NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

PETTIGREW, J.

The defendant, Dwayne Deon Folse, was charged by bill of information with first degree robbery, a violation of La. R.S. 14:64.1. He entered a plea of not guilty and, following a jury trial, was found guilty of the responsive offense of simple robbery, a violation of La. R.S. 14:65. He filed a motion for new trial, which was denied. The State filed a habitual offender bill of information, and after a hearing, the defendant was adjudicated a second-felony habitual offender.1 He was sentenced to fourteen years imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. The defendant filed a motion to reconsider sentence, which was denied. He now appeals, alleging one counseled and eight pro se assignments of error. For the following reasons, we affirm the defendant's conviction, habitual offender adjudication, and sentence.

FACTS

On June 28, 2012, in the early afternoon, the defendant entered the Whitney Bank on Jefferson Highway in Baton Rouge, wearing a hard hat and a neon construction vest. He approached teller Leah Clark's window and slid a note to her that stated, "Give me all your money. This is a robbery." According to Clark, the defendant kept his hand underneath his shirt "insinuating that he had a weapon." Clark believed that the defendant had a weapon and felt threatened. She removed money and a red dye pack from her drawer and handed it to the defendant. The defendant took the money, exited the bank, and proceeded to walk toward the CC's Coffee House near the bank. Clark pushed the bank's silent alarm button and notified the branch manager, Amy Dunham, that her window had just been robbed. While the defendant was still in Clark's line of vision, the dye pack exploded. After the explosion, the defendant fled on foot toward Corporate Boulevard. Officers arrived on the scene approximately fifteen minutes later.

Investigations revealed that approximately $2,600.00 was stolen from the bank. The branch manager provided officers with still photographs from the bank's surveillance videos, and photographs were broadcast over local news outlets. After receiving an anonymous tip, officers developed the defendant as a suspect. They prepared a photographic lineup and showed it to three bank employees, none of whom were able to identify the defendant as the person who robbed the bank. Shortly thereafter, the defendant reported to the East Baton Rouge Parish Prison and turned himself in for the robbery, explaining that he "[did] it for his family."

COUNSELED ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

In his sole counseled assignment of error, the defendant argues that the sentence imposed by the district court was excessive. Specifically, he contends that "a lengthy incarceration will serve no meaningful purpose" and that he is capable of rehabilitation. He argues that the sentence was an abuse of the district court's discretion in light of the mitigating circumstances including the fact that he was "under the duress of losing his job," "going through the turmoil of a divorce," was under "financial strain," and "not thinking clearly." Additionally, the defendant argues that he "did the right thing and turned himself in."

Article I, Section 20, of the Louisiana Constitution prohibits the imposition of excessive punishment. Although a sentence may be within statutory limits, it may violate a defendant's constitutional right against excessive punishment and is subject to appellate review. State v. Sepulvado, 367 So.2d 762, 767 (La. 1979). A sentence is unconstitutionally excessive if it is grossly disproportionate to the severity of the offense or is nothing more than a purposeless and needless infliction of pain and suffering. See State v. Hurst, 99-2868, p. 10 (La. App. 1 Cir. 10/3/00), 797 So.2d 75, 83, writ denied, 2000-3053 (La. 10/5/01), 798 So.2d 962. A sentence is grossly disproportionate if, when the crime and punishment are considered in light of the harm done to society, it shocks the sense of justice. State v. Hogan, 480 So.2d 288, 291 (La. 1985). The sentence imposed will not be set aside absent a showing of manifest abuse of the district court's wide discretion to sentence within statutory limits. State v. Lobato, 603 So.2d 739, 751 (La. 1992).

The Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure sets forth items that must be considered by the district court before imposing sentence. La. Code Crim. P. art. 894.1. The district court need not recite the entire checklist of Article 894.1, but the record must reflect that it adequately considered the guidelines. State v. Herrin, 562 So.2d 1, 11 (La. App. 1 Cir.), writ denied, 565 So.2d 942 (La. 1990). In light of the criteria expressed by Article 894.1, a review for individual excessiveness should consider the circumstances of the crime and the district court's stated reasons and factual basis for its sentencing decision. State v. Watkins, 532 So.2d 1182, 1186 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1988). Remand for full compliance with Article 894.1 is unnecessary when a sufficient factual basis for the sentence is shown. See State v. Lanclos, 419 So.2d 475, 478 (La. 1982).

The district court ordered a presentence investigation report ("PSI") prior to sentencing the defendant. According to the report, the defendant was interviewed in reference to the PSI, but indicated that he had nothing to say. The report further indicates that the defendant did not take responsibility for his actions and that his "silence in this matter reflects his disregard for the laws and for the [well-being] of the innocent people in our community." At the conclusion of the report, it was noted that the defendant previously pled guilty to three counts of bank robbery, was sentenced to eighty-seven months imprisonment, and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $52,251.00. The recommendation from the defendant's probation and parole officer was that he be sentenced to a term of imprisonment commensurate with the offense.

The defendant addressed the district court at the sentencing hearing, noting that this was the first time that he had been convicted of a crime in Louisiana. He argued that he was a hard-working citizen, was going through a divorce, and "things just got out of hand." He argued that the only reason he chose to go to trial was because the State claimed that he had a gun, and he "never picked up a gun in [his] life no more than just to honor [his] country when [he] was in the service."

The district court stated that it reviewed the PSI and noted that the defendant declined to make any statement or comment to the probation and parole officer. The court noted the defendant's three prior counts of bank robbery and opined that it might have been willing to give leniency if this were the defendant's first offense, but this was "in essence" his fourth bank robbery.2

We find that the district court adequately considered the relevant statutory guidelines, including mitigating and aggravating factors, before imposing the defendant's sentence. Considering the district court's careful review of the circumstances, the PSI report, and the nature of the instant crime, we find no abuse of discretion by the district court. The sentence is not grossly disproportionate to the severity of the offense or shocking to the sense of justice, and is amply justified by the record. Additionally, maximum sentences were warranted in this matter. Maximum sentences may be imposed only for the most serious offenses and the worst offenders, or when the offender poses an unusual risk to the public safety due to his past conduct of repeated criminality. State v. Parker, 2012-1550, p. 14 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/26/13), 116 So.3d 744, 754, writ denied, 2013-1200 (La. 11/22/13), 126 So.3d 478; State v. Miller, 96-2040, p. 4 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/7/97), 703 So.2d 698, 701, writ denied, 98-0039 (La. 5/15/98), 719 So.2d 459. Accordingly, the sentence imposed by the district court is not excessive, and this assignment of error lacks merit.

PRO SE ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER ONE

In his first pro se assignment of error, the defendant argues that the district court erred in failing to order an evidentiary hearing after he allegedly raised a claim under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), during a November 19, 2013 hearing.

A counseled "Motion to Discover and Disclose Evidence Favorable to Defense" was filed on October 22, 2012, and a hearing was set for January 16, 2013. That day, the State filed its answer to discovery, and the district court found probable cause after testimony was heard as to the preliminary examination. The matter was reassigned for motions on May 14, 2013. The defendant filed a pro se motion raising a general Brady claim on April 22, 2013. On May 14, 2013, the defendant withdrew all pro se motions. The transcript of the November 19, 2013 hearing was not included in the record, but the minute entry from that date indicates that the parties appeared before the court and, on joint motion, set the matter for motions on February 25, 2014. The February 25, 2014 minute entry indicates that on joint motion of the parties, the matter was set for trial on June 9, 2014, and a pretrial conference was scheduled for May 29, 2014. None of the minute entries indicate that a Brady violation was raised.

Based on the foregoing, this assignment of error is without merit.

PRO SE ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER TWO

In his second pro se assignment of error, the defendant argues that the district court failed to suppress an "unreliable and inaudible" iPhone recording of his alleged confession. Specifically, he alleges that "[n]o voice exemplars were used for identification where the suspect did not identify himself as the speaker, and no witnesses heard firsthand the voice of the defendant at any time connecting it with the alleged speaker."

Defense counsel filed a motion to suppress the defendant's statement arguing that the best evidence of the defendant's alleged incriminating statement was the recording from Detective Samuel Wilson, Jr.'s cellular telephone, which was "mysteriously erased." At the time of the hearing on the motion to suppress, the defense had received the recording from the detective's cellular phone and incorporated into its argument that the recording was "not very clear or very audible."

Detective Wilson testified at the hearing and explained that he recorded his interview with the defendant on his iPhone and admitted that the quality was not very good, but that portions of the recording could be understood. His phone subsequently "crashed," which is why he did not have the recording at the time of the preliminary examination hearing held on January 16. He subsequently realized that the recording had been synced onto his computer, and he was able to have it transferred onto a disk. At the conclusion of the hearing, the defense argued that the testimony and evidence did not establish that the person being recorded was the defendant. Prior to denying the motion to suppress, the district court noted that the detective testified that the person on the recording was the defendant, and he found the detective's testimony to be credible. The court further noted that it had "absolutely no evidence whatsoever that this tape has been tampered with."

District courts are vested with great discretion when ruling on a motion to suppress. State v. Long, 2003-2592, p. 5 (La. 9/9/04), 884 So.2d 1176, 1179, cert. denied, 544 U.S. 977, 125 S.Ct. 1860, 161 L.Ed.2d 728 (2005). When a district court denies a motion to suppress, factual and credibility determinations should not be reversed in the absence of a clear abuse of the district court's discretion, i.e., unless such ruling is not supported by the evidence. See State v. Green, 94-0887, p. 11 (La. 5/22/95), 655 So.2d 272, 280-281. However, a district court's legal findings are subject to a de novo standard of review. See State v. Hunt, 2009-1589, p. 6 (La. 12/1/09), 25 So.3d 746, 751.

The State bears the burden of proving the admissibility of a purported confession. La. Code Crim. P. art. 703D. Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:451 provides that, before a purported confession can be introduced in evidence, it must be affirmatively shown to be free and voluntary and not made under the influence of fear, duress, intimidation, menaces, threats, inducements, or promises. It must also be established that an accused who makes a confession during custodial interrogation was first advised of his/her Miranda3 rights. State v. Plain, 99-1112, p. 5 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/18/00), 752 So.2d 337, 342.

Whether a showing of voluntariness has been made is analyzed on a case-by-case basis with regard to the facts and circumstances of each case. State v. Benoit, 440 So.2d 129, 131 (La. 1983). The district court must consider the totality of the circumstances in deciding whether a confession is admissible. State v. Hernandez, 432 So.2d 350, 352 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1983). Testimony of the interviewing police officer alone may be sufficient to prove a defendant's statements were freely and voluntarily given. State v. Maten, 2004-1718, p. 12 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/24/05), 899 So.2d 711, 721, writ denied, 2005-1570 (La. 1/27/06), 922 So.2d 544.

The beginning of the recording of the defendant's statement reveals that the detective noted the date, time, and location. He further noted that he was interviewing the defendant, who he named as "Dwayne Folse" and described as a black male born on July 7, 1959. The detective then proceeded to read the defendant his Miranda rights prior to the defendant making his statement admitting guilt. There is no indication on the recording that the defendant does not understand his rights. Based on the foregoing, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to suppress. Accordingly, this assignment of error is without merit.

PRO SE ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER THREE

In his third pro se assignment of error, the defendant argues that the district court erred in admitting his booking photograph into evidence.

The State called Lieutenant James Sandridge to testify at trial. During his testimony, the State offered into evidence a photograph taken of the defendant when he was booked into parish prison. The defense objected to the admission of "any photos that we haven't seen till [sic] today." The State responded that the photographs were being introduced to establish the defendant's identity. The defense then argued that there was no indication that photograph had been used to make an identification. The State argued that the photograph depicted how defendant looked when he turned himself in for the robbery. Defense counsel noted that how the defendant turned himself in was in dispute. The district court asked whether the photograph was taken when the defendant was booked for the instant offense, the State responded in the affirmative, and the court overruled the defendant's objection. The photograph was then marked for identification and published for the jury. Lieutenant Sandridge testified that the photograph was taken of the defendant when he turned himself in on June 30, 2012.

Lieutenant Sandridge further explained that a "mug shot" is taken when suspects are booked into parish prison. He testified that this particular picture of the defendant was taken on June 30, 2012, when the defendant was booked into parish prison by Officer Powell. Officer Brandon Powell had previously testified at the trial that the defendant approached him and stated that he robbed the Whitney Bank on Jefferson Highway. Officer Powell confirmed that he booked the defendant into jail.

Photographs are generally admissible if they illustrate any fact, shed any light upon an issue in the case, or are relevant to describe the person, thing, or place depicted. State v. Sepulvado, 93-2692, p. 7 (La. 4/8/96), 672 So.2d 158, 164, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 934, 117 S.Ct. 310, 136 L.Ed.2d 227 (1996). A district court's ruling with respect to the admissibility of photographs will not be overturned unless it is clear the prejudicial effect of the evidence outweighs its probative value. State v. Maxie, 93-2158, p. 11 n.8 (La. 4/10/95), 653 So.2d 526, 532 n.8.

As noted by the defendant, how the defendant turned himself in was in dispute. The booking photograph was relevant to establish that the defendant was the person who turned himself in and was booked for the June 28, 2012 robbery of the Whitney Bank and to corroborate Officer Powell's testimony. The defendant does not establish how admitting the booking photograph was prejudicial. This assignment of error is without merit.

PRO SE ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER FOUR

In his fourth pro se assignment of error, the defendant argues that the district court erred in allowing the testimony of his prior employer, Timothy Wilhite.

After the State called Timothy Wilhite as a witness, the defendant objected to the "entire line of questioning" as irrelevant. The State responded that Wilhite owned the company from which the defendant was terminated approximately one month prior to the robbery, corroborating the defendant's statement. The district court responded, "I mean, the statement says he robbed this place because he had a good job, he lost it and the reason he robbed the bank is because he didn't have enough money. That was in the statement." The district court reminded the defense that it "challenged the statement. You've — you've suggested he gave him all of his answers to — to that and this is just disputing that." The court concluded that the defendant could "object if you think there's an improper foundation or something, but I — I'm not going to exclude this witness until I hear what he has to say."

The defendant argues that the district court erred in admitting the testimony for various reasons. A majority of the reasons presented in his pro se brief are being argued for the first time on appeal. A new basis for an objection may not be raised for the first time on appeal. The purpose behind the contemporaneous objection rule is to put the trial judge on notice of an alleged irregularity so that he may cure the problem. See La. Code Crim. P. art. 841A, La. Code Evid. art. 103A(1); State v. Young, 99-1264, p. 9 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/31/00), 764 So.2d 998, 1005. However, the defendant's relevancy argument was properly preserved for review.

"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. La. Code Evid. art. 401. Evidence that is not relevant is not admissible. See La. Code Evid. art. 402. Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, or waste of time. La. Code Evid. art. 403.

During Wilhite's testimony, the State introduced the defendant's employment file kept by Wilhite's company. The records contained within the employment file established that the defendant was terminated on May 25, 2012, for absenteeism. The file also contained payroll information indicating that the defendant earned as much as $1,193.10 per week prior to his termination.

We find no abuse of discretion in the district court's allowing the introduction of Wilhite's testimony at trial. His testimony was relevant to establish that the defendant was terminated from the company and in need of money prior to the bank robbery, as the defendant indicated in his statement. Nothing about the introduction of the testimony was unduly prejudicial, confusing, or wasteful of time. This assignment of error is without merit.

PRO SE ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER FIVE

In his fifth pro se assignment of error, the defendant argues that he was denied a copy of his PSI report. He acknowledges that his counsel viewed the report, but claims that without a copy of it, he was unable to contest any of its contents.

A defendant does not have an absolute right to demand the PSI, but before imposing sentence, the district court may advise the defendant or his counsel of the factual contents and conclusions of any PSI report. See La. Code Crim. P. art. 877B. A defendant has a constitutional right, however, to rebut a PSI if it is prejudicial to his case. In order for an appellate court to review the effects of a PSI upon a defendant's sentence, the defendant must orally object, request a hearing, move to traverse, or offer countervailing information before or during the sentencing hearing. State v. Milstead, 95-1983, pp. 5-6 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/27/96), 681 So.2d 1274, 1277-1278, writ denied, 96-2601 (La. 3/27/97), 692 So.2d 392.

When a defendant timely moves for disclosure of the PSI, alleging with particularity that it contains false information detrimental to the defendant, the district court errs if the contents (absent the source of confidential information) are not disclosed and the defendant given an opportunity to contradict or explain substantially prejudicial information. State v. Johnson, 602 So.2d 310, 313 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1992).

In the instant case, defense counsel noted that she had reviewed the PSI twice. The defendant did not allege with any particularity that the PSI report contained false information detrimental to his case. Defense counsel did not object to the PSI or ask for an opportunity to rebut any facts contained within the report. Moreover, the defendant does not specifically point out, in brief to this court, any factual inaccuracies contained in the PSI. Accordingly, this assignment of error is without merit.

PRO SE ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER SIX

In his sixth pro se assignment of error, the defendant argues that the district court erred in denying his motion for new trial. Specifically, he contends that the motion should have been granted because of newly discovered evidence. According to the defendant, the "newly discovered evidence" was that the broadcasting of the surveillance photograph resulted in Crime Stopper's receiving multiple names of potential suspects, other than his own.

The record does not contain any motions for new trial filed by the defendant. The only evidence that one was filed is included in a minute entry from January 8, 2015, which states that the defendant filed a motion for new trial, which was denied. Nonetheless, a defendant seeking new trial based on newly discovered evidence must establish four elements: (1) that the new evidence was discovered after trial; (2) that failure to discover the evidence before trial was not attributable to his lack of diligence; (3) that the evidence is material to the issues at trial; and (4) that the evidence is of such a nature that it would probably produce a different verdict in the event of retrial. State v. Ward, 2014-1923, p. 8 (La. 6/30/15), 167 So.3d 592, 596 (per curiam). The fact that names other than the defendant's were submitted in response to the broadcasting of the photograph of the suspect would not produce a different verdict in the event of retrial. The State had compelling evidence of the defendant's identity as the perpetrator of the offense, including the defendant's admission and his name being submitted through Crime Stoppers. Accordingly, this assignment of error is without merit.

PRO SE ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER SEVEN

In his seventh pro se assignment of error, the defendant argues that the district court failed to timely impose a sentence due to delays caused by the State. Specifically, he contends that the State delayed sentencing through its attempt to seek certification of his prior offense in Illinois.

Principles of fundamental fairness dictated by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibit inordinate delays in post-conviction proceedings such as imposition of sentence, when the delays cause prejudice to the defendant. State v. Duncan, 396 So.2d 297, 299 (La. 1981). A defendant is statutorily entitled to the imposition of sentence "without unreasonable delay" and the sanction for noncompliance is divestiture of the district court's sentencing jurisdiction. La. Code Crim. P. art. 874; State v. McQueen, 308 So.2d 752, 755 (La. 1975). What constitutes an "unreasonable delay" is determined on a flexible case-by-case basis. City of Baton Rouge v. Bourgeois, 380 So.2d 63, 64 (La. 1980) (per curiam).

In the instant case, the defendant was convicted on June 12, 2014. That day, the district court ordered a PSI and set sentencing for October 16, 2014. The defendant did not enter any objections to the sentencing date. The minute entry from October 16, 2014, indicates that the matter was continued, on joint motion of the parties, to January 8, 2015. The parties appeared on January 7, 2015, for a motion for new trial filed by the defendant. On the State's motion, the matter was continued until the next day. On January 8, 2015, the district court denied the motion for new trial and the matter was continued until April 14, 2015. The State filed a habitual offender bill of information on March 27, 2015, and the defendant was arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty on April 14, 2015. On the State's motion, the matter was set for a hearing on August 20, 2015. On that date, the habitual offender hearing was held, and the defendant was adjudicated a second-felony habitual offender and sentenced.

We note that the defendant failed to object to the sentencing delay, and thus, the instant claim was not preserved for our review. See La. Code Evid. art. 103A(1); La. Code Crim. P. art. 841A. Moreover, the defendant has failed to establish that the delay was unreasonable or that he was prejudiced by the delay. This assignment of error is without merit.

PRO SE ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER EIGHT

In his last pro se assignment of error, the defendant challenges his habitual offender adjudication. Specifically, he challenges his out-of-state conviction being used as a predicate and further contends that the State failed to establish his identity as the perpetrator of that predicate offense.

Pursuant to La. R.S. 15:529.1A, an enhanced sentence may be imposed on an offender who has been convicted of a felony within this state or "under the laws of any other state or of the United States, or any foreign government of a crime which, if committed in this state would be a felony." Thus, the defendant's argument that his conviction for a crime committed in another state cannot be used as a predicate offense is without merit. We now turn to his second argument that the State failed to establish his identity as the perpetrator of predicate offense.

To obtain a multiple-offender adjudication the State is required to establish both the prior felony conviction and that the defendant is the same person convicted of that felony. In attempting to do so, the State may present: (1) testimony from witnesses; (2) expert opinion regarding the fingerprints of the defendant when compared with those in the prior record; (3) photographs in the duly authenticated record; or (4) evidence of identical driver's license number, sex, race, and date of birth. State v. Payton, 2000-2899, p. 6 (La. 3/15/02), 810 So.2d 1127, 1130. The Habitual Offender Act does not require the State to use a specific type of evidence in order to carry its burden at the hearing, and the prior convictions may be proved by any competent evidence. Id., 2000-2899 at 8, 810 So.2d at 1132.

Herein, the habitual offender bill of information alleged one predicate offense, which was a February 10, 2000 conviction for three counts of bank robbery under docket number 99CR468-1 in the United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois. At the habitual offender hearing, the State submitted into evidence a certified copy of the bill of information, minute entry, and plea agreement for that conviction. The State submitted a copy of the fingerprint card associated with the arrest of that offense, as well as the fingerprint card associated with the defendant's arrest for the instant offense.

Michele Douglas, a training instructor with the Federal Bureau of Investigations, testified that both sets of fingerprints were from the same individual, and both fingerprint cards listed the same social security number and date of birth. Louisiana State Police Bureau of Criminal Identification and Information records analyst Amanda Collins also testified that the fingerprints on both cards originated from the same source. Collins compared those fingerprint cards with a set of fingerprints taken of the defendant on the day of the habitual offender hearing and testified that they were all provided from the same source.

Accordingly, the evidence introduced by the State at the habitual offender hearing was sufficient to establish that the defendant was the same person who pled guilty to the prior offense. Therefore, this assignment of error is without merit.

CONVICTION, HABITUAL OFFENDER ADJUDICATION, AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED.