MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS (Doc. 24)

CHARLES E. BINDER, Magistrate Judge.

I. RECOMMENDATION

For the reasons set forth below, IT IS RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs be GRANTED in PART and that Plaintiff be awarded a total amount of $2,427.13, which represents 8.2 hours of attorney and paralegal time and $500.00 in costs.

II. REPORT

A. Introduction

Pursuant to an order of reference from United States District Judge Thomas L. Ludington under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A),1 pending is Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs pursuant to the fee-shifting provision of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1692k.

Attorney Ronald Weiss and other members of his firm represented Plaintiff throughout the pendency of this case. Plaintiff's counsel filed the case on August 10, 2012, alleging that two defendants violated the FDCPA. On October 15, 2012, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Acceptance of Offer of Judgment between Plaintiff and Defendant Weber & Olcese, P.L.C. The acceptance expressly stated that the "issue of attorney fees and court costs remains pending as does the claim against Main Street Acquisition." (Doc. 19 at Ex. A.)

On January 7, 2012, a stipulated order to dismiss Main Street Acquisition Corp. was filed. (Doc. 20.) The order expressly stated that the dismissal was "with prejudice and without fees or costs to either party." (Doc. 20 at 1.)

Plaintiff now moves for attorney fees and costs in the amount of $5,406.50. (Doc. 24 at 2.) Defendant Weber & Olcese ("Defendant") responds that the amount requested is unreasonable and should be "drastically reduced" in light of the nominal amount of damages and because the request includes "non-recoverable time entries allegedly incurred both before and after October 1, 2012, in clear contravention of the Offer." (Doc. 26 at 1-2.)

B. FDCPA Standards

In a successful FDCPA case, a plaintiff's counsel may seek "the cost of the action, together with a reasonable attorney's fee as determined by the court." 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3). The statute provides that the "court shall consider, among other relevant factors[,]" the "frequency and persistence of noncompliance by the debt collector, the nature of such non-compliance, and the extent to which such noncompliance was intentional[.]" 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(b)(1).

Determination of a reasonable fee begins with calculating the product of a "reasonable hourly rate," Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 104 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1983), and "the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation," i.e., the "so-called lodestar amount[.]" Garner v. Cuyahoga County Juvenile Ct., 554 F.3d 624, 642 (6th Cir. 2009). The Supreme Court has provided twelve factors to be considered when determining or adjusting from the lodestar amount:

Hensley, 461 U.S. at 430 n.3.

A reasonable fee is "one that is adequate to attract competent counsel but [does] not produce windfalls to attorneys." Hadix v. Johnson, 65 F.3d 532, 535 (6th Cir. 1995). "A request for attorney fees should not result in a second major litigation." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437. Courts should be mindful of cases in which attorney fees are "the engine . . . powering the case," Carroll v. United Compucred Collections, Inc., No. 1:99-00152, 2008 WL 3001595, at *4, n.4 (M.D. Tenn. July 31, 2008), and the "fee petition tail should not be allowed to wag the dog." Career Agents Network v. careeragentsnetwork.biz, 722 F.Supp.2d 814, 825 (E.D. Mich. 2010). Determining a reasonable rate requires that the court use the prevailing market rates in the local community, i.e., the venue in which the court sits. Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 285-86, 109 S.Ct. 2463, 105 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1989).

"Cases may be overstaffed" and it is a plaintiff's burden to document "the appropriate hours expended" so that "[w]here the documentation of hours is inadequate, the district court may reduce the award accordingly." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433, 437. "[P]urely clerical or secretarial tasks should not be billed" under fee shifting statutes such as the FDCPA, "regardless of who performs them." Jenkins, 491 U.S. at 188, n.10. However, paralegal fees are included in the concept of attorney fees. Northcross v. Board of Ed. of Memphis City Shcools, 611 F.2d 624, 639 (6th Cir. 1979) (cited with approval in Atallah v. Law office of Timothy E. Baxter, P.C., No. 12-cv-11618, 2013 WL 866477, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 7, 2013)). In addition, when an Offer of Judgment offers to compensate for fees incurred only through the date of the offer, only fees incurred through that date are compensable. Atallah, at *4.

When parties litigate the issue of attorney fees, the additional fees generated by that litigation are termed "fees for fees." Lamar Advertising Co. v. Charter Twp. of Van Buren, 178 F. App'x 498, 502 (6th Cir. 2006). These "fees for fees" are recoverable but should only be awarded in accord with the limitations provided by the Sixth Circuit:

Coulter v. Tennessee, 805 F.2d 146, 151 (6th Cir. 1986).

C. Analysis

In the instant case, Plaintiff requests $500 in costs and fees for litigating the motion for attorney fees as well as $4,906.50 in costs and fees for litigating the main case. (Doc. 24 at 11.) At the outset, Section 1692k(a)(3) allows Plaintiff to recover costs, therefore I suggest that the $500.00 of documented costs should be granted.

As for the lodestar amounts, under the standards above, and after review of the exhibits, I see no principled reason to depart from the amounts proposed by Plaintiff.

As for attorney fees, Plaintiff seeks recovery for 23.3 hours of time expended by a total of 16 attorneys, paralegals, law clerks and a legal assistant at rates that range from $100.00 per hour to $330.00 per hour. See Doc. 24 at Ex. J. It is noted that both attorneys and paralegals have indicated that they are waiving some of the time they state they have expended on this case. (Doc. 24 at Exs. I, N, R). All but three of the paralegals, law clerks and the legal assistants indicate that they devoted one or more hours to the processing of this case. Attorneys Meyers, Weiss and Lamb list a collective 16.8 hours expended on this case. (Doc. 24 at Ex. J.) It is to them that I turn my primary attention.

Reviewing the time expended by Attorneys Meyers, Weiss and Lamb, along with the paralegal staff, under the Hensley standards, I first suggest that the case is not particularly complex, and did not appear to require the highest level of counsel's professional expertise. Moreover, Defendant's Offer of Judgment was accepted early in the proceedings — hardly a month after the filing of an Answer and Affirmative Defenses. (Docs. 17, 19). Although Plaintiff prevailed, the judgment amount is small. While I have no doubt as to the experience and ability of Plaintiff's counsel, their relationship with their client does not appear to be a lengthy one. Finally, as to Defendant's argument that no fees should be awarded for time expended after the acceptance of the offer of judgment, I conclude that under Coulter, 3% should be added for time expended after Plaintiff's acceptance of the Offer of Judgment.

Accordingly, after considering the Hensley standards applied to the circumstances of this case, I suggest that Plaintiff's counsel be compensated as follows:

III. REVIEW

Pursuant to Rule 72(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, "[w]ithin 14 days after being served with a copy of the recommended disposition, a party may serve and file specific written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations. A party may respond to another party's objections within 14 days after being served with a copy." Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). See also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Failure to file specific objections constitutes a waiver of any further right of appeal. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L. Ed.2d 435 (1985); Howard v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981). The parties are advised that making some objections, but failing to raise others, will not preserve all the objections a party may have to this report and recommendation. Willis v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 931 F.2d 390, 401 (6th Cir. 1991); Smith v. Detroit Fed'n of Teachers Local 231, 829 F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir. 1987). Pursuant to E.D. Mich. LR 72.1(d)(2), a copy of any objections is to be served upon this magistrate judge.