NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
WELCH, J.
The defendant, Allen Lazaro Thompson, was charged by grand jury indictment with three counts of aggravated rape (victim under the age of thirteen), violations of Louisiana Revised Statutes section 14:42 (counts 1-3); three counts of sexual battery (victim under the age of thirteen), violations of Louisiana Revised Statutes section 14:43.1 (counts 4-6); eight counts of indecent behavior with juveniles, violations of Louisiana Revised Statutes section 14:81 (counts 7-14); and one count of contributing to the delinquency of juveniles (performing any sexually immoral act), a violation of Louisiana Revised Statutes section 14:92A(7) (count 15). He pled not guilty and, following a jury trial, was found guilty as charged on all fifteen counts by unanimous verdict. He filed motions for new trial and postverdict judgment of acquittal, both of which were denied.
The defendant was then sentenced. On counts 1-3, on each count, he was sentenced to life imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of parole. On counts 4-6, on each count, he was sentenced to ninety-nine years at hard labor, the first twenty-five years to be served without the benefit of parole. On counts 7-14, on each count, the defendant was sentenced to twenty-five years at hard labor, with at least two years to be served without the benefit of parole. On count 15, the defendant was sentenced to one day at hard labor. The district court ordered that the sentences run consecutively. The defendant now appeals, challenging the district court's ruling on his motion to appoint an expert. For the following reasons, we affirm the defendant's convictions. We affirm the defendant's sentences on counts 1-6 and count 15. The sentences imposed on counts 7-14 are vacated and remanded for resentencing.
FACTS
On October 29, 2011, officers at the Bogalusa Police Department received a complaint from the mother of one of the eight victims, T.B.,1 that the defendant had sexually abused him. Arrest and search warrants were obtained, and the defendant was placed under arrest on November 1, 2011. The defendant was interviewed the following day and admitted that he performed oral sex on T.B. and that T.B. performed oral sex on him. At a second interview, on November 15, 2011, the defendant admitted that he also performed oral sex on E.S. and C.P.
At trial, T.B. testified that the defendant was his neighbor and that he would spend the night at the defendant's house with his friends and sometimes by himself. According to T.B., the defendant allowed the children to view pornographic movies and magazines and purchased alcohol for them. T.B. also witnessed the defendant perform oral sex on C.P. C.P. confirmed at trial that the defendant performed oral sex on him more than one time and that he was about ten or eleven years old the first time that it occurred. E.S. testified that the defendant performed oral sex on him for the first time when he was seven or eight years old and that it occurred more than one time. Both C.P. and E.S. testified that the defendant allowed them to view pornographic material.
C.S. testified that the defendant let him drink alcohol when he was nine or ten years old. The defendant also allowed him to view pornographic movies and magazines. According to C.S., the defendant touched his penis with his hand and mouth. He testified that it happened more than one time, and that the first time it happened, he was around ten or eleven years old.
C.W. testified that the defendant touched his penis over his clothes when he was nine or ten years old. C.W. stated that this occurred more than one time. S.D. testified that the defendant's hand and mouth touched his penis. He also testified that he viewed pornographic materials at the defendant's house. T.O. corroborated the testimony of the other victims that the defendant allowed them to watch pornographic movies and bought alcohol for them.
R.C.'s Children's Advocacy Center interview was played for the jury. He admitted that the defendant allowed them to watch pornographic movies. R.C. did not disclose sexual abuse in this interview, but the defendant admitted to touching R.C.'s penis in his November 2, 2011, interview.
DISCUSSION
In his sole assignment of error, the defendant argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to appoint an expert to assess the impact that his dyslexia may have had on his ability to understand and intelligently waive his Miranda2 rights before participating in his two videotaped interviews.
Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion to appoint an expert to determine whether his dyslexia affected his understanding and waiver of his Miranda rights. The motion states that before making his statements, the defendant was read his Miranda rights and signed a waiver, but "defense counsel is concerned as to what extent defendant's dyslexia may have affected defendant's understanding and waiver of his [Miranda] rights." According to the motion, in addition to suffering from dyslexia, the defendant was born in Cuba, completed a sixth grade education in Honduras, and learned English as a second language.
At a hearing on expert funding, whether ex parte or contradictory, the defendant has the burden to show a need for the funding by establishing with a reasonable degree of specificity what type of expert is needed and the purpose for which the expert is required. He must show it is more likely than not the expert assistance will be required to answer a serious issue or question raised by the State's or defense's theory of the case, and that denial would result in an unfair trial. If this burden is met, the district court is to order the State to provide those funds. State v. Touchet, 93-2839 (La. 9/6/94), 642 So.2d 1213, 1221. A reviewing court examines a denial of funding under the abuse of discretion standard. State v. Lee, 2005-2098 (La. 1/16/08), 976 So.2d 109, 137, cert. denied, 555 U.S. 824, 129 S.Ct. 143, 172 L.Ed.2d 39 (2008).
At the hearing on the motion to appoint an expert, the defendant did not present any arguments or evidence to prove that the expert assistance would be required to answer a serious issue or question raised by the State's or his theory of the case. Thus, the defendant failed to meet his burden to show a need for the funding for the expert witness, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion.
Moreover, after reviewing the record, the two videotaped statements of the defendant, and the hearing on the motion to suppress the defendant's statements, it is clear that the defendant intelligently waived his Miranda rights. As noted at the hearing on the motion to suppress, the officer interviewing the defendant read his rights to him prior to both interviews and determined that the defendant did not have a problem understanding English. According to the officer's testimony, after he read the defendant his rights, he asked the defendant whether he understood them, and the defendant stated that he did. The "Waiver of Rights" section of the "Interrogation; Advice of Rights" form was also read to and signed by the defendant. The defendant indicated that he understood and was willing to give a statement. The district court viewed both videotaped statements at the hearing on the motion to suppress and found that the defendant intelligently waived his rights. In his reasons for denying the motion to suppress, the court noted that in the first statement, the defendant appeared relaxed and spoke with very little detectable accent. The court opined that the defendant was "urbane," "sophisticated," and "his language exhibits excellent and precise and subtle selection of words in order to be absolutely polite and absolutely precise about making his statements and making sure that the receiver receives the right message." An expert's opinion on dyslexia would not have altered the district court's determination that the defendant intelligently waived his rights. After reviewing the defendant's argument and the record of this case, we find this assignment of error lacks merit.
SENTENCING ERROR
We have conducted our routine review of the record for errors discoverable by a mere inspection of the pleadings and proceedings pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 920(2), and we have found an error. The crime of indecent behavior with juveniles is punishable by a term of imprisonment at hard labor for not less than two nor more than twenty-five years when the victim is under the age of thirteen and the offender is seventeen years of age or older. At least two years of the sentence imposed shall be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. La. R.S. 14:81H(2). The defendant was convicted of eight counts of indecent behavior with juveniles (counts 7-14). On counts 7-14, on each count, the defendant was sentenced to twenty-five years at hard labor "without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for at least two of those years." Pursuant to La. R.S. 14:81H(2), the trial court had discretion to restrict benefits for as little as two years of the sentences, for as much as twenty-five years of the sentences, or for any period in between two and twenty-five years. It is impossible to determine from the quoted language how many years of the sentences are without benefits, and thus, the sentences are indeterminate and in violation of La. C.Cr.P. art. 879. Because the sentences are indeterminate, and because resentencing would involve discretion, we vacate the sentences and remand for resentencing. See State v. Price, 2005-2514 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/28/06), 952 So.2d 112, 123-25 (en banc), writ denied, 2007-0130 (La. 2/22/08), 976 So.2d 1277.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant's convictions and sentences on counts 1-6 and 15 are affirmed; the sentences on counts 7-14 are vacated and remanded for resentencing.
CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES ON COUNTS 1-6 AND 15 ARE AFFIRMED. SENTENCES ON COUNTS 7-14 ARE VACATED AND REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING.
