Filed: Jul. 07, 2016
Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2020
Summary: 15-630 Cuka v. Lynch BIA A078 938 184 A078 938 185 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTA
Summary: 15-630 Cuka v. Lynch BIA A078 938 184 A078 938 185 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTAT..
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15-630
Cuka v. Lynch
BIA
A078 938 184
A078 938 185
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED
ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE
(WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY
OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for
2 the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States
3 Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the
4 7th day of July, two thousand sixteen.
5
6 PRESENT:
7 DENNIS JACOBS,
8 PIERRE N. LEVAL,
9 DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
10 Circuit Judges.
11 _____________________________________
12
13 KLEMENTINA CUKA, XHEKSON CUKA,
14 Petitioners,
15
16 v. 15-630
17 NAC
18 LORETTA E. LYNCH, UNITED STATES
19 ATTORNEY GENERAL,
20 Respondent.
21 _____________________________________
22
23 FOR PETITIONER: Joshua Bardavid, New York, New York.
24
25 FOR RESPONDENT: Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy
26 Assistant Attorney General; Mary
27 Jane Candaux, Assistant Director,
28 Michael C. Heyse, Trial Attorney,
29 Office of Immigration Litigation,
30 United States Department of Justice,
31 Washington, D.C.
1 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
2 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
3 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is
4 DISMISSED.
5 Petitioners Klementina Cuka and her minor son, Xhekson
6 Cuka, natives and citizens of Albania, seek review of a February
7 18, 2015, decision of the BIA denying their motion to reopen
8 the removal proceedings. In re Klementina Cuka, Xhekson Cuka,
9 Nos. A078 938 184/185 (B.I.A. Feb. 18, 2015). We assume the
10 parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural
11 history in this case.
12 We discern no abuse of discretion in the BIA’s denial of
13 reopening. See Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir.
14 2006). The motion was untimely and number barred and we
15 otherwise lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not
16 to reopen sua sponte.
Id. at 517-18.
17 An alien seeking to reopen proceedings may file one motion
18 to reopen no later than 90 days after the date on which the final
19 administrative decision was rendered. See 8 U.S.C.
20 § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). There is no
21 dispute that the December 2014 motion was untimely because the
2
1 BIA issued a final decision in February 2005, and number barred
2 because it was the second motion to reopen.
3 Nor do any exceptions apply to excuse the time and number
4 limitations. An application for or eligibility to adjust
5 status is not an exception to the time and number limitations.
6 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3); Matter of
7 Yauri, 25 I. & N. Dec. 103, 105 (BIA 2009).
8 Accordingly, the only basis for reopening is the BIA’s sua
9 sponte authority pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). We lack
10 jurisdiction to review the BIA’s refusal to exercise that
11 “entirely discretionary” authority. Ali, 448 F.3d at 518.
12 However, “where the Agency may have declined to exercise its
13 sua sponte authority because it misperceived the legal
14 background and thought, incorrectly, that a reopening would
15 necessarily fail, remand to the Agency for reconsideration in
16 view of the correct law is appropriate.” Mahmood v. Holder,
17
570 F.3d 466, 469 (2d Cir. 2009).
18 Contrary to the Cukas’ argument, the BIA did not
19 misapprehend the law. The BIA concluded that the removal order
20 rendered the Cukas ineligible for provisional unlawful-
21 presence waivers. The Cukas concede this point and the
3
1 regulations confirm that the BIA is correct. See 8 C.F.R.
2 § 212.7(e)(4)(vi). Accordingly, the BIA did not misapprehend
3 the Cukas’ eligibility. The refusal to reopen and vacate the
4 removal order solely to render them eligible for that relief
5 is a discretionary decision not subject to judicial review.
6 See Ali, 448 F.3d at 518.
7 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
8 DISMISSED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal
9 that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED,
10 and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition
11 is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument
12 in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of
13 Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule
14 34.1(b).
15 FOR THE COURT:
16 Catherine O=Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
4
