VICKI MILES-LaGRANGE, District Judge.
Before the Court is Plaintiff's Renewed Motion for Remand and Brief in Support, filed October 13, 2015. On November 3, 2015, defendant responded, and on November 10, 2015, plaintiff replied. Based on the parties' submissions, the Court makes its determination.
This action was filed on December 16, 2014, in the District Court of Beaver County, State of Oklahoma and stems from plaintiff's allegations of defendant's prior underpayment or non-payment of royalties owed to plaintiff on natural gas and/or constitutes of the gas stream produced from wells in Beaver County, Oklahoma. On February 26, 2015, plaintiff initially filed his motion to remand, and on July 1, 2015, this Court denied plaintiff's motion to remand. The Court ruled that defendant had satisfied the jurisdictional requirements under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 ("CAFA"). Specifically, the Court found that the undisputed damages of $3.7 million along with the statutory 12% per annum interest on proceeds that were not timely paid, pursuant to the Production and Revenue Standards Act ("PRSA"), exceeded the $5,000,000.00 jurisdictional amount required by CAFA.
On August 12, 2015, plaintiff filed his Notice of Appeal, appealing the Court's Order denying his motion to remand to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. On October 10, 2015, the Tenth Circuit issued its Order and Judgment reversing this Court's Order and remanding this matter back to this Court for further proceedings. Specifically, the Tenth Circuit found that the PRSA's statutory interest provision was the type of interest that 28 U.S.C. § 1332 prohibited the Court from considering. See Whisenant v. Sheridan Prod. Co., LLC, 627 F.App'x 706, 709 (10th Cir. 2015). Further, the Tenth Circuit remanded this matter back to this Court for "a determination of whether any amounts other than interest under Oklahoma's Production Revenue Standards Act may be added to the alleged unpaid royalties to satisfy CAFA's amount-in-controversy requirement." Id.
Based on the Tenth Circuit's Order, plaintiff now renews his requests to remand this matter back to state court.
Under CAFA, a United States district court may exercise original jurisdiction over a class action if a party shows, "among other things, that `the matter in controversy exceed[] the sum or value of $5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs.'"
Frederick, 683 F.3d at 1245. "[A] defendant seeking to remove under CAFA must show that the amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000 by a preponderance of the evidence." Id. at 1246. A removing party may make this showing in several ways, including:
Frederick, 683 F.3d at 1247. Thus, the removing party is "entitled to present its own estimate of the stakes; it is not bound by the plaintiffs' estimate in the complaint." Id. Moreover,
Id. (internal footnote and citations omitted). In addition, a plaintiff's pre-certification stipulations limiting damages sought is not proper as such stipulation cannot bind the class. See Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, 133 S.Ct. 1345, 1349 (2013) (citing Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S.Ct. 2368, 2380 (2011)).
Pursuant to the Tenth Circuit's Order remanding this matter back to this Court for further proceedings, the Court finds a determination needs to be made as to whether the amount in controversy should include (1) attorney's/expert witness fees; (2) under/non-paid royalties from other gas stream constituents that defendant asserts plaintiff alleges in his Class Action Petition ("Complaint") were not properly paid
Okla. Stat. tit. 52, § 903. Further, the PRSA states:
Okla. Stat. tit. 52, § 570.14(C). The Tenth Circuit has determined that attorney fees may be considered in the jurisdictional amount if a statute allows recovery. See Woodmen of World Life Ins. Soc'y v. Mangnaro, 342 F.3d 1213, 1218 (10th Cir. 2003) (citing Mo. State Life Ins. Co. v. Jones, 290 U.S. 199, 202 (1933)).
Plaintiff contends that it is not appropriate to consider statutory attorney fees when determining the amount in controversy since his claim was not pled pursuant to the PRSA but is a common law breach of lease claim in which he seeks attorney's fees out of the recovered damages amount. Defendant contends that, pursuant to the ELRA, the exclusive remedy for plaintiff's claim of under/non-payment of royalties on gas leases is governed by the PRSA.
Having carefully reviewed the parties' submissions, the Court finds that attorney's/expert witness fees, provided by the PRSA, should not be included in the amount in controversy determination, as plaintiff has only pled a breach of lease claim and not a claim pursuant to the ELRA or PRSA. Specifically, the Court finds that plaintiff's claim is based on defendant's alleged breach of the implied covenant of the fully executed oil and gas lease between plaintiff and defendant. See Compl. ¶ 44. The Court finds that the executed lease between the parties constitutes a private agreement which the ELRA exempts from the PRSA remedy provision.
Defendant now asserts its position that plaintiff, in his Complaint, originally claimed that defendant underpaid or did not pay for on-lease fuel, and gas stream constituents — carbon dioxide, nitrogen, and helium (collectively known as "Exclusion E"); therefore, those under/nonpayment claims should be included in the damages amount. Plaintiff contends that since the Court determined that the base damages amount was $3.7 million dollars, and defendant did not appeal that determination, defendant cannot now assert that damages for Exclusion E should be included in the damages amount in determining the amount in controversy.
Having carefully reviewed the parties' submissions, as well as plaintiff's Complaint, the Court finds that the damages amount in Exclusion E should be considered in determining whether the CAFA jurisdictional requirement has been met in this matter. The Court finds that in its July 5, 2015 Order, the Court specifically noted that defendant believed it was improper not to include the damages amount for Exclusion E, and because the Court found that the CAFA jurisdictional amount was satisfied when the PRSA statutory interest amount was added to the undisputed damages amount of $3.7 million, there was no need to address defendant's contentions regarding Exclusion E damages. The Court finds that defendant's contentions as to including the Exclusion E damages were properly preserved to be addressed at a later time if required. Therefore, the Court will consider Exclusion E damages in determining if the CAFA jurisdictional amount of $5,000,000.00 has been met in this matter.
Plaintiff contends that he makes no claim for under payment of royalties for on-lease fuel deductions. Defendant contends that it reasonably understood from plaintiff's Complaint that he was seeking royalty for on-lease fuel use. Having carefully reviewed plaintiff's Complaint, as well as the parties' submissions in this matter, the Court finds that it was reasonable for defendant to believe that plaintiff was alleging that on-lease fuel deductions were a part of his claim of under/non-payment royalties on gas constituents. Plaintiff, in his Complaint, alleges:
Notice of Removal [docket no. 1], Exhibit 1, Class Action Petition ¶¶10 & 12(a) & (d). The Court specifically finds that plaintiff made no distinction as to what type of gas he was claiming defendant failed to pay or underpaid the royalties on. Plaintiff specifically stated the nature of the action was "claims based upon Defendant's prior underpayment or non-payment of royalties on natural gas and/or constituents of the gas stream produced from wells in Oklahoma through improper accounting methods, . . . ." Id. ¶ 1. The Court finds that defendant could have reasonably believed, based on the allegations in plaintiff's Complaint, that the estimated amount in controversy should include the estimated disputed royalty amount of $256,978
Plaintiff further contends that he did not claim he was entitled to royalty payments for the gases nitrogen, carbon dioxide, or helium in his Complaint. Defendant contends that "based on a plain reading of the Petition and common usage of terms in the industry including a general definition of `gas' to include `all of the constituents of the raw gas stream,' including helium, nitrogen, and carbon dioxide, [it] believed that plaintiff did allege royalty underpayment for all of these gas constituents." Def. Resp. [docket no. 23] at 19 (citing Mark Humphries Deposition p. 94 ln. 8-14, Exhibit 1 of plf.'s Amended Motion to Remand [docket no. 17]).
Having carefully reviewed plaintiff's Complaint, as well as the parties' submissions in this matter, the Court finds that it was reasonable for defendant to believe that plaintiff was alleging an under/non-payment of royalties for the gases nitrogen, carbon dioxide, and helium. Plaintiff specifically alleges:
Notice of Removal [docket no. 1], Exhibit 1, Class Action Petition ¶¶34 & 39. Further, in his initial motion to remand, plaintiff conceded that, while defendant did not have an obligation to process and sell products recovered and sold by third parties from the class wells, defendant was required to pay for those products including carbon dioxide and nitrogen when those products were recovered. See Amended Motion to Remand [docket no. 17] at 6. Based on plaintiff's allegations and contentions, the Court finds that defendant's estimated disputed royalty amount of $712,706, for the gases nitrogen ($84,972), carbon dioxide ($51,024) and helium ($576,710) should be included in the amount in controversy.
Based on the Court's determination of the disputed royalty amounts that should be included, the amount in controversy stands at $4,691,482.00, which is not enough to satisfy the CAFA jurisdictional requirement of $5,000,000.00. Defendant contends that plaintiff seeks to recoup the under/non-paid royalties beyond the date plaintiff filed his Complaint and, therefore, the amount of future accruing damages should be included in the amount in controversy. Specifically, defendant contends that plaintiff alleges the time period for recoupment of damages is from January 1, 2009 to the time Class Notice is given. Defendant contends that since the Court has set the date for oral arguments on class certification for November 11, 2016, notification of the class cannot occur before this date. As a result, defendant contends that the estimated disputed royalty amount that would accrue up until class notification would be $39,562.20 per month. Based on this monthly accrual, defendant contends that the CAFA jurisdictional requirement of $5,000,000.00 would have been reached by the end of September 2015, well far in advance of the potential date for notification of the class. Plaintiff contends that the amount in controversy should be assessed at the time of removal and that defendant cannot include damages that have yet and may never accrue.
"[T]he time-of-filing rule [requires] the district court [to] determine the jurisdictional facts as they are when the complaint is filed, not as they might be upon final judgment." Symes v. Harris, 472 F.3d 754, 758 (10th Cir. 2006). Further, "[o]ngoing damages demanded in the plaintiff's complaint are part of the state of the facts at the time of filing of the complaint." Sullivan One, LLC v. Silver Cinemas Acuisition Corp., No. 13-CV-01998-CMA-CBS, 2014 WL 503644, at 2 (D. Colo. Feb. 7, 2014) (citing Carrillo v. MCS Indus. Inc., No. 12-0573, 2012 WL 5378300, at 16 (D.N.M. Oct. 15, 2012)).
Having carefully reviewed plaintiff's Complaint, as well as the parties' submissions, the Court finds that future damages for the non/under royalty payments by defendant should be included in the amount in controversy. Plaintiff specifically defines the potential class and period for damages recoupment in this matter as:
Notice of Removal [docket no. 1], Exhibit 1, Class Action Petition ¶10. The Court finds that it was plaintiff's intention that damages would accrue in this action from January 1, 2009 until the class was given notice. At the time plaintiff filed this action, plaintiff was unaware of the date the class would be given notice and, further, specifically pled that "[he] [did] not know whether class-wide damages [would] exceed $5 million, exclusive of interest and cost." Id. The Court finds that based on plaintiff's pleading, it was reasonable for defendant at the time of removal to determine that the amount in controversy would include damages up until the time the class was given notification, which would exceed the CAFA jurisdictional requirement of $5,000,000.00. Therefore, since defendant has established by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy in this matter could exceed $5,000,000.00, the Court finds that this matter should not be remanded back to state court.
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's Renewed Motion for Remand and Brief in Support [docket no. 55].
Court's July 1, 2015 Order [docket no. 41] at p. 4.