PYLE, Judge.
Paul Patterson ("Patterson") appeals his convictions, following a jury trial, for Class D felony possession of cocaine
On May 3, 2014, around 9:00 a.m., Elkhart County Sheriff's Department Patrol Officer Shannon Stanfill ("Officer Stanfill") was driving his patrol car in Elkhart County when another oncoming vehicle, which was driven by Patterson, drove into the officer's lane of travel and nearly struck the officer's vehicle. Officer Stanfill, who also noticed that Patterson was not wearing a seatbelt, made a U-turn, activated his emergency lights, and stopped Patterson's car.
As Officer Stanfill walked toward Patterson's car, he noticed that the car's license plate was expired. When the officer got to the car, Patterson was in the driver's seat, Mark Turbin ("Turbin") was sitting in front passenger seat, and Reginald Crowder ("Crowder") was sitting in the rear passenger seat. The officer noticed that Crowder had an open alcoholic beverage container in between his feet.
When Officer Stanfill checked the vehicle's registration, he learned that it was registered in the name of Gladys Dewey ("Dewey"). Patterson had purchased the car in November 2013 but had failed to register it in his name. Upon discovering that the car was not properly registered, the officer cited Patterson for the infractions of having a false registration and for failing to wear a seatbelt. Officer Stanfill told Patterson that the car would have to be impounded, and Patterson was "upset as anybody would be." (Tr. 107).
The officer called for backup, and Elkhart Police Department Corporal Christopher Bella ("Corporal Bella") arrived at the scene. Officer Stanfill then had Patterson and the two other men exit the car, and he patted them down. When patting down Crowder, Officer Stanfill found a new glass pipe that "appeared to be a crack pipe[.]" (Tr. 130). At that point, the officer detained Crowder and informed Patterson and Turbin that they were "free to leave[.]" (Tr. 110).
Before Officer Stanfill started to inventory the vehicle, he asked Patterson if he wanted to get anything out of the car, and Patterson responded that he did. Patterson went to the front driver's side door and "collected some belongings and papers . . . out of the vehicle and put them in a grocery sack." (Tr. 110). Upon leaving the car, Patterson locked the front driver's side door.
Officer Stanfill unlocked the car via the passenger-side door and started to inventory it. The officer found a clear baggie corner with a knot tied in it under the front driver's seat area near the center console. (Tr. 115). He then found two bags of "iBlown"
The State charged Patterson with Class D felony possession of cocaine and Class A misdemeanor possession of a synthetic drug or a synthetic look alike substance. The trial court held a two-day jury trial on February 5 and 6, 2015. During voir dire, the trial court asked the jury pool if anyone had any prior convictions, and Juror #5 stated that she had just been convicted of operating while intoxicated ("OWI") the preceding month and that she was on probation. Juror #5 also indicated that she had been awake since the previous day and was tired. While Patterson's counsel was questioning the jury pool, Juror #4 stated that she was "kind of having an anxiety attack" and was having difficulty breathing. (Tr. 52).
When Patterson's counsel questioned the jury pool about the concept that a person is innocent until proven guilty, he asked Juror #12 if she was "comfortable" with basing her verdict upon the evidence presented, and she responded, "I don't know. Sometimes I think that — I don't know." (Tr. 45). Patterson's counsel told Juror #12 that "there are certain rules and laws that . . . jurors ha[d] to follow" and then asked her if she would be "comfortable with the fact that [she] c[ould] only go on what is evidence when making [her] decision[,]" Juror #12 responded, "No." (Tr. 45). Juror #12 further stated:
(Tr. 45-46). Juror #12 also stated that she did not "like the idea that [she] ha[d] to see a person as guilty of something" and that she thought it was difficult to pass judgment on someone. (Tr. 46). She also stated that she did not "want to say a person has to go to jail you know and stuff and determine their [sic] — ah — their [sic] livelihood, you know, what their [sic] future's going to be and everything . . . It's kind of hard for me to be that sometimes you know what I mean." (Tr. 46). After Patterson's counsel told Juror #12 that the trial court would determine any sentence, she responded:
(Tr. 47).
Following the conclusion of voir dire, the trial court held a bench conference to discuss any strikes that the parties had.
(Tr. 65-66). The trial court then questioned Juror #5 about whether she "would be too sleepy to stay awake during th[e] trial[,]" and Juror #5 nodded her head in the affirmative. (Tr. 66).
The trial court then ruled on the challenge to this juror, and the parties further discussed the State's challenges for cause:
(Tr. 66). The trial court then questioned Juror #4, asking her if she would have difficulty serving on the jury because of her anxiety. After she responded that she would, the trial court granted the State's challenge for cause and struck Juror #4.
The trial court and the parties then discussed the State's challenge to Juror #12:
(Tr. 67-68). The trial court then excused Juror #4, Juror #5, and Juror #12.
During the trial, the State presented evidence regarding the facts of the offense as set forth above. The State also played State's Exhibit 2, Officer Stanfill's video footage of the stop.
When sentencing Patterson, the trial court imposed concurrent sentences on his convictions. Specifically, the trial court imposed a 720-day sentence for Patterson's Class D felony possession of cocaine conviction and ordered it to be executed in the Department of Correction. For his Class A misdemeanor conviction, the trial court imposed a concurrent 360-day sentence and determined that this sentence had been satisfied by his time served. Patterson now appeals.
Patterson argues that: (1) the trial court erred by denying his Batson challenge; and (2) the State did not present sufficient evidence to support his two convictions.
Patterson first contends that the trial court erred by denying his challenge, alleging that the State had improperly exercised its peremptory challenge to strike an African-American juror from the potential jury pool in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
Our Indiana Supreme Court has set forth the following explanation of and standard of review for a Batson challenge:
Cartwright v. State, 962 N.E.2d 1217, 1220-21 (Ind. 2012) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Patterson acknowledges that steps one and two of the Batson analysis were without issue, thus acknowledging that the State had provided a race-neutral reason for striking Juror #12. Instead, he raises a procedural-like challenge and contends that the trial court failed to comply with the third step of the Batson analysis. Specifically, Patterson asserts that the trial court was "obligated to further inquire into the State's response with respect to Juror number twelve and that it should have questioned Juror #12. (Patterson's Br. 10). We disagree.
Patterson has misconstrued the third step in the Batson analysis. Contrary to Patterson's assertion, the trial court is not required to engage in further investigation or to conduct "further meaningfully voir dire examination" of a juror. (Patterson's Br. 12). "At the third and last stage of a Batson inquiry, in light of the parties' submissions, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has shown purposeful discrimination." Addison v. State, 962 N.E.2d 1202, 1209 (Ind. 2012) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). "The issue [in the third Batson step] is whether the trial court finds the prosecutor's race-neutral explanation credible." Id. at 1210.
Here, the State sought to use a peremptory strike on Juror #12. From what has been transcribed in the transcript, it appears that the State sought to strike Juror #12 because she had made statements suggesting that she would be unable to follow the trial court's instructions. The trial court determined that the State's reason was race-neutral, and it denied Patterson's Batson challenge and made some additional "[i]naudible" remarks. (Tr. 68). While the transcribed portion of the trial court's ruling does not contain a statement indicating that the trial court specifically determined the State's proffered reason to be credible, we will infer that the trial court's ultimate denial of Patterson's Batson challenge to support such a determination, especially where Patterson "offered the trial court no reason to cast doubt on the State's explanation for the strike" and is challenging only the procedural aspect of the trial court's ruling in the third step of the Batson analysis. See Addison, 962 N.E.2d at 1210 (explaining that while it is technically "incorrect" for a trial court to "conflate" the second and third step of a Batson inquiry, the defendant had "offered the trial court no reason to cast doubt on the State's explanation for the strike").
Patterson argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for Class D felony possession of cocaine and Class A misdemeanor possession of a synthetic drug or a synthetic look alike substance.
Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146-47 (Ind. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
At the time of Patterson's crime, the possession of cocaine statute, INDIANA CODE § 35-48-4-6(a), provided that "[a] person who, without a valid prescription or order of a practitioner acting in the course of the practitioner's professional practice, knowingly or intentionally possesses cocaine (pure or adulterated) . . . commits possession of cocaine . . ., a Class D felony[.]" Additionally, the possession of a synthetic drug or a synthetic look alike substance statute, INDIANA CODE § 35-48-4-11.5(c), provided that "[a] person who knowingly or intentionally possesses a synthetic drug or synthetic drug lookalike substance commits possession of a synthetic drug or synthetic drug lookalike substance, a Class A misdemeanor."
It is well-established that possession of an item may be either actual or constructive. See Lampkins v. State, 682 N.E.2d 1268, 1275 (Ind. 1997), modified on reh'g, 685 N.E.2d 698 (Ind. 1997). Constructive possession, which is applicable in this case, occurs when a person has: (1) the capability to maintain dominion and control over the item; and (2) the intent to maintain dominion and control over it. Id.
The capability element of constructive possession is met when the State shows that the defendant is able to reduce the controlled substance to the defendant's personal possession. Goliday v. State, 708 N.E.2d 4, 6 (Ind. 1999). Additionally, "[a] trier of fact may infer that a defendant had the capability to maintain dominion and control over contraband from the simple fact that the defendant had a possessory interest in the premises on which an officer found the item." Gray v. State, 957 N.E.2d 171, 174 (Ind. 2011). See also Goliday, 708 N.E.2d at 6 (explaining that "[p]roof of a possessory interest in the premises in which the illegal drugs are found is adequate to show the capability to maintain control and dominion over the items in question") (quoting Davenport v. State, 464 N.E.2d 1302, 1307 (Ind. 1984), cert. denied).
The intent element of constructive possession is shown if the State demonstrates the defendant's knowledge of the presence of the contraband. Goliday, 708 N.E.2d at 6. A defendant's knowledge may be inferred from either the exclusive dominion and control over the premises containing the contraband, or if the control is non-exclusive, evidence of additional circumstances pointing to the defendant's knowledge of the presence of contraband. Id. These additional circumstances may include: "(1) a defendant's incriminating statements; (2) a defendant's attempting to leave or making furtive gestures; (3) the location of contraband like drugs in settings suggesting manufacturing; (4) the item's proximity to the defendant; (5) the location of contraband within the defendant's plain view; and (6) the mingling of contraband with other items the defendant owns." Gray, 957 N.E.2d at 175.
Patterson, contends that the evidence was not sufficient to support his two convictions, arguing that the State failed to prove that he had constructive possession of these two substances. Specifically, he contends that there were no "circumstances to show that he knew of the contraband or had an ability to control it." (Patterson's Br. 8). We disagree.
Turning to the capability element, we note that the evidence reveals that the drugs were found in Patterson's car that he was driving. Specifically, the drugs were found on the floor of the front driver's side—the cocaine was in a baggie on the floor of the driver's side near the console and the synthetic drug was under the driver's floor mat. Patterson attempts to suggest that the evidence was "unclear" regarding what side of the car the drugs were found. (Patterson's Br. 14). Our review of the record reveals that Officer Stanfill testified that the drugs were found on the front driver's side. Patterson's challenge is nothing more than a request to reweigh the evidence and reassess the witness's testimony, which we will not do. See Drane, 867 N.E.2d at 146. From the evidence presented, the jury could have reasonably inferred that Patterson was able to reduce the contraband to his personal possession and that he, therefore, had the capability to maintain dominion and control over the items. See Goliday, 708 N.E.2d at 6; Woods v. State, 640 N.E.2d 1089, 1091 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that the defendant had capability to maintain dominion and control over drugs found in the car he was driving and under the car seat where he was sitting).
In regard to the intent element of constructive possession, Patterson suggests that there was not sufficient evidence to satisfy this element, arguing that he did not have exclusive control of the car because it had passengers; he did not make any furtive movements or incriminating statements; he did not attempt to flee; and the drugs were not in plain view.
While there was no evidence of these specific additional circumstances, the State is not required to prove all additional circumstances when showing that a defendant had the intent to maintain dominion and control over contraband. See Gee v. State, 810 N.E.2d 338, 344 (Ind. 2004) (explaining that the additional circumstances "are not exclusive" and that "the State is required to show that whatever factor or set of factors it relies upon in support of the intent prong of constructive possession, those factors or set of factors must demonstrate the probability that the defendant was aware of the presence of the contraband and its illegal character").
Here, the evidence presented demonstrated the probability that Patterson was aware of the presence of the contraband. The State presented evidence that Patterson had owned the vehicle and had been the only person to drive the car since he bought it in November 2013. The State also presented evidence that the drugs were found in close proximity to Patterson, who had been driving the car. Specifically, the synthetic drug was under the front driver's floor mat, and the cocaine was in a knotted up baggie corner on the floor of the driver's side near the console. Officer Stanfill testified that the baggie corner indicated a potential for drug use. Additionally, the State presented evidence that one of the passengers had an unused glass pipe that could be used as a crack pipe; that a piece of steel wool, which was frequently used as a filter to smoke crack cocaine, was found under the front passenger seat; and that Patterson had a lighter on him. The evidence also showed that after Patterson had been allowed to return his car, he went to the front driver's side door, removed some items, and locked that door. Additionally, after Officer Stanfill arrested Patterson, he accused the officer of planting the drugs in the car. Officer Stanfill also testified that he did not see anyone, other than Patterson, access the driver's side front area of the car.
From this evidence, the jury could have reasonably determined that Patterson had the intent to maintain dominion and control and that he constructively possessed the contraband. See, e.g., Woods, 640 N.E.2d at 1091 (explaining that "[c]onstructive possession of items found in a vehicle may be imputed to the driver of the vehicle" and affirming the defendant's possession of cocaine conviction where he was driving and the drugs were found under his seat); Young, 564 N.E.2d at 972 (holding that the evidence was sufficient to support an inference that the defendant, and not the passenger in the vehicle, had control over a spray can containing cocaine and was therefore in constructive possession). We will not reweigh the evidence or the jury's determination. See Drane, 867 N.E.2d at 146. Accordingly, we affirm Patterson's two convictions.
Affirmed.
Baker, J., and Bradford, J., concur.
