BRADFORD, Judge.
Appellant-Respondent N.B. ("Mother") appeals the termination of her parental rights regarding her four children B.B., J.B., D.B., and N.B ("the Children").
This case began on November 23, 2009, when DCS filed a petition alleging that B.B. and J.B. were children in need of services ("CHINS"). Before the CHINS proceedings underlying this case began, the Children were the subject of a prior CHINS proceeding and removed twice from Mother's care for truancy and neglect issues. The Children were "returned to the care and custody of their parents in August 2009 with the CHINS case closed," three months prior to the initiation of the CHINS proceeding underlying this case. Ex. A. p. 3.
Mother does not challenge any of the probate court's enumerated findings, and her Statement of the Facts consists solely of the those findings, which are as follows:
Appellant's App. pp. 42-46. The probate court found that termination of the parent-child relationship was in the Children's best interests and granted DCS's petition for termination. This appeal follows.
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the traditional right of a parent to establish a home and raise his or her child. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 145 (Ind. 2005). Further, we acknowledge that the parent-child relationship is "one of the most valued relationships of our culture." Id. However, although parental rights are of a constitutional dimension, the law allows for the termination of those rights when a parent is unable or unwilling to meet his responsibility as a parent. In re T.F., 743 N.E.2d 766, 773 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. Therefore, parental rights are not absolute and must be subordinated to the child's interests in determining the appropriate disposition of a petition to terminate the parent-child relationship. Id.
The purpose of terminating parental rights is not to punish the parent but to protect the child. Id. Termination of parental rights is proper where the child's emotional and physical development is threatened. Id. The probate court need not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed such that his physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship. Id.
Mother contends that the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing was insufficient to support the probate court's order terminating her parental rights. In reviewing termination proceedings on appeal, this court will not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses. In re Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights of S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d 874, 879 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). We only consider the evidence that supports the probate court's decision and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Id. Where, as here, the probate court includes findings of fact and conclusions thereon in its order terminating parental rights, our standard of review is two-tiered. Id. First, we must determine whether the evidence supports the findings, and, second, whether the findings support the legal conclusions. Id. We note that Mother does not challenge the probate court's factual findings and instead challenges only the probate court's conclusions.
In deference to the probate court's unique position to assess the evidence, we set aside the probate court's findings and judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if they are clearly erroneous. Id. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there are no facts or inferences drawn therefrom to support it. Id. A judgment is clearly erroneous only if the legal conclusions made by the probate court are not supported by its findings of fact, or the conclusions do not support the judgment. Id.
In order to involuntarily terminate a parent's parental rights, DCS must establish by clear and convincing evidence that:
Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2) (2011).
Mother does not dispute that DCS presented sufficient evidence to support the first and third elements set forth in Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2). Mother, however, argues that DCS failed to establish either that (1) there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the Children's removal from or the reasons for the Children's continued placement outside of their home will not be remedied, or (2) there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the Children. Additionally, with regard to J.B. and N.B., Mother argues that there was insufficient evidence of a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the children following termination.
On appeal, Mother argues that DCS failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the conditions resulting in the Children's removal from and continued placement outside her care will not be remedied. Mother also argues that DCS failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the Children. However, it is well-settled that because Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is written in the disjunctive, the probate court need only find either that the conditions resulting in removal from or continued placement outside the parent's home will not be remedied or that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the child. In re C.C., 788 N.E.2d 847, 854 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied. Here, the probate court concluded that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions which resulted in the removal of the children from Mother's care would not be remedied
In order to determine whether the conditions will be remedied, the probate court should first determine what conditions led DCS to place the Children outside of Parents' care or to continue the Children's placement outside Parents' care, and, second, whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will be remedied. In re A.I., 825 N.E.2d 798, 806 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied; In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 882. When assessing whether a reasonable probability exists that the conditions justifying a child's removal or continued placement outside his parent's care will not be remedied, the probate court must judge the parent's fitness to care for the child at the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions. In re A.N.J., 690 N.E.2d 716, 721 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). The probate court must also evaluate the parent's habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation. Id.
A probate court may properly consider evidence of the parent's prior criminal history, drug and alcohol abuse, history of neglect, failure to provide support, and lack of adequate employment and housing. McBride v. Monroe Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 798 N.E.2d 185, 199 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). Moreover, a probate court "`can reasonably consider the services offered by [DCS] to the parent and the parent's response to those services.'" Id. (quoting In re A.C.C., 682 N.E.2d 542, 544 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997)). The evidence presented by DCS "need not rule out all possibilities of change; rather, DCS need establish only that there is a reasonable probability that the parent's behavior will not change." In re Involuntary Termination of Parent-Child Relationship of Kay L., 867 N.E.2d 236, 242 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
The probate court found, in part, as follows:
Appellant's App. pp. 23-24.
The Children were the subject of a CHINS proceeding prior to the instant case due to truancy and neglect issues. DCS noted that the family has been involved with the CASIE Center
Since the Children's initial removal from Mother, Mother did little to convince the probate court that the circumstances predicating removal had changed. With regards to Mother's anger issues, it appears that Mother failed to make any significant progress. In October of 2010, Mother threatened DCS workers stating, "that if she loses her children she will go after DCS and the Magistrate before harming herself." Ex. A. p. 56. Case workers reported that Mother initially made some progress in counseling; however, Mother voluntarily stopped participating in counseling despite the court order for individual therapy, and her behavior subsequently deteriorated. Mother and Father separated in June of 2011. On August 19, 2011, Mother attacked Father after Father attempted to pick up the Children for weekend parenting time. According to accounts provided by the Children, Father, and neighbors, "mother was screaming and cursing at father on the street.... Mother then flew into a rage, punching and slapping at the father, around his face and head, with her car keys.... Father was bleeding from cuts caused by mother during the attack.... the police arrested [Mother] for Class D felony Domestic Battery." Ex. A. p. 119. This incident led to new CHINS cases being opened for D.B. and N.B., and removal, yet again, of the Children from Mother's care. In a later incident, Mother admitted to throwing a brick through Father's car window while Father and D.B. were in the car.
The older children discussed this and other incidents with their CASA workers and reported that "domestic violence against father by their mother was commonplace." Id. The Children also disclosed to CASA workers that they had seen "mother engaged in sexual activity with a man, as well as kissing their 17 year old neighbor ... in order to show the older boys `how it was done,'" and "described drug use by their mother with her friends." Id.
Mother also had issues maintaining stable financial support for the Children. Despite the probate court's order to obtain and maintain employment and maintain an appropriate home, Mother failed to do so. It appears that during the five-year life of this case, Mother was only employed once for approximately three months, and Mother claimed that she could not maintain that job due to her court-ordered obligations. However, the probate court noted that there were only two hearings during that employment period, one of which Mother did not attend. In February of 2013, Mother lost her housing, claiming that she was unable to pay for utilities. Mother had still not obtained housing by December 2013, at which point DCS agreed to pay for three months' rent and utilities for Mother at a South Bend home. However, at the end of the three-month period, Mother had failed to obtain employment, could not pay rent, and either left or was evicted from the home.
Mother argues that she prefers to be a stay-at-home mother, and that the probate court's decision to hold her lack of employment against her "violate[d] her fundamental rights to raise her children as she sees fit...." Appellant's App. p. 16. However, as we mentioned above, "[a] court may properly consider evidence of a parent's ... failure to provide support, and lack of adequate housing and employment." McBride, 798 N.E.2d at 199.
We also note that throughout the pendency of this case, Mother has habitually neglected the Children and shown a lack of commitment to preserve the parent-child relationship. The Children were initially removed from Mother's care for, among other things, neglectful behavior, lack of adequate supervision, and truancy. Mother failed to acknowledge her responsibility to assure her Children are attending school and instead blames the school. Furthermore, at the time of the probate court's order of termination, Mother had not visited Children in over a year.
The probate court heard testimony from Family Case Manager ("FCM") Sheila LeSure and guardian ad litem ("GAL") Christine Wrage who both opined that continuation of the parent-child relationships was not in the best interests of the Children and posed a threat to the Children. GAL Wrage testified that during the two years she was involved in the case, Mother was entirely unwilling to comply with orders to obtain employment and housing. Instead of taking responsibility, Mother complained about DCS and blamed FCM LeSure for her being unable to maintain employment. FCM LeSure testified Mother was unable to provide a safe and stable environment for the Children and that she did not believe the conditions predicating the Children's continued removal would be remedied. FCM LeSure also noted that there was evidence that, in the short time since moving in with her new boyfriend, there had already been incidents of domestic violence and drug use involving Mother.
Accordingly, the probate court did not err in concluding that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions which led to the removal of the Children from Mother's care would not be remedied.
Mother argues that there was insufficient evidence to establish the existence of a satisfactory plan following termination for J.B. and N.B. Kimberly Majewski, a family consultant with Kidspeace, testified that J.B. and N.B. had adjusted to their foster home placements and made improvements with their behavioral issues. The probate court stated that the plan for J.B. and N.B. was adoption. Mother argues that there is a lack of evidence indicating that (1) J.B. and N.B's current placement is acceptable and (2) that their current foster parents would consider adoption. Essentially, Mother argues that DCS must find a permanent adoptive home for the children prior to terminating her parental rights. However, Mother provides no supporting authority which stands for this proposition.
This court has previously held that adoption is generally a satisfactory plan.
In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d 994, 1007 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied (citations omitted); see also In re S.L.H.S., 885 N.E.2d 603, 618 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) ("In order for the trial court to terminate the parent-child relationship, the court must find that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child. This plan need not be detailed, so long as it offers a general sense of the direction in which the child will be going after the parent-child relationship is terminated."). Accordingly, we find that the probate court did not err in concluding that adoption was a satisfactory plan for the Children.
Mother also argues that the probate court's "failure to find her unfit while at the same time terminating her parental rights violates Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) ... and, alone, is grounds for reversal." Appellant's Br. p. 15. Mother essentially argues that the probate court was required to make a specific finding that Mother is unfit. Mother misinterprets Troxel. In Troxel, the Court noted that "so long as a parent adequately cares for his or her children (i.e., is fit), there will normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm of the family...." Id. at 68. Here, the probate court made it abundantly clear that it found that Mother had not adequately cared for the Children, i.e. was an unfit parent.
The judgment of the probate court is affirmed.
Baker, J., and Pyle, J., concur.
