TERRENCE G. BERG, District Judge.
In this appeal of the Administrative Law Judge's finding that Plaintiff was ineligible for disability Social Security benefits, Magistrate Judge Anthony P. Patti issued a Report and Recommendation on July 29, 2016 (Dkt. 17) recommending that Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment be denied (Dkt. 12), Defendant's motion for summary judgment be granted (Dkt. 14) and the Commissioner's findings and conclusions be affirmed.
Either party may serve and file written objections "[w]ithin fourteen days after being served with a copy" of the Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Plaintiff filed a timely objection (Dkt. 18) and Defendant filed a response. (Dkt. 19) A district court must conduct a de novo review of the parts of a Report and Recommendation to which a party objects. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
The Court has reviewed Judge Patti's Report and Recommendation and Plaintiff's objection that the Magistrate Judge erred in affirming the Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ) decision to discount the opinion of Plaintiff's treating physician, Dr. White. (Dkt. 18) For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff's objection is
Because neither party objects to Judge Patti's factual findings or procedural history (Dkt. 17 at 2-9), the Court turns directly to a discussion of the law applicable to Plaintiff's objection, followed by an application of that law to the relevant facts.
The District Court has jurisdiction to review the Commissioner's final administrative decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). When reviewing a case under the Social Security Act, the Court "must affirm the Commissioner's decision if it is supported by substantial evidence and was made pursuant to proper legal standards." Rogers v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence is "defined as more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Cutlip v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994).
In assessing the medical evidence supplied in support of a disability claim, an ALJ must adhere to certain governing standards, including the treating physician rule. SSR 96-2p, 1996 WL 374188 (July 2, 1996); see also Wilson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 544 (6th Cir. 2004). Because treating physicians are "the medical professionals most able to provide a detailed, longitudinal picture of [a claimant's] medical impairment(s)," an ALJ must give their opinions controlling weight if they are "well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and not inconsistent with other substantial evidence in [the] case record." Wilson, 378 F.3d at 544. In explaining the weight they assign a treating physician's opinion, an ALJ must give "good reasons," or explanations "sufficiently specific to make clear to any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the treating source's medical opinion and the reasons for that weight." SSR 96-2p, 1996 WL 374188, at *5.
Where a treating physician's opinion is (1) not supported by the objective medical evidence and (2) the bases for the opinion are unclear, the ALJ has an obligation to make every reasonable effort to re-contact the treating physician to clarify her opinion. SSR 96-2p, 1996 WL 374188, at *6; see also Ferguson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. 628 F.3d 269, 272-74 (6th Cir. 2010).
In accordance with the legal standards discussed above, Plaintiff's objection is overruled for the reasons stated below.
Plaintiff claims that the ALJ improperly discounted Dr. White's opinion because it was not "weighed or discussed at all, just dismissed as vague." (Dkt. 18 at 2). In fact, the ALJ summarized Dr. White's opinion and explained his reasons for giving it limited weight. Specifically, the ALJ stated:
(Dkt. 10-2 at 22-23) The ALJ explained that Dr. White's opinion was not well supported, and indeed contradicted, by substantial relevant evidence in the record. (Id. at 22) The description of Dr. White's opinion as "otherwise vague" was secondary to this evidentiary concern. (Id. at 23). As Judge Patti correctly concluded (Dkt. 17 at 24-26), the ALJ's decision to discount Dr. White's opinion was stated clearly, supported by substantial evidence and sufficiently explained.
Plaintiff also argues, for the first time, that the ALJ failed to comply with the treating physician rule because he discounted Dr. White's opinion for vagueness without first re-contacting him for clarification. (Dkt. 18 at 2) This argument is both procedurally barred and meritless. In the Sixth Circuit, it is impermissible to raise an argument for the first time in an objection to a magistrate's Report and Recommendation. See Murr v. United States 200 F.3d 895, 902 n.1 (6th Cir. 2000); Swain v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 379 F. App'x 512, 517-18 (6th Cir. 2010). Plaintiff's argument is thus procedurally barred. Notwithstanding this procedural barrier, Plaintiff's argument fails because the conditions necessary to trigger the ALJ's recontact obligation were not met. That is, while the ALJ found that Dr. White's opinion was not well supported by the evidence, the ALJ did not find that the bases for Dr. White's opinion were unclear. (Dkt. 10-2 at 22-23) Although the ALJ described Dr. White's opinion as "otherwise vague," there was no need to re-contact the physician because the evidence Dr. White's opinion relied on was apparent and, in light of the other record evidence, sufficient to allow the ALJ to make a determination as to Plaintiff's disability status.
In sum, the ALJ properly discounted Dr. White's opinion and Plaintiff's argument that the ALJ had a duty to re-contact Dr. White is procedurally barred and meritless. Plaintiff's objection is therefore overruled.
For the reasons set forth above,
It is hereby
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