OPINION

Presiding Justice McDADE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Plaintiff, U.S. Bank Trust, filed a complaint to foreclose mortgage against defendant, Breanna D. Atchley, and was subsequently granted a judgment for foreclosure and sale. Following the sale, plaintiff moved to confirm the sale. The court granted plaintiff's motion in part, but denied plaintiff's request for an in personam deficiency judgment. Plaintiff appeals that denial. We vacate the trial court's order in part and remand with instructions.

¶ 2 FACTS

¶ 3 On January 2, 2014, plaintiff filed a complaint to foreclose mortgage against defendant. The complaint alleged that defendant continued to owe $48,325.73 on the note and mortgage, with interest accruing on the note at $7.28 per diem. Among plaintiff's requests for relief in the complaint was "[a] personal judgment for deficiency, if applicable and sought, and only against parties who have signed the Note." Attached to the complaint were the note and mortgage, each of which were signed by defendant.

¶ 4 Defendant did not file an answer to the complaint, nor did she otherwise appear. Plaintiff subsequently filed a motion for default judgment and a motion for judgment for foreclosure and sale. On April 21, 2014, the trial court granted plaintiff's motions. The written order stated:

¶ 5 The judicial sale occurred on January 5, 2015. The sheriff's report of sale and distribution—filed that same day—indicated that, at that time, plaintiff owed defendant $60,462.29. The amount bid at sale was $35,644.62, resulting in a deficiency of $24,817.57.

¶ 6 The court confirmed the sale on January 26, 2015. In the confirmation of sale, the court ordered an in rem deficiency judgment in the amount of $24,817.57. Handwritten on the otherwise typed order, next to the in rem deficiency judgment, is the following: "Plaintiff [sic] request for an in personam judgment is denied without further documentation."

¶ 7 ANALYSIS

¶ 8 On appeal, plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in denying its request for an in personam deficiency judgment. Specifically, plaintiff argues that it fulfilled each of the criteria required to receive an in personam deficiency judgment under the Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure Law (Foreclosure Law) (735 ILCS 5/15-1101 et seq. (West 2012)). We agree.

¶ 9 At the outset of our analysis, we note that defendant has not filed a brief on appeal. Our supreme court has held that the failure of an appellee to file a brief does not mandate pro forma reversal, as "[a] considered judgment of the trial court should not be set aside without some consideration of the merits of the appeal." First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill.2d 128, 131, 345 N.E.2d 493 (1976). Instead:

¶ 10 Mortgage foreclosures, judicial sales, and deficiency judgments are all governed by the Foreclosure Law. 735 ILCS 5/15-1101 et seq. (West 2012). Section 15-1508(e) of the Foreclosure Law, entitled "Deficiency Judgment," stipulates as follows:

¶ 11 The word "shall," as used in the Foreclosure Law, means mandatory, rather than permissive. 735 ILCS 5/15-1105(b) (West 2012). Indeed in any statute, the word "shall" ordinarily imposes an imperative duty. Lohr v. Havens, 377 Ill.App.3d 233, 236, 316 Ill.Dec. 319, 879 N.E.2d 386 (2007). Accordingly, a trial court must grant an in personam deficiency judgment in favor of a plaintiff under section 15-1508(e) of the Foreclosure Law when the requirements set forth in that section are met.

¶ 12 In the present case, plaintiff sought an in personam deficiency judgment against defendant in the original complaint. The complaint listed defendant as the person personally liable for any deficiency, and plaintiff attached the note and mortgage, both signed by defendant. Additionally, defendant was personally served in the case, vesting the trial court with in personam jurisdiction over defendant. See J.C. Penney Co. v. West, 114 Ill.App.3d 644, 646, 70 Ill.Dec. 314, 449 N.E.2d 188 (1983). Finally, the deficiency, totaling $24,817.57, was proven upon the presentation of the sheriff's report of sale.

¶ 13 Neither section 15-1508(e) nor section 15-1504(f) (governing requests for deficiency judgments in complaints) of the Foreclosure Law expressly considers the effect of bankruptcy on the court's authorization to grant an in personam deficiency judgment. However, we recognize that the trial court's judgment for foreclosure stipulated that such a deficiency judgment would be granted only where defendant's "liability has not been discharged in bankruptcy." Although the trial court's requirement for "further documentation" was ambiguous, we consider the possibility that it related to potential bankruptcy concerns. Even if this was the cause for the trial court's concerns; however, the burden was on defendant to present prima facie proof that the debt had been discharged in bankruptcy. See Woerter v. David, 311 Ill.App. 595, 599, 37 N.E.2d 448 (1941). Defendant, having never appeared before the trial court, provided no evidence that the debt had been discharged in bankruptcy, and a requirement that plaintiff prove the debt not discharged in bankruptcy would constitute an improper shifting of the burden of proof.

¶ 14 The Foreclosure Law's mandate that a trial court grant an in personam deficiency judgment requires no more than what plaintiff has provided in the present case. Therefore, the trial court's insistence upon "further documentation" was contrary to the statute. Plaintiff has demonstrated prima facie reversible error, and our examination shows that plaintiff's contentions are supported by the record. See First Capitol Mortgage Corp., 63 Ill.2d at 133, 345 N.E.2d 493. Accordingly, we vacate that portion of the trial court's order awarding an in rem deficiency judgment and remand the matter so that the trial court may enter an in personam deficiency judgment.

¶ 15 CONCLUSION

¶ 16 The judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County is vacated in part and remanded with instructions.

¶ 17 Vacated in part.

¶ 18 Cause remanded with instructions.

Justices CARTER and O'BRIEN concurred in the judgment and opinion.