC") has recently stated that the requirement in § 1677b(c)(1) that Commerce use the best available information "is ambiguous," Dorbest Ltd. v. United States, 604 F.3d 1363, 1373 (Fed.Cir. 2010), and Commerce has broad discretion to determine which information is the best available, Nation Ford Chem. Co. v. United States, 166 F.3d 1373, 1377 (Fed.Cir. 1999) (citing cases). Bearing this in mind, the Court concludes that Commerce's consistent practices of rejecting financial statements that suggest subsidies and treating financial statements regarding identical and comparable merchandise as equally acceptable alternatives are reasonable interpretations of the statutory mandate to use the best available information. For this reason, the Court finds that Commerce acted within its discretion in excluding the Deepak financial statement due to the possibility that Deepak received actionable subsidies, and that Commerce reasonably used financial statements from manufacturers of comparable merchandise instead. The Court therefore upholds this aspect of the Final Determination.
In the Final Determination, Commerce determined that the financial statements of Lakshmi and Sterling were among the best available information, and used them in valuing Plaintiffs' factors of production.
Plaintiffs claim that Commerce should have rejected the financial statements of
The second prong of Plaintiffs' argument is that Lakshmi and Sterling manufacture high tensile automotive fasteners ("HTAF"), a product that Plaintiffs contend is not even comparable to STR. Comparability is not defined in the antidumping statute or the regulation. Commerce's typical practice in analyzing comparability is to consider the similarities in production, end uses, and physical characteristics between two products. (Pls.' 56.2 Mem. at 16 (citation omitted).) Plaintiffs claim that Commerce did not analyze the factors in this case. (Id. at 17.) If it had, Plaintiffs assert, evidence on the record would have shown that HTAFs are custom-made in small batches, "must meet very strict specifications for strength, reliability and structure" to withstand "highstress critical applications," and thus have "a significantly more advanced and costly manufacturing process" resulting in factory overhead ratios more than ten times that of STR. (Id. at 17-21.) The Brother Companies claim that this evidence was not rebutted at the administrative level and argue that, as a result, the Final Determination is unsupported by substantial evidence on the record. (Id. at 21.)
The United States and Vulcan counter that, given that Deepak's financial statements were properly rejected due to subsidy, the Lakshmi and Sterling financial statements were the best available information. Commerce contends that it considered the differences and similarities between HTAF and STR and determined that they were comparable because they were both fasteners, and were made using "similar raw materials and production processes." (Def.'s 56.2 Opp. at 20.) Commerce did not ignore the evidence regarding differences between the products, but concluded that HTAF are comparable to STR, "albeit more specialized." (Id. at 21.) Commerce therefore exercised its discretion to "choose among imperfect alternatives." (Id. (internal quotation omitted.))
With regard to Commerce's decision to use Lakshmi's financial statement, Plaintiffs also contend that Commerce acted arbitrarily and capriciously because it rejected Deepak's financial statements due to a subsidy on the one hand, while accepting Lakshmi's financial statements despite record evidence that Lakshmi received a subsidy on the other hand. (Pls.' 56.2 Mem. at 22-23.) The United States and Vulcan contend that this last issue is not properly before the Court because the Brother Companies failed to raise it in the administrative proceedings and Plaintiffs thus failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. (Def.'s 56.2 Opp. at 21-23; Def.-Int.'s 56.2 Opp. at 18-21.)
The statute, 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c), and the regulation, 19 C.F.R. § 351.408(c)(4),
It is clear from this analysis that Commerce considered the evidence on the record that fairly detracted from a finding of comparability, as well as the evidence that ultimately led Commerce to conclude that HTAF and STR were comparable. Commerce, noting the differences between the two products, ultimately decided that both products are "steel threaded fasteners" and thus viewed the two products as more similar than different. Id.
After close consideration, the Court finds that Commerce's decision that HTAF and STR are comparable is supported by substantial evidence in the record and took adequate notice of the contrary evidence. Although the Court might not have come to the same conclusion were the decision for the Court to make, Commerce operates in this area with a great deal of discretion, which the Court is bound to respect. Reviewing the IDM, the Court is convinced that a reasonable decisionmaker could have come to the same conclusion as Commerce. The Court therefore upholds the Final Determination to the extent that it chose to use the financial statements of Lakshmi and Sterling as producers of comparable merchandise.
As to Plaintiffs' arbitrary-and-capricious claim against use of Lakshmi's financial statement, this Court is mandated to, "where appropriate, require the exhaustion of administrative remedies" in trade cases. 28 U.S.C. § 2637(d). As the CAFC has explained, "[a]lthough that statutory injunction is not absolute, it indicates a congressional intent that, absent a strong contrary reason, the court should insist that parties exhaust their remedies before the pertinent administrative agencies." Corus Staal BV v. United States, 502 F.3d 1370, 1379 (Fed.Cir.2007). The Court of International Trade generally enforces the exhaustion requirement strictly in trade cases. Id. (citing cases). In addition to the statutory admonition that the Court of International Trade require exhaustion, Commerce by regulation requires that "all arguments that continue in the submitter's view to be relevant to the... final determination or final results" must be raised in the party's case brief, which is submitted after the preliminary determination but before the final determination. 19 C.F.R. § 351.309(c)(2).
In defining the scope of its discretion to entertain unexhausted claims under 28
None of these exceptions apply to the present case. Futility does not apply here, for if Plaintiffs had raised this issue before Commerce below, it is difficult to see how Commerce would have justified continuing to use Lakshmi's subsidized financial statement while rejecting Deepak's. There is no intervening court decision applicable here. The issue is not one of pure law, because settling it requires consideration of the particular facts regarding the two financial statements, not simply the analysis of a statute using standard tools of statutory construction. See Consolidated Bearings, 166 F.Supp.2d. at 587. Plaintiffs have not identified some clear judicial precedent that applied to the issue, nor argued that Plaintiffs failed to raise the argument in the expectation that Commerce would follow that clear precedent.
It is true that plaintiffs may raise arguments before the Court of International Trade that were not raised in a case brief before Commerce "if Commerce did not address the issue until its final decision," where the result was that the party did "not have ... a full and fair opportunity to raise the issue at the administrative level." Qingdao Taifa Group Co., Ltd. v. United States, 33 CIT ___, 637 F.Supp.2d 1231, 1236 (2009) (citing LTV Steel Co. v. United States, 21 CIT 838, 868-69, 985 F.Supp. 95, 120 (1997)). At the core of this issue is Plaintiffs desire to exclude the Lakshmi financial statement, a position that Plaintiffs previously asserted in their case brief before Commerce. (Brief From Law Firm of DeKeiffer Horgan to Sec of Commerce (Jan. 16, 2009), PR 176, at 15-17). At that time, Plaintiffs had every reason to raise the issue of Lakshmi's receipt of subsidies; yet, while raising other challenges to Lakshmi's financial statement, nowhere in their case brief did Plaintiffs mention Lakshmi's receipt of a countervailable subsidy. (See id.) This failure is all the more striking since Plaintiffs did, in fact, raise the subsidization issue in arguing for the exclusion of the financial statements of two other companies, Sarda Energy and Minerals Ltd. and Welspun Power and Steel Ltd. (Id. at 19-21, 23.) Furthermore, Plaintiffs did not raise the subsidization issue regarding Lakshmi in their rebuttal brief. (See Brief From Law Firm of DeKieffer Horgan to Sec of Commerce (Jan. 26, 2009) PR 182, at 15-16.) Given this record, the Court finds that Plaintiffs simply failed to use the opportunity of their case and rebuttal briefs to argue to Commerce that Lakshmi's financial statement should be excluded due to Lakshmi's receipt of countervailable subsidies. Because Commerce never had the opportunity to decide the issue in
In the Final Determination, Commerce determined that Mangal had received a countervailable subsidy and thus rejected its financial statement when valuing Plaintiffs' factors of production.
Plaintiffs contend that Commerce erred when it rejected the financial statement of Mangal upon finding that Mangal received countervailable subsidies. (Pls.' 56.2 Mot. at 23-24.) The Brother Companies argue that the subsidies received by Mangal comprised only 3% of the company's gross global sales revenue, and therefore "were the United States to investigate Mangal Steel, sales of subject merchandise to the United States might well be at a de minimis (2% or less) level of subsidization; [sic] hence not countervailable at all." (Id. at 23-24 (emphasis in original).) Defendant reiterates that receipt of the DEPB subsidy, regardless of the amount of that subsidy, is a sufficient basis for Commerce to reject the company's financial statements, and argues that the amount of the subsidy is irrelevant to the legal standard governing this decision. (Def.'s 56.2 Opp. at 15-16.) Defendant-Intervenor agrees with Defendant, and points out that Plaintiffs have, with this argument, conceded that Mangal received subsidies. (Def.-Int.'s 56.2 Opp. at 21-25.)
Plaintiffs also claim that "to the extent Mangal's financial statement reflects any subsidies that in fact would be countervailable, this is already adverse to [the Brother Companies] in the ratio calculations because the Department's practice is to offset revenue from subsidies against G & A expense." (Pls.' 56.2 Mot. at 24 (emphasis in original).) In response, Defendant asserts that the offsetting of subsidy revenue against G & A expenses is irrelevant to the determination of what constitutes the best available information when calculating the factors of production. (Def.'s 56.2 Opp. at 15.) Defendant-Intervenor objects that Plaintiffs' proposal is contrary to Commerce's practice, unprecedented, and would be impossible to realize in a non-market economy. (Def.-Int.'s 56.2 Opp. at 24-25.)
Plaintiffs final argument related to the financial statement of Mangal is that Commerce erred because, regardless of subsidy, Mangal's financial statement was still the "best available information," given that Mangal produced merchandise identical to that produced by the Brother Companies, and given that Mangal had the same level of production experience as the Brother Companies. (Pls.' 56.2 Mot. at 25-26.)
As explained regarding Deepak, Commerce acted permissibly in rejecting Mangal's financial statement due to evidence that Mangal may have received a countervailable subsidy. Plaintiffs' argument that the subsidy Mangal received "might well" not be countervailable were Mangal investigated is beside the point. Commerce need not turn the search for suitable proxy financial statements into a full-blown countervailing duty investigation before it may reject a financial statement that indicates that the company may have received subsidies. And Commerce does not err in rejecting such a financial statement where an interested party offers mere speculation that the subsidy "might well" be at a de
Plaintiffs contest Commerce's decision to reject the financial statement of Rajratan. (Pls.' 56.2 Mem. at 27-29.) As to Rajratan, Commerce stated in the IDM that "the Department agrees with [Vulcan] that the financial statements of companies that produce inputs—which are consumed in manufacturing the subject merchandise—would not capture the downstream costs of producing STR." IDM at 9. But Vulcan never argued before the agency that Rajratan's product was an input to STR (See generally Brief From Law Firm of Vorys Sater to Sec of Commerce (Jan. 16, 2009), PR 178 ("Vulcan Case Brief"; see Brief From Law Firm of Vorys Sater to Sec of Commerce (Jan. 23, 2009), PR 181 ("Vulcan Rebuttal Brief") at 7-9). Without explicitly saying that Rajratan produced an input to STR, Commerce appears to have found so as a basis for rejecting Rajratan's financial statement. See IDM at 9-10 (stating that "[w]ire rod is a general production material input that often involves value-added further manufacturing in order to produce a finished (or semi-finished) steel product, including STR, and is thus less comparable to STR than companies that produce finished steel product... [t]herefore ... the Department finds that the 07/08 Rajratan Global ... financial statements are not appropriate sources for the surrogate financial ratios"). This is also the position Defendant argues in its brief before the Court. (Def.'s 56.2 Opp. at 16 ("Commerce excluded Rajratan's financial statement ... because Rajratan produces wire rod, an input consumed in the manufacturing of the subject merchandise" (citing IDM at 9)).)
Plaintiffs contend that Commerce erred because Rajratan's financial statement shows that it does not manufacture Plaintiffs' input, steel rod, but rather manufactures "p.c. [prestressed concrete] wire" and "tyre bead wire." (Pls.' 56.2 Mem. at 27; Pls.' Reply Mem. at 13-14.) Rajratan's financial statement in the administrative record confirms that the company produces "P.C. Wire" and "Tyre Bead Wire." (Letter w/attachment(s) from Law Firm of deKieffer & Horgan to Sec of Commerce Jiaxing Brother Surrogate Data, (Dec. 12, 2008), PR 165 at Ex. 3, p. 27.) Plaintiffs argue that, contrary to the findings in the IDM, both Rajratan and the Brother Companies use the same input, steel rod, as an input in the manufacture of simple downstream products. (Pls.' 56.2 Mem. at 27; Pls.' Reply Mem. at 13-14.)
Vulcan does not challenge Plaintiffs on this question. As mentioned above, Vulcan did not argue in its case brief before Commerce that Rajratan produced an input to STR, but rather that "[a] wire company will not have the same manufacturing costs as a producer of steel threaded rod or other fasteners." (Vulcan Rebuttal Brief at 8.) Vulcan concedes here that the Brother Companies and Rajratan use the same input. (Def.-Int.'s 56.2 Opp. at 26 ("The primary input for the production of steel wire is wire rod—the same input that
Commerce's rejection of Rajratan's financial statement was based on the mistaken finding that Rajratan manufactured an upstream product used as an input in the production of STR. This finding is not supported by substantial evidence on the record, which shows that Rajratan produces p.c. wire and tyre bead wire, not steel rod. Defendant points to nothing in the record indicating that Rajratan manufactures steel rod; and Vulcan concedes that Rajratan does not produce steel rod. The record is utterly devoid of any evidence that Rajratan does so. Commerce, having mistakenly concluded that Rajratan's product was an input used in Plaintiffs' STR manufacture, rejected Rajratan's financial statement for that reason. The Court thus finds that Commerce's decision to reject Rajratan's financial statement is not supported by substantial evidence on the record. This aspect of the Final Determination is therefore remanded to Commerce. Commerce is directed, on remand, to reconsider the appropriateness of using Rajratan's financial statement by analyzing the comparability of Rajratan's merchandise to the subject merchandise.
As for Visakha Wire Ropes Ltd. ("Visakha"), Plaintiffs state that Commerce "did not articulate a factual basis for its decision or any other reason," (Pls.' 56.2 Mem. at 27-28), apart from "baldly assert[ing] that wire rope is not `comparable' to subject merchandise" (Pls.' 56.2 Reply at 14). Plaintiffs therefore argue that the decision is "defective and must be remanded for a proper explanation of the Department's reasoning based on record evidence." (Pls.' 56.2 Mem. at 28.)
Commerce's articulated rationale for rejecting the Visakha financial statement was that "the Department agrees with [Vulcan] that the company does not appear to manufacture products comparable to STR." (IDM at 9-10.)
Defendant, in its brief, quotes Commerce's IDM summary of Vulcan's position in summarizing Commerce's findings. (Def.'s 56.2 Opp. at 17-18.) According to Defendant, "[t]hrough adoption of Vulcan's unrebutted positions backed by record evidence, Commerce indicated a reasonable and discernible basis for its decision." (Id. at 18) (citing NMB Sing. Ltd. v. United States, 557 F.3d 1316, 1319 (Fed.Cir.2009) for the proposition that the explanation for
Although the IDM does not present Commerce's reasoning in the most lucid terms, it does indicate that Commerce accepts Vulcan's position in rejecting Visakha's financial statement. In doing so, Commerce implicitly indicates that it finds that wire rope is not a comparable product to the subject merchandise due to the differences in production process. Given that Commerce, in making such decisions, operates within a wide area of discretion, and given that Commerce referenced the record and Vulcan's arguments from the record in articulating its decision, the Court finds that Commerce's decision is based on substantial evidence. Plaintiffs' motion is therefore denied with regard to the rejection of Visakha's financial statement.
For the reasons discussed above, it is hereby
