PATRICK J. HANNA, Magistrate Judge.
Currently before the court is a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed by Yun Chen, a citizen of China, on August 18, 2014 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. He names former United States Attorney Eric Holder (now Loretta Lynch), South Louisiana Correctional Center Warden David Viator, Department of Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson and ICE New Orleans Field Office Director Brian Acuna.
Petitioner was convicted in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona of conspiracy to transport and harbor illegal aliens in 2013, for which he was sentenced to 13 months and 1 day. [rec. doc. 15-2, pg. 38-41].
After serving his sentence, petitioner was taken into ICE custody. Petitioner was ordered removed on February 14, 2014 and his order of removal became final on that date when petitioner waived his right to appeal. [Id. at pg. 24].
At the time of filing, petitioner was in the custody of the Department of Homeland Security/Bureau of Immigration Customs Enforcement (DHS/ICE), detained at the South Louisiana Correctional Center in Basile, Louisiana. Accordingly, his detention was subject to review by officials in Louisiana. [See e.g. rec. doc. 15-2, pg. 11-23].
In his petition, Petitioner alleges that despite his cooperation, the ICE had been unable to remove him to China. Thus, petitioner claimed that he had been in post-removal-order custody pursuant to INA § 241 in excess of both the statutory 90 day removal period and the jurisprudential six month removal period, and that his detention therefore violated the Constitution and principles set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001). Accordingly, petitioner sought his release from custody under an order of supervision. [rec. docs. 1 and 4].
The government was ordered to respond to the petition. After receiving an extension of time to answer, the government presented documentation establishing that petitioner was released from custody in Louisiana on September 9, 2014 pursuant to an Order of Supervision, after attempts to secure a travel document were unsuccessful. [rec. doc. 15-1, affidavit of Marquis Marshall, DHS Immigration Enforcement Agent]. Petitioner spent eight months in detention in Louisiana prior to his release. There is no indication that petitioner failed to fully cooperate or in any way hampered the government's efforts to effect his removal while detained in Louisiana.
Nine months later, on June 1, 2015, petitioner was retaken into ICE custody in Los Angeles, California, after being notified that an interview with the Chinese Consulate had been scheduled to procure a travel document. [rec. doc. 15-2, pg. 7-10]. He was transferred to the Adelanto Detention Facility, located within the jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Central District of California. Accordingly, Petitioner's current detention is being reviewed by officials in California. [See rec. doc. 15-2, pg. 1-2, 5-6]. It appears, however, that petitioner's case will soon be transferred to Headquarters, located in Washington, D.C., for review. [rec. doc. 15-2, pg. 33-4]. Again, there is no indication that petitioner is failing to fully cooperate or is in any way hampering the government's efforts to effect his removal since he has been detained in California.
In its October 13, 2015 response to the instant petition, the government argues that the petition may now be premature as to Petitioner's second detention in California because the second jurisprudential six month removal period has not yet elapsed. The government further asserts that petitioner's prior detention in Louisiana should not be counted, as Zadvydas does not allegedly address breaks in detention, but rather was allegedly concerned with continuous detention. This argument is disingenuous as the danger sought to be addressed by Zadvydas was "indefinite detention" of aliens. Surely, under the reasoning of Zadvydas, a series of releases and re-detentions by the government, as was done in this case, while technically not in violation of the presumptively reasonable jurisprudential six month removal period, in essence results in an indefinite period of detention, albeit executed in successive six month intervals.
The government also argues in its response that it expects a travel document will be issued soon. However, the online detainee locator system indicates that petitioner remains in detention at the Adelanto Detention Facility, and telephonic communication with the Facility confirmed this fact. Petitioner has, at present, been detained a second time for an additional five and one-half months, and his second jurisprudential six month removal period will expire on December 1, 2015. Therefore, petitioner will soon have been in detention for a period almost as long as the time he served for his criminal conviction. Under these circumstances, the government's allegations regarding the issuance of a travel document border on incredible, given that this is the second time petitioner has been in detention awaiting the "expected" and alleged soon to be "forthcoming" travel document for petitioner's removal, while ICE officials allegedly diligently work with Chinese officials to procure the "golden ticket."
Nevertheless, this Court need not address these arguments as the government additionally argues that the appropriate venue for this action may now be the Central District of California, where petitioner is currently detained, and his wife and daughter reside. For the reasons which follow, this argument is persuasive, and accordingly, this Court will transfer this case to the United States District Court for the Central District of California, Eastern Division, Riverside.
In Padilla v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court endorsed the "district of confinement" rule, stating that "[t]he plain language of [28 U.S.C. § 2241(a)] confirms the general rule that for core habeas petitions challenging present physical confinement, jurisdiction lies in only one district: the district of confinement." Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 426, 443 (2004). Padilla, however, specifically concerned an enemy combatant, not an immigrant detainee. Indeed, the Padilla Court expressly "left open the question whether the Attorney General is a proper respondent to a habeas petition filed by an alien detained pending deportation." Id. at 436 n. 8. The Padilla Court also did not explicitly overrule the Court's decision in Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484 (1973), which held that "traditional principles of venue" govern certain habeas cases filed pursuant to § 2241. Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 493, 93 S.Ct. 1123, 35 L.Ed.2d 443 (1973). Courts have relied on Braden in determining the proper venue for such cases filed by alien detainees. See Farez-Espinoza v. Chertoff, 600 F.Supp.2d 488, 495 (S.D. N.Y. 2009); Navarro v. Gonzalez, 2006 WL 954191, *2 (N.D. Cal. 2006). Indeed, the government in this case cites Braden and Farez-Espinoza in support of its argument.
Since the tension between Padilla and Braden has not been resolved in alien detainee cases, this Court will apply both the "district of confinement" rule and the traditional venue standard. As discussed below, the Court finds that under either standard, this case should be transferred to the United States District Court for the Central District of California, Eastern Division, Riverside.
28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) empowers district courts to grant writs of habeas corpus "within their respective jurisdictions." This language reinforces the "general rule that for core habeas petitions challenging present physical confinement, jurisdiction lies in only one district: the district of confinement." Padilla, 542 U.S. at 443; cf. Braden, 410 U.S. at 494, 500 (rejecting the notion that habeas petitions must always be brought in the district of confinement, but acknowledging that "in many instances the district in which petitioners are held will be the most convenient forum for the litigation of their claims"). The "district of confinement" rule weighs in favor of finding that venue is proper in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. Petitioner is currently being detained at the Adelanto Detention Facility, in Adelanto, California, located within the jurisdiction of the Central District of California. Accordingly, under the "district of confinement" rule, venue lies in the Central District of California.
The federal venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e), states in pertinent part:
In determining whether venue is proper in a particular district, a court must consider the following factors: (1) where all material events took place; (2) where records and witnesses pertinent to the petitioner's claim are likely to be found; and (3) the relative convenience of the forum for the parties. Farez-Espinoza, 600 F.Supp.2d at 495 citing Henderson v. I.N.S., 157 F.3d 106, 128 n. 25 (2nd Cir. 1998) citing Braden, 410 U.S. at 493-94; Navarro, 2006 WL 954191 at *2 citing Braden, 410 U.S. at 493-94.
In this case, Petitioner is currently being detained in California, and his detention is currently being reviewed by officials located in California. The administrative files pertinent to Petitioner's challenged detention are likely located in California. Indeed, the government submits the affidavit of one such official located in California in its response to the instant petition, DHS Immigration Enforcement Agent Marquis Marshall, who reviewed petitioner's administrative file and attached portions of same to her declaration. [See rec. doc. 15-1]. As to the parties' convenience, the government witnesses regarding petitioner's current detention are located in California, not Louisiana. Petitioner himself is presently detained in California, and both his wife and daughter reside in California. [See rec. doc. 4, pg. 12-13, ¶ 7(V)].
While it is true that Petitioner was ordered removed while in Louisiana, Petitioner is not challenging his removal in this petition, but rather his detention. As noted above, all of the actions surrounding his current detention are taking place in California. Although petitioner's detention may soon be reviewed by Headquarters in Washington, D.C., any orders rendered by Headquarters will be transmitted to California for execution, not Louisiana.
In short, the Court is unable to point to any evidence regarding petitioner's current detention that supports hearing the petition in this district. Accordingly, based on traditional venue considerations, the United States District Court for the Central District of California is the proper venue to hear this petition.
The court may transfer a case, "[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice . . . to any other district or division where it might have been brought. . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Such transfers may be made sua sponte, and the decisions to effect a § 1404 transfer is committed to the sound discretion of the transferring judge.
Here, while this case was originally properly brought in this district, venue is no longer proper here. The case could now properly be re-filed in the Central District of California. However, neither party has expressly opposed this Court's transfer of the case to the the Central District of California.
It is in the interest of justice to transfer this case to the Central District of California, rather than to dismiss it as suggested by the government because "`dismissal of the action would only cause [petitioner] to incur the additional expense of filing the same habeas corpus petition' in [the] proper district." Id. citing Tenrreiro v. Ashcroft, 2004 WL 1588217, at *2 quoting Roman v. Ashcroft, 340 F.3d 314, 328-29 (6th Cir. 2003).
The Court also notes that ordering the transfer of this petition to the Central District of California is consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 1631.
Thus, applying this logic, the Court finds that, for the reasons articulated above, transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) and/or 28 U.S.C. § 1631 is in the interest of justice, particularly given that the second jurisprudential six month removal period will soon expire, and ICE has once again not obtained a travel document for Petitioner, suggesting that removal is not imminent, and accordingly, entitling petitioner to release.
Therefore,
