NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

PETTIGREW, J.

The defendant, Dylan Folse, was charged by bill of information with simple burglary, a violation of La. R.S. 14:62. He pled not guilty and, following a jury trial, was found guilty as charged. The defendant filed a motion for post verdict judgment of acquittal, which was denied. The defendant was sentenced to four years imprisonment at hard labor. The defendant now appeals, designating three assignments of error. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the conviction and sentence.

FACTS

On the evening of January 29, 2011, Jonathan Bergeron was barbecuing with friends, including Billy Durocher (B.J.), at his house on Maple Street in Thibodaux, Louisiana. At about 7:00 p.m., everyone went inside to eat. Around 8:00 p.m., Bergeron went back outside to check on some meat that was still on the barbecue pit. Bergeron noticed that someone was in B.J.'s vehicle, a 2004 Chevy Tahoe. When the person in the Tahoe saw Bergeron, he took off running down the street. Bergeron shouted for B.J. and ran after the person. Bergeron testified at trial that the person, who looked at Bergeron before he ran, was a white male who was short and small and wearing a white hoodie and blue jeans. The person ran down Maple Street to Arms Street, where he took a right. Bergeron lost sight of him and went back to his house to get a flashlight. At the same time, B.J. had gotten into his Tahoe and drove around the neighborhood looking for the person. At around this time, Bergeron's girlfriend called the police. At the corner of Arms Street and Maple Street, B.J. picked up Bergeron. B.J. drove to the next corner, the intersection of Arms Street and Locust Street, and they spotted the same person wearing the white hoodie crossing Arms Street. B.J. got out of his Tahoe and pushed the person down. The person got up and ran. B.J. chased him down Locust Street until losing sight of him after the person ran through someone's backyard and, apparently, jumped a fence.

Lieutenant Todd Gagnaurd, with the Thibodaux Police Department, was off duty, but responded to the burglary call. The officer drove his police unit to Maple Street, parked, and turned off his headlights. A few minutes later, he saw a thin male in a white hoodie emerge from the side of a house. The person saw Lieutenant Gagnaurd and took off running. Lieutenant Gagnaurd quickly caught up with the person in his unit, ordered him to the ground, and held him at gunpoint. Several officers arrived soon thereafter. The person, identified as the defendant, was handcuffed, arrested, and placed in a police unit. Bergeron and BJ. were brought to the scene where the defendant was. Bergeron identified defendant as the person who was in BJ.'s Tahoe, and both Bergeron and BJ. identified him as the person they encountered on Arms Street. The defendant was taken to the police station, where he was questioned by Lieutenant John Sutton, Jr., with the Thibodaux Police Department. Lieutenant Sutton testified at trial that the defendant did not want to talk to him. The only information the defendant offered was that he was out walking to get a cold drink.

The defendant's friend, John Robichaux, testified at trial that on the night of this incident with BJ.'s Tahoe, the defendant was at his house on Arms Street at about 7:30 p.m. They went to Wal-Mart then returned to Robichaux's house. According to Robichaux, the defendant left his house a little after 8:00 p.m. to go home to eat. The defendant said he would be back after that. Robichaux testified the defendant was wearing a cream-colored hoodie, jeans, and red fitted ball cap.

The defendant's father, David Richard, testified at trial that he and his son lived on Locust Street. Richard got home about 7:30 p.m. and made supper. The defendant came home at about 8:05 p.m., got some food and something to drink, watched some television, and then left about ten minutes later. The defendant told his father he was going back to John's. About a minute after the defendant left, Richard got a call from his son, telling him that some guys were chasing him and he needed help. After about three minutes of trying to call his son back, a police officer answered the defendant's cell phone and told Richard the defendant was being detained by the police on Maple Street.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NOS. 1, 2, and 3

In these related assignments of error, the defendant argues, respectively, the evidence was insufficient to prove that he was the person seen in the vehicle; the evidence was insufficient to prove that the person entered the vehicle with the intent to commit a felony or theft therein; and the trial court erred in denying the motion for post verdict judgment of acquittal.

A conviction based on insufficient evidence cannot stand as it violates Due Process. See U.S. Const, amend. XIV; La. Const, art. I, § 2. The standard of review for the sufficiency of the evidence to uphold a conviction is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). See La. Code Crim. P. art. 821(B); State v. Ordodi, 2006-0207, p. 10 (La. 11/29/06), 946 So.2d 654, 660; State v. Mussall, 523 So.2d 1305, 1308-1309 (La. 1988). The Jackson standard of review, incorporated in Article 821, is an objective standard for testing the overall evidence, both direct and circumstantial, for reasonable doubt. When analyzing circumstantial evidence, La. R.S. 15:438 provides that the fact finder must be satisfied the overall evidence excludes every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. See State v. Patorno, 2001-2585, p. 5 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/21/02), 822 So.2d 141, 144. Furthermore, when the key issue is the defendant's identity as the perpetrator, rather than whether the crime was committed, the State is required to negate any reasonable probability of misidentification. Positive identification by only one witness is sufficient to support a conviction. It is the fact finder who weighs the respective credibilities of the witnesses, and this court will generally not second-guess those determinations. See State v. Hughes, 2005-0992, pp. 5-6 (La. 11/29/06), 943 So.2d 1047, 1051; State v. Davis, 2001-3033, p. 3 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/21/02), 822 So.2d 161, 163-164.

Regarding identity, according to the defendant, BJ. and Bergeron admitted repeatedly throughout the trial that their identification of him was based "exclusively on the fact that he had on a white hoodie." The State did elicit testimony that the perpetrator was white, younger, and smaller, but according to the defendant, the State "repeatedly harped on the hoodie and Bergeron repeatedly expressed that his identification rested on that item of clothing." The defendant further asserts that when asked on cross-examination whether the identification was based "solely on the white hooded sweatshirt," Bergeron admitted that indeed it was. In support of this assertion, the defendant referenced the following testimony in his brief:

The evidence at trial established that the defendant was the person inside the Tahoe who then took off running when he was spotted by Bergeron. While Bergeron testified that it was thirty to thirty-five feet from his carport door to the Tahoe and that the person he saw was on the other side of the Tahoe from him (Bergeron), Bergeron did not admit, contrary to the defendant's assertion, that the lighting was poor. Bergeron testified that there was a working streetlight across the street. He further testified that a motion light under his carport came on when he walked outside. Also, the interior light of the Tahoe was on and stayed on, even after the defendant ran away. Bergeron testified that when the defendant was inside the Tahoe, he "just kind of looked up at me," then closed the door and took off. Bergeron also testified that when chasing the defendant, he got a good look at him. Bergeron identified the defendant in court as the person he saw in the Tahoe. Bergeron stated that the person he saw was wearing a white hoodie (a sweatshirt with a hood and pockets in the front) and blue jeans. Bergeron described him as white, smaller, shorter, and younger. The defendant was seventeen years old and described by Lieutenant Gagnaurd as "skinny." Bergeron was twenty-nine years old, six feet two inches in height, and weighed 225 pounds. When BJ. initially saw the defendant running away from Bergeron, BJ. testified that the person running was white and wearing a white hoodie. BJ. was also "pretty sure" he had a cap on. The defendant's friend and his father testified the defendant was wearing a red ball cap that night. The defendant's friend stated the defendant "pretty much" wore that cap every day. When Bergeron and BJ. were driving in the Tahoe looking for the defendant, they saw him walking at the corner of Arms Street. Bergeron testified that the person on the street was the same white, short, younger person with the white hoodie whom he had seen minutes before in the Tahoe.

Both Bergeron and B J., as well as Lieutenant Gagnaurd, testified that, besides the defendant, they saw no one else on the street that night. When Bergeron and BJ. went to identify the defendant, who had been placed in a police unit, they each identified the defendant as the person they had encountered on the street; and Bergeron also identified the defendant as the person he had seen in the Tahoe.

Thus, while Bergeron could not identify the hair color of the person in the Tahoe, or what kind of facial hair he had, he identified the white hoodie and blue jeans the person was wearing, as well as his physical characteristics, namely his race, size, and youth. The person apprehended by the police only minutes later, who matched this description, was identified as the defendant.

We find that the evidence was sufficient to establish the defendant committed a simple burglary. To support a conviction of simple burglary, the State must prove the unauthorized entry of BJ.'s vehicle and that the intruder entered with the intent to commit a theft or felony therein. See La. R.S. 14:62(A); State v. Jacobs, 504 So.2d 817, 820 (La. 1987). The defendant was clearly in BJ.'s Tahoe without permission. The defendant, someone completely unknown to both Bergeron and BJ., was spotted in BJ.'s Tahoe by Bergeron. The interior light of the vehicle was on. Bergeron testified that he could see movement inside the vehicle. When the defendant saw Bergeron, he closed the passenger door and ran. BJ. testified that his back passenger door was latched, but not closed completely. BJ. further testified that his rear door (hatchback) was ajar. Thus, the defendant had looked and/or gone inside the Tahoe through two different doors. The defendant asserts in his brief that whoever was standing by the Tahoe may have simply wanted to take a look at the interior of the vehicle, or that possibly the interior light was on and that person was being a good Samaritan in turning off the light to prevent the battery from running out of power. However, Bergeron saw the defendant inside the Tahoe; and more importantly, two doors were opened on the Tahoe, including the rear door, which would seem to belie the defendant's suggestion of a benevolent neighbor. Further, the defendant ran away when he realized he was discovered, and continued to run through the neighborhood to avoid apprehension. Flight following an offense reasonably raises the inference of a "guilty mind." State v. Captville, 448 So.2d 676, 680 n.4 (La. 1984). See State v. Fuller, 418 So.2d 591, 593 (La. 1982) (flight and attempt to avoid apprehension indicates consciousness of guilt, and therefore, is one of the circumstances from which a juror may infer guilt). A fact finder could have reasonably concluded that the defendant was searching for something to take (which would have constituted an intent to commit a theft) and was interrupted by Bergeron when he went outside. See State v. Smith, 2002-1018, pp. 8-10 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/11/03), 844 So.2d 119, 125-126 (where the defendant's unauthorized entry of his arm inside a vehicle satisfied the simple burglary element of specific intent to commit a felony or theft therein). Moreover, a jury is not required to refute any number of possible hypotheses of innocence that the defendant may suggest on appeal. The defendant did not testify at trial, and defense counsel's theory of the case was that the person in the Tahoe was not the defendant. On appeal, the reviewing court does not determine whether another possible hypothesis suggested by a defendant could afford an exculpatory explanation of the events. State v. Mitchell, 99-3342, p. 7 (La. 10/17/00), 772 So.2d 78, 83.

The jury heard the testimony and viewed the evidence presented to it at trial and found the defendant guilty as charged. The trier of fact is free to accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of any witness. The trier of fact's determination of the weight to be given evidence is not subject to appellate review. An appellate court will not reweigh the evidence to overturn a fact finder's determination of guilt. State v. Taylor, 97-2261, pp. 5-6 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/25/98), 721 So.2d 929, 932. We are constitutionally precluded from acting as a "thirteenth juror" in assessing what weight to give evidence in criminal cases. Mitchell, 99-3342 at 8, 772 So.2d at 83. The fact that the record may contain evidence that conflicts with the testimony accepted by a trier of fact does not render the evidence accepted by the trier of fact insufficient. State v. Quinn, 479 So.2d 592, 596 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1985).

When a case involves circumstantial evidence and the trier of fact reasonably rejects the hypothesis of innocence presented by the defense, that hypothesis falls, and the defendant is guilty unless there is another hypothesis that raises a reasonable doubt. State v. Moten, 510 So.2d 55, 61 (La. App. 1 Cir.), writ denied, 514 So.2d 126 (La. 1987). The jury's verdict reflected the reasonable conclusion that, based on the physical evidence and the eyewitness testimony, the defendant entered BJ.'s Tahoe without permission with intent to commit a theft therein. In finding the defendant guilty, the jury clearly rejected the defense's theory of misidentification.

After a thorough review of the record, we find that the evidence negates any reasonable probability of misidentification and supports the jury's verdict. We are convinced that viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt, and to the exclusion of the hypothesis of innocence suggested by the defense at trial, that the defendant was guilty of simple burglary. See State v. Calloway, 2007-2306, pp. 1-2 (La. 1/21/09), 1 So.3d 417, 418 (per curiam). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying the post verdict judgment of acquittal.

These assignments of error are without merit.

CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED.